Ex Parte Robert Joseph Yezak v. the State of Texas
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Opinion
TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN
NO. 03-25-00540-CR NO. 03-25-00541-CR NO. 03-25-00551-CR
Ex parte Robert Joseph Yezak
FROM THE 27TH DISTRICT COURT OF BELL COUNTY NO. FR78644, THE HONORABLE DEBBIE GARRETT, JUDGE PRESIDING
MEMORANDUM OPINION
The State has indicted appellant Robert Joseph Yezak with driving while
intoxicated (DWI)—third offense or more. See Tex. Penal Code §§ 49.04(a), .09(b)(2). Yezak
attempts to appeal from the trial court’s denials of his: (1) pretrial application for writ of habeas
corpus on June 12, 2025 (03-25-00540-CR); (2) motion to disqualify Judge Debbie Garrett
(03-25-00541-CR); and (3) pretrial application for writ of habeas corpus on July 17, 2025
(03-25-00551-CR). 1 We conclude that we lack jurisdiction over the appeals.
I. Hybrid Representation
The record reflects that the appeals are impermissible attempts at hybrid
representation. A defendant has no right to hybrid representation, see Patrick v. State,
906 S.W.2d 481, 498 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995); Scarbrough v. State, 777 S.W.2d 83, 92 (Tex.
1 For appellate cause numbers 03-25-00540-CR and 03-25-00551-CR, we address Yezak’s amended notices of appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(f) (allowing appellant to file amended notice of appeal at any time before his brief is filed). Crim. App. 1989), and a trial court is free to disregard pro se filings presented by a defendant
who is represented by counsel, Jenkins v. State, 592 S.W.3d 894, 902 n.47 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2018).
The record includes five orders from the trial court appointing counsel for Yezak.
In the most recent—entered on March 18, 2025—Thomas Seigman was appointed to represent
Yezak in trial court cause number 78644 “in all litigation in the trial court through and including
a ruling on a Motion for New Trial, and filing a notice of appeal, if appropriate, unless released
by written order of this Court at an earlier date or by the Court’s appointment of appellate
counsel.” There is no written order in the record releasing Seigman from his appointment, and
the trial court has not appointed appellate counsel for Yezak. Thus, when Yezak filed his notices
of appeal in this Court in July 2025, he was represented by counsel in the trial court, and his
notices of appeal present nothing for our review. See Holman v. State, Nos. 03-25-00312-CR,
03-25-00313-CR, 2025 WL 1999225, at *1 (Tex. App.—Austin July 18, 2025, no pet.)
(mem. op., not designated for publication) (“Holman has no right to hybrid representation, and
because he is represented by counsel in both cases, his notices of appeal present nothing for
our review.”).
We note that the record includes a signed docket-sheet entry dated July 17, 2025,
in which the trial court stated that during a hearing on that date, “Tom Seigman who was present
as stand by counsel became counsel for the defendant . . . . [D]efendant requested Tom Seigman
as his Counsel. Tom Seigman came to counsel table as counsel for defendant.”
The entry does not change our analysis. The order appointing Seigman to
represent Yezak was unqualified and did not refer to Seigman as standby counsel. To the extent
that the order and docket entry conflict, the order controls. See State v. Atkinson, 541 S.W.3d 876,
2 880 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, no pet.) (“[W]e may not rely upon a docket sheet
entry to contradict the trial court’s written and signed order.”); State v. Shaw, 4 S.W.3d 875, 878
(Tex. App.—Dallas 1999, no pet.) (“Docket sheet entries are not part of the record because they
are inherently unreliable, lacking the formality of orders and judgments.”); Bell v. State,
734 S.W.2d 83, 84 (Tex. App.—Austin 1987, no pet.) (“The record, not the docket entry, is the
authoritative evidence upon which the parties must rely on appeal.”).
II. Signed and Written Orders
Additionally, the clerk’s record for trial court cause number 78644 reflects that
the trial court has not ruled on any of Yezak’s six pretrial applications for writ of habeas corpus.
Although Yezak filed an application on July 17, 2025, the pro se order accompanying the
application is likewise unsigned.
We have jurisdiction to consider appeals from the entry of an appealable order.
See Tex. R. App. P. 25.2; Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 44.02; see also Tex. R. App. P. 26.2(a)(1).
However, there must be a written and signed order from which to appeal. See State
v. Sanavongxay, 407 S.W.3d 252, 259 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (affirming dismissal for lack of
jurisdiction because record contained no written order from which defendant could appeal); State
v. Rosenbaum, 818 S.W.2d 398, 401–02 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (holding that for purposes of
appeal, trial court “enters” order when judge signs order). Without a written order signed by the
trial court ruling on Yezak’s pretrial habeas applications, there are no appealable orders in cause
numbers 03-25-00540-CR and 03-25-00551-CR. See Sanavongxay, 407 S.W.3d at 259; see also
Hernandez v. State, No. 03-23-00526-CR, 2023 WL 7356903, at *1 (Tex. App.—Austin
Nov. 8, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (“Because the trial court has
3 not yet entered a signed written order in the habeas proceeding or made a finding of guilt or
received a jury verdict with respect to the charged offense, we lack jurisdiction over this
matter.”).
III. Denial of Motion to Disqualify
On the other hand, while the clerk’s record contains a signed denial of Yezak’s
motion to recuse or disqualify the trial court judge, we would lack jurisdiction over an appeal
from such an order even if it were not an impermissible attempt at hybrid representation.
An order denying a motion to recuse is reviewable only on appeal from a final
judgment. Tex. R. Civ. P. 18a(j)(1)(A). There is no final judgment of conviction in this record.
Without a timely appeal from a final conviction in a criminal case, we lack jurisdiction over a
stand-alone order denying a motion to recuse. See Green v. State, 374 S.W.3d 434, 445–46
(Tex. Crim. App. 2012).
An order on a motion to disqualify “may be reviewed by mandamus and may be
appealed in accordance with other law.” Tex. R. Civ. P. 18a(j)(2); see De Leon v. Aguilar,
127 S.W.3d 1, 5 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (orig. proceeding) (applying Rule 18a to criminal
cases). In criminal cases, “[j]urisdiction must be expressly given to the courts of appeals in a
statute” thus, “[t]he standard for determining jurisdiction is not whether the appeal is precluded
by law, but whether the appeal is authorized by law.” Ragston v. State, 424 S.W.3d 49, 52 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2014).
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