Rel: November 21, 2025
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA OCTOBER TERM, 2025-2026
_________________________
SC-2024-0760 _________________________
Ex parte William Chad Randolph
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
(In re: William Chad Randolph
v.
State of Alabama)
(Greene Circuit Court: CC-21-12; Court of Criminal Appeals: CR-2024-0091)
MENDHEIM, Justice. SC-2024-0760
William Chad Randolph petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari
to review the Court of Criminal Appeals' decision in Randolph v State,
[Ms. CR-2024-0091, Aug. 30, 2024] __ So. 3d __ (Ala. Crim. App. 2024)
(an opinion authored by Judge Kellum in which three judges concurred
in the result), which affirmed Randolph's conviction in the Greene Circuit
Court ("the trial court") for first-degree rape. See Ala. Code 1975, § 13A-
6-61(a)(1). We granted Randolph's petition to consider whether the Court
of Criminal Appeals' decision conflicts with Naylor v. State, 108 So. 3d
1063 (Ala. Crim. App. 2012), regarding the admission, over Randolph's
objection, of lay-witness testimony on the ultimate issue in the case. We
reverse and remand.
Except to the limited extent necessary to understand our rationale,
we see no need to repeat the discussion of the evidence presented at trial,
which is reflected, for the most part, in the main opinion and in Judge
Cole's dissent in Randolph. See Randolph, __ So. 3d at __ (Cole, J.,
dissenting). Randolph was convicted and sentenced for the rape of H.S.,
his 16-year-old niece; Randolph's wife is the sister of H.S.'s mother.
Randolph, who was 45 years old when the alleged rape purportedly
occurred, resided in Walker County, as did H.S. The alleged rape
2 SC-2024-0760
purportedly occurred in September 2020 at Randolph's fish-camp trailer,
which is located in Greene County, after he and H.S. had been fishing for
several hours. No physical evidence of the alleged rape was presented at
trial, and the State's case against Randolph centered on the credibility of
H.S., who testified at trial along with other witnesses who received
information directly from or derived from H.S.
Several days after the alleged rape, Randolph turned himself in to
Greene County Sheriff's Deputy Melvin Smith, who had contacted
Randolph and informed him that a warrant for his arrest had been issued
based on H.S.'s allegations. Beginning in April 2021, Randolph began
requesting that the State disclose the name of any expert witness that
the State intended to call as a witness at trial and the subject matter,
facts, and opinions regarding which any such expert might testify. Trial
was eventually scheduled to occur on June 26, 2023.
On June 2, 2023, Randolph filed a motion to compel requesting that
the State be required to satisfy his outstanding discovery requests, which
included the April 2021 motion seeking expert-witness disclosures. On
June 25, 2023, Randolph filed a motion to suppress requesting that the
State not be permitted to introduce as evidence or reference any
3 SC-2024-0760
document or tangible thing that had not been produced to Randolph
before he filed that motion. The motion to suppress referenced, in part,
Randolph's attempts to require the State to disclose the identity of any
experts and the substance of any expert's anticipated testimony.
Before the trial began on June 26, 2023, a hearing was held
regarding Randolph's motion to suppress and a motion in limine that he
had filed and orally had amended. During that hearing, Randolph's
counsel stated that he had received and listened to a Child Advocacy
Center ("CAC") forensic interview of H.S. that had occurred several days
after the alleged rape. Randolph's counsel stated that he had recently
been made aware that Tonya Blaze, an employee of the Walker County
Department of Human Resources ("DHR") who had observed the forensic
interview, had been subpoenaed to testify for the State and that he was
"not asking for the Court not to allow her to testify. Substantively I don't know what she can testify to that is not hearsay. … So if she goes to testify to anything that [H.S.] told her, that's all hearsay because she's not a party opponent. They're calling her as their witness. I'm not calling her as mine, number one.
"Number two, if they're calling her for the indirect purpose of asking her did she believe this witness, that's a direct violation or invading the province of the jury. The Court is aware of that. Even the Court can't say yes ma'am, I believe you. 4 SC-2024-0760
"….
"[Counsel for the State]: … In terms of her testimony, Your Honor, we don't intend to ask her anything that's improper. We do think that we should be allowed to put her on the stand to show that an investigation was done. As the Court can appreciate, juries expect that to happen, as [Randolph's counsel] just alluded to previously. That will be our purpose. We will ask her what her investigation consisted of. We have no intention of asking her to respond to any questions that would violate the hearsay rule. We're simply going to ask her what she did and what her investigation consisted of.
