Ex parte M'Clenachan

2 Yeates 502
CourtSupreme Court of Pennsylvania
DecidedDecember 15, 1799
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 2 Yeates 502 (Ex parte M'Clenachan) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Ex parte M'Clenachan, 2 Yeates 502 (Pa. 1799).

Opinion

Shippen, C. J.

The view and intention of the several acts of insolvency was to liberate unfortunate debtors from personal imprisonments, where they fairly deliver up their effects to their creditors, without concealment or fraud, or a strong presumption of such fraud. Concealment is the most common and ordinary species of fraud, but cannot be deemed the only species. Conveyances in trust are mentioned in the former acts of assembly, as well as the late one, as a strong indication of fraud. It was with some surprise that I heard it contended at the bar, that if there was no concealment, but the petitioner boldly dis[504]*504closes how he had disposed of his property, however fraudulent the manner of such disposition might be, yet his person ought to be liberated, and the creditors referred for their remedy to those to whom the property had been transferred. This doctrine carried to its extent, would indeed be a monstrous mischief, and destructive of all commercial credit. If a swindler.should have address enough to obtain credit for a large store of goods, and finding himself going to ruin, should, in the face of the world, ship off those goods to his friends or relations in another country, and then apply for the benefit of the insolvent acts, disclosing the whole transaction, is it possible that a court could shut its eyes to such a fraud, and discharge him from imprisonment?

The case before us is certainly not so glaring. Mr. M’Clenachan was a man of fortune, perhaps honorably acquired ; but entering into speculations, and connecting himself in trade with a man of little or no fortune, found after some time his affairs considerably deranged, his bills of exchange returned upon his-handsjand his notes to a large amount protested at bank. This was the time that he conceived the idea of transferring a considerable share of his property to his children. With what view was this done ? He acknowledges he was alarmed at the situation of his affairs,but he tells us,he thought his estate sufficient to discharge his debts, notwithstanding these gifts to his children. In the event hovever, this does not turn out to be the case; his creditors will be considerable sufferers. His ideas at the time may "possibly diminish in some sort the immorality of the act, but cannot in my mind have any such effect upon the transaction, so as to make that innocent which the law calls fraudulent. All the circumstances show he had it at heart to make a handsome provision for his children, even if it should be at the expense of his creditors. Among his other children was an infant of about ten years of age, to whom he likewise conveys a valuable property. It is very unusual for a man during his life-time, to make so young a child independent of himself in point of fortune. With what view then was this done ? Obviously, that though his creditors might suffer, he was determined in all events that his children should be provided for. Whatever gloss may be put upon this business it is not sanctioned by law. Courts of equity uniformly say, that a man must be just before he is generous.

It is contended however, that he had on the 31st October 1796, when he made these transfers to his children, sufficient estate at the then value to pay all his debts. The fact itself is at best very problematical. The different statements of the contending parties make a satis[505]*505factory'judgment on the matter, difficult to be formed. But if that could be proved to be the case, should he not have immediately surrendered that property to his creditors, that the most might be made of it ? Was he justifiable in still withholding the notes of Morris and Nicholson, which were daily depreciating, at the risk of the creditors, while, what he had given to his children was subject to no such risk ? It is therefore my opinion, that the fact even if established, being thus circumstanced, would be an insufficient vindication of the petitioner.

' It has been urged, that the act of assembly of 1798, under the construction of the opposite counsel, is repugnant to the constitution. I see no collision between the act and the constitution. By the latter it is directed, that the debtor shall not be confined “ without a strong presumption of fraud.” The act of assembly specifies two kinds of fraud, concealment, or conveying away his estate to his family or friends, the meaning whereof, although it is inaccurately worded, cannot be mistaken. It is obviously meant, that these conveyances should bo to the prejudice of his creditors. If in the event it appears that such conveyances are the means of defeating the creditors, they are fraudulent; and the person who makes the conveyances, is expressly declared not to be an object of relief under the act, as being guilty of an actual fraud.

Yeates, J.

declined giving any opinion, not having heard the argument in June last.

Smith,

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Related

Fidelity Trust Co. v. Union National Bank
169 A. 209 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1933)
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9 Serg. & Rawle 322 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1823)

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Bluebook (online)
2 Yeates 502, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ex-parte-mclenachan-pa-1799.