Rel: December 19, 2025
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA OCTOBER TERM, 2025-2026
_________________________
SC-2025-0213 _________________________
Ex parte Michael Timothy Huff
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
(In re: Michael Timothy Huff
v.
State of Alabama)
(Russell Circuit Court: CC-23-305 and CC-23-549; Court of Criminal Appeals: CR-2023-0983)
PER CURIAM.
WRIT QUASHED. NO OPINION. SC-2025-0213
Shaw, Wise, Bryan, and Mendheim, JJ., concur.
Parker, J., concurs specially, with opinion.
Cook, J., dissents, with opinion, which Stewart, C.J., and Sellers,
J., join.
McCool, J., recuses himself.
2 SC-2025-0213
PARKER, Justice (concurring specially).
I agree that we should quash the writ as improvidently granted.
Our Court granted review to resolve a material (and narrow)
question of first impression relating to the mental-culpability element of
reckless manslaughter. Ala. Code 1975, § 13A-6-3(a)(1). That question
conceded Michael Timothy Huff's awareness of his wife Rhonda Crute's
"previous instances of violence," her "documented mental issues," and
that she was high on methamphetamine when he left her alone with his
ailing sister, Beverly Dunn, for those 22 fateful minutes on February 9,
2023. Petition at 3. The linchpin of the question, rather, was its premise
that Crute had shown "no intention" or "signs" that she would harm
Dunn before Huff left the two alone.1 In those circumstances, did Huff
1The question presented in Huff's petition for certiorari was actually premised on the absence of signs that Crute might kill Dunn if the two were left alone. Petition at 3. But in my view, it makes no difference whether Crute was more or less likely to murder Dunn or, instead, whether Crute was merely capable of hurting Dunn in some less dramatic way. For one thing, whether Huff could reasonably have foreseen Dunn's death (as opposed to mere injury) concerns the causation element of reckless manslaughter, not the mental-culpability element. Cf. Grant v. State, 324 So. 3d 887, 898 (Ala. Crim. App. 2020). And our Court specifically declined to review any question related to that element of reckless manslaughter. See this Court's May 28, 2025, order (limiting review to "Issue I," mental culpability). What is more, even in a causation analysis, the foreseeability of the "degree of harm" appears to be 3 SC-2025-0213
act recklessly in leaving Dunn alone with Crute? To put it more precisely,
was Huff "aware of" and did he "consciously disregard[]" a "substantial
and unjustifiable risk" that Crute would harm Dunn? Ala. Code 1975, §
13A-2-2(3) (defining "recklessly").
There are at least two reasons why this case proves to be a poor
vehicle for answering that question.
First, Huff's framing of the question discounts evidence that he
knew his wife was armed at that critical moment when he left Dunn's
apartment. At trial, Crute acknowledged that she "always carried [a]
knife with [her]." Crute further acknowledged that she carried a knife
with her "every time" she left the couple's home. From that testimony,
the jury could rationally have believed that Huff knew not only that his
wife was high, violent, and mentally ill when he left her alone with Crute
but also that she was carrying a knife. Evidence of a person's habit can
validly prove that person's conduct "on a particular occasion." Rule 406,
Ala. R. Evid.
immaterial if some harm was foreseeable. Commentary to § 13A-2-5, Ala. Code 1975 (emphasis added). 4 SC-2025-0213
Second, and more importantly, the question discounts Huff's own
statements that he was aware of and consciously disregarded a
substantial and unjustifiable risk of Crute harming Dunn. In a
Mirandized statement at the police station describing the moments
before he left Dunn's apartment, Huff said: "Every time I looked at
[Crute] she had a wild look on her face." In that same interview, Huff told
police that Crute "seemed crazy before he left" Dunn's apartment. He also
told police: "I shouldn't have left [Crute] there after I saw her giving
[Dunn] these evil looks." Of course, this evidence may be subject to
multiple, competing interpretations. And of course, other evidence in the
record may point in different directions. But weighing the evidence is the
jury's job, not ours. Huff's statements are at least legally sufficient to
support the mental-culpability element of his reckless-manslaughter
conviction, especially when viewed in the light most favorable to the
jury's verdict. Cf. Ex parte Stewart, 900 So. 2d 475, 477 (Ala. 2004).
Huff's statements -- his admissions, really -- also mean that the
question is not truly a "material question … of first impression"
warranting our Court's discretionary review. Rule 39(a)(1)(C), Ala. R.
App. P. That is because when the facts and circumstances of a criminal
5 SC-2025-0213
offense are "inconclusive," this Court has long held that a defendant's
"admissions or confession" may "aid[]" the jury, allowing it to convict
"beyond a reasonable doubt, and so to support a conviction, although such
facts and circumstances, standing alone, would not thus satisfy [that
standard]." Bridges v. State, 284 Ala. 412, 417-18, 225 So. 2d 821, 826
(1969) (citing cases). As I see it, a reviewing court can and should resolve
this case through a straightforward application of that principle with no
need to further develop the law.
At the end of the day, this case does not fairly present the question
on which this Court granted review, let alone a material question of first
impression. In these circumstances, the most prudent course is to quash
the writ and allow the Court of Criminal Appeals' decision to stand as the
final word in this matter.
6 SC-2025-0213
COOK, Justice (dissenting).
On February 9, 2023, Michael Timothy Huff went to visit his 74-
year-old sister, Beverly Dunn, in Phenix City. Dunn had just been
released from the hospital after a fall and was having a hard time getting
around, so Huff stopped by to see if she needed anything.
