In the Court of Appeals Second Appellate District of Texas at Fort Worth ___________________________
No. 02-25-00242-CR ___________________________
Ex Parte Ronderrick Johnson
On Appeal from the 396th District Court Tarrant County, Texas Trial Court No. C-396-W012598-1763670-AP
Before Sudderth, C.J.; Bassel and Womack, JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Sudderth MEMORANDUM OPINION
Pro se Appellant Ronderrick Johnson claims that his guilty plea was involuntary
because his trial counsel (Counsel) was ineffective. Johnson sought habeas relief from
his deferred adjudication community supervision order on this basis, identifying
Counsel’s two deficient actions as his failing to move for a speedy trial and to move
for recusal of the visiting trial court judge. A magistrate judge denied relief, and the
trial court adopted its actions. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 11.072, § 8.
Johnson asserts that this denial of relief was erroneous because, according to
him, the trial court (1) could not refer the habeas proceeding to a magistrate judge
without Johnson’s express consent; (2) was unreasonable in its decision to believe
certain affiants over others; (3) neglected to address Counsel’s failure to subpoena
witnesses for trial; and (4) erred by holding that Counsel’s allegedly deficient actions
were not deficient. But (1) the referral to a magistrate judge was statutorily authorized
with or without Johnon’s consent; (2) the trial court, as the factfinder, had the
discretion to believe certain affiants over others; (3) Johnson did not raise his
subpoena-related allegations as grounds for habeas relief; and (4) even if Counsel’s
actions were deficient, Johnson did not show harm. In other words, we will affirm.
I. Background
In late 2019, Johnson was indicted for two counts of sexual assault and one
count of aggravated assault by choking, all three of which were committed against his
ex-girlfriend. The case went to trial more than three years later in February 2023.
2 A visiting judge presided over the trial. After the State elicited testimony from
its first witness—the complainant—and after it presented photographic and audio
evidence of Johnson’s offenses, Johnson changed his pleas to guilty and entered into a
plea bargain. The State dismissed one count of sexual assault, and Johnson received
five years’ deferred adjudication community supervision on the two remaining
offenses.
Soon thereafter, Johnson hired new attorneys and moved for a new trial based
on Counsel’s alleged failure to subpoena witnesses for trial. The trial court denied the
motion.
Johnson raised Counsel’s ineffective assistance again a few years later, this time
in an application for a writ of habeas corpus. Johnson’s habeas application did not
rely on the subpoena-related allegations that he had raised in his motion for new trial,
though. Rather, Johnson asserted that his guilty plea had been involuntary, claiming
that he would not have pleaded guilty had Counsel moved (1) for a speedy trial or
(2) to recuse the visiting judge from the case.
The trial court signed an order referring the habeas proceeding to a magistrate
judge, and the magistrate requested a response from the State and affidavits from
Counsel and from the prosecutor who had worked on Johnson’s case. After receiving
the response and the affidavits, the magistrate judge denied relief and explained its
rationale in detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law. As relevant here, the
magistrate found that key portions of Johnson’s affidavit were not credible, that
3 neither a motion for speedy trial nor a motion to recuse the visiting judge would have
been meritorious, that Counsel’s failure to file such motions was not deficient, and
that there was no credible evidence that an earlier trial date or a different judge would
have affected Johnson’s decision to plead guilty. The trial court adopted the
magistrate judge’s actions, and Johnson appeals. See id.
II. Standard of Review
An individual may challenge the legal validity of an order imposing community
supervision by filing an application for writ of habeas corpus, just as Johnson did
here. See id. art. 11.072. In such cases, the applicant bears the burden of establishing
his right to habeas relief by a preponderance of the evidence. Ex parte Martinez, 330
S.W.3d 891, 900–01 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011).
