Opinion issued August 25, 2026
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
habeas corpus challenging the bond conditions. The trial court denied appellant’s supplemental application.
Appellant argues that the trial court should have granted his applications for writ of habeas corpus because: (1) the bond set by the trial court was excessive and (2) the trial court erred in setting bond conditions. We find no abuse of discretion and affirm.
Standard of Review
We review a trial court’s ruling on a defendant’s application for writ of habeas corpus for abuse of discretion. See Ex parte Bennett, 719 S.W.3d 440, 445 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2025, no pet.). In appeals of the denial of habeas relief concerning pretrial bail, “we ‘measure the trial court’s ruling against the relevant criteria by which the ruling was made.’” Ex parte Babin, No. 01-26-00164-CR, 2026 WL 2089405, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] July 21, 2026, no pet. h.) (mem. op.) (quoting Montalvo v. State, 315 S.W.3d 588, 592 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, no pet.)).
An appellate court also reviews a challenge to bond conditions for abuse of discretion. See Ex parte Buks, 654 S.W.3d 516, 521 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2022, no pet.). An appellant bears the burden of establishing that the trial court abused its discretion in setting the bond amount or imposing the specific conditions. See id. A trial court abuses its discretion if it acts without reference to any guiding
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principles or rules. See Ex parte Hunt, 138 S.W.3d 503, 505 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, pet. ref’d). Put differently, a “trial court abuses its discretion if its decision lies outside the zone of reasonable disagreement.” Ex parte Allen, 619 S.W.3d 813, 816 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2020, pet. ref’d).
I. The trial court did not abuse its discretion as to the bond amount.
Appellant argues the trial court abused its discretion in denying the writ of habeas corpus because the bond amount is excessive. We disagree.
Legal Background
“The United States and Texas Constitutions protect the right to be free from excessive bail.” Babin, 2026 WL 2089405, at *3 (citing U.S. CONST. amend. VIII and TEX. CONST. art. 1, § 11). Bail secures the presence of the defendant in court for trial. Id. at *2. “Determining the appropriate bail amount is a balancing act ‘between the defendant’s presumption of innocence and the State’s interest in assuring the defendant’s appearance at trial.’” Ex parte Cardenas, 557 S.W.3d 722, 730 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi-Edinburg 2018, no pet.) (quoting Ex parte Beard, 92 S.W.3d 566, 573 (Tex. App.—Austin 2022, pet. denied)).
To determine whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying appellant’s application for writ of habeas corpus requesting that his bond be reduced, we review factors enumerated in Article 17.15 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. See Babin, 2026 WL 2089405, at *4.
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Article 17.15 instructs trial courts to consider the following factors in setting the amount of bail:
1. The bail shall be sufficiently high to give reasonable assurance that the undertaking will be complied with;
2. The power to require bail is not to be so used as to make it an instrument of oppression;
3. The nature of the offense and the circumstances under which it was committed are to be considered;
4. The ability to make bail is to be regarded, and proof may be taken upon this point;
5. The future safety of a victim of the alleged offense and the community shall be considered; and 6. The citizenship status of the defendant.
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 17.15. In addition, trial courts may also consider the following factors:
1. the accused’s work record;
2. the accused's family and community ties;
3. the accused’s length of residency;
4. the accused’s prior criminal record;
5. the accused’s conformity with previous bond conditions;
6. the existence of other outstanding bonds, if any; and 7. aggravating circumstances alleged to have been involved in the charged offense.
Ex parte Rubac, 611 S.W.2d 848, 849–50 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981).
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“On appellate review, it is the duty of the reviewing court to measure the ultimate ruling of the habeas court against the relevant bail factors to ensure that the court did not abuse its discretion.” Babin, 2026 WL 2089405, at *2 (citing Ex parte Dixon, No. PD-0398-15, 2015 WL 5453313, at *2 (Tex. Crim. App. Sept. 16, 2015) (citing TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 17.15; TEX. CONST. art. I, §§ 11, 13)). We determine whether a bail amount is reasonable “on a case-by-case basis.” Babin, 2026 WL 2089405, at *4.
Analysis
We find no abuse of discretion on this record. The trial court concluded that, in light of the applicable factors, appellant’s bond of $250,000 for aggravated sexual assault of a child under six years of age was reasonable and neither excessive nor oppressive. The trial court based this conclusion on the nature of the offense, the possible punishment range, the circumstances of the alleged offense, and appellant’s access to nieces and nephews under twelve years of age and to a soon-to-be-born infant. The trial court found the amount was similar to that imposed in similar cases.
