Ex parte Nathan Nash PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS (In re: Joshua Hunter Jones and Davis Ice Cream Alabama, LLC) (Jefferson Circuit Court: CV-24-901910).

• Court: Supreme Court of Alabama
• Decided: June 27, 2025
• Docket: SC-2024-0834
• Status: Published

Opinion

Rel: June 27, 2025

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.

SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA OCTOBER TERM, 2024-2025

_________________________

SC-2024-0834 _________________________

Ex parte Nathan Nash

PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS

(In re: Nathan Nash

v.

Joshua Hunter Jones and Davis Ice Cream Alabama, LLC)

(Jefferson Circuit Court: CV-24-901910) SC-2024-0834

SHAW, Justice.

Nathan Nash, the plaintiff below, petitions this Court for a writ of

mandamus directing the Jefferson Circuit Court to vacate its order

transferring the action to the Tuscaloosa Circuit Court. We grant the

petition and issue the writ.

Facts and Procedural History

On April 8, 2024, Nash was involved in an automobile collision in

Tuscaloosa County with a truck driven by Joshua Hunter Jones and

owned by Jones's employer, Davis Ice Cream Alabama, LLC. Nash filed

a complaint for damages, including lost wages, in Jefferson County

against Jones individually, alleging negligence and wantonness, and

against Davis Ice Cream, alleging negligent training and hiring. The

complaint alleged that Davis Ice Cream was a limited-liability company

whose principal place of business was in Jefferson County and that Nash

and Jones reside in counties adjacent to Jefferson County -- Nash in Bibb

County and Jones in St. Clair County.

In August 2024, Davis Ice Cream filed a motion for a change of

venue under Alabama's forum non conveniens statute, § 6-3-21.1, Ala.

Code 1975, requesting, in the interest of justice, that the action be

2 SC-2024-0834

transferred to the Tuscaloosa Circuit Court based on the fact that the

collision occurred there. Nash filed an objection to the motion, stating

that, after the collision, he was transported by ambulance to the

University of Alabama at Birmingham ("UAB") emergency room in

Jefferson County. Nash also filed an affidavit stating that, following the

collision, he received treatment from five medical-service providers, all of

which are located in Jefferson County. Nash's affidavit also stated that

his employer at the time of the collision was located in Jefferson County.

The Jefferson Circuit Court entered an order transferring the

action to the Tuscaloosa Circuit Court. Nash filed a motion for

reconsideration and then timely petitioned this Court for a writ of

mandamus. This Court ordered an answer and briefs.

Standard of Review

"A writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy and is appropriate when the petitioner can show (1) a clear legal right to the order sought; (2) an imperative duty upon the respondent to perform, accompanied by a refusal to do so; (3) the lack of another adequate remedy; and (4) the properly invoked jurisdiction of the court."

Ex parte BOC Grp., Inc., 823 So. 2d 1270, 1272 (Ala. 2001). "When we

consider a mandamus petition relating to a venue ruling, our scope of

review is to determine if the trial court [exceeded] its discretion, i.e., 3 SC-2024-0834

whether it exercised its discretion in an arbitrary and capricious

manner." Ex parte Integon Corp., 672 So. 2d 497, 499 (Ala. 1995).

Discussion

Nash argues that the Jefferson Circuit Court exceeded its

discretion in transferring the action to the Tuscaloosa Circuit Court

under the interest-of-justice prong of § 6-3-21.1(a), which provides:

"With respect to civil actions filed in an appropriate venue, any court of general jurisdiction shall, for the convenience of parties and witnesses, or in the interest of justice, transfer any civil action or any claim in any civil action to any court of general jurisdiction in which the action might have been properly filed and the case shall proceed as though originally filed therein."

(Emphasis added.)

It appears to be undisputed that Jefferson County and Tuscaloosa

County are both proper venues for this action. See § 6-3-2(a)(3), Ala. Code

1975; § 6-3-7(a)(2), Ala. Code 1975. When analyzing the interest-of-

justice prong of § 6-3-21.1(a),

" 'this Court focuses on whether the "nexus" or "connection" between the plaintiff's action and the original forum is strong enough to warrant burdening the plaintiff's forum with the action.' '[T]he county to which the transfer is sought must have a "strong" nexus or connection to the lawsuit, while the county from which the transfer is sought must have a "weak" or "little" connection to the action.' Additionally, this Court has held that 'litigation should be handled in the forum where 4 SC-2024-0834

the injury occurred.' 'Although we assign "considerable weight" to the location where the accident occurred, it is not, and should not be, the sole consideration for determining venue under the "interest of justice" prong of § 6-3-21.1.' Accordingly, in determining venue under § 6-3-21.1, this Court traditionally considers the residence of the parties and any interested or affected nonparties."

Ex parte Burgess, 298 So. 3d 1080, 1083 (Ala. 2020) (internal citations

omitted). The determination whether to transfer a case under the

interest-of-justice prong of § 6-3-21.1(a) is dependent on the facts of the

case and is not merely "a simple balancing test weighing each county's

connection to an action." Ex parte J & W Enters., LLC, 150 So. 3d 190,

196 (Ala. 2014).