For the applicant “[t]o demonstrate that he is entitled to . . . relief on the basis
of ineffective assistance of counsel, [he] must demonstrate that (1) counsel’s
performance was deficient, in that it fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness[;] and (2) the applicant was prejudiced as a result of counsel’s errors,”
meaning that “but for counsel’s errors, [the applicant] would not have pleaded guilty
and would have insisted on going to trial.” Ex parte Uribe, 516 S.W.3d 658, 666 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth 2017, pet. ref’d).
“[T]he trial judge is the sole finder of fact.” Ex parte Garcia, 353 S.W.3d 785,
787–88 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (distinguishing review of Article 11.072 habeas
proceeding from Article 11.07 habeas proceeding). On appeal, we afford almost total
4 deference to the trial court’s findings of fact—particularly those based on credibility
and demeanor—as long as the findings are supported by the record. Guzman v. State,
955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997); see Garcia, 353 S.W.3d at 788 (clarifying
that the Guzman standard of deference controls in Article 11.072 habeas cases). This
deference applies even when, as here, the witness testimony is submitted by affidavit.
State v. Guerrero, 400 S.W.3d 576, 583 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); Ex parte Juara, 643
S.W.3d 702, 712 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2021, pet. ref’d).
III. Discussion
Johnson claims that the trial court erred by (1) referring the habeas proceeding
to a magistrate judge without his consent; (2) crediting Counsel’s and the prosecutor’s
averments; (3) failing to make findings regarding Johnson’s subpoena-related
allegations; and (4) finding that speedy trial and recusal motions would not have
prevailed, so Counsel was not deficient for failing to file them.1
A. Referral to Magistrate: The referral did not require Johnson’s consent.
First, Johnson asserts that the trial court lacked the authority to refer his habeas
application to a magistrate judge without his express consent. But the referral was
statutorily authorized and did not require Johnson’s consent.
The Government Code permits a Tarrant County criminal court to refer
“proceedings involving . . . a writ of habeas corpus” to a magistrate via an order of
1 Johnson lists five appellate issues, but we reorder and condense them for organizational purposes.
5 referral. Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. §§ 54.656(a)(4), 54.657. This is precisely what the trial
court did; it signed an order referring Johnson’s habeas proceeding to a magistrate
judge as statutorily authorized.
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In the Court of Appeals Second Appellate District of Texas at Fort Worth ___________________________
No. 02-25-00242-CR ___________________________
Ex Parte Ronderrick Johnson
On Appeal from the 396th District Court Tarrant County, Texas Trial Court No. C-396-W012598-1763670-AP
Before Sudderth, C.J.; Bassel and Womack, JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Sudderth MEMORANDUM OPINION
Pro se Appellant Ronderrick Johnson claims that his guilty plea was involuntary
because his trial counsel (Counsel) was ineffective. Johnson sought habeas relief from
his deferred adjudication community supervision order on this basis, identifying
Counsel’s two deficient actions as his failing to move for a speedy trial and to move
for recusal of the visiting trial court judge. A magistrate judge denied relief, and the
trial court adopted its actions. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 11.072, § 8.
Johnson asserts that this denial of relief was erroneous because, according to
him, the trial court (1) could not refer the habeas proceeding to a magistrate judge
without Johnson’s express consent; (2) was unreasonable in its decision to believe
certain affiants over others; (3) neglected to address Counsel’s failure to subpoena
witnesses for trial; and (4) erred by holding that Counsel’s allegedly deficient actions
were not deficient. But (1) the referral to a magistrate judge was statutorily authorized
with or without Johnon’s consent; (2) the trial court, as the factfinder, had the
discretion to believe certain affiants over others; (3) Johnson did not raise his
subpoena-related allegations as grounds for habeas relief; and (4) even if Counsel’s
actions were deficient, Johnson did not show harm. In other words, we will affirm.
I. Background
In late 2019, Johnson was indicted for two counts of sexual assault and one
count of aggravated assault by choking, all three of which were committed against his
ex-girlfriend. The case went to trial more than three years later in February 2023.