Huff decided to bring his wife, Rhonda Crute, with him that day. As
explained below, although Crute had a history of violence, substance
abuse, and mental-health issues, there was no evidence indicating that
she had previously expressed any hostility or violence toward Dunn or
had previously made any threats against her at any time. There also was
no evidence indicating that Crute showed any hostility or violence toward
Dunn while Huff was present with the two of them on that day.
At some point during their visit, Huff offered to pick up food for
Dunn at a local fast-food restaurant, leaving Crute alone with her for
approximately 22 minutes. While he was away, Crute repeatedly stabbed
Dunn, resulting in her death. Crute later pleaded guilty to Dunn's
murder and is now in prison.
Although Huff was not present when Crute killed Dunn, he was
nevertheless charged with, and later convicted of, (1) reckless
7 SC-2025-0213
manslaughter, see § 13A-6-3(a)(1), Ala. Code 1975, and (2) first-degree
hindering prosecution, see § 13A-10-43, Ala. Code 1975, over Dunn's
death. He was then sentenced as a habitual felony offender to concurrent
terms of life imprisonment for the reckless-manslaughter offense and to
99 years' imprisonment for the hindering-prosecution offense.
Huff appealed and the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed both of
his convictions and resulting sentences by an unpublished memorandum.
See Huff v. State (No. CR-2023-0983, Dec. 20, 2024), ____ So. 3d ____
(Ala. Crim. App. 2024) (table). However, the vote was divided 3-2 on the
reckless-manslaughter conviction, with Presiding Judge Windom and
then-Judge McCool dissenting. Huff thereafter petitioned this Court for
a writ of certiorari to review the Court of Criminal Appeals' decision.
This Court granted certiorari review to consider only the propriety
of Huff's reckless-manslaughter conviction and to specifically consider,
as a material question of first impression, whether a defendant can be
independently convicted of reckless manslaughter under § 13A-6-3(a)(1)
even though he or she is not the actual person who committed the act
that resulted in a victim's death. Today, our Court quashes the writ,
without an opinion. For the reasons explained below, I respectfully
8 SC-2025-0213
dissent.
Facts and Procedural History
The evidence presented during Huff's trial showed that on
February 9, 2023, police were dispatched to Dunn's apartment in Phenix
City. Officer Tommy Pell of the Phenix City Police Department testified
that, when he entered the apartment, he discovered a "female laying face
down with her feet partially underneath a recliner." He said that she
appeared to have knife wounds to her head and her back and that there
was a great deal of blood around her body.
Dunn's neighbor, William Hogancamp, testified that, on the day
that Dunn was killed, he had taken her to see her doctor. According to
Hogancamp, Dunn had just gotten out of the hospital after a fall and was
having a hard time getting around. He said that, at around 6:30 p.m., he
saw a female leave Dunn's apartment. When he asked that female how
Dunn was doing, Hogancamp said that she responded: "I'd appreciate it
if you [did] not speak to me, my husband is an extremely jealous man."
He later saw her leaving with a man who was driving a red truck.
Next, Crute, Huff's wife, took the stand and stated that she had
pleaded guilty to killing her sister-in-law by stabbing her to death. When
9 SC-2025-0213
asked about the events that led to the killing, Crute testified that, on
February 9, 2023, she and Huff went to Dunn's apartment because Dunn
had just gotten out of the hospital. She said that she was tired and did
not want to go but Huff wanted her to go with him.
According to Crute, both she and Huff had used methamphetamine
that day, and she said that Huff knew that she had smoked a gram of
methamphetamine that day. Although she admitted that
methamphetamine sometimes could make her angry, she also stated that
it had other effects on her mood as well, including making her "feel good
for awhile."
When they got to Dunn's apartment, Crute said, they talked a little
and she felt "strange." At some point, Huff offered to pick up food for
Dunn at Sharky's Chicken restaurant ("Sharky's"), a local fast-food
restaurant. After Huff left, Crute said, she was alone with Dunn. During
that time, Crute admitted, she stabbed Dunn three times with a butcher
knife that she had in her boot.
When asked about the knife that she used to kill Dunn, Crute
admitted that she often carried a knife in her boot and that, that day, she
was carrying a "butcher knife" for her protection. Crute explained that
10 SC-2025-0213
Huff knew that she owned knives but that he did not know that she "had
those knives on her." When asked if she could have put the butcher knife
she used to kill Dunn in her boot without Huff knowing it, Crute
responded: "Yep." 2
2I note that the record reflects that the following exchange occurred
between Crute and the prosecutor regarding Crute's possession of knives:
"Q: … He also let you keep knives in your house. This isn't the only knife you had in there, was it?
"A: No. I had a whole bunch of knives.
"Q: A whole bunch of knives. And he let you carry them around with you went around places [sic], didn't he?
"A: He let me?
"Q: Yes, ma'am.
"A: He didn't know that I had those knives on me.
"Q: He never knew you carried a knife?
"A: He knew I carried a work knife.
"Q: He never knew you carried other knives?
"A: No.
"Q: You could put that knife on you without his knowing it?
"A: Yep. Put it in my boot." 11 SC-2025-0213
According to Crute, when Huff returned from Sharky's, she was
standing outside of Dunn's apartment. She said that Huff looked in the
apartment and then came right back out before transporting her back to
their trailer. When they got to their trailer, Crute said that Huff kept
telling her to "get out." She also stated that Huff told her that she had 20
minutes to leave before he called the police; however, she noted that Huff
did not actually notify the police about what had happened until several
hours later.
Crute initially testified that she did not know why she had stabbed
Dunn, given that she had no issues with Dunn. However, upon additional
questioning, Crute testified about her delusions involving her sister
named Rita. She testified that, many years ago, Rita tried to take Huff
away from her. She further testified that Rita appeared to her in the form
of other people, that Rita was evil, and that she frequently heard Rita's
voice. Crute testified that, when she was stabbing Dunn, Dunn asked her
if she was trying to kill her and that she responded: "Yes, Rita, I am." (R.
