Rel: September 19, 2025
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA SPECIAL TERM, 2025 _________________________
SC-2025-0152 _________________________
Ex parte Penn National Security Insurance Company
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re: James Godwin
v.
Penn National Security Insurance Company et al.)
(Dallas Circuit Court: CV-24-900303)
BRYAN, Justice.
Penn National Security Insurance Company ("Penn National")
petitions this Court for a writ of mandamus directing the Dallas Circuit SC-2025-0152
Court to transfer the underlying action to the Tuscaloosa Circuit Court.
Penn National argues that the transfer is required for the convenience of
the parties and witnesses and in the interest of justice under § 6-3-21.1,
Ala. Code 1975. We deny the petition.
Background
The claims in this action arise from an automobile accident that
occurred in rural Tuscaloosa County on January 3, 2024. According to
the complaint, James Godwin was employed by Talton Communications,
Inc. ("Talton"), and was driving a vehicle owned by Talton in the line and
scope of his employment at the time of the accident. The accident
occurred when a vehicle driven by Desi Bernard Peoples struck the
vehicle driven by Godwin from behind. An Alabama Uniform Traffic
Crash Report ("the accident report") was prepared by an officer of the
Alabama Law Enforcement Agency. No emergency-medical-services
personnel were called to the scene. No evidence suggests that Godwin
received any medical treatment in Tuscaloosa County.
Godwin is a resident of Dallas County. Peoples is a resident of
Fayette County. Talton's principal place of business is in Dallas County.
Talton provided insurance coverage for its employees, including
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uninsured-/underinsured-motorist benefits, through a policy with Penn
National, a foreign company authorized to do business in Alabama.
On October 23, 2024, Godwin filed a verified complaint against
Peoples, Penn National, and Talton in the Dallas Circuit Court ("the trial
court"). He sought relief based on claims of negligence and wantonness,
the uninsured-/underinsured-motorist provisions of the Penn National
policy, and the Alabama Workers' Compensation Act, § 25-5-1 et seq.,
Ala. Code 1975. Godwin amended his complaint on November 5, 2024,
seemingly to clarify that the only claim asserted against Talton was for
workers' compensation benefits.
Penn National answered the complaint and filed a separate motion
to dismiss, to sever, or to transfer. The motion sought to sever Godwin's
workers' compensation claim against Talton from his other claims. The
motion also sought to transfer the claims against Penn National and
Peoples to the Tuscaloosa Circuit Court based on both the convenience of
the parties and witnesses and the interest of justice. Penn National
supported its motion to transfer with only Godwin's complaint and the
accident report. Peoples joined the motion but provided no argument or
evidence of his own.
3 SC-2025-0152
Godwin opposed Penn National's motion. As to a severance, he
stated that he had no objection to bifurcating the workers' compensation
claims for trial so that the workers' compensation claim would be tried
separately. Godwin, however, did not want the claims severed, asserting
that that would require the creation of an entirely new action with the
imposition of a new filing fee and increased costs associated with
separate discovery related to the same events.
As to a transfer, Godwin argued that Dallas County was more
convenient than Tuscaloosa County and that Dallas County had a strong
connection to the action. Godwin provided an affidavit from Eric
Jackson, the director of the facility where Godwin had received physical
therapy for treatment of injuries he alleged he had suffered as a result of
the accident. Jackson stated that the physical-therapy facility is in
Dallas County. Thus, Jackson and other staff of the facility who provided
care to Godwin all worked in Dallas County. Jackson stated that, if they
were called as witnesses, it would be highly inconvenient and
burdensome for him or his staff to travel to Tuscaloosa County. He stated
that it would be more convenient for them to travel to the Dallas County
courthouse and that they would spend significantly less time away from
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work if they had to testify in Dallas County rather than Tuscaloosa
County.