"THE COURT: All right.
"[Randolph's counsel]: One last issue as it relates to her, Your Honor. … DHR makes findings indicated or not indicated. That is not a judiciary finding at all. I don't even know what the true burden is. I'm guessing preponderance of the evidence or somebody just feels sufficiently satisfied. But that is not a judiciary finding. And even if it had been a judiciary finding, it would be at a lower standard than beyond a reasonable doubt. Whatever it is, it's below that standard.
"So she cannot come in and say that DHR determined that they think he did it. It continues to invade the province of the jury, and that part of her testimony absolutely has to be precluded, Your Honor.
"[Counsel for the State]: Your Honor, we totally disagree with the defense's position on that. DHR has a function. Their function is to investigate any reports that 5 SC-2024-0760
they receive that involve child neglect or child abuse or sexual abuse. That's what they do. Part of their process and part of their investigative process is to reach a decision. And in this case, they did.
"Of course, [Randolph's counsel] knows that they indicated this report that they did and this investigation they did involving his client, which, again, is why we're being asked again to exclude something that is detrimental to his client. I do not think it invades the province of the jury to reach a determination of guilt or innocence in this case, and I think it is improper to preclude Ms. Blaze from being able to communicate to this jury what her conclusion was at the end of her investigation.
"I don't see the basis for excluding that. We're not saying it's guilty or not guilty. We're just saying what was the result of your investigation.
"THE COURT: All right I'll withhold ruling on it until we get to that point and then make a decision."
Trial was held on June 26, 2023, and June 29, 2023. Blaze testified
for the State and stated that she was the supervisor for adult protective
services for DHR and had been working for DHR for three years. Blaze
stated that she had a bachelor of arts degree in social work; that she was
a certified social worker and had regularly participated in continuing
education (including attending child-abuse seminars and conferences);
and that, before becoming a supervisor, she had been a child-abuse-and-
neglect investigator for DHR.
6 SC-2024-0760
Blaze testified that in September 2020 she was involved in a DHR
investigation into an incident involving Randolph and H.S., who was
described as the "victim" in relation to Randolph. Blaze testified that the
investigation had involved allegations of "[s]exual abuse, sexual
penetration," and had included interviewing H.S., H.S.'s mother, and
H.S.'s maternal grandmother. Blaze also stated that she had attempted
to interview Randolph multiple times but that his attorney would not
permit it.1 Blaze testified that she had observed but had not conducted
the forensic interview of H.S., which had occurred at the Walker County
CAC.
Blaze stated that, after her investigation was complete, she had
arrived at a disposition. When counsel for the State asked Blaze what
that disposition was, Randolph's counsel objected "to the disposition
being spoken to on all the bases that we had before," and the trial court
overruled that objection. Counsel for the State again asked Blaze about
the disposition, and Randolph's counsel objected, stating, "again, we
object to that. It's invading the province of the jury," and the trial court
1During the hearing on Randolph's motion in limine, the trial court
denied Randolph's request to prohibit Blaze from testifying about his refusal to speak with Blaze. 7 SC-2024-0760
again overruled the objection. The following colloquy then occurred
between counsel for the State and Blaze:
"Q: What was your disposition, Ms. Blaze?
"A: Indicated for sexual abuse.
"Q: And when you say you disposed of this case by it being indicated, can you explain to the ladies and gentlemen of the jury what that means?
"A: Indicated meaning we found enough evidence to support the allegations."
After Blaze's direct examination, Randolph's counsel cross-
examined Blaze regarding the standard of proof used for the purpose of
making the disposition, among other matters. Thereafter, on redirect
examination by counsel for the State, the following colloquy occurred
after Blaze again testified that she had not been able to interview
Randolph:
"Q: Did you find sufficient evidence to indicate these allegations?
"A: Yes, sir.
"Q: And contrary to how it was being asked by defense counsel, it wasn't just because there was just a tiny bit more than not, right?
"[Randolph's counsel]: Objection to leading.
8 SC-2024-0760
"THE COURT: All right. Don't lead. Go ahead.
"By [counsel for the State:]
"Q: Did you understand my question, Ms. Blaze?
"A: I believe so.
"Q: Was it just a fraction more that put you over?
"A: No, sir."