64.) According to Crute, she believed that she was stabbing Rita while
she was stabbing Dunn and that it was only afterward that she realized
that she had stabbed Dunn. Although Crute admitted that when she
12 SC-2025-0213
heard Rita's voice she got angry and that, in the days leading up to the
murder, she had been hearing Rita's voice, she also testified that Huff
did not know this.
Finally, when asked if she had ever attacked Huff, Crute admitted
that, in 2019, she fired a rifle at Huff five times. During that incident,
Crute said that the police came to their house and used tear gas, which
led to her surrender. Following that incident, Crute said, she was
imprisoned for two years. After she got out of prison, Crute said, she went
to live with Huff and the two of them started using methamphetamine.
Dunn's son, Jerry Foxworth, testified that his mother had had a bad
fall and was in "real bad shape" on the day she was killed. According to
Foxworth, his mother did not like Crute and Huff had told him that Crute
was "crazy."
Next, Officer Michael Felder of the Phenix City Police Department
testified that he was sent to Huff's house to detain Huff and his wife the
day that Dunn was killed. He said that, when he approached Huff, Huff
told him that his wife was crazy.
Officer Deon San Nicholas of the Phenix City Police Department
testified that he interviewed Huff and Crute at the police station. Officer
13 SC-2025-0213
San Nicholas said that he read Huff his Miranda3 rights and that Huff
signed a waiver-of-rights form.
Huff then gave a statement that was admitted into evidence during
his trial. That statement read, in relevant part:
"When we got there, I ask my sister if she was doing o.k. from the fall she took at her apartment office. She said that she was hurting and I ask if she wanted me to go get her something to eat. … She wanted chicken wings from Sharky's. She called and ordered. Every time I looked at Rhonda [Crute] she had a wild look on her face. Rhonda went to the bathroom when I left to get the food. When I got back she was standing outside by the parking lot and she said let's go. I said what the heck has happened. Rhonda said that [Dunn] tried to attack her. Then I went and looked in the apartment and seen my sister lying on the floor in a puddle of blood. I ask Rhonda to call the police and she said I'm not going to jail. I said yes you will. Go home she said it wasn't her fault. I said well …. Is it. Then Rhonda came out on the porch at our house and coldly said [she] would do it again."
Huff told Officer San Nicholas that the reason why he took Crute away
from the scene and did not call for an ambulance was that he was "in fear
because [Crute] had recently tried to shoot him." Huff also told him that
Crute "seemed crazy before he left" Dunn's apartment to go get food.
Finally, Lieutenant Robert Isabel of the Phenix City Police
Department testified that he was lead investigator on the case and that
3Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
14 SC-2025-0213
he had collected surveillance footage from Sharky's on the day Dunn was
killed. According to Lt. Isabel, the footage showed that Huff was at the
restaurant at the time police believed that Dunn had been killed and it
appeared that Huff had left Crute alone with Dunn for approximately 22
minutes.
When asked by the prosecution to go over some of the things he
learned during his investigation that led to Huff's being charged in the
case, Lt. Isabel stated:
"I'll try to piece it together somewhat chronologically. First off, he brought [Crute] to the residence of his sister. He chose to leave [Crute] with his sister alone at that residence knowing the mental state that she was in, knowing that she was under the influence of methamphetamine, knowing that she was having these delusions of shape shifters and talking to people that weren't there, knowing that she was giving his sister these evil looks, that he states, I shouldn't have left her there after I saw her giving these evil looks, I should have known better, knowing that she -- I believe during his initial interview that night of the case he said that he knew she had a box cutter folding knife type of knife on her at all times, so regardless if he knew that she had this 18 inch butcher knife in her boot or not, knew that she was armed in that circumstance, knew that his sister had just got out of the hospital, was unable to defend herself. I think all these actions are reckless. He comes back to the residence. I think it's -- according to the doctor's statements, you know, she may not have been able to be saved if there was an ambulance there or not, but regardless, left his sister there laying in a pool of blood not knowing if she was deceased or not, not calling 9-1-1 for four to five hours later, she was -- I mean -- 15 SC-2025-0213
I'm trying to think of what else. And then his statement is, the only thing I'm guilty of here is taking that crazy bitch over there. He made that statement to Investigator [Jose] Silva after the fact, after we charged him. He also acknowledged that it is possible she would have lived if he'd have called 9-1- 1, according to himself. Regretted taking her over there because he knew how crazy [Crute] was and even more so on meth, and then, also, he admitted to his nephew that he didn't even know if she was deceased when he decided to leave her there at the residence."
(Emphasis added.)
In May 2023, Huff was indicted for Dunn's murder and for
hindering prosecution. In November 2023, Huff was indicted for reckless
manslaughter. The State moved for the three charges to be consolidated
for trial, and that motion was granted.
After the State rested its case, Huff moved for a judgment of
acquittal. He asserted that the State had failed to present a prima facie
case of either reckless manslaughter or first-degree hindering
prosecution. That motion was denied.
Huff then testified in his own defense. He stated that, on the day
Dunn was killed, he had gone with Crute to Dunn's apartment to check
on her. Huff said that he usually checked on his sister at least once a
week and that he had been doing so more frequently ever since she had
been released from the hospital. 16 SC-2025-0213
Although Huff admitted that he took Crute to Dunn's apartment
knowing that she was on methamphetamine, Huff also emphasized that
he had no reason to think that Crute posed a danger to Dunn because
Crute had never threatened to hurt Dunn before and that, to his
knowledge, she did not have anything against Dunn. Rather, Huff said,
the only person Crute had ever been violent toward was him, and he
mentioned the 2019 incident during which, he admitted, Crute shot at
him multiple times.
