Ex parte Thurmond

17 S.C.L. 605
CourtCourt of Appeals of North Carolina
DecidedJune 15, 1830
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 17 S.C.L. 605 (Ex parte Thurmond) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of North Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Ex parte Thurmond, 17 S.C.L. 605 (N.C. Ct. App. 1830).

Opinion

O’Neall, J.

delivered the,opinion of the Court.

In this case, the only question necessary to be considered, at length, is, whether a sheriff, in confinement, under an attachment for contempt, in not paying over money collected by him on execution, can be discharged, oil any other terms than the payment of the debt, interest, and costs. In the solution of this question will necessarily be considered, the power of the Court to discharge, as well under the discretionary power, which it possesses over all cases of contempt, as under the insolvent debtor’s act.

An attachment may very well be defined to be, a process issued from a Court of Record, to punish any person concerned in, or attendant on, the administration of justice, for misconduct, mal-practice, or neglect of duty ; and to compel a performance of its orders, judgments, or decrees, interlocutory, or final. The sheriff is an officer of the Court, charged by law, with the execution of all its process, and is amenable to this summary mode of proceeding, for either mal-practice, or neglect of duty. For mal-practice, in the view of the Court, he might be forthwith attached; but for neglect of duty, the proceeding is by rule to shew cause. In England, the Court ran ly grants an attachment against the sheriff, immediately on his failing to shew cause; hut more usually proceeds by rules against him, to compel the performance of his duty, and “if he do not obey them, will increase the amercements till he do.” It is clear, howpver, that an attachment may issue, on his failing to make [607]*607his return to the rule. 2 Hawk. P. C. ch. 22, sec. 4. In this State, the practice appears to have been pretty uniform, that on his falling to make his return to the rule, or refusing to answer interrogatories, which the party suing out the rule may exhibit at its return, the rule is made absolute; and the attachment issues, unless the sheriff “ will perform the duty required.” 1 Mill, 152.

When the attachment has issued, what is its nature and effect? Is it a civil, or a criminal, process? In some cases, I thiuk it is a civil process: as where it issues to compel a party to a suit to pay an award, or a decree of a Court of Equity; or against a security for the costs of a suit; and the like. In these cases its object is, exclusively, the payment of money, and it is in lieu of an execution. Cowp. 136. 1 T. R. 265, 4 T. R. 316, 809. 7 T. R. 156. 1 Bos. & Pul. 336. 3 Desaus. 269. 4 M'C 237. In other cases, where it issues against a sheriff for mal-praetice, such as refusing, in the presence of the Court, to carry its orders.into effect, receiving a bribe, or oppressive conduct in the discharge of his duties, it is certainly a criminal process. In cases of neglect of dut’-’, such as failing to -ollect, or pay over money when collected,,under execution, it. is-partly a criminal, and'partly a civil, process, it is criminal botli in form and in effect, so far as it is designed to punish the sheriff for his neglect: but so far as its effect is to redress the injury of the party, who procures it to be issued, by compelling the sheriff to place him in as good a situation as he would have been in, had the sheriff done his duty, it is generally a civil process. State v. Sheriff of Charleston, 1 Mill, 151. Daniel v. Capers, 4 M‘C. 237.

The effect of an attachment, when issued, on the party arrested under it, is to bring him before the Court, to answer, touching the supposed contempt. In the first mentioned class of cases, attachments for the payment of money, these being in the nature of executions, it is not necessary to exhibit interrogatories. In the second class, attachments for mal-practice, interrogatories must, and in the third class, attachments for neglect of duty, may, be exhibited. Upon the party’s answer to these depends his dis-ch.Tue, or commitment. In the two last cases, the party attached may be recognized to appear, and answer touching the contempt. 2 Hawk. P. C. 6th edition, note at the end of ch. 22, [608]*608p. 231. if the party in the second class fail to purge the con* jolUp^ t¡)e q,,,,.); Wonld punish him by fine and imprisonment, at *ts discretion. In the third class, the rule formerly was, to impose a fine, out of which the party procuring the attachment might, on application to the King, be remunerated for his loss. At present, it appears, that, in all cases of this class, the Court requires the party attached, to put the party procuring the attachment, in as good a situation as he would have been in, had he done his.duty. I Sell. Prac. 202. 2 Barn. & Ald. 192. 7 T. R. 239. Bacc. Shff. 31. In flagrant cases, calling for an example, the Court might superadd fine and imprisonment.

On the present occasion', the party is in confinement under the attachments, and no interrogatories have been exhibited to him to be answered. He stands, therefore, upon the footing of one committed after having failed to purge the contempt: that is, he is to be imprisoned, until he put the parties, procuring the attachments, in as good a situation as they would have been in, had he don-' his duty. This is the general condition, upon which the contempt may still he purged. In the English reports, no case of a sheriff attached for nonpayment of money, and moving to be, discharged, on account of bis inability to pay it, can be found. In the King v. Davis, 1 Bos. & Pul. 336, an attorney was attached for not paying ovei money collected for his client; and the Court in that case held, that the attachment against him was a civil process, and that 'he was intitled, to be discharged under the lord’s act. The cases of attachment against the sheriff found in the English books, are where the sheriff has either taken insufficient bail, or permitted the party to go at large without bail; and in these cases, the Courts have uniformly refused, when the plaintiff had sustained any delay, or loss, to set aside the attachment on any other terms, than the payment of the whole debt, and costs. This, however, is the extent of the rule.

In the present case we are untrammelled by precedent; and the Court concludes, that where the sheriff shews, that he is unable, through poverty, or misfortune, to put the party procuring the attachment in as good a situation as he wonld have been in, had he done his duty, and he has returned the execution, lie might be dispharged, under the discretionary power of the Court over all cases- of contempt. But if, in this cases [609]*609the prisoner can be relieved under the insolvent debtor’s act, the Court prefer to take that course. It furnishes a surer guide in meting out justice between the prisoner, and all Of his creditors, and fixes a rule, by which the discretion of the Court,can always be regulated. It is, too, a legislative provision for the unfortunate, secured by high sanctions, and great guards against fraud, and perjury. Under the insolvent debtor’s act, the prisoner, until he purges the contempt, cannot be discharged: so soon, however, as he has done that, by returning the executions, and filing his pétition and schedule, he will be confined, and retained, under the civil part of the process of attachment only, that is, .until he pays the debts, interest, and costs. The question is, whether, as to this, he is not intitled to' the benefit of the insolvent debtor’s act. • - »

The words both of the preamble, and of the enacting clause, are sufficiently broad to embrace him. The preamble speaks of the inefficacy of former laws for the relief of the poor, distressed, and insolvent prisoner for debt;

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
17 S.C.L. 605, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ex-parte-thurmond-ncctapp-1830.