2 A visiting judge presided over the trial. After the State elicited testimony from
its first witness—the complainant—and after it presented photographic and audio
evidence of Johnson’s offenses, Johnson changed his pleas to guilty and entered into a
plea bargain. The State dismissed one count of sexual assault, and Johnson received
five years’ deferred adjudication community supervision on the two remaining
offenses.
Soon thereafter, Johnson hired new attorneys and moved for a new trial based
on Counsel’s alleged failure to subpoena witnesses for trial. The trial court denied the
motion.
Johnson raised Counsel’s ineffective assistance again a few years later, this time
in an application for a writ of habeas corpus. Johnson’s habeas application did not
rely on the subpoena-related allegations that he had raised in his motion for new trial,
though. Rather, Johnson asserted that his guilty plea had been involuntary, claiming
that he would not have pleaded guilty had Counsel moved (1) for a speedy trial or
(2) to recuse the visiting judge from the case.
The trial court signed an order referring the habeas proceeding to a magistrate
judge, and the magistrate requested a response from the State and affidavits from
Counsel and from the prosecutor who had worked on Johnson’s case. After receiving
the response and the affidavits, the magistrate judge denied relief and explained its
rationale in detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law. As relevant here, the
magistrate found that key portions of Johnson’s affidavit were not credible, that
3 neither a motion for speedy trial nor a motion to recuse the visiting judge would have
been meritorious, that Counsel’s failure to file such motions was not deficient, and
that there was no credible evidence that an earlier trial date or a different judge would
have affected Johnson’s decision to plead guilty. The trial court adopted the
magistrate judge’s actions, and Johnson appeals. See id.
II. Standard of Review
An individual may challenge the legal validity of an order imposing community
supervision by filing an application for writ of habeas corpus, just as Johnson did
here. See id. art. 11.072. In such cases, the applicant bears the burden of establishing
his right to habeas relief by a preponderance of the evidence. Ex parte Martinez, 330
S.W.3d 891, 900–01 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011).
For the applicant “[t]o demonstrate that he is entitled to . . . relief on the basis
of ineffective assistance of counsel, [he] must demonstrate that (1) counsel’s
performance was deficient, in that it fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness[;] and (2) the applicant was prejudiced as a result of counsel’s errors,”
meaning that “but for counsel’s errors, [the applicant] would not have pleaded guilty
and would have insisted on going to trial.” Ex parte Uribe, 516 S.W.3d 658, 666 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth 2017, pet. ref’d).
“[T]he trial judge is the sole finder of fact.” Ex parte Garcia, 353 S.W.3d 785,
787–88 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (distinguishing review of Article 11.072 habeas
proceeding from Article 11.07 habeas proceeding). On appeal, we afford almost total
4 deference to the trial court’s findings of fact—particularly those based on credibility
and demeanor—as long as the findings are supported by the record. Guzman v. State,
955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997); see Garcia, 353 S.W.3d at 788 (clarifying
that the Guzman standard of deference controls in Article 11.072 habeas cases). This
deference applies even when, as here, the witness testimony is submitted by affidavit.
State v. Guerrero, 400 S.W.3d 576, 583 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); Ex parte Juara, 643
S.W.3d 702, 712 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2021, pet. ref’d).
III. Discussion
Johnson claims that the trial court erred by (1) referring the habeas proceeding
to a magistrate judge without his consent; (2) crediting Counsel’s and the prosecutor’s
averments; (3) failing to make findings regarding Johnson’s subpoena-related
allegations; and (4) finding that speedy trial and recusal motions would not have
prevailed, so Counsel was not deficient for failing to file them.1
A. Referral to Magistrate: The referral did not require Johnson’s consent.
First, Johnson asserts that the trial court lacked the authority to refer his habeas
application to a magistrate judge without his express consent. But the referral was
statutorily authorized and did not require Johnson’s consent.