Randolph filed an oral motion for a judgment of acquittal at the
close of the State's case, which the trial court denied, after which
Randolph presented no further evidence. Thereafter, while discussing
jury charges, Randolph requested a jury instruction regarding expert
testimony, referencing Blaze's testimony. Specifically, Randolph's
proposed jury instruction no. 12 included statements that the jury could
"consider each expert opinion received in evidence in this case and give
it such weight as you may think it deserves" and that the jury "d[id] not
have to accept as true[] the opinion of any expert that testifies." As to
the requested instruction, the following colloquy occurred:
"[The trial court]: 12 you've got experts. I don't recall that we had -- am I forgetting somebody that may have been an expert?
"[Counsel for the State]: I don't think that's an issue.
9 SC-2024-0760
"[Randolph's counsel]: The only reason that we inserted that is two-fold, Judge. Initially I didn't know what the evidence would hold, and two, he did put his DHR worker up on the stand, embellished her a little bit about her specialty as far as interviewing goes.
"[Counsel for the State]: Judge, I didn't ask the Court to recognize her as an expert[;] I did not call her as an expert. I understand what [Randolph's counsel] is saying, but there's no reason to charge the jury on experts because we didn't have any expert witnesses."
The trial court then denied Randolph's requested jury instruction
regarding expert testimony, over the objection of Randolph's counsel.
After the trial court instructed the jury, the jury returned a guilty
verdict, and the trial court scheduled a sentencing hearing, after which
it sentenced Randolph. Randolph timely filed a motion for a judgment of
acquittal or, in the alternative, for a new trial. He alleged, in part, that
the trial court had erred by allowing Blaze, as a lay witness, to "offer[]
conclusory testimony on the ultimate issue" and invade the province of
the jury. See Rule 704, Ala. R. Evid. ("Testimony in the form of an opinion
or inference otherwise admissible is to be excluded if it embraces an
ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact."); see also Advisory
Committee's Notes to Rule 704 ("The basis for the preclusion is the fear
that the admission of such an opinion will preempt the role and function
10 SC-2024-0760
of the factfinder."). The trial court denied Randolph's motion, and he
appealed. As noted above, the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. See
Randolph, supra. We granted certiorari review to consider the issue
whether the Court of Criminal Appeals erred by rejecting Randolph's
argument that the trial court had erred by admitting, over his objection,
Blaze's lay-witness testimony that Randolph had sexually abused and
sexually penetrated H.S.
We will address two preliminary matters before discussing the
merits. First, the State contends in its appellate brief that,
"[a]t the outset, this case is a poor vehicle to decide the question presented because the fractured decision below means there are many different reasons why the appellate court could have affirmed Randolph's conviction. Randolph takes aim only at Judge Kellum's opinion, but that opinion does not constitute the 'decision' that Randolph argues conflicts with prior decisions of the Court of Criminal Appeals."
We disagree. The fact that only one judge concurred in the rationale
expressed in the Court of Criminal Appeals' main opinion in Randolph
does not mean that the majority's decision to reject Randolph's argument
regarding the admission of Blaze's testimony and to affirm the trial
court's judgment does not conflict with existing precedent, specifically
Naylor. Naylor accurately reflects Alabama law regarding ultimate- 11 SC-2024-0760
issue testimony from a lay witness.2 In comparison to Naylor, either
trial-court error exists in the present case, was preserved, and is
reversible or not. There is no unsolvable legal mystery here simply
because a majority of the judges on the Court of Criminal Appeals agreed
to reject Randolph's argument without stating why.
Second, despite the State's contention in its appellate brief to the
contrary and Judge Kellum's opinion in Randolph, the present case does
not concern expert testimony or the limits on such testimony. Thus, we
will not address those issues. 3 As the above discussion reflects, Blaze did
not testify as an expert and the trial court did not exercise discretion to
treat her as an expert. Instead, the State took the position that Blaze --
2Our opinion should not be read as approving the rationale in Naylor except to the extent expressly discussed in this opinion. See Naylor v. State, 108 So. 3d 1078, 1079 (Ala. 2012).
3This Court has acknowledged that
"[t]he confusion and feelings of shame and guilt associated with sexual abuse of children are beyond the ken of the average juror. Therefore, expert testimony should be allowed to explain the emotional effects of sexual abuse upon an adolescent, so that the triers of fact may appropriately draw conclusions from the testimony."
