Court of Appeals Tenth Appellate District of Texas
10-24-00060-CV
Ex parte N.T.W.
On appeal from the 272nd District Court of Brazos County, Texas Judge John L. Brick, presiding Trial Court Cause No. 23-001095-CV-272
JUSTICE HARRIS delivered the opinion of the Court.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
N.T.W. appeals the portion of the trial court’s order denying the
expunction of his Evading Arrest or Detention prosecution records. N.T.W.
argues that former article 55.01(a)(2)(A) and (B) provide alternative paths for
misdemeanor expunction under the offense-based Texas expunction scheme
and that under article 55.01(a)(2)(B), N.T.W. is entitled to expunction. We
agree. Because we find that N.T.W. met all statutory requirements under
article 55.01(a)(2)(B), we reverse and render judgment that N.T.W. is entitled
to expunction for the offense of Evading Arrest or Detention. Background
On January 19, 2016, N.T.W. was arrested in Brazos County for
Evading Arrest or Detention. The Brazos County Attorney’s Office filed a
formal information and complaint, alleging that N.T.W. committed a Class A
misdemeanor offense of Evading Arrest or Detention. Pursuant to a plea
negotiation in which N.T.W. pleaded guilty to the Class C misdemeanor
offense of Disorderly Conduct, the Brazos County Attorney’s Office dismissed
the Evading Arrest charge on June 30, 2016.
N.T.W. was then placed on 180 days deferred disposition for the related
Disorderly Conduct offense. After N.T.W. successfully completed his deferred
disposition, the Brazos County Attorney’s Office subsequently dismissed the
Disorderly Conduct charge on December 26, 2016.
On April 9, 2023, N.T.W. filed a Petition seeking to expunge the records
of the dismissed Evading Arrest or Detention prosecution and the related
completed Disorderly Conduct deferred adjudication. The Trial Court issued
a written Order Partially Granting Petition for Expunction, granting the
request to expunge the Disorderly Conduct charge but denying the
expunction on the Evading Arrest charge on the grounds that article
55.01(a)(2)(A)(ii) precludes expunction for a case where an indictment or
Ex parte N.T.W. Page 2 information has been filed, and the Petitioner does not meet the criteria
listed in that section.
On December 29, 2023, N.T.W. filed a Motion for New Trial, which was
denied on February 6, 2024. N.T.W appealed the portion of the Order
denying the expunction Petition as to the Evading Arrest or Detention
prosecution request.
Standard of Review and Applicable Law
A trial court’s ruling on a petition for expunction is reviewed for abuse
of discretion, but the meaning of a statute is a question of law reviewed de
novo. Ex parte R.P.G.P., 623 S.W.3d 313, 317 (Tex. 2021). Here, the trial
court’s ruling on N.T.W.’s expunction request hinged on a question of law
because it required an interpretation of article 55.01; therefore, we review the
ruling de novo. State v. T.S.N., 547 S.W.3d 617, 620 (Tex. 2018); City of
Rockwall v. Hughes, 246 S.W.3d 621, 625 (Tex. 2008) (stating that statutory
construction is a question of law).
Article 55.01 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure sets forth the
requirements for the expunction of criminal records. A person is only entitled
to expunction if all statutory requirements have been satisfied. Tex. Dep't of
Pub. Safety v. J.H.J., 274 S.W.3d 803, 806 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
2008, no pet.). Because expunction is a “privilege defined by the Legislature,”
Ex parte N.T.W. Page 3 the statutory requirements are “mandatory and exclusive and cannot be
equitably expanded by the courts.” Ex parte R.P.G.P., 623 S.W.3d at 316. As
applicable to this case, article 55.01(a)(2) states:
(a) A person who has been placed under a custodial or noncustodial arrest for commission of either a felony or misdemeanor is entitled to have all records and files relating to the arrest expunged if: … (2) the person has been released and the charge, if any, has not resulted in a final conviction and is no longer pending and there was no court-ordered community supervision under Chapter 42A for the offense, unless the offense is a Class C misdemeanor, provided that:
(A) regardless of whether any statute of limitations exists for the offense and whether any limitations period for the offense has expired, an indictment or information charging the person with the commission of a misdemeanor offense based on the person's arrest or charging the person with the commission of any felony offense arising out of the same transaction for which the person was arrested: … (ii) if presented at any time following the arrest, was dismissed or quashed, and the court finds that the indictment or information was dismissed or quashed because: … (d) the presentment had been made because of mistake, false information, or other similar reason indicating absence of probable cause at the time of the dismissal to believe the person committed the offense; or
(e) the indictment or information was void; or
(B) prosecution of the person for the offense for which the person was arrested is no longer possible because the limitations period has expired.