Godwin also provided an affidavit from his wife, Stephanie, whom
he expected to call as a witness to testify about his injuries and his
limitations before and after the accident. She lives and works in Dallas
County. Stephanie stated that it would be highly inconvenient for her to
travel to Tuscaloosa County and that it would be more convenient for her
to travel to the Dallas County courthouse. Thus, she stated, leaving the
action in Dallas County would result in her spending less time away from
work.
On February 2, 2025, the trial court denied Penn National's motion
to sever but ordered that the workers' compensation claim would be tried
separately. The trial court also denied Penn National's and Peoples'
motions to transfer. On March 7, 2025, Penn National petitioned this
Court for a writ of mandamus directing the trial court to grant its motion
to transfer the action to the Tuscaloosa Circuit Court. Penn National
does not seek relief from the trial court's denial of its motion to sever.
Peoples has not joined Penn National's mandamus petition.
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Standard of Review
"We have held that ' "[t]he proper method for obtaining review of a denial of a motion for a change of venue in a civil action is to petition for the writ of mandamus." ' Ex parte Southeast Alabama Timber Harvesting, LLC, 94 So. 3d 371, 373 (Ala. 2012) (quoting Ex parte National Sec. Ins. Co., 727 So. 2d 788, 789 (Ala. 1998)). Nevertheless, the standard for obtaining mandamus review before this Court is a high one:
" ' "A writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy, and it will be 'issued only when there is: 1) a clear legal right in the petitioner to the order sought; 2) an imperative duty upon the respondent to perform, accompanied by a refusal to do so; 3) the lack of another adequate remedy; and 4) properly invoked jurisdiction of the court.' Ex parte United Serv. Stations, Inc., 628 So. 2d 501, 503 (Ala. 1993). A writ of mandamus will issue only in situations where other relief is unavailable or is inadequate, and it cannot be used as a substitute for appeal. Ex parte Drill Parts & Serv. Co., 590 So. 2d 252 (Ala. 1991)." '
"Ex parte Wilson, 854 So. 2d 1106, 1108-09 (Ala. 2002) (quoting Ex parte Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 720 So. 2d 893, 894 (Ala. 1998)). Moreover, '[w]e apply the abuse-of discretion standard when considering a mandamus petition challenging a venue ruling, and we will not issue the writ unless the trial court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary and capricious manner.' Ex parte Brookwood Health Servs., Inc., 781 So. 2d 954, 956-57 (Ala. 2000). ' "Our review is ... limited to those facts that were before the trial court." ' Ex parte Jim Burke Auto., Inc., 776 So. 2d 118, 120 (Ala. 2000) (quoting Ex parte National Sec. Ins. Co., 727 So. 2d at 789)."
Ex parte J & W Enters., LLC, 150 So. 3d 190, 193 (Ala. 2014).
6 SC-2025-0152
Analysis
Penn National bases its petition on § 6-3-21.1. That statute
provides, in relevant part:
"(a) With respect to civil actions filed in an appropriate venue, any court of general jurisdiction shall, for the convenience of parties and witnesses, or in the interest of justice, transfer any civil action or any claim in any civil action to any court of general jurisdiction in which the action might have been properly filed and the case shall proceed as though originally filed therein. …"
The parties do not dispute before this Court that venue would be proper
in both Dallas County and Tuscaloosa County. See § 6-3-7, Ala. Code
1975; and Rule 82(c), Ala. R. Civ. P. "When venue is appropriate in more
than one county, the plaintiff's choice of venue is generally given great
deference." Ex parte Perfection Siding, Inc., 882 So. 2d 307, 312 (Ala.
2003). Thus, the "burden of proof in seeking a transfer under [§ 6-3-21.1]
rests squarely on the shoulders of the defendant." Id.
Penn National argues that the trial court should have transferred
the action to the Tuscaloosa Circuit Court based on both grounds of § 6-
3-21.1: for the convenience of the parties and witnesses and in the
interest of justice. As to both grounds, Penn National, citing Ex Parte
Indiana Mills & Mfg, Inc., 10 So. 3d 536, 542 (Ala. 2008), argues that the
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legislature's use of the word "shall" in the statute makes transfer
mandatory. .
