Ex Parte Nathan Ryan Jones v. the State of Texas

• Court: Texas Court of Appeals, 10th District (Waco)
• Decided: February 12, 2026
• Docket: 10-25-00037-CR
• Status: Published

Opinion

Court of Appeals Tenth Appellate District of Texas

10-25-00036-CR, 10-25-00037-CR

Ex parte Nathan Ryan Jones

On appeal from the 82nd District Court of Robertson County, Texas Judge Bryan F. Russ Jr., presiding Trial Court Cause Nos. 22-03-21586-CR, 22-04-21619-CR

JUSTICE SMITH delivered the opinion of the Court.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Nathan Ryan Jones appeals the habeas court’s denial of his article

11.072 applications for writs of habeas corpus based on ineffective assistance

of trial counsel. We affirm.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

In an article 11.072 application for writ of habeas corpus, the habeas

judge is the sole factfinder. See Ex parte Garcia, 353 S.W.3d 785, 788 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2011). In our review, we afford great deference to the habeas

court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law that are supported by the record.

See Ex parte Mello, 355 S.W.3d 827, 832 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2011, pet. ref’d). We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the habeas court’s

ruling and uphold the ruling absent an abuse of discretion. Id. We review de

novo the habeas court’s resolution of pure questions of law and its resolution

of mixed questions of law and fact that do not turn on witness credibility. See

Ex parte Beck, 541 S.W.3d 846, 852 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017). We will uphold

the habeas court’s decision on any theory of law applicable to the case. See id.

RELEVANT LAW

Article 11.072 of the Code of Criminal Procedure establishes the

procedures for a writ of habeas corpus in a criminal case in which the

defendant was originally placed on community supervision. See TEX. CODE

CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 11.072. An applicant seeking a writ of habeas corpus

bears the burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he is entitled

to relief. Ex parte Torres, 483 S.W.3d 35, 43 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016).

An applicant seeking relief based on ineffective assistance of counsel

must demonstrate that (1) counsel’s performance was deficient, in that it fell

below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) the applicant was

prejudiced as a result of counsel’s errors, in that, but for those errors, there is

a reasonable probability of a different outcome. Id. (citing Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 693 (1984)). If the applicant fails to make a

Ex parte Nathan Ryan Jones Page 2 showing under either prong, his claim for ineffective assistance of counsel must

be denied. Rylander v. State, 101 S.W.3d 107, 110 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003).

Counsel has a duty in every case to make a reasonable investigation or

a reasonable decision that an investigation is unnecessary. See Ex parte

Martinez, 195 S.W.3d 713, 721 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). When an applicant

raises the claim that counsel was ineffective for failure to investigate, he must

demonstrate what the more in-depth investigation would have shown. Ex

parte Dennis, 665 S.W.3d 569, 574 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022). Additionally,

[i]n the context of a collateral challenge to a guilty plea, the focus of the prejudice inquiry is on “whether counsel’s constitutionally ineffective performance affected the outcome of the plea process,” and on whether a defendant has shown that “but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.”

Torres, 483 S.W.3d at 43 (quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985)).

RELEVANT FACTS

Jones was charged in the underlying cases with separate instances of

Repeated Violation of Court Order or Condition of Bond for allegedly

communicating with a person he was court-ordered not to communicate with.

See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 25.072. On September 12, 2022, pursuant to a

plea agreement, Jones pled guilty and was placed on five years deferred

adjudication community supervision in both cases. On October 25, 2024, Jones

Ex parte Nathan Ryan Jones Page 3 filed article 11.072 applications for writs of habeas corpus requesting the trial

court to set aside the orders placing him on deferred adjudication community

supervision. He alleged that his original pleas in each case were involuntary

based on ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

The habeas court held a hearing on the applications for writs of habeas

corpus. Jones’s trial counsel was the only witness called to testify at the

hearing. Copies of discovery provided by the State to Jones’s trial counsel were

also admitted into evidence. The habeas court concluded that Jones failed to

prove that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel and denied

his applications for writs of habeas corpus.1

ANALYSIS

Jones argues ineffective assistance of counsel by attacking the

sufficiency of the evidence in the discovery provided by the State and claiming

that trial counsel should have conducted further investigation into the

allegations. However, Jones has failed to satisfy the deficient-performance

prong of Strickland because there is no evidence in the record explaining what

a more in-depth investigation would have shown. Further, trial counsel

1 Because the trial court’s order did not deny Jones’s habeas applications as frivolous and the clerk’s

record did not include the required findings of fact and conclusions of law, this Court abated the appeal for entry of the necessary findings and conclusions. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 11.072, §7(a).

Ex parte Nathan Ryan Jones Page 4 testified that he reviewed each of the allegations with Jones, Jones reviewed

all of the documents in the discovery,2 and Jones decided to enter into the plea

agreement. This supports a finding that trial counsel’s performance was not

deficient because he made a reasonable decision that further investigation was

unnecessary. See Martinez, 195 S.W.3d at 721. Counsel also noted that he

was present when Jones entered his guilty pleas and heard the court ask Jones

whether his pleas were entered freely, knowingly, and voluntarily. The habeas

court expressly found trial counsel to be credible. Because Jones’s failed to

demonstrate deficient performance by his trial counsel, he failed to establish

his claim for ineffective assistance of counsel.3 The habeas court did not abuse

its discretion in denying Jones’s applications for writs of habeas corpus.

Accordingly, Jones’s sole issue in each of these appeals is overruled. We

affirm the orders of the habeas court.

2 Trial counsel explained that Jones did not review any of the video evidence because Jones did not

make an appointment to review the video evidence at trial counsel’s office. 3 In his supplemental brief, Jones takes issue with the following finding of fact: “In the hearing on this matter, [Jones] did not testify and no evidence was presented that [Jones] would have insisted on going to trial if he knew or suspected his attorney was ineffective.” He claims that this finding is a violation of his constitutional right to remain silent. This finding is relevant to the prejudice prong of the analysis. See Torres, 483 S.W.3d at 43. Because we find that that the record supports the habeas court’s ruling on the deficient-performance prong of Strickland, we do not address the habeas court’s findings or conclusions concerning the prejudice prong or Jones’s challenges to them. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1; Rylander, 101 S.W.3d at 110.

Ex parte Nathan Ryan Jones Page 5 STEVE SMITH Justice

OPINION DELIVERED and FILED: February 12, 2026 Before Chief Justice Johnson, Justice Smith, and Justice Harris Affirmed Do not publish CR25

Ex parte Nathan Ryan Jones Page 6