Ex parte N.T.W. Page 4 TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 55.01(a)(2) (emphasis added).
Statutes are analyzed “‘as a cohesive, contextual whole’ with the goal of
effectuating the Legislature’s intent,” and reading the plain language of the
statute “in context, not isolation.” Ex parte R.P.G.P., 623 S.W.3d at 317
(citing State v. T.S.N., 547 S.W.3d 617, 620 (Tex. 2018)); Ross v. St. Luke's
Episcopal Hosp., 462 S.W.3d 496, 501 (Tex. 2015). Courts should not
interpret statutes in a manner that renders any portion superfluous or
meaningless. Crosstex Energy Servs., L.P. v. Pro Plus, Inc., 430 S.W.3d 384,
390 (Tex. 2014) (quoting Columbia Med. Ctr. of Las Colinas, Inc. v. Hogue,
271 S.W.3d 238, 256 (Tex. 2008)).
Analysis
In his sole issue, N.T.W. asserts that former article 55.01(a)(2)(A) and
(B) provide alternative paths for misdemeanor expunction under the offense-
based Texas expunction scheme. N.T.W. argues that he is entitled to
expunction because he satisfies the requirements of 55.01(a)(2)(B). The State
argues that because an information was filed charging N.T.W. with Evading
Arrest, and he does not meet the requirements of 55.01(a)(2)(A), N.T.W. is not
entitled to an expunction of his Evading Arrest charge.
The State’s interpretation is at odds with the plain language of article
55.01(a)(2), which divides (a)(2)(A) and (B) with the word “or.” See TEX. CODE
Ex parte N.T.W. Page 5 CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 55.01(a)(2). Had the Legislature intended to require
that a person seeking expunction satisfy both (A) and (B), it could have
instead joined the subsections using “and.” Therefore, in construing the
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Court of Appeals Tenth Appellate District of Texas
10-24-00060-CV
Ex parte N.T.W.
On appeal from the 272nd District Court of Brazos County, Texas Judge John L. Brick, presiding Trial Court Cause No. 23-001095-CV-272
JUSTICE HARRIS delivered the opinion of the Court.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
N.T.W. appeals the portion of the trial court’s order denying the
expunction of his Evading Arrest or Detention prosecution records. N.T.W.
argues that former article 55.01(a)(2)(A) and (B) provide alternative paths for
misdemeanor expunction under the offense-based Texas expunction scheme
and that under article 55.01(a)(2)(B), N.T.W. is entitled to expunction. We
agree. Because we find that N.T.W. met all statutory requirements under
article 55.01(a)(2)(B), we reverse and render judgment that N.T.W. is entitled
to expunction for the offense of Evading Arrest or Detention. Background
On January 19, 2016, N.T.W. was arrested in Brazos County for
Evading Arrest or Detention. The Brazos County Attorney’s Office filed a
formal information and complaint, alleging that N.T.W. committed a Class A
misdemeanor offense of Evading Arrest or Detention. Pursuant to a plea
negotiation in which N.T.W. pleaded guilty to the Class C misdemeanor
offense of Disorderly Conduct, the Brazos County Attorney’s Office dismissed
the Evading Arrest charge on June 30, 2016.
N.T.W. was then placed on 180 days deferred disposition for the related
Disorderly Conduct offense. After N.T.W. successfully completed his deferred
disposition, the Brazos County Attorney’s Office subsequently dismissed the
Disorderly Conduct charge on December 26, 2016.
On April 9, 2023, N.T.W. filed a Petition seeking to expunge the records
of the dismissed Evading Arrest or Detention prosecution and the related
completed Disorderly Conduct deferred adjudication. The Trial Court issued
a written Order Partially Granting Petition for Expunction, granting the
request to expunge the Disorderly Conduct charge but denying the
expunction on the Evading Arrest charge on the grounds that article
55.01(a)(2)(A)(ii) precludes expunction for a case where an indictment or
Ex parte N.T.W. Page 2 information has been filed, and the Petitioner does not meet the criteria
listed in that section.