Certainly, this Court in Indiana Mills noted: " '[T]he Legislature, in
adopting § 6-3-21.1, intended to vest in the trial courts, the Court of Civil
Appeals, and this Court the power and the duty to transfer a cause when
"the interest of justice" requires a transfer.' " Id. at 541 (quoting Ex parte
First Family Fin. Servs., Inc., 718 So. 2d 658, 660 (Ala. 1998)). In First
Family, this Court explained: "The trial judge has a degree of discretion
in determining whether the factors listed in the statute, i.e., 'the
convenience of the parties and witnesses' and 'the interest of justice,' are
in favor of transferring the action." 718 So. 2d at 660. Thus, this "Court
will reverse the trial court's ruling in this regard only up on a showing of
an abuse of discretion." Id. We will consider the application of each
ground and the trial court's exercise of discretion in turn.
I. The Convenience of the Parties and Witnesses
As to the convenience of the parties and witnesses, Penn National
was required to present evidence showing that Tuscaloosa County was a
significantly more convenient forum than Dallas County. This Court has
explained the showing required by § 6-3-21.1 as follows:
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"[T]his Court has recognized that
" ' "[a] defendant seeking a transfer based on § 6-3- 21.1 has the burden of proving to the satisfaction of the trial court that the defendant's inconvenience and expense in defending the action in the venue selected by the plaintiff are so great that the plaintiff's right to choose the forum is overcome. Ex parte New England Mut. Life, 663 So. 2d [952,] 956 [(Ala. 1995)]; Ex parte Townsend, 589 So. 2d [711,] 715 [(Ala. 1991)]. For a transfer to be justified, the transferee forum must be 'significantly more convenient' than the forum chosen by the plaintiff. Ex parte Townsend, 589 So. 2d at 715. See also[ ] Ex parte Johnson, 638 So. 2d 772, 774 (Ala. 1994)." '
"Ex parte Blair Logistics, LLC, 157 So. 3d 951, 955 (Ala. Civ. App. 2014) (quoting Ex parte Integon Corp., 672 So. 2d 497, 500 (Ala. 1995) (emphasis added)). Thus, a trial court should not grant a motion for a change of venue under the convenience-of-the-parties prong unless the new forum is shown to be 'significantly more convenient' than the forum in which the action was filed. See Ex parte First Tennessee Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 994 So. 2d 906, 909 (Ala. 2008).
"In cases in which this Court has found that the 'convenience of the parties and witnesses' warrants a transfer of the action, evidence was provided demonstrating that the proposed transferee forum was 'significantly more convenient' than the transferor forum. Such evidence included affidavits from parties and witnesses stating that the incident underlying the action occurred in the transferee forum, affidavits from the parties stating that they lived in the transferee forum, and evidence indicating that requiring the parties and/or the witnesses to travel to the transferor forum would be a significant burden. See, e.g., Ex parte Kane, 989 So. 2d 509, 511, 512-13 (Ala. 2008) (noting affidavits 9 SC-2025-0152
submitted by the movant in support of the motion for a change of venue in holding that the transferee forum would be a 'substantially more convenient' forum than the transferor forum). In contrast, in cases in which the party moving for the transfer has failed to present evidence demonstrating that the transferee forum is 'significantly more convenient' than the transferor forum, this Court has declined to order a transfer. See, e.g., Ex parte Gentile Co., 221 So. 3d 1066, 1069 (Ala. 2016) (noting that the petitioner failed to present any evidence in support of its motion for a change of venue under the doctrine of forum non conveniens in declining to order a transfer of the case)."
Ex parte Tyson Chicken, Inc., 291 So. 3d 477, 480-81 (Ala. 2019).