To be sure, the trial court found that certain factors weighed against a high bond, including appellant’s ties to the community and his limited criminal history. 1 The trial court noted his limited resources but did not deem them controlling.
1 The findings of fact also recognized that appellant was born and raised in Austin County.
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Appellant’s counsel argues that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to lower the $250,000 bond to $25,000 based on appellant’s and his family’s inability to afford the larger bond. Evidence shows he could not afford the $250,000 bond.2 But under Texas law, inability to make bail, although a factor to consider, is not alone controlling. See Ex parte Gentry, 615 S.W.2d 228, 231 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981); see also Babin, 2026 WL 2089405, at *5. As our Court has explained: “The ability of an accused to post bail is a factor to be considered, but the inability to make the bail set by the trial court does not automatically render the bail excessive.” Babin, 2026 WL 2089405, at *5 (quoting Ex parte Tomlinson, Nos. 14-02-00784-CR, 2002 WL 31008642, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Sept. 5, 2002, no pet.) (mem. op.)). Moreover “[b]ail set in a particular amount becomes oppressive when it is based on the assumption that the defendant cannot afford bail in that amount and when it is set for the express purpose of forcing the defendant to remain incarcerated.” Babin, 2026 WL 2089405, at *5 (quoting Ex parte Moreno, No. 01- 20-00312-CR, 2021 WL 4733239, at *9 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Oct. 1,
2 Appellant’s mother testified that she had no savings that she could put towards the bond other than a nest egg of $25,000. Appellant testified that, before he was charged with this offense and jailed, he worked as a landscaper, earning approximately $4,000 per month. Appellant testified that he owns a 2012 Jeep Grand Cherokee that may be worth about $4,000 to $5,000. He stated he owns no other personal or real property. Appellant has also been in jail for approximately one year.
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2021, no pet.) (mem. op.)). On this record, we cannot conclude that the trial court set the amount of bail for the express purpose of keeping appellant incarcerated or as a means of oppression. Babin, 2026 WL 2089405, at *5 (citing Ex parte Grant, No. 01-23-00889-CR, 2024 WL 924433, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 5, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“[N]othing in our record shows that the trial court intentionally set a high bail amount to keep [appellant] incarcerated”))).
We examine the factors that supported the bond amount. The nature of the offense and length of the possible sentence are key considerations in determining the reasonableness of bail. See Grant, 2024 WL 924433, at *4 (citing Rubac, 611 S.W.2d at 849 (highlighting these as primary factors)). Here, the nature of the offense supports the trial court’s bond amount. The punishment that may be imposed also supports the bond.
The offense with which appellant is charged is aggravated sexual assault of a child younger than ten years of age. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 22.021. This is a first- degree felony for which the potential punishment may be imprisonment for life or for any term of not more than 99 years or less than five years. See id. § 12.32(a).
“Perhaps reflecting the wide range of punishment, Texas courts have approved bail amounts as low as $1,000 and as high as $1,000,000 for first degree felony offenses” like this one. Ex parte Rean, No. 03-09-00032-CR, 2009 WL 2902707, at *4 (Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 26, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op.) (in
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considering nature of offense, appellate courts often compare bail amounts in cases involving offenses of same degree because they carry same punishment range). The bail amount in this case is within this range approved for other first-degree felonies. Moreover, $250,000 is comparable to bail amounts approved in other sex offense cases, including aggravated sexual assault of a child. See, e.g., Clemons v. State, 220 S.W.3d 176, 179 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2007, no pet.) (upholding total bail of $600,000 for two indictments of aggravated sexual assault and two indictments for indecency with child); Ex parte Hulin, 31 S.W.3d 754, 762 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, no pet.) (approving total bail of $150,000 for offenses of sexual assault and criminal solicitation of minor); Ex parte Bratcher, Nos. 05-05-00634- CR & 05-05-00635-CR, 2005 WL 1634971, at *5 (Tex. App.—Dallas July 13, 2005, no pet.) (mem. op.) (upholding bond of $500,000 in two cases charging aggravated sexual assault of child offenses).
The punishment that may be imposed also supports the bond here because the child victim in this case was younger than ten years of age at the time of the offense, and thus, the minimum sentence is increased to 25 years. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 22.021(f). When the charged offense is serious and “involves aggravating factors that may result in a lengthy prison sentence, bail must be set sufficiently high to secure the defendant’s presence at trial.” Ex parte Bordelon, No. 04-20-00364, 2021 WL 1988259, at *3 (Tex. App.—San Antonio May 19, 2021, pet. ref’d) (mem. op.).