Ex parte Hill, 553 So. 2d 1138, 1139 (Ala. 1989).
12 SC-2024-0760
its witness -- was a lay witness, and the trial court treated Blaze as a lay
witness.4 Doing so was not legal error because no law required the State
to offer Blaze's testimony as expert testimony or required the trial court
to treat Blaze as an expert witness despite the State's position at trial.
The only issues that we must decide are whether error occurred as to the
admission of lay-witness Blaze's testimony on the ultimate issue, over
Randolph's objection, and, if so, whether any such error was harmless
error under the facts before us. See Rule 45, Ala. R. App. P. (harmless-
error rule).
As to the former issue, Randolph raised a timely objection, and we
agree with Judge Cole, who stated:
4Converting Blaze to an expert witness -- contrary to the State's
position at trial and the ruling of the trial court as to Blaze's status -- would result in error regarding the denial of Randolph's request for a jury instruction as to the consideration of expert testimony. See Weeks v. State, 580 So. 2d 79, 81 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991) (" '[O]ur decisions are to the effect that every accused is entitled to have charges given, which would not be misleading, which correctly state the law of his case, and which are supported by any evidence, however weak, insufficient, or doubtful in credibility.' Ex parte Chavers, 361 So. 2d 1106, 1107 (Ala. 1978). Because the trial court failed to instruct the jury on the weight to be given the testimony of the expert, the judgment of the circuit court is reversed and this cause is remanded for further action not inconsistent with this opinion.").
13 SC-2024-0760
"It is clear that '[t]estimony in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is to be excluded if it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact.' Rule 704, Ala. R. Evid. …
"This case is similar to the situation addressed by this Court in Naylor v. State, 108 So. 3d 1063 (Ala. Crim. App. 2012).[5] Naylor argued that the opinion testimony of three witnesses who testified during his trial violated Rule 704, Ala. R. Evid., and improperly addressed the ultimate issue in the case. After noting that it was unclear whether any of the witnesses testified as experts, this Court held:
" ' ….
" ' During redirect examination by the State, [Lawrence County Sheriff's Department Investigator Mike] Agee was permitted to testify, after repeated objections by Naylor: "My opinion is [B.J.] was a victim of sexual assault by her stepdad." (Emphasis added.) During direct examination by the State, [Jennifer] Owens[, who was a child-abuse investigator for the Lawrence County DHR and had investigated B.J.'s allegations against Naylor,] testified, over objection, "I did believe that [B.J.] was a victim of sexual abuse." Monica Haddock[, who worked for an agency that conducted forensic interviews of children who allegedly had been abused,] testified, also over defense objection, "I feel like she was a victim of a traumatic event, that being sexual abuse that she disclosed." (Emphasis added.) …
5Jason Bart Naylor was charged and convicted of rape, sodomy, and
incest based on his allegedly having had sexual intercourse and deviant sexual intercourse with his minor stepdaughter, B.J. Naylor, 108 So. 3d at 1064. Like Randolph, Naylor was not charged with "sexual abuse." 14 SC-2024-0760
" ' Naylor argues that testimony from Inv. Agee, Owens, and Haddock was improper because, he argues, it embraces the ultimate issue and violated Rule 704, Ala. R. Evid. …
" ' .…
" ' Inv. Agee, Owens, and Haddock testified as lay witnesses, and they had no firsthand knowledge of whether B.J. was sexually abused by Naylor. …
" ' We note, furthermore, that the testimony of Inv. Agee and Haddock embraced the ultimate issue. "An ultimate issue has been defined as the last question that must be determined by the jury. See Black's Law Dictionary (5th ed. 1991)." Tims v. State, 711 So. 2d 1118, 1125 (Ala. Crim. App. 1997). Rule 704, Ala. R. Evid., states: "Testimony in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is to be excluded if it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact." The Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 704 explain that "[t]he basis for the preclusion is the fear that the admission of such an opinion will preempt the role and function of the factfinder." … The State concedes that Inv. Agee's testimony embraced the ultimate issue. However, the State argues, incorrectly, that Haddock did not testify about whether Naylor was the perpetrator of the sexual abuse she believed B.J. had suffered. Haddock clearly testified that she believed that B.J. had been the victim of the "sexual abuse that she disclosed." (Emphasis added.) B.J. never alleged that anyone other than Naylor had sexually abused her; therefore, Haddock's testimony clearly implicated Naylor as the
15 SC-2024-0760
perpetrator of B.J.'s abuse, and that testimony, too, embraced the ultimate issue. …
" ' … [T]he testimony from Inv. Agee and Haddock gave unwarranted and legally impermissible stamps of approval to B.J.'s allegations that Naylor had sexually abused her, and thus usurped the jury's function to decide the ultimate issue. …'
"Naylor, 108 So. 3d at 1073-76 (footnote omitted).