Penn National relies almost exclusively on the fact that the
accident, and thus Godwin's injury, occurred in Tuscaloosa County and
that the accident was investigated there. It also makes a general
statement that "litigating this suit in Dallas County would be vexatious
and oppressive to not only Penn National, but most importantly, to
Peoples." Penn National, however, presented no affidavits or other
evidence from its own representatives or witnesses showing that there
would be any burden on them in attending proceedings in Dallas County.
It likewise presented no affidavit from Peoples stating that he would be
burdened by proceedings in Dallas County. "The arguments of counsel
are not evidence." Deng v. Scroggins, 169 So. 3d 1015, 1028 (Ala. 2014).
See also Ex parte Autauga Heating & Cooling, LLC, 58 So. 3d 745, 749 10 SC-2025-0152
(Ala. 2010) (" '[S]tatements of counsel in motions, briefs, and arguments'
… cannot be considered 'evidentiary material' and thus will not be
considered by this Court." (citation omitted)).
The only evidence Penn National presented to support its motion to
transfer is Godwin's verified complaint and a copy of the accident report.
In pertinent part, the complaint merely states the parties' places of
residence and principal places of business. It shows that venue is proper
in Dallas County but does not show that litigation in Dallas County
would be inconvenient for any party or witness. The accident report
states the location of the accident and the residences of Godwin and
Peoples. It does not state the investigating officer's place of residence or
primary workplace. The accident report provides no evidence indicating
that it would be inconvenient for the officer to travel to Dallas County.
Moreover, it is not certain that he would even be a witness at trial.
In opposition to the motion to transfer, Godwin presented affidavits
from two witnesses who explained that they would be inconvenienced by
attending proceedings in Tuscaloosa County. The director of the
physical-therapy facility in Dallas County where Godwin received
treatment stated that it would be inconvenient and burdensome for him
11 SC-2025-0152
or any of his staff to travel to Tuscaloosa County. He explained that
travel to the Dallas County courthouse would result in any witness from
the physical-therapy facility spending less time away from work than
they would if they had to travel to Tuscaloosa County. Godwin's wife
likewise explained in her affidavit that she lived and worked in Dallas
County and that it would be inconvenient for her to travel to Tuscaloosa
County. She stated that she would spend less time away from work if
she had to travel to the Dallas County courthouse rather than Tuscaloosa
Additionally, Godwin's residence was in Dallas County, as was the
principal place of business of his employer and separate defendant,
Talton. Talton has neither joined Penn National's motion to transfer nor
sought transfer on its own motion. Thus, it seems to have consented to
venue in Dallas County. Penn National has not sought relief from the
trial court's denial of its motion to sever Godwin's claim against Talton.
Thus, another defendant in the case has its principal place of business in
Dallas County.
Penn National points to this Court's decision in Ex parte Kane, 989
So. 2d 509 (Ala. 2008), for the proposition that transfer is required when
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the only connections to the plaintiff's chosen forum are that it is the
plaintiff's place of residence and that an automobile-liability insurer does
business there. This Court's decision in Kane, however, does not apply
as Penn National suggests. In that case, the movants presented evidence
from several witnesses indicating that that they resided in Lee County
and would be inconvenienced by litigating in the plaintiff's chosen forum,
Clay County. The acts and omissions made the basis of the case all
occurred in Lee County. The only connections to Clay County were that
the plaintiff resided in Clay County and that the insurance carrier did
business there.
In this case, Godwin resides in Dallas County and Penn National
does business there. However, regarding the location of witnesses, which
was key to this Court's analysis in Kane, the witnesses in this case reside
and work in Dallas County and testified that it would be inconvenient for
them to travel to Tuscaloosa County. Further, Dallas County has
connections to the case beyond those suggested by Penn National.
Godwin received medical treatment there for his alleged injuries.
Additionally, his claims against Talton relate, at least partially, to his
employment, which was based in Dallas County. In fact, the only
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connection of Tuscaloosa County to the case is that it was the location
where the accident occurred.