Huff then testified that, after they arrived at Dunn's apartment, he
offered to go get her some food from Sharky's. He said that, before he left,
he noticed that Crute had a weird look on her face and that, when he
asked her what was wrong, she told him she had a toothache. Huff said
that he did not know that Crute had a knife in her boot when he left the
two of them alone that day.
According to Huff, when he returned from Sharky's with the food,
he saw Crute outside of Dunn's apartment. Crute told him that Dunn had
attacked her and that she wanted to leave. Huff said that he stepped into
Dunn's apartment and then immediately stepped back outside when he
saw his sister in a pool of blood. He then took Crute back to their trailer
17 SC-2025-0213
where, he said, she told him that she would do it again. When asked why
he did not call 911 after finding his sister, Huff said that he was "on
drugs" and he panicked.
When asked about Crute's history of mental-health issues, Huff
admitted that he knew that she had had mental-health issues dating
back to the 1970s but that she had been taking medications to help with
those issues. However, around the time of the murder, Huff said, he
thought that she had not refilled those medications. When asked about
Crute's delusions concerning her sister Rita, Huff stated that Crute is "a
crazy bitch" that hears and sees things that are not there, but he said
that Crute never told him that she wanted to kill "Rita."
After all the evidence was presented, Huff renewed his motion for
a judgment of acquittal. At that time, he asserted that the evidence "is
clear that although [Huff] drove his wife to the scene of the crime, he had
no knowledge, scheme or plan, nor did he intend to cause the death of the
victim and that the evidence is undisputed that [Huff] was not present
during the crime."
The trial court dismissed the murder charge after finding that the
State had failed to present sufficient evidence of that offense; however, it
18 SC-2025-0213
submitted the reckless-manslaughter and hindering-prosecution charges
to the jury. As explained above, the jury convicted Huff of both offenses.
After he was sentenced, Huff appealed his convictions and sentences to
the Court of Criminal Appeals. He thereafter petitioned this Court for a
writ of certiorari to review the Court of Criminal Appeals' decision
affirming his convictions and sentences.
Standard of Review
As stated previously, we granted certiorari review to consider, as a
material question of first impression, whether a defendant can be
independently convicted of reckless manslaughter under § 13A-6-3(a)(1)
even though he or she is not the actual person who committed the act
that resulted in a victim's death. This is a legal question, and it is well
settled that " ' " [t]his Court reviews pure questions of law in criminal
cases de novo . " ' " Ex parte Holbert, 4 So. 3d 410, 412 (Ala. 2008) (quoting
Ex parte Morrow, 915 So. 2d 539, 541 (Ala. 2004), quoting in turn Ex
parte Key, 890 So. 2d 1056, 1059 (Ala. 2003)).
In addition to considering that legal question, however, we are also
reviewing whether the law was properly applied to the sufficiency-of-the-
evidence question raised by Huff on direct appeal to the Court of Criminal
19 SC-2025-0213
Appeals. Our Court has previously stated that the standard of review for
a ruling on a motion for a judgment of acquittal that challenges the
sufficiency of the evidence is
" ' " ' whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational finder of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt .' " Nunn v. State, 697 So. 2d 497, 498 (Ala. Crim. App. 1997), quoting O'Neal v. State, 602 So. 2d 462, 464 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992). " ' When there is legal evidence from which the jury could, by fair inference, find the defendant guilty, the trial court should submit [the case] to the jury, and, in such a case, this court will not disturb the trial court's decision .' " Farrior v. State, 728 So. 2d 691, 696 (Ala. Crim. App. 1998), quoting Ward v. State, 557 So. 2d 848, 850 (Ala. Crim. App. 1990). "The role of appellate courts is not to say what the facts are. Our role ... is to judge whether the evidence is legally sufficient to allow submission of an issue for decision [by] the jury." Ex parte Bankston, 358 So. 2d 1040, 1042 (Ala. 1978) .' "
Ex parte Stewart, 900 So. 2d 475, 477 (Ala. 2004) (quoting Webster v.
State, 900 So. 2d 460, 463 (Ala. Crim. App. 2004)).
Discussion
Huff contends that the Court of Criminal Appeals erred in affirming
his reckless-manslaughter conviction for two reasons. First, he contends
that he should not have been convicted of reckless manslaughter because
he "did not legally cause" Dunn's death; rather, he contends, Crute acted
"of her own free will" in murdering Dunn.
20 SC-2025-0213
Second, Huff contends that he should not have been convicted of
reckless manslaughter because he did not act recklessly by bringing
Crute with him to visit his sister on the day she was killed. Although he
acknowledges that he knew that Crute had a history of violence,
substance abuse, and mental-health issues, Huff contends that he could
not have known that Crute was a danger to Dunn because Crute had
never threatened to hurt Dunn before and, to his knowledge, did not have
anything against Dunn.
In response, the State argues that no reasonable person in Huff's
situation would have taken Crute to see his ailing sister knowing that
she had a history of violence and mental-health issues. In particular, the
State notes that Huff knew that Crute had taken methamphetamine the
day they went to see Dunn and that she became angry whenever she used
that drug. The State also notes that Huff was aware that Crute had a
history of violence and had even tried to shoot and kill him on a prior
occasion. The State further notes that Crute had a history of seeing
visions of her sister, Rita, that she wanted to kill Rita, and that she called
out Rita's name when she stabbed Dunn. Taken together, the State
contends that sufficient evidence was presented during Huff's trial below
21 SC-2025-0213
to show that he caused Dunn's death by consciously disregarding the
substantial risk that Crute posed to Dunn given her mental state and
history of violence when he took her over to Dunn's apartment and left
Crute there alone with her. It is for these reasons that the State contends
that Huff is due no relief.
