Ex Parte Wilson Carstaffin, Jr. v. the State of Texas

Opinion

In the

Court of Appeals

Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

No. 06-26-00102-CR

EX PARTE WILSON CARSTAFFIN, JR.

On Appeal from the 202nd District Court Bowie County, Texas

Trial Court No. 26C0608-202

Before Stevens, C.J., van Cleef and Rambin, JJ.

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Rambin

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Wilson Carstaffin, Jr., acting pro se, appeals the trial court’s order denying his application for a writ of habeas corpus challenging his parole conditions. We dismiss for want of jurisdiction. I. Background Carstaffin was convicted of sexual battery, child molestation, and enticing a child in the State of Georgia, for which he served ten years’ incarceration in the Georgia Department of Corrections. The record before us does not contain the Georgia judgment, nor does it otherwise indicate the length of Carstaffin’s sentence. Carstaffin was released on parole in 2021 and approved for transfer to Texas under the Interstate Compact for Adult Offender Supervision (ICAOS).1 At the time he filed his application, Carstaffin’s parole was apparently being supervised by the Texarkana District Parole Office of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice located in Bowie County, Texas.

Carstaffin’s application in the trial court challenged “the constitutionality of conditions and findings enforced by” his Texas parole officers. Specifically, Carstaffin alleged that the

1 The ICAOS “provides a mechanism for Texas parolees to serve parole in other compact states, and vice-versa.” Graphic Packaging Corp. v. Hegar, 538 S.W.3d 89, 102 (Tex. 2017) (citing TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 510.017, art. 1). Among other functions of the ICAOS, “a ‘sending’ state ‘transfer[s] supervision authority’ over a parolee to a ‘receiving’ state, which in turn must let a sending state’s officials enter the receiving state to ‘retake’ an offender for parole violations.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 510.017, art. 1); see Sledge v. Dir., TDCJ-CID, No. 5:11-CV-78, 2014 WL 869356, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 28, 2014) (“The [ICAOS] allows participating states to transfer supervision of adult offenders across state lines, and to return offenders to originating jurisdictions if necessary.”). Carstaffin urged that the trial court had “jurisdiction to review unlawful restraints imposed within the State of Texas,” and specifically to review the “constitutionality of conditions and findings enforced by Texas authorities acting under the [ICAOS].” Carstaffin argues that the ICAOS “does not diminish constitutional protections,” and he alleges that the Texas officials acted under the ICAOS. But Carstaffin expressly states that “a receiving state may possess authority under the [ICAOS] to impose supervision conditions it lawfully imposes upon similarly situated offenders,” and he expressly does not “contend that acceptance of interstate supervision exempts him from Texas’s lawful supervision requirements.”

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conditions of supervision imposed upon him by his Texas parole officers “[v]iolated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment;[2] [r]elie[d] on unsupported and arbitrary findings; [f]ail[ed] to comply with minimum procedural safeguards required under clearly established law; [and] [r]etaliated against [him] for protected First Amendment[3] activity.”

Carstaffin filed his application on May 5, 2026. Without holding a hearing, on May 21, 2026, the trial court issued an order denying Carstaffin’s application, stating that it was “not well taken and should be DENIED.” From that order, Carstaffin appeals. II. Jurisdiction “A threshold issue in any case is whether the court has the jurisdiction to resolve the pending controversy.” State v. Roberts, 940 S.W.2d 655, 657 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996), overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Medrano, 67 S.W.3d 892 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). “This issue of jurisdiction is fundamental and cannot be ignored. Accordingly, a court may sua sponte address the issue because subject matter jurisdiction cannot be conferred by agreement of the parties; jurisdiction must be vested in a court by constitution or statute.” Id.; see Baines v. State, 418 S.W.3d 663, 671 n.4 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2010, pet. ref’d) (“Subject-matter jurisdiction is a threshold matter which an appellate court must address, sua sponte, if not raised by the parties, before deciding substantive issues.” (citing Roberts, 940 S.W. at 657)). “In short, each court has jurisdiction to determine whether it has jurisdiction.” Roberts, 940 S.W.2d at 657.

2 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.

3 See U.S. CONST. amend. I.

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On appeal, Carstaffin argues that “[b]ecause Appellant alleges continuing unconstitutional restraints upon his present liberty, his claims fall within the scope of Chapter 11 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure.”

“Article 11.07 provides the exclusive means to challenge a final felony conviction.” Bd.

of Pardons & Paroles ex rel. Keene v. Ct. of Appeals for Eighth Dist., 910 S.W.2d 481, 483 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (per curiam) (orig. proceeding). “Jurisdiction to grant post conviction habeas corpus relief on a final felony conviction rests exclusively with [the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals].” Id.; Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Just. v. Bovee, 632 S.W.3d 244, 251–52 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2021, no pet.) (“Under Article 11.07, the Court of Criminal Appeals has exclusive and original jurisdiction to grant postconviction habeas corpus relief from a final felony conviction.”); see Ex parte Bowman, Nos. 02-25-00481-CR & 02-25-00482-CR, 2026 WL 627958, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Mar. 5, 2026, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (same) (collecting cases).

Carstaffin expressly does not challenge his conviction. But, “[f]or habeas purposes, parole is a form of confinement.” Bovee, 632 S.W.3d at 252 (citing Keene, 910 S.W.2d at 483). “And relief from confinement is relief from a conviction.” Id. (citing Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486 (1994) (“suit must be brought under habeas statute if it ‘necessarily require[s] the plaintiff to prove the unlawfulness of his conviction or confinement’” (alteration in original))).

“The general rule is that a suit seeks relief from confinement if it challenges the fact or duration of confinement, but not if it merely challenges the rules, customs, and procedures

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affecting the conditions of confinement.” Id. (citing Cook v. Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Justice Transitional Plan. Dep’t, 37 F.3d 166, 168 (5th Cir. 1994)).

There is, however, an important exception for the latter type of suits. If a suit challenges a rule, custom, or procedure affecting the conditions of confinement, and establishing the basis for the requested relief will necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of a condition imposed, the suit must be brought as a habeas petition, regardless of whether it actually seeks relief from the condition.

Id. at 252–53 (citing Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81 (2005); Heck, 512 U.S. at 487). “But if establishing the basis for the requested relief will not necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of a condition imposed, the suit may be brought as a civil action in trial court (in the absence of some other bar to the suit).” Id. at 253.

“Applying the law here, we arrive at the dispositive issue: whether [Carstaffin] will necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of a condition of his parole by establishing the basis for the [relief] he seeks.” Id. “If so, jurisdiction rests with the Court of Criminal Appeals,” id., and Carstaffin’s application was improperly brought in the district court.

Carstaffin asserts that the challenged conditions of parole are constitutionally invalid. In his habeas petition, Carstaffin sought a determination that certain of his conditions of parole violated constitutional due process, that his parole officer retaliated against him in violation of the First Amendment, and that the imposed parole conditions were arbitrary and unreasonable. Carstaffin requested “removal of conditions that are unsupported by constitutionally sufficient findings” and prohibition of “enforcement of arbitrary or retaliatory restrictions.”

Consequently, “jurisdiction rests with the [Texas] Court of Criminal Appeals.” Id. at 252; see Ex parte Wood, 125 S.W.3d 805, 806 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2004, orig. proceeding).

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III. Conclusion We dismiss Carstaffin’s application for want of jurisdiction.

Jeff Rambin

Justice

Date Submitted: August 14, 2026 Date Decided: August 25, 2026

Do Not Publish