Penn National argues that the location of Godwin's injury is
"dispositive." However, the cases it cites and the analysis it urges us to
consider all discuss the location of injury as it relates to the interest-of-
justice ground under § 6-3-21.1. See Ex parte Quality Carriers, Inc., 183
So. 3d 937 (Ala. 2015); Ex parte Morton, 167 So. 3d 295 (Ala. 2014); Ex
parte Manning, 170 So. 3d 638 (Ala. 2014); Ex parte Indiana Mills, 10 So.
3d 536; Ex parte State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 149 So. 3d 1082 (Ala.
2014). We thus will further consider these arguments in their proper
context in our consideration of the interest-of-justice ground set out
below.
Regarding the convenience of the parties and witnesses, however,
Penn National presented no evidence showing that the inconvenience or
expense of litigating in Tuscaloosa County would be significantly less
burdensome than litigating in Dallas County. It failed to identify any
witness who would be inconvenienced by proceedings in Dallas County.
It failed to identify any witness or party for whom proceedings in Dallas
County would be vexatious or oppressive. It failed to show the location
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of any evidence in Tuscaloosa County that would not also be readily
available in Dallas County. Penn National has not met its burden of
showing that Tuscaloosa County is a significantly more convenient forum
than Dallas County. See Ex parte Sanders, 314 So. 3d 1226, 1231 (Ala.
2020). "Without more, we cannot say that the trial court abused its
discretion in refusing to transfer the action to [Tuscaloosa] County based
on" the convenience of the parties and witnesses under § 6-3-21.1. Ex
parte Alabama Power Co., 640 So. 2d 921, 925 (Ala. 1994).
II. The Interest of Justice
Penn National argues that the action must be transferred to the
Tuscaloosa Circuit Court in the interest of justice, primarily because that
is where the accident occurred. This Court has held that the "interest of
justice" ground under § 6-3-21.1 requires "the transfer of the action from
a county with little, if any, connection to the action, to the county with a
strong connection to the action." Ex parte National Sec. Ins. Co., 727 So.
2d 788, 790 (Ala. 1998). The factors to be considered in determining
which county has a strong connection to the action and which county has
a weak connection include factors related to the convenience of the
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parties and factors related to the public interest. This Court has
explained:
"Some courts have described the interest of justice in terms interchangeable with the convenience of the parties. In First Family, supra, this Court quoted the United States Supreme Court's decision in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 67 S. Ct. 839, 91 L. Ed. 1055 (1947):
" ' " 'Important considerations are the relative ease to sources of proof; availability of compulsory process for attendance of unwilling, and the cost of obtaining attendance of willing, witnesses; possibility of view of premises, if view would be appropriate to the action; and all other practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious, and inexpensive.' " '
"First Family, 718 So. 2d at 661 (quoting Ex parte Gauntt, 677 So. 2d 204, 221 (Ala. 1996) (Maddox, J., dissenting), quoting in turn Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 508, 67 S. Ct. 839). First Family also quoted Gilbert (by way of Justice Maddox's dissent in Gauntt) concerning considerations that are less directly related to the convenience of the parties and witnesses:
" ' " 'Factors of public interest also have place in applying the doctrine. Administrative difficulties follow for courts when litigation is piled up in congested centers instead of being handled at its origin. Jury duty is a burden that ought not to be imposed upon the people of a community which has no relation to the litigation. In cases which touch the affairs of many persons, there is reason for holding the trial in their view and reach rather than in remote parts of the country where they can learn of it by report only. There is a local
16 SC-2025-0152
interest in having localized controversies decided at home.' " '
"First Family, 718 So. 2d at 661 (quoting Gauntt, 677 So. 2d at 221 (Maddox, J., dissenting), quoting in turn Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 508-09, 67 S. Ct. 839).