I. Underlying Legal Authorities -- Statutes and Caselaw
A. Section 13A-6-3, Ala. Code 1975 -- Alabama's Reckless- Manslaughter Statute
Under § 13A-6-3(a)(1), Ala. Code 1975, a person commits the crime
of reckless manslaughter if "[h]e recklessly causes the death of another
person." 4 Section 13A-2-2(3), Ala. Code 1975, defines "recklessly" as
follows:
"A person acts recklessly with respect to a result or to a circumstance described by a statute defining an offense when he is aware of and consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the result will occur or that the circumstance exists. The risk must be of such nature and degree that disregard thereof constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would observe in the situation."
4I quote the version of § 13A-6-3(a)(1) in effect at the time of Dunn's
death. 22 SC-2025-0213
"For reckless manslaughter, defining recklessness is highly fact
sensitive, requiring consideration of whether defendant was aware of, but
consciously disregarded, a substantial and unjustifiable risk to human
life, such as would constitute a gross deviation from the standard of care
owed to others." Jennifer A. Brobst, Criminal Offenses and Defenses in
Alabama § 4:4 (2023)(footnote omitted). 5
Because there is no dispute that Crute was the one who actually
murdered Dunn, under the statutes quoted above, the key questions in
this case are whether Huff could independently be convicted of reckless
manslaughter for causing Dunn's death by bringing Crute to his sister's
home knowing that Crute had a history of violence and mental-health
issues and whether having such knowledge meant that he consciously
5See also Ex parte Koppersmith, 701 So. 2d 821 (Ala. 1997) (upholding defendant's conviction for reckless manslaughter for the death of his wife after he beat her and threw her off of their porch, in a case in which the jury was charged on murder, reckless manslaughter, and criminally negligent homicide); Jones v. State, 217 So. 3d 947 (Ala. Crim. App. 2016) (finding sufficient evidence of recklessness when defendant strangled victim); Thompson v. State, 97 So. 3d 800 (Ala. Crim. App. 2011) (finding sufficient evidence to uphold a conviction for manslaughter when bruising and other evidence indicated a physical altercation had occurred just before the shooting that caused the victim's death); Ashley v. State, 651 So. 2d 1096 (Ala. Crim. App. 1994) (finding reversible error in a capital-murder case for failure to provide a manslaughter jury instruction when death occurred during a burglary). 23 SC-2025-0213
disregarded a substantial risk that Crute could have posed a danger to
Dunn.
Although our Court has previously recognized that a person can be
convicted of reckless manslaughter as an accomplice if there is evidence
that the individual's conduct "aided and encouraged another who was
aware of, and who consciously disregarded, a substantial risk of death,"
see Ex parte Simmons, 649 So. 2d 1282, 1285 (Ala. 1994), there is very
little Alabama caselaw -- including none from our Court -- addressing the
circumstances under which a person can be found independently guilty
of reckless manslaughter for the death of another person even though he
or she was not the actual person that caused the victim's death. However,
it appears that the Court of Criminal Appeals has done so and, in fact,
has developed a framework over time for deciding the question now
before us using the statutes discussed above.
B. Lewis v. State, 474 So. 2d 766 (Ala. Crim. App. 1985)
For example, a variation of this question was first considered by the
Court of Criminal Appeals in the context of a criminally-negligent-
homicide conviction in Lewis v. State, 474 So. 2d 766 (Ala. Crim. App.
1985). In that case, the victim shot himself after having played Russian
24 SC-2025-0213
roulette earlier in the day with the defendant. The defendant was
charged with murder in connection with the victim's death but was
convicted of criminally negligent homicide, see § 13A-6-4(a).
On appeal, the defendant argued that his conviction for criminally
negligent homicide was due to be overturned because, he said, there was
not sufficient evidence presented at trial to sustain his conviction.
Specifically, he argued that his acts were not the proximate cause of the
victim's death.
In addressing the defendant's argument, the Court of Criminal
Appeals first noted that, under § 13A-6-4(a), " ' [a] person commits the
crime of criminally negligent homicide if he causes the death of another
person by criminal negligence .' " 474 So. 2d at 770. That court further
noted that, under § 13A-2-2(4),
" ' [a] person acts with criminal negligence with respect to a result or a circumstance which is defined by statute as an offense when he fails to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the result will occur or that the circumstance exists. The risk must be of such nature and degree that the failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the situation .' "
Id.
The Court of Criminal Appeals then explained that, because the 25 SC-2025-0213
evidence was clear "that the deceased either committed suicide or fell
victim to an unfortunate misadventure," that court was faced with the
following question: " ' When may one human being be held criminally
liable for the self-destruction of another ?' " Id. (quoting Brenner, Undue
Influence in the Criminal Law: A Proposed Analysis of the Criminal
Offense of "Causing Suicide," 47 Albany L. Rev. 62, 63 (1982)). In
answering this question, the Court of Criminal Appeals explained that,
in Alabama, " ' [a] person is criminally liable if the result would not have
occurred but for his conduct, operating either alone or concurrently with
another cause, unless the concurrent cause was sufficient to produce the
result and the conduct of the actor clearly insufficient .' " Id. (quoting §
13A-2-5(a), Ala. Code 1975). That court further explained that " ' [t]he
problem lies, of course, in determining when, and if, an accused did in
fact cause his alleged victim to commit suicide. This difficult
determination requires proof that the suicide was caused by the accused's
actions and was not the result of the victim's own free will .' " Id. (quoting
Brenner, supra, at 63).