Here, Davis Ice Cream moved to transfer the action and thus had

the initial burden of demonstrating that having the action transferred to

Tuscaloosa County would serve the interest of justice. Davis Ice Cream

could carry that burden by showing not only that Tuscaloosa County has

a strong connection to the action, but also that Jefferson County has a

weak connection to the action. Burgess, 298 So. 3d at 1083.

As for Jefferson County's connection to the action, Davis Ice

Cream's principal place of business is in Jefferson County. Additionally,

Nash demonstrated that his relevant medical providers are located in

5 SC-2024-0834

Jefferson County. Nash also asserted that his loss-of-wages claim would

likely require documents or deposition testimony from his employer,

which is located in Jefferson County. Furthermore, as Nash's objection

to the motion to transfer the action pointed out: "Plaintiff has also

asserted in [his] Complaint claims of negligent training, managing and

hiring of employees, including the defendant Joshua Hunter Jones." The

act of hiring Jones, Nash noted, "presumably occurred at the principal

office of [Davis Ice Cream], located in Jefferson County."

Tuscaloosa County's only substantiated connection to the action is

that the collision took place there. Ex parte Reed, 295 So. 3d 38, 41 (Ala.

2019) (quoting Ex parte National Sec. Ins. Co., 727 So. 2d 788, 789 (Ala.

1998)) (" '[This Court's] review [of a mandamus petition] is … limited to

those facts that were before the trial court.' "). Davis Ice Cream stated in

its motion to transfer the action that "the accident was investigated by

Tuscaloosa law enforcement officers" and that, thus, "Tuscaloosa County

witnesses and officials who may need to testify will benefit from the case

being transferred to Tuscaloosa County." However, the "crash report"

produced by Davis Ice Cream merely states the name of the investigating

officer. Davis Ice Cream did not provide evidence showing where the

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investigating officer resides, where his department is located, or where

he would travel from to attend proceedings. Davis Ice Cream's motion to

transfer the action did not identify or provide evidence of any other

eyewitnesses in Tuscaloosa County. Moreover, Davis Ice Cream has not

suggested, and has presented no evidence demonstrating, that any of the

parties received medical treatment for their injuries in Tuscaloosa

County and has not identified any relevant documents located in

Tuscaloosa County.

The facts of this case are analogous to those in J & W Enterprises,

in which this Court held that a change of venue was not warranted under

the interest-of-justice prong of § 6-3-21.1(a). In J & W Enterprises, the

plaintiff was injured in an automobile collision in Mobile County, but

filed suit in Clarke County, where one of the defendants resided and

where the defendant employer maintained its principal place of business.

150 So. 3d at 192. The defendants filed a motion for a change of venue to

Mobile County, where the collision occurred, and that motion was denied.

Id. The defendants then petitioned this Court for a writ of mandamus.

Id. In denying the petition, this Court reasoned:

"In the present case, the facts before this Court do not indicate that Mobile County has a particularly strong 7 SC-2024-0834

connection to this lawsuit. The accident occurred in Mobile County, and the Mobile Police Department prepared an accident report, but there the connections to Mobile County cease. None of the parties lives in Mobile County. [The plaintiff] did not receive treatment for his injuries in Mobile County. [The defendants] have not identified any relevant documents that are located in Mobile County. No eyewitnesses are located in Mobile County, and the investigating police officer has testified that he is willing to travel to Clarke County. In light of the facts before us, Mobile County's nexus to the action is purely fortuitous -- the place on the interstate where the accident occurred."

Id. at 196 (footnote omitted).

The facts of this case are also analogous to those in Burgess, in

which this Court held that a change of venue was not warranted under

the interest-of-justice prong of § 6-3-21.1(a). There, the Court determined

that the transferee county's "sole connection to this case is the fact that

the accident occurred there. The defendants have not asserted additional

facts to indicate that the overall connection between [the transferee

county] and this case is strong." Burgess, 298 So. 3d at 1084.

Additionally, in its venue analysis, the Burgess Court considered that the

plaintiff had asserted a claim of negligent entrustment against another

defendant in addition to his claim of negligence against the driver and

stated: "[I]t stands to reason that documents relevant to Burgess's

negligent-entrustment claim are located in [the original venue]." Id. 8 SC-2024-0834

Here, too, the sole connection to Tuscaloosa County is that the

collision occurred there. Additionally, one of the claims in this action

involves negligent hiring. As in Burgess, it stands to reason that the

negligent-hiring claim would involve documents or other evidence in

Jefferson County, where Davis Ice Cream maintains its principal place

of business and presumably does its hiring and keeps documents relevant

to its hiring processes.

Ultimately, Davis Ice Cream failed to meet its burden of proving

both that Tuscaloosa County has a strong connection to the action and

that Jefferson County has a weak connection to the action. Thus, Davis

Ice Cream failed to demonstrate that, in the interest of justice, a change

of venue was warranted.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the Jefferson Circuit

Court exceeded its discretion in transferring this case to the Tuscaloosa

Circuit Court. We thus grant the petition for a writ of mandamus and

hereby direct the Jefferson Circuit Court to vacate its order transferring

the action to the Tuscaloosa Circuit Court.

PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED.

9 SC-2024-0834

Stewart, C.J., and Wise, Bryan, Sellers, Mendheim, Cook, McCool,

and Lewis, JJ., concur.