"The key factors concerning the interest of justice that clearly apply in this case are the burden of piling court services and resources upon the people of a county that is not affected by the case and, perhaps most basic of all, the interest of the people of a county to have a case that arises in their county tried close to public view in their county."
Ex parte Smiths Water & Sewer Auth., 982 So. 2d 484, 489-90 (Ala.
2007).
This Court has stated often that consideration of these factors is not
a simple balancing test. See Ex parte J & W Enters., 150 So. 3d at 196
(holding that this "analysis has never involved a simple balancing test").
The party seeking transfer must show not only that the requested forum
has a strong connection to the action, but also that the current forum has
only a weak connection to the action. See, e.g., Ex parte Sanders, 314 So.
3d at 1230; Ex parte KKE, LLC, 295 So. 3d 26, 332-34 (Ala. 2019) (holding
that movants did not show that transferor county's connection to case
was weak and thus did not demonstrate that the trial court had exceeded
its discretion by denying transfer); Ex parte Tyson Chicken, 291 So. 3d
17 SC-2025-0152
at 482-83 (holding that movant's burden had not been satisfied when both
counties had strong connections to the action). "This inquiry" regarding
the strength of the transferee county's connection and the weakness of
the transferor county's connection "necessarily depends on the facts of
each case." J & W Enters., 150 So. 3d at 196.
Penn National argues that this Court "has unequivocally held that
the location where the cause of action arises and the location where the
injury occurs are the dispositive factors to be considered under the
interest of justice analysis." Penn National's petition at 8-9. This
argument misstates our holdings and distorts the proper analysis under
§ 6-3-21.1. This Court has never held any one factor to be dispositive of
the interest-of-justice analysis. The cases Penn National cites each
consider multiple factors involved in the particular circumstances as part
of our normal analysis of the interest-of-justice ground of § 6-3-21.1
described above. See Ex parte Quality Carriers, 183 So. 3d at 943-44; Ex
parte Manning, 170 So. 3d at 644-45; Ex parte Morton, 167 So. 3d at 301-
02; Ex parte State Farm, 149 So. 3d at 1087-88; Ex parte Indiana Mills,
10 So. 3d at 540-42.
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This Court has "assign[ed] 'considerable weight' " to the location of
the injury, but "it is not, and should not be, the sole consideration for
determining venue under the 'interest of justice' prong of § 6-3-21.1." Ex
parte J & W Enters., 150 So. 3d at 196-97. See also Ex parte Elliott, 254
So. 3d 882, 886 (Ala. 2017). In J & W Enterprises, an accident between
two tractor-trailer rigs occurred on Interstate 10 in Mobile County. The
plaintiff sued in the Clarke Circuit Court, and the defendant driver's
employer sought a transfer to Mobile County, the location where the
accident occurred. The plaintiff alleged claims of negligence and
wantonness against the defendant driver. Against the defendant driver's
employer, he alleged claims of negligent entrustment and negligent
hiring. The plaintiff was a resident of Texas. The defendant driver was
a resident of Clarke County. His employer's principal place of business
was in Clarke County. There were no witnesses to the action. The
plaintiff did not receive any medical treatment in Mobile County. The
Mobile police officer who had investigated the accident stated by affidavit
that it would not be inconvenient for him to travel to Clarke County to
testify. 150 So. 3d at 192.
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In light of our prior cases, this Court concluded: "In the present
case, the facts before this Court do not indicate that Mobile County has
a particularly strong connection to this lawsuit. … In light of the facts
before us, Mobile County's nexus to the action is purely fortuitous -- the
place on the interstate where the accident occurred." 150 So. 3d at 196.
Thus, although the location of the accident was given considerable
weight, it was not the sole consideration. This Court held that the
defendant driver's employer had not shown that Mobile County had a
"particularly strong connection" to the lawsuit.