The Government Code permits a Tarrant County criminal court to refer
“proceedings involving . . . a writ of habeas corpus” to a magistrate via an order of
1 Johnson lists five appellate issues, but we reorder and condense them for organizational purposes.
5 referral. Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. §§ 54.656(a)(4), 54.657. This is precisely what the trial
court did; it signed an order referring Johnson’s habeas proceeding to a magistrate
judge as statutorily authorized. The statute says nothing about needing a party’s
consent. See id. And to the extent that Johnson objected to the referral, he failed to
preserve that objection by raising it in the trial court. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(1)
(requiring a party to raise a timely and specific trial court objection “[a]s a prerequisite
to presenting [the] complaint for appellate review”); Nash v. State, 123 S.W.3d 534,
536–37 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, pet. ref’d) (noting that “[t]his court
has . . . previously held that in order to challenge the trial court’s referral of voir dire
to a magistrate, the appellant must have preserved error in the trial court”); see also
Guerrero v. State, No. 02-13-00611-CR, 2015 WL 1407748, at *4 (Tex. App.—Fort
Worth Mar. 26, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (citing and
following Nash but noting sister court’s contrary rule).
We overrule Johnson’s first issue.
B. Credibility Determinations: We defer to the factfinder.
Johnson next challenges the trial court’s fact findings. He argues that it was
unreasonable for the trial court to credit Counsel’s “deceptive” and “misleading”
averments, to believe the prosecutor’s averments about pretrial delays and events,2 to
Johnson further asserts that the prosecutor committed misconduct in his case. 2
These accusations were not raised as a basis for relief below, and on appeal, they appear to be lodged in an attempt to impeach the prosecutor’s credibility. As we have already noted, the trial court was free to believe the prosecutor’s averments. See
6 accept the disputed averments without requiring corroborating documentation, and to
adopt the State’s “selective view of the record” in rejecting his speedy trial complaint.3
But “the trial judge is the sole finder of fact.” Garcia, 353 S.W.3d at 788. The
trial court had the discretion to “believe any or all of [the] witness[es’] testimony” or
averments. Guerrero, 400 S.W.3d at 583 (noting that rule applies even when “all of the
evidence is submitted through affidavits, depositions, or interrogatories”). And
although Johnson questions the trial court’s decision to believe Counsel’s and the
prosecutor’s averments, in doing so he indirectly acknowledges that such averments
were indeed evidence before the trial court that it could have believed. These
credibility determinations were within the trial court’s discretion, and because they are
supported by the record—namely, by the affidavits themselves—we must defer to
Garcia, 353 S.W.3d at 788; Ex parte Salim, 595 S.W.3d 844, 853 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.). 3 Johnson repeatedly criticizes the trial court’s “adopt[ing] the State’s [proposed] findings wholesale,” claiming that “courts have repeatedly held that such uncritical adoption . . . constitutes an abuse of discretion.” But the case law he cites for this purported rule holds no such thing. See Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, N.C., 470 U.S. 564, 572, 105 S. Ct. 1504, 1510–11 (1985) (noting that Court has “criticized courts for their verbatim adoption of findings of fact prepared by prevailing parties” but stating that, “even when the trial judge adopts proposed findings verbatim, the findings are those of the court and may be reversed only if clearly erroneous”); Garcia, 353 S.W.3d at 787–88 (distinguishing between Article 11.07 habeas proceeding and Article 11.072 habeas proceeding and emphasizing that, in review of the latter, “the trial judge is the sole finder of fact” and “there is less leeway . . . to disregard the findings of a trial court”). Plus, in the context of Article 11.07 habeas proceedings in particular, the legislature expressly contemplated and authorized the trial court to “require the prevailing party to submit a proposed order” that “includ[es proposed] findings of fact and conclusions of law.” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 11.072, § 7(a).
7 them. See id.; Garcia, 353 S.W.3d at 788; Guzman, 955 S.W.2d at 89. We overrule his
second issue.
C. Subpoena-Related Complaint: Findings were not necessary.
Johnson next asserts that the trial court erred by “failing to investigate and
make findings as to whether [Counsel] had in fact subpoenaed and secured the
attendance of defense witnesses” at trial. He claims that Counsel failed to subpoena
any defense witnesses, that this failure constituted deficient performance, and that the
trial court was required to make findings on the issue.
