Ex Parte: Omarion Lewis v. the State of Texas

CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedSeptember 20, 2023
Docket12-23-00159-CR
StatusPublished

This text of Ex Parte: Omarion Lewis v. the State of Texas (Ex Parte: Omarion Lewis v. the State of Texas) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Ex Parte: Omarion Lewis v. the State of Texas, (Tex. Ct. App. 2023).

Opinion

NO. 12-23-00159-CR

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT

TYLER, TEXAS

EX PARTE: § APPEAL FROM THE 217TH

OMARION LEWIS § JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

§ ANGELINA COUNTY, TEXAS

MEMORANDUM OPINION Omarion Lewis appeals from the trial court’s denial of his pretrial application for writ of habeas corpus seeking a bond reduction. We reverse and remand.

BACKGROUND A warrant was issued for Appellant’s arrest for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. Three co-defendants were also arrested for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. At the time of the alleged offense, 1 Appellant was seventeen years old and a high school student. Accompanied by his mother, Appellant turned himself in, and he was subsequently indicted. 2 Appellant’s bond was set at $500,000, and he filed an application for writ of habeas corpus, in which he sought reduction of his bond. In the motion, Appellant asserted that he is a United States citizen with no prior criminal record, and he asked the court to schedule an evidentiary hearing and to set a bond in a reasonable amount with reasonable conditions to allow him to obtain release pending trial. Appellant asserted that the amount of his bail “is unsupported by the evidence and law and is therefore excessive and unlawful.”

1 Public online jail records from Angelina County, Texas, indicate that the offense occurred on March 12, 2023. 2 The indictment does not appear in the record, but the prosecutor stated at the beginning of the bond reduction hearing that Appellant was indicted. At the hearing on the application, Appellant’s mother, Betty Shankle, testified that she has worked as a correctional officer for twenty-two years and has never been in trouble with the law. Shankle explained that Appellant is a lifelong citizen of the United States and the State of Texas, is unemployed, did not graduate from high school, and has no money. Shankle contacted three bond companies, but each required a fee plus ten percent of the bond amount, and she testified that she can only afford a $30,000 bond. Shankle does not own a home, owns one vehicle, and does not have weapons in her home. Shankle testified that she would post bond for Appellant if it were reduced, and Appellant would reside with her. Shankle testified that although she resides in Wisconsin, she can move back to Texas to live with one of her sisters, and she would ensure that Appellant would appear at every court date and abide by the bond conditions. When asked by the prosecutor if she is aware that the victim died, Shankle testified, “I wasn’t aware at the time.” When Shankle learned that an arrest warrant for Appellant was issued, she immediately came to Texas and accompanied Appellant when he surrendered to the police. Shankle hopes that Appellant will obtain a GED and employment. The trial court signed an order denying Appellant’s application for writ of habeas corpus. This appeal followed.

BOND AMOUNT In one issue, Appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by declining to reduce the amount of his bail bond. The State did not file a brief.

Standard of Review and Applicable Law Because the decision regarding a proper bail amount lies within the sound discretion of the trial court, we review the trial court’s denial of a request to reduce bail for an abuse of discretion. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 17.15 (West Supp. 2022); Ex parte Rubac, 611 S.W.2d 848, 850 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981); Clemons v. State, 220 S.W.3d 176, 178 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2007, no pet.). In determining whether the trial court abused its discretion, we do not substitute our judgment for that of the trial court. Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 379-80 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990). We must determine whether the trial court acted arbitrarily or unreasonably, without reference to any guiding rules or principles. Id. at 380. A trial court abuses its discretion when its decision is so clearly wrong as to lie outside the zone of reasonable disagreement. Id. at 391 (op.

2 on reh’g). The petitioner bears the burden of showing that the bail set is excessive. Rubac, 611 S.W.2d at 849. The purpose of setting a pretrial bond is to secure an appellant’s presence at trial. See Ex parte Rodriguez, 595 S.W.2d 549, 550 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1980); Ex parte Rincon, Nos. 04-13-00715-CR—04-13-00718-CR, 2014 WL 2443870, at *1 (Tex. App.—San Antonio May 28, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). The amount of bond necessary to achieve said purpose is committed to the trial court’s sound discretion; however, the trial court’s discretion is bounded and guided by constitutional and statutory provisions. See Ex parte Estrada, 398 S.W.3d 723, 724 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2008, no pet.). The federal constitution, our state constitution, and our state laws prohibit “excessive” bail. U.S. CONST. Amend. VIII, TEX. CONST. art. I, § 13; TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 1.09 (West 2005). “[B]ail shall be sufficiently high to give reasonable assurance that the undertaking will be complied with[;] however, “[t]he power to require bail is not to be so used as to make it an instrument of oppression.” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 17.15(1), (2). Although a defendant’s ability to make bail must be considered, it is not controlling. See id. art. 17.15(4); Rodriguez, 595 S.W.2d at 550. The primary considerations when assessing the reasonableness of bail are the punishments that can be imposed and the nature of the offense. Ex parte Ramirez- Hernandez, 642 S.W.3d 907, 917 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2022, no pet.); Ex parte Melartin, 464 S.W.3d 789, 792 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, no pet.). The trial court must also consider the safety of law enforcement and the community.3 TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 17.15(5). Additional factors to be weighed in determining the amount of bond include (1) the accused’s work record, (2) the accused’s family and community ties, (3) the accused’s length of residency, (4) the accused’s prior criminal record, (5) the accused’s conformity with previous bond conditions, (6) the existence of other outstanding bonds, if any, and (7) aggravating circumstances allegedly involved in the charged offense. See Rubac, 611 S.W.2d at 849-50. Analysis We begin by summarizing the evidence adduced at the hearing regarding the nature of the offense and the potential punishments, as well as other applicable factors. Appellant is charged with aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, and the prosecutor indicated that the victim died of his injuries. The nature of the offense and the potential punishment weigh in favor of a somewhat

3 The safety of the victim is also a factor; however, in this case, the victim is deceased.

3 high bail amount. If convicted of the second-degree felony offense of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, Appellant faces a punishment range of two to twenty years in prison and a fine of up to $10,000. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 12.33 (West 2019), 22.02(a)(2), (b) (West Supp. 2022). The safety of the community also supports a somewhat high bail amount. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PRO. ANN. art. 17.15(a)(5). Shankle testified that if Appellant’s bond were lowered and he were released on bond, he would reside with her at her sister’s residence in Texas, and she hopes he would work toward obtaining a GED.

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Ex Parte: Omarion Lewis v. the State of Texas, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ex-parte-omarion-lewis-v-the-state-of-texas-texapp-2023.