Additionally, the facts did not show that Clark County's connection
to the action was markedly weak. Both defendants were located there,
and evidence related to the plaintiffs' claims of negligent entrustment
and hiring would be located there. Thus, this Court concluded that the
defendant driver's employer had not met its burden. "Given the specific
facts of this case, we cannot say that Mobile County has a significantly
stronger connection to this case than does Clarke County so that the
interest of justice will be offended by trial in Clarke County." 150 So. 3d
at 197. Thus, this Court held, the trial court had not exceeded its
discretion in refusing to transfer the action.
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In Ex parte Elliott, the movant insurer requested a transfer from
the county where the accident occurred, thus presenting similar, but
differing, specific facts and burdens than those in J & W Enterprises. In
Elliott, an automobile accident occurred in Lowndes County and was
investigated by City of Hayneville police in Lowndes County. The
plaintiff was a resident of Montgomery County and sought treatment for
her injuries there. She sued her automobile insurer in Lowndes County,
seeking uninsured-motorist benefits under her policy, which was issued
in Montgomery County. The insurer was a foreign corporation. On the
insurer's motion, the trial court transferred the case to Montgomery
County. 254 So. 3d at 883-84.
On those specific facts, this Court determined that both counties
had strong connections to the case. Thus, the movant insurer had not
met its burden of showing that the transferor county had only a weak
connection and that the transferee county had a significantly stronger
connection to the action. Thus, this Court held, the trial court had
exceeded its discretion in transferring the action. 254 So. 3d at 887.
In considering J & W Enterprises, on which the movant insurer had
relied, this Court in Elliott explained:
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"This Court's decision in J & W Enterprises should not be read as undermining location-of-injury as the foremost factor in the interest-of-justice analysis. To the contrary, J & W Enterprises reaffirmed our assignment of ' "considerable weight" to the location where the accident occurred.' 150 So. 3d at 196. Instead, we merely recognized in J & W Enterprises that the location of the accident is not the sole factor to be considered in the interest-of-justice analysis and that there will be circumstances, as was the case in J & W Enterprises, where the interest of justice will not compel the case to be heard in the venue where the accident occurred."
254 So. 3d at 887.
Penn National argues that, by this statement in Elliott, "any
relevancy Ex parte J & W Enterprises might have had to this case was
extinguished … when this Court, in revisiting its decision in [J & W
Enterprises,] returned the focus of the interest-of-justice factor … to the
location where the accident occurred." Penn National's reply brief at 8.
By this argument, Penn National once again misstates our holdings and
distorts the proper analysis under § 6-3-21.1. In Elliott, this Court by no
means overruled, departed from, or changed the interest-of-justice
analysis, as stated in J & W Enterprises. Consistent with one another,
both opinions focus the analysis on the specific facts presented in each
case considered in light of the movants' burdens. The location of the
injury is to be given considerable weight, but in some circumstances it
22 SC-2025-0152
may present a strong connection to the action and in some circumstances
it may not. It is the movant's burden to show with appropriate evidence
that the relative strength and weakness of the transferee and transferor
counties is sufficient to override the plaintiff's choice of forum given the
specific circumstances of each case.
The only evidence Penn National has presented to satisfy its burden
is a copy of the accident report. This evidence alone is insufficient to
prove both that Tuscaloosa County has a strong connection to the matters
giving rise to the action and that Dallas County has a weak connection
to the matters giving rise to the action. Penn National points to the
"considerable weight" given to the location of the injury and notes that
the accident, injuries, and investigation all occurred in Tuscaloosa
County. It cites Ex parte Southeast Alabama Timber Harvesting, LLC,
94 So. 3d 371 (Ala. 2012), and Ex parte Wachovia Bank, N.A., 77 So. 3d
570 (Ala. 2011). In each of those cases, the location of the injury was not
automatically determined to have a strong connection to the case. The
inquiry was whether anything material to the case happened in each
county. Southeast Alabama Timber, 94 So. 3d at 376; Wachovia Bank,
77 So. 3d at 573-74. See also Ex parte Reed, 295 So. 3d 38, 43 (Ala. 2019)
23 SC-2025-0152
(holding that "nothing material to the action transpired in" transferor
county).