But while Johnson raised his subpoena-related complaint in his motion for new
trial, he did not raise it as a ground for relief in his habeas application. Johnson’s
habeas application alleged ineffective assistance based on two other deficiencies:
Counsel’s failure (1) to file a motion for speedy trial and (2) to move to recuse the
visiting judge. Because Johnson’s subpoena-related complaint was not a basis for his
requested habeas relief, the trial court did not need to address this issue to resolve
Johnson’s habeas petition. See Ex parte Reyes, 474 S.W.3d 677, 680–81 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2015) (recognizing that “the principle that a court may decline to address issues
that are not necessary to the court’s disposition applies equally to the Article 11.072
habeas context,” applying rule to trial court’s order granting relief, and clarifying that
trial court could grant relief on one ground without addressing other grounds that
were not dispositive). We overrule his third issue.
8 D. Deficiency Findings: Regardless, Johnson did not show prejudice.
In his final appellate issue, Johnson challenges the trial court’s findings
regarding the motions that he claims Counsel should have filed, i.e., the trial court’s
findings that motions for a speedy trial and recusal would have been fruitless. But the
challenged findings relate to the first prong of ineffective assistance—whether
Counsel performed deficiently. See Uribe, 516 S.W.3d at 666 (listing prongs). Even if
Counsel’s performance had been deficient, Johnson did not show the second prong
of ineffective assistance—that Counsel’s failure to file the relevant motions
contributed to Johnson’s guilty plea. See id.
A habeas applicant asserting ineffective assistance must demonstrate not only
that his counsel’s performance was deficient but also that the “ineffective
performance affected the outcome of the plea process” such that “but for counsel’s
errors, [the applicant] would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going
to trial.” Id. (quoting Ex Parte Torres, 483 S.W.3d 35, 43 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016)).
Here, the trial court found that the relevant motions would not have affected
Johnson’s guilty pleas. And the record supports this finding.
The record confirms that Johnson—with knowledge of the trial’s date and the
visiting judge’s identity—proceeded to trial and entered pleas of not guilty in open
court. Johnson did not change his pleas to guilty until later—after the parties had
presented opening statements, the State had elicited testimony from the complaining
witness, the trial court had admitted photographic evidence of the complainant’s
9 injuries and of her text-message conversations with Johnson, and the jury had heard
audio recordings of the complainant’s 911 call and of Johnson’s calls to the
complainant after the assaults. This timing supports a finding that neither the trial’s
date nor the visiting judge’s identity was a catalyst for Johnson’s guilty pleas; had the
trial date or judge’s identity been a determinative factor, Johnson would not have
proceeded to trial in front of the visiting judge in the first place. Cf. Tulk v. State, No.
02-24-00432-CR, 2025 WL 2088266, at *4 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth July 24, 2025, no
pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (holding no harm from denial of
continuance when defendant changed his plea after voir dire and noting that “[i]f the
trial court’s denial of [the] . . . continuance was, as [the defendant] argue[d], influential
in his decision to plea[d guilty], he would have [presumably] pleaded guilty at an
earl[ier] stage of the proceedings”); Milem v. State, No. 02-24-00201-CR, 2025 WL
1536399, at *4 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth May 29, 2025, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not
designated for publication) (similar).
Because the record supports the trial court’s findings that Counsel’s alleged
deficiencies did not affect Johnson’s changed pleas, we need not address whether
Counsel’s actions were, in fact, deficient. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1. We overrule this
final issue.
IV. Conclusion
Johnson has not shown that the trial court erred in its handling of the habeas
proceeding, nor has he shown that the order imposing deferred adjudication
10 community supervision is invalid. Having overruled his four appellate issues, we
affirm the trial court’s order denying habeas relief. See Tex. R. App. P. 43.2(a). All
pending motions are denied.
/s/ Bonnie Sudderth
Bonnie Sudderth Chief Justice
Do Not Publish Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
Delivered: September 25, 2025