In reversing the defendant's conviction, the Court of Criminal
Appeals determined that the victim's conduct was a "supervening,
26 SC-2025-0213
intervening cause sufficient to break the chain of causation" because it
occurred (1) after the Russian roulette game had ended and after the
defendant had put the gun away and (2) the defendant was not present
when the victim shot himself. Id. at 771. In particular, the Court of
Criminal Appeals held that, "[e]ven though the victim might never have
shot himself in this manner if the [defendant] had not taught him to play
Russian [r]oulette, we cannot say that the [defendant] should have
perceived the risk that the victim would play the game by himself or that
he intended for him to do this." Id. (emphasis added). Although the Court
of Criminal Appeals acknowledged that the case presented "a tragic
situation" and made clear that it did not "condone the [defendant's]
conduct[] in any manner," it explained that "the causal link between the
[defendant's] conduct and the victim's death was severed when the victim
exercised his own free will" and, therefore, held that "this case must be
reversed and this cause rendered." Id.
C. Grant v. State, 324 So. 3d 887 (Ala. Crim. App. 2020)
After Lewis, supra, it appears that the next time the Court of
Criminal Appeals addressed this question was in Grant v. State, 324 So.
3d 887 (Ala. Crim. App. 2020), the case on which that court relied below
27 SC-2025-0213
in affirming Huff's reckless-manslaughter conviction.
There, the defendant, Terri Lynn Grant, was convicted of reckless
manslaughter over her involvement in the death of Khaled Almashni at
the hands of Jordan Daniel Johnson. On the day Almashni was
murdered, Johnson went to Grant's house at her request and told her
that she " ' had crossed him' " and that either " ' [she] was gonna die, or
[Almashni] was gonna die .' " 324 So. 3d at 891 (quoting State's Exhibit
94, at 1:55:18-31). Johnson then told Grant that she " ' could either get in
the car and take him to [Almashni ]' " so that he could kill Almashni or
he would kill her. Id. (quoting State's Exhibit 94, at 2:05:38-47). Grant
then drove Almashni to Johnson's apartment.
According to Grant, when she and Johnson arrived at Almashni's
apartment, she opened the door and saw Almashni sleeping in the living
room. When Almashni got up, Grant said that she " ' just heard a shot
and [she] took off running' " toward her truck. Id. (quoting State's Exhibit
94, at 2:09:06-15).
After Grant was convicted of reckless manslaughter, she appealed
her conviction to the Court of Criminal Appeals. On appeal, Grant's only
argument was that the trial court had erred by submitting the reckless-
28 SC-2025-0213
manslaughter charge to the jury when, she said, " ' there was no rational
evidentiary basis' " for such a charge. Id. at 893 (quoting Grant's brief at
38).
After reciting the elements of the reckless-manslaughter offense
from the Criminal Code that I have quoted above, see § 13A-6-3(a)(1), and
§ 13A-2-2(3), the Court of Criminal Appeals explained that the legal
propriety of a reckless-manslaughter charge in Grant's case rested on "(1)
whether Grant was complicit in Johnson's act of killing Almashni or (2)
whether Grant was independently reckless to the point of committing
manslaughter herself." Id. at 894.
After concluding that Grant could not be convicted of reckless
manslaughter under a complicity theory, the Court of Criminal Appeals
proceeded with addressing the second question. In addressing the
causation element of the offense, the Court of Criminal Appeals, quoting
from and citing Lewis, supra, explained as follows:
" ' Section 13A-2-5(a), Ala. Code 1975, provides that "[a] person is criminally liable if the result would not have occurred but for his conduct, operating either alone or concurrently with another cause, unless the concurrent cause was sufficient to produce the result and the conduct of the actor clearly insufficient." The Commentary to § 13A-2-5 explains that
" ' " this section is a modified 'but for' test, with an 29 SC-2025-0213
express exclusion of those situations in which the concurrent cause was clearly sufficient to produce the result and the defendant's conduct clearly insufficient .... If the actual result is not within the contemplation of the actor, or within the area of risk of which he should have been aware, he is not deemed to have 'caused' the result. But if the difference is only one concerning which person or what property would be affected by defendant's act, or one of the degree of harm which would result, he is still held to have 'caused' the result."
" ' The accused's conduct is not the cause-in-fact of an injury if there was an unforeseen "supervening, intervening cause sufficient to break the chain of causation." Lewis v. State, 474 So. 2d 766, 771 (Ala. Cr. App. 1985) .' "
Id. at 897 (quoting Pearson v. State, 601 So. 2d 1119, 1126 (Ala. Crim.
App. 1992)).
Again, citing and quoting from Lewis, supra, the Court of Criminal
Appeals then explained that foreseeability is the key issue in a causation
inquiry in a reckless-manslaughter case:
" ' The "controlling question[]" is "whether the ultimate result was foreseeable to the original actor." Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 151 n.9, 97 S. Ct. 1730, 1735 n.9, 52 L. Ed. 2d 203 (1977). If the accused "should have perceived" that his own conduct would concur with another cause to bring about the injury to the victim, then the other cause is concurrent, not supervening. See Shirah v. State, 555 So. 2d 807, 812-13 (Ala. Cr. App. 1989) (conduct of accused, who supplied morphine to victim, was the cause-in-fact of victim's death from overdose of Secobarbital and morphine combined). On the other hand, a supervening cause "breaks the chain of 30 SC-2025-0213
causation" precisely because it is not a reasonably foreseeable result of the accused's conduct. Lewis, 474 So. 2d at 771 .' "
Id. at 898 (quoting Pearson, 601 So. 2d at 1127).