"Like the victim in Naylor, H.S. implicated one person -- Randolph. Blaze testified that DHR had determined that the allegations made by H.S., which were against only Randolph, were supported by the evidence. In other words, DHR determined that, based upon its investigation, which included factors not considered by the jury, H.S.'s allegations implicating Randolph were true. Blaze's testimony not only gave her 'stamp[] of approval' to H.S.'s testimony, but the 'stamp[] of approval' of the entire Alabama Department of Human Resources. Blaze's testimony violated Rule 704, Ala. R. Evid., and was an inadmissible opinion as to the ultimate issue in the case."
Randolph, __ So. 3d at __ (Cole, J., dissenting) (citations to record and to
briefs omitted). Having determined that the trial court erred by allowing
lay-witness Blaze to invade the province of the jury by testifying on the
ultimate issue, we must consider the issue whether the admission of that
testimony probably injuriously affected Randolph's substantial rights.
See Rule 45.
16 SC-2024-0760
The harmless-error rule has been applied to the admission of
inadmissible evidence, over a defendant's objection, when the
inadmissible evidence was irrelevant, innocuous, or cumulative. See,
e.g., Ex parte Brownfield, 44 So. 3d 43, 50 (Ala. 2009). This Court also
has stated that the harmless-error rule may be applied when the
evidence of the defendant's guilt is overwhelming, see id., but we have
acknowledged that " 'the proper inquiry here is not whether evidence of
the defendant's guilt is overwhelming but, instead, whether a substantial
right of the defendant has or probably has been adversely affected.' Ex
parte Lowe, 514 So. 2d 1049, 1050 (Ala.1987)." Ex parte Jackson, 68 So.
3d 211, 216 (Ala. 2010); see also Ex parte Phillips, 962 So. 2d 159, 163
(Ala. 2006) ("[E]ven '[o]verwhelming evidence of guilt does not render
prejudicial error harmless under Rule 45[, Ala. R. App. P.]' [Ex parte]
Hutcherson, 677 So. 2d [1205,] 1209 [(Ala. 1996)]; and Ex parte Lowe,
514 So. 2d 1049, 1050 (Ala.1987). See, also, Ex parte Greathouse, 624
So. 2d 208, 211 (Ala.1993) (acknowledging the possibility that prejudicial
error could be harmless, however, when the evidence of the defendant's
guilt is 'virtually ironclad').").
17 SC-2024-0760
As noted above, the State offered no physical evidence indicating
that Randolph had "[e]ngage[d] in sexual intercourse with [H.S.] by
forcible compulsion." § 13A-6-61(a)(1). For example, the State presented
no DNA evidence and no evidence of bruising on H.S. or Randolph despite
the alleged struggle in the trailer between H.S. and Randolph. Also, no
third-party witness testified that he or she had observed the alleged rape
or physical evidence of a rape. Instead, the State's case was based on
H.S.'s testimony and the testimony of other witnesses, who in turn had
relied on what H.S. had stated to them after the alleged rape had
purportedly occurred. Although there was testimony that Randolph
remained silent and left his house (at his wife's request) when H.S.'s
mother confronted and attacked him a few days after the alleged rape,
that he did not participate in DHR's investigation on advice of counsel,
and that he turned himself in to Deputy Smith at the fish-camp trailer
where H.S. claimed the towel she had used to clean herself had been, the
import of those actions for purposes of his criminal trial depended on the
veracity of H.S.'s allegations. 6
6In Ex parte Marek, 556 So. 2d 375 (Ala. 1989), this Court abolished
the tacit-admission rule, which provided that " 'silence under accusation is some evidence from which the jury may infer that the accused 18 SC-2024-0760
As to H.S.'s testimony, although the jury may have determined that
she was credible in the absence of Blaze's testimony, there also was
evidence that would support questioning H.S.'s credibility, and the fact
that Randolph did not testify made the issue of H.S.'s credibility even
more important. H.S. and her mother testified that H.S. had been mad
at her mother in the summer of 2020, after H.S.'s mother and father had
separated. H.S. eventually was adjudicated as a child in need of
supervision and was still subject to supervision by the juvenile court
when the alleged rape purportedly occurred. H.S. testified that her
relationship with her mother had improved before the alleged rape, but