On December 29, 2023, N.T.W. filed a Motion for New Trial, which was
denied on February 6, 2024. N.T.W appealed the portion of the Order
denying the expunction Petition as to the Evading Arrest or Detention
prosecution request.
Standard of Review and Applicable Law
A trial court’s ruling on a petition for expunction is reviewed for abuse
of discretion, but the meaning of a statute is a question of law reviewed de
novo. Ex parte R.P.G.P., 623 S.W.3d 313, 317 (Tex. 2021). Here, the trial
court’s ruling on N.T.W.’s expunction request hinged on a question of law
because it required an interpretation of article 55.01; therefore, we review the
ruling de novo. State v. T.S.N., 547 S.W.3d 617, 620 (Tex. 2018); City of
Rockwall v. Hughes, 246 S.W.3d 621, 625 (Tex. 2008) (stating that statutory
construction is a question of law).
Article 55.01 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure sets forth the
requirements for the expunction of criminal records. A person is only entitled
to expunction if all statutory requirements have been satisfied. Tex. Dep't of
Pub. Safety v. J.H.J., 274 S.W.3d 803, 806 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
2008, no pet.). Because expunction is a “privilege defined by the Legislature,”
Ex parte N.T.W. Page 3 the statutory requirements are “mandatory and exclusive and cannot be
equitably expanded by the courts.” Ex parte R.P.G.P., 623 S.W.3d at 316. As
applicable to this case, article 55.01(a)(2) states:
(a) A person who has been placed under a custodial or noncustodial arrest for commission of either a felony or misdemeanor is entitled to have all records and files relating to the arrest expunged if: … (2) the person has been released and the charge, if any, has not resulted in a final conviction and is no longer pending and there was no court-ordered community supervision under Chapter 42A for the offense, unless the offense is a Class C misdemeanor, provided that:
(A) regardless of whether any statute of limitations exists for the offense and whether any limitations period for the offense has expired, an indictment or information charging the person with the commission of a misdemeanor offense based on the person's arrest or charging the person with the commission of any felony offense arising out of the same transaction for which the person was arrested: … (ii) if presented at any time following the arrest, was dismissed or quashed, and the court finds that the indictment or information was dismissed or quashed because: … (d) the presentment had been made because of mistake, false information, or other similar reason indicating absence of probable cause at the time of the dismissal to believe the person committed the offense; or
(e) the indictment or information was void; or
(B) prosecution of the person for the offense for which the person was arrested is no longer possible because the limitations period has expired.
Ex parte N.T.W. Page 4 TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 55.01(a)(2) (emphasis added).
Statutes are analyzed “‘as a cohesive, contextual whole’ with the goal of
effectuating the Legislature’s intent,” and reading the plain language of the
statute “in context, not isolation.” Ex parte R.P.G.P., 623 S.W.3d at 317
(citing State v. T.S.N., 547 S.W.3d 617, 620 (Tex. 2018)); Ross v. St. Luke's
Episcopal Hosp., 462 S.W.3d 496, 501 (Tex. 2015). Courts should not
interpret statutes in a manner that renders any portion superfluous or
meaningless. Crosstex Energy Servs., L.P. v. Pro Plus, Inc., 430 S.W.3d 384,
390 (Tex. 2014) (quoting Columbia Med. Ctr. of Las Colinas, Inc. v. Hogue,
271 S.W.3d 238, 256 (Tex. 2008)).
Analysis
In his sole issue, N.T.W. asserts that former article 55.01(a)(2)(A) and
(B) provide alternative paths for misdemeanor expunction under the offense-
based Texas expunction scheme. N.T.W. argues that he is entitled to
expunction because he satisfies the requirements of 55.01(a)(2)(B). The State
argues that because an information was filed charging N.T.W. with Evading
Arrest, and he does not meet the requirements of 55.01(a)(2)(A), N.T.W. is not
entitled to an expunction of his Evading Arrest charge.