Applying the foregoing legal principles to the evidence in Grant's
case, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that the State presented
sufficient evidence to support the trial court's decision to submit the
reckless-manslaughter charge to the jury. In support of its holding, that
court first explained: "In this case, it was undisputed that Johnson did
not know where Almashni lived. Thus, it is clear that, but for Grant
taking Johnson to Almashni's apartment, Almashni would not have been
murdered by Johnson on March 26, 2016." Id.
Next, the Court of Criminal Appeals explained that Grant was
specifically on notice that Johnson wanted to harm Almashni and that,
therefore, it was "foreseeable" that the murder might occur because
"Grant knew Johnson was armed at that time" and because Grant drove
Johnson to Almashni's apartment after Johnson told her that he intended
to kill Almashni." Id. (emphasis added). Thus, because Johnson would
not have been in a position to kill Almashni but for Grant's taking him to
Almashni's apartment and because it was foreseeable that Johnson
would kill Almashni if given the opportunity, the Court of Criminal 31 SC-2025-0213
Appeals held that Grant's act of taking Johnson to Almashni's apartment
was a cause in fact of Almashni's death. Id. That court then explained
that, because the killing was a foreseeable result of Grant's actions,
Johnson's actions did not "break the chain of causation" and, therefore,
were not an "unforeseen" "supervening" cause of Almashni's death. Id.
The Court of Criminal Appeals also explained, however, that the
analysis did not stop with whether Grant's conduct was a cause in fact of
Almashni's death. Specifically, it explained that there must also be
evidence that Grant's conduct was sufficiently "reckless" in order to
sustain her conviction for that offense. 324 So. 3d at 899. Because it was
undisputed that Johnson did not know where Almashni lived, and
because there was evidence indicating that Grant knew Johnson was
angry with Almashni, that Grant knew Johnson was armed, that
Johnson had told Grant he intended to kill Almashni, and that, despite
those facts, Grant drove Johnson to Almashni's apartment, the Court of
Criminal Appeals held that, "by leading Johnson to Almashni's
apartment under such circumstances, Grant was 'aware of and
consciously disregard[ed] a substantial and unjustifiable risk' that
Almashni would be killed." Id. (quoting § 13A-2-2(3)) (emphasis added).
32 SC-2025-0213
That court further explained that the conscious disregard of such a
substantial risk " ' constitute[d] a gross deviation from the standard of
conduct that a reasonable person would observe in [Grant's] situation .' "
Id. (quoting § 13A-2-2(3)). In support of that conclusion, it explained that
it did "not believe a reasonable person would have taken Johnson to
Almashni's apartment under the circumstances set forth above because
doing so provided Johnson, who did not know where Almashni lived, with
the opportunity to kill Almashni by, in a manner of speaking, leading the
slaughterer to the lamb." Id. Based on the foregoing, the Court of
Criminal Appeals affirmed Grant's reckless-manslaughter conviction.
II. Putting it All Together -- How the Above Statutes and Caselaw Help Us Answer the Question Now Before Us
In my view, the above statutes and caselaw correctly articulate
under what circumstances a defendant can be convicted of reckless
manslaughter even when he or she is not the actual person who
committed the act that resulted in the victim's death. Stated simply, the
above authorities all make clear that, for a defendant to be independently
convicted of reckless manslaughter, two elements must be met. First, the
defendant must have reasonably foreseen that his or her conduct would
operate concurrently with the conduct of another and then result in the 33 SC-2025-0213
victim's death. Second, the defendant must have been aware of, and have
consciously disregarded, a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the
victim's death would occur and the defendant's disregard of that risk
must be so great that his or her failure to recognize it is a gross deviation
from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would have
observed in the defendant's situation.
III. Applying the Foregoing Legal Principles to Huff's Case
Relying on the facts from Grant, supra, the Court of Criminal
Appeals held that the jury correctly found beyond a reasonable doubt that
Huff put into motion a chain of events that resulted in Dunn's death by
bringing Crute to visit Dunn. It further held that Huff consciously
disregarded the risk of his actions because he knew that Crute had a
history of violence, substance-abuse issues, and mental-health issues.
Accordingly, that court affirmed Huff's reckless-manslaughter
conviction.
Although Grant certainly provides a helpful framework for
answering the question now before us, that case is distinguishable from
the present case because, here, there is no evidence that Huff's conduct
was sufficiently reckless so as to sustain his conviction for that offense.
34 SC-2025-0213
For example, in Grant, there was evidence indicating that Grant knew
that Johnson was angry at Almashni. She also knew that he had a
specific intent to harm Almashni because she knew that Johnson was
armed and he had told her that he was going to kill Almashni. Despite
being aware of the specific risk that Johnson posed to Almashni's life,
Grant took Johnson to Almashni's apartment anyway, thus setting into
motion the events that led to Almashni's death.
Here, although Huff was the one who took Crute to Dunn's
apartment that day, the similarities with Grant stop there. Unlike in
Grant, Huff was not physically present when Crute killed Dunn. Also,
unlike in Grant, where the defendant knew that Johnson had specifically
announced his intent to kill Almashni, the evidence presented during
Huff's trial indicated that Crute did not say or do anything before their
arrival at Dunn's apartment that would have made Huff aware that she
might kill Dunn. Crute testified that she had no issues with Dunn. While
Huff admitted that Crute had a "strange look" on her face when he left to
go to Sharky's, he also stated that he asked Crute if she was okay and
that she told him that she had a toothache.
Huff further testified that he was the only person toward whom
35 SC-2025-0213
Crute had ever been violent, and that violence had occurred several years
earlier. Although Huff admitted that he knew that Crute had taken
methamphetamine on the day they visited Dunn, and although Crute
stated that the drug could make her angry, Crute also testified that
methamphetamine had other effects on her mood, including making her
"feel good for awhile." Finally, Huff testified that Crute had never shown
any animosity or aggression toward Dunn, which would have included
while all three were in Dunn's apartment together on that day after
Crute had taken methamphetamine. All of this evidence indicates that
Huff was not "aware of and consciously disregard[ed] a substantial and
unjustifiable risk" that Crute would kill Dunn in the 22 minutes while he
went to Sharky's. § 13A-2-2(3) (emphasis added).