In response to an argument similar to Penn National's, this Court
recently explained that our cases consider facts in addition to the location
of the accident or injury to justify a transfer. See Ex parte Burgess, 298
So. 3d 1080, 1083-84 (Ala. 2020) (considering Ex parte Tier 1 Trucking,
LLC, 222 So. 3d 1107 (Ala. 2016); Ex parte Southeast Alabama Timber,
supra; Ex parte Autauga Heating & Cooling, supra, 58 So. 3d 745 (Ala.
2010); Ex parte Indiana Mills, supra). See also Ex parte State Farm, 149
So. 3d at 1087-88. Because the movant in Burgess had failed to provide
any evidence beyond the accident report, this Court held, it had failed to
show that the transferor county had a weak connection to the case. 298
So. 3d at 1083-84.
Here, the accident report shows only that the accident occurred in
Tuscaloosa County. Certainly, the citizens of that county have an
interest in seeing that motorists on their roads act responsibly. Even if
we accept that that is enough to show a strong connection to the case,
Penn National has not met its burden of showing that Dallas County has
only a weak connection to the matters giving rise to the action. Certainly,
24 SC-2025-0152
events material to Godwin's claims occurred in Dallas County. All of his
medical treatment occurred there, most of the witnesses reside there and
will testify about events that occurred there, his employment on which
his workers' compensation claim rests is based there, and Penn
National's policy was issued there. Under these circumstances, we
cannot say that nothing material to the action occurred in Dallas County
or that Dallas County has only a weak connection with the case.
Penn National argues that our cases have held that the plaintiff's
place of residence, employment, medical treatment, and insurance are
not enough to outweigh the location of the injury. It references Ex parte
Sanders, supra; Ex parte Manning, supra; and Ex parte Kane, supra;
and it relies most heavily on Ex parte Elliott, supra. However, there was
more to each of those cases than the type of balancing Penn National
suggests. See Sanders, 314 So. 3d at 1230-31 (holding that transferee
county, the place of residence of one defendant and one eyewitness,
without more, had insufficiently strong connection to override plaintiff's
choice of forum in county where accident occurred and closer to where
medical treatment was received); Manning, 170 So. 3d at 644-45 (holding
that the county where accident occurred was also location of
25 SC-2025-0152
hospitalization and place of residence of another party and that only
connection to other county was that one party resided there); Kane, 989
So. 2d at 512-13 (noting that, in addition to being location of accident, all
witnesses but plaintiff resided in transferor county and providing no
discussion of where medical treatment occurred).
We do find Elliott persuasive. There, both counties had strong
connections to the action. "The accident, injuries, and police
investigation occurred in Lowndes County. On the other hand, Elliott
resides in Montgomery County, where she sought treatment for her
injuries resulting from the accident and where the parties' contractual
dealings arose." 254 So. 3d at 887. Because the defendant did not show
that the transferor county had only a weak connection to the action, this
Court held that the trial court had erred in ordering a transfer. Id.
Similarly, here, Godwin resides in Dallas County, where he sought
treatment for his injuries and where the policy giving rise to his claim
against Penn National arose. Penn National therefore has not met its
burden of showing that Dallas County has only a weak connection to the
action. Therefore, it has not shown that the trial court exceeded its
discretion in denying its motion to transfer. Because Penn National has
26 SC-2025-0152
no clear legal right to an order transferring the action to Tuscaloosa
County and has failed to show any duty on the part of the trial court to
grant its motion to transfer, it is not entitled to a writ of mandamus.
Therefore, we deny its petition.
PETITION DENIED.
Stewart, C.J., and Shaw, Wise, Mendheim, Cook, McCool, and
Lewis, JJ., concur.
Sellers, J., concurs in the result.