H.S. admitted that she had lied to her mother during the period before
the alleged rape. Likewise, H.S.'s mother admitted that, before the
acquiesced in the statement and admitted its truth.' " Id. at 380 (quoting Clark v. State, 240 Ala. 65, 69, 197 So. 23, 27 (1940). In so doing, we noted that "neither logic nor common experience any longer supports the tacit admission rule, if, indeed, either ever supported it," and that the use of silence to support an inference of guilt could not withstand scrutiny. Id. at 381. See also Fowler v. State, 562 So. 2d 666, 669 (Ala. Crim. App. 1989) ("Implicit in Marek was the finding by the Court that such admissions, by their very nature, lacked trustworthiness."). Further, even under that rule, it had been held that, "where it would be one's duty or nature to speak and there is an opportunity to speak, silence is evidence, though slight in weight." Kennedy v. State, 39 Ala. App. 676, 681, 107 So. 2d 913, 918 (1958). 19 SC-2024-0760
alleged rape, she had texted Randolph's wife that H.S. was "messed up
and just tells lies for no reason." Also, there was at least one
inconsistency between what H.S. testified happened in regard to the
alleged rape and her mother's testimony about what H.S. had told her
over the course of two days after the alleged rape. H.S. testified that
Randolph had approached her, wearing "nothing but his underwear,"
after he had taken a shower and that, after the alleged rape, he had
retrieved his wet towel from the bathroom for her to clean herself up.
According to H.S.'s mother, however, H.S. told her the day after the
alleged rape that Randolph had "come out of the bath with a towel
wrapped around him" when he first approached H.S. Further, H.S.
admitted that her counselor would not listen to her -- "kind of kept
rushing it off" -- when H.S. had attempted to describe the alleged rape to
her two days after it purportedly occurred. Also, H.S.'s mother testified
that she had been troubled about H.S. lying to her counselor.
Further, Blaze was the only person who testified regarding the
disposition of the DHR investigation implicating Randolph as a
perpetrator of sexual abuse and sexual penetration of H.S. We cannot
conclude that her testimony was irrelevant, innocuous, or cumulative.
20 SC-2024-0760
And based on the record and pertinent precedents, we likewise cannot
conclude that Randolph's substantial rights were not prejudiced by the
admission of Blaze's inadmissible testimony, which Randolph's counsel
attempted to mitigate by questioning Blaze about the burden of proof she
applied but that the State then emphasized. See Naylor, supra; see also
Frye v. State, 185 So. 3d 1156, 1167-68 (Ala. Crim. App. 2015)
(concluding that the admission of A.A.'s inadmissible testimony of prior
bad acts was not harmless when "the ultimate issue at trial was whether
the sexual intercourse and deviate sexual intercourse between A.A. and
Frye was achieved by forcible compulsion," there was no direct or
conclusive evidence of forcible compulsion, and "[t]he outcome of the case
… depended essentially on the jurors' perceptions of the witnesses'
credibility"); Sheffield v. State, 248 So. 3d 38, 48 (Ala. Crim. App. 2017)
("The ultimate issue at trial was whether Sheffield acted in self-defense
when he shot and killed McMillian. Sheila's [inadmissible] hearsay
statements directly rebutted Sheffield's self-defense claim, indicating
that Sheffield was jealous and that he had no justification for shooting
McMillian. Although the State presented a strong case of guilt, we
cannot say that the State's evidence of Sheffield's guilt was so
21 SC-2024-0760
overwhelming as to render harmless the improper admission of Sheila's
statements accusing Sheffield of intentionally killing McMillian without
proper justification.").
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the Court of Criminal
Appeals' rejection of Randolph's argument is in conflict with Alabama
law regarding lay-witness testimony on the ultimate issue, as discussed
in Naylor, and that the admission of Blaze's inadmissible testimony was
not harmless error. Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Criminal
Appeals' decision and remand the case for proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Stewart, C.J., and Wise, Bryan, Sellers, and Cook, JJ., concur.
Shaw, J., concurs in the result.
McCool, J., recuses himself.