The State’s interpretation is at odds with the plain language of article
55.01(a)(2), which divides (a)(2)(A) and (B) with the word “or.” See TEX. CODE
Ex parte N.T.W. Page 5 CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 55.01(a)(2). Had the Legislature intended to require
that a person seeking expunction satisfy both (A) and (B), it could have
instead joined the subsections using “and.” Therefore, in construing the
statute consistent with the plain meaning of its language, we find that a
person who has been arrested is entitled to expunction relating to the arrest
under 55.01(a)(2)(B) if: (1) the person has been released; (2) the charge has
not resulted in a final conviction and is no longer pending; (3) there was no
court-ordered community supervision for the offense, and (4) prosecution for
the evading arrest charge is no longer possible because the statute of
limitations period has expired. Ex parte N.B.J., 552 S.W.3d 376, 380 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, no pet.).
An information has been presented in this case, so the State contends
that N.T.W. must satisfy one of the statutory requirements set forth beneath
(a)(2)(A)(ii). However, proper statutory interpretation requires that we read
subsections (A) and (B) as separate and alternative pathways to expunction
because they are separated by the word “or.” Although (A)(ii) is applicable
when an information has been presented following the arrest, nothing within
the statute indicates that (A)(ii) must apply when an information has been
presented. The Legislature included (B) as a path to expunction regardless of
Ex parte N.T.W. Page 6 whether an information was presented, giving N.T.W. a route to expunction
independent of (A)(i) and (ii). See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 55.01(a)(2).
The State argues that N.T.W.’s interpretation is inconsistent with
Legislative intent. Considering the recent non-substantive changes to the
relevant statute, we disagree. The Legislature rewrote 55.01(a)(2)(B) as a
standalone article reading: “A person to whom this subchapter applies is
entitled to have all records and files relating to the arrest expunged if
prosecution of the person for the offense for which the person was arrested is
no longer possible because the limitations period has expired.” TEX. CODE
CRIM. PRO. ANN. art. 55A.054. Reading 55A.054 in conjunction with 55A.051,
which lists the expunction prerequisites formerly within 55.01(a)(2), indicates
the Legislature intended former article 55.01(a)(2)(B) as an alternative
pathway to expunction, distinct from (a)(2)(A).
The Texas Supreme Court recently revisited the offense-based versus
arrest-based entitlement to expunction under article 55.01(a)(2). Ex parte
R.P.G.P., 623 S.W.3d at 325. After analyzing the statutory language of
article 55.01(a)(2)(A), the Supreme Court concluded that misdemeanor
offenses are eligible for expunction on an individual basis. Id. at 315. The
Court also found that the prerequisites to expunction in article 55.01(a)(2)
are offense-based. Id. at 323. (“The alteration from ‘any’ to ‘the’ indicates the
Ex parte N.T.W. Page 7 Legislature’s intent to change, or at least clarify, that arrests are tied to
single offenses for the purpose of satisfying the requirements in (a)(2).”).
Following the offense-based approach, Texas appellate courts considering
expunctions under 55.01(a)(2)(B) have treated it as separate and distinct
from the requirements of (a)(2)(A), granting expunction requests when the
petitioner has satisfied the prerequisites of (a)(2) and the applicable statute
of limitations had expired. Ex parte R.J.F., 640 S.W.3d 365, 370 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2022, no pet.); Ex parte N.B.J., 552 S.W.3d at 380. See
Ex parte E.A., No. 02-23-00231-CV, 2024 WL 482871, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort
Worth Feb. 8, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op.).
The record reflects that N.T.W. has been released, his Evading Arrest
charge has not resulted in a final conviction and is no longer pending, there
was no court-ordered community supervision for the offense, and the
applicable statute of limitations has expired. N.T.W. thus satisfies all the
requirements under 55.01(a)(2)(B) and is therefore entitled to an expunction
of his Evading Arrest charge.
Conclusion
We find that former article 55.01(a)(2)(A) and (B) provide alternative
paths for misdemeanor expunction under the offense-based Texas expunction
scheme, and under article 55.01(a)(2)(B), N.T.W. is entitled to expunction.
Ex parte N.T.W. Page 8 We reverse and render judgment that N.T.W. is entitled to expunction for the
offense of Evading Arrest or Detention regarding the portion of the trial
court’s order denying the expunction on the Evading Arrest charge.
LEE HARRIS Justice
OPINION DELIVERED and FILED: May 7, 2026 Before Chief Justice Johnson, Justice Smith, and Justice Harris Reversed and rendered CV06
Ex parte N.T.W. Page 9