The State contends, however, that there was further evidence
presented during Huff's trial that indicated that he was consciously
aware of the substantial and unjustifiable risk that Crute posed to his
sister's life that day, including her propensity for carrying a knife and
her hallucinations. For instance, the State notes that Crute testified that
she was seeing visions of her sister Rita, whom she had previously said
that she wanted to kill. The State also notes that Huff told law-
36 SC-2025-0213
enforcement officers that he regretted taking Crute to Dunn's apartment
because he knew that Crute was "crazy."
However, there was no evidence indicating that Huff was aware
that Crute had a weapon on her that day or that she had been seeing
visions of Rita. Huff expressly testified that he was unaware that, in the
days leading up to the murder, Crute had been hearing voices and
"seeing" her sister, Rita. Crute confirmed this to be true during her
testimony. Moreover, as noted above, Crute specifically testified that
Huff was unaware that she had the butcher knife with her on the day of
the murder. (R. 70-71.) ("Q. You could put that knife on you without his
knowing it? A. Yep. Put it in my boot.").
In my view, the facts in this case more closely resemble the facts in
Lewis, supra. In that case, the defendant's criminally-negligent-homicide
conviction was overturned. The Court of Criminal Appeals held that,
"[e]ven though the victim might never have shot himself in this manner
if the [defendant] had not taught him to play Russian [r]oulette," it could
not "say that the [defendant] should have perceived the risk that the
victim would play the game by himself or that he intended for him to do
this." Lewis, 474 So. 2d at 771. The same can be said in the present case.
37 SC-2025-0213
Like in Lewis, Huff was not physically present when Crute stabbed
Dunn. He also did not suggest or participate in Dunn's murder. In fact,
the evidence presented during Huff's trial undisputedly showed that he
was unaware that Crute had killed Dunn until after he returned from
Sharky's. Further, like in Lewis, Huff did not own or otherwise supply
the weapon that Crute used to kill Dunn. He also did not know that it
was in Crute's possession when they went to visit Dunn. Finally, the facts
here are even weaker than in Lewis, because Lewis involved a prior game
of Russian roulette while, in this case, there had not been any prior
incident between Crute and Dunn that could have foreshadowed what
was about to happen. Once again, the evidence presented during Huff's
trial showed that his only alleged wrongdoing was bringing his wife to
Dunn's apartment and leaving her there with Dunn for 22 minutes.
To the extent that it might be argued that Huff's statements to law-
enforcement officers support a reckless-manslaughter conviction, I
disagree. It is true that Huff expressed deep regret for the stabbing of
his sister and blamed himself for taking his wife to his sister's apartment
that day. See, e.g., R. 244 ("I shouldn't have left her there after I saw her
giving these evil looks, I should have known better") (emphasis added).
38 SC-2025-0213
Perhaps such regret might (or might not) be sufficient evidence to
support a conviction for criminally negligent homicide, which, our Court
has explained, involves a defendant who disregarded a risk of which he
or she "should have been aware." Ex parte Koppersmith, 701 So. 2d 821,
822 (Ala. 1997). It is not, however, sufficient to support a conviction for
reckless manslaughter, which, as explained repeatedly throughout this
writing, requires the defendant to " ' " consciously disregard[]" a
substantial and unjustifiable risk.' " Id. (quoting Weems v. State, 463 So.
2d 170, 172 (Ala. 1984) (explaining fully the differences between
"depraved heart" murder under § 13A-6-2(a)(2), reckless manslaughter
under § 13A-6-3(a)(1), and criminally negligent homicide under § 13A-6-
4(a)))(emphasis added). Thus, evidence of what Huff "should have
known" or "should have been aware" of is not sufficient for a reckless-
manslaughter conviction. Instead, there must be evidence of a
"substantial and unjustifiable risk" that he "consciously disregarded."
For the reasons stated above, there simply is no evidence of this in this
case.
The State also argues that, after the murder, Huff did not seem
sufficiently upset about his sister's death and that he did not render aid
39 SC-2025-0213
when he saw her lying on the floor of her apartment in a pool of blood.
State's brief at 10 n.2 (noting that Huff " ' didn't seem upset' " but that he
seemed " ' matter-of-fact' " and did not inquire about whether Dunn was
dead during his contact with police). But the State never explains why
Huff's behavior after the murder is relevant to whether Huff "consciously
disregarded" a "substantial and unjustifiable risk" before the murder.
Based on the foregoing, I believe that there was insufficient
evidence from which a rational finder of fact could have found that Huff
was "aware of and consciously disregard[ed] a substantial and
unjustifiable risk" that Crute would kill Dunn. § 13A-2-2(3). To conclude
otherwise would mean that Huff (or anyone in his situation) could be
convicted of reckless manslaughter if he took his wife anywhere and she
murdered anyone. This simply is not consistent with the statutes and
caselaw discussed above. Because the evidence presented below was
insufficient to satisfy the second element of a reckless-manslaughter
offense, I need not address if the first element -- that is, whether Huff
could have reasonably foreseen that his conduct in bringing his wife to
Dunn's apartment caused Dunn's death -- was met.
Conclusion
40 SC-2025-0213
In sum, because I believe that Huff could not have reasonably
foreseen Dunn's death at the hands of Crute, see Lewis, supra, I
respectfully dissent from the decision to quash the writ.
Stewart, C.J., and Sellers, J., concur.