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Because appellant is charged with sexually assaulting a child younger than ten, this aggravating circumstance requires a minimum sentence of 25 years. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.021(f). The seriousness of the alleged offense and the possible lengthy sentence in this case support the trial court’s finding that this bond was necessary to secure appellant’s presence at trial. See Ex parte Temple, 595 S.W.3d 825, 829 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2019, pet. ref’d) (holding that when appellant is charged with a serious crime and lengthy sentence is probable, pretrial bail must be set high enough to secure accused’s presence).
Looking to the future safety of a victim of the alleged offense and the community, we note that appellant is charged with sexually assaulting his three-year- old daughter. The State argued that evidence showed that appellant was a severe risk to the safety of the community, given that he has several young nieces and nephews. Appellant’s mother testified that she lives in a trailer park and there are a number of children who live in the area. She also testified that her daughter, who is pregnant with a girl, lives with her. Detective Leal of the Sealy Police Department asserted that the nature of the offense was such that appellant posed a danger to the community and to children around him. Thus, evidence supported the trial court’s determination that this bond was necessary for the safety of the victim and the community.
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As mentioned, some considerations weighed against a high bond amount.
Appellant offered evidence that he could not pay the bond amount. Evidence showed that appellant is a citizen of the United States. He had no prior convictions other than for driving while intoxicated and no prior outstanding bonds. He also had ties to the community with family living nearby, and he had held several jobs, with an oil-related company and as a landscaper. But no individual factor controls and the trial court considers all of the evidence and must weigh all of the factors as a whole in deciding whether bail is reasonable. Bordelon, 2021 WL 1988259, at *3.
The trial court found that the evidence concerning the nature of the offense, the possible punishment range, the circumstances of the alleged offense, and appellant’s access to nieces and nephews under twelve years of age and to a soon- to-be-born infant supported the $250,000 bond. We conclude that appellant has not established an abuse of discretion by the trial court in denying appellant’s application for writ of habeas corpus. Accordingly, we overrule appellant’s first issue.
II. We also see no abuse of discretion as to bond conditions.
In his second issue, appellant argues that the trial court erred in setting specific conditions of bond. We review bond conditions for an abuse of discretion. See Buks, 654 S.W.3d at 521.
Legal Background
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In reviewing a trial court’s order denying habeas relief, “the appellate court affords ‘almost total deference to the judge’s determination of the historical facts that are supported by the record, especially when the fact findings are based on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor.’” Ex parte McKeand, 454 S.W.3d 52, 54 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, no pet.) (quoting Ex parte Wilson, 171 S.W.3d 925, 928 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, no pet.)).
“To secure a defendant’s attendance at trial, a magistrate may impose any reasonable condition of bond related to the safety of a victim of the alleged offense or to the safety of the community.” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 17.40(a). Pretrial bond conditions must meet three standards: (1) they must be to secure the defendant’s presence at trial; (2) they must be reasonable; and (3) they must be related to the safety of the alleged victim and the community. See Buks, 654 S.W.3d at 522.
Analysis
Appellant complains of the conditions that he wear an ankle monitor and have a curfew; he also complains about the restrictions on his proximity to places where children congregate and on his communications with children. Appellant contends these conditions violate his constitutional rights of liberty, association, and travel. We disagree.
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To begin, “[c]urfew, home confinement, and electronic monitoring are recognized means of protecting the safety of the community while an accused awaits trial.” Ex parte Sykes, Nos. 01-22-00903-CR and 01-22-00904-CR, 2023 WL 3357672, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] May 11, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.). Indeed, the Code of Criminal Procedure permits magistrates to require specific conditions of a defendant’s bond including “that the defendant submit to home confinement and electronic monitoring . . . .” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. arts. 17.43(a), 17.44(a)(1). On this record, appellant has not established an abuse of discretion or constitutional violation as to these conditions.
The restriction on appellant’s ability to travel (and the time in which he may travel near places where children congregate) is also a means of protecting children; on this record, it likewise does not violate appellant’s constitutional rights. See Buks, 654 S.W.3d at 524. “Texas courts have consistently upheld similar conditions that restrict defendants’ geographical location regarding having children present with them in order to protect not just the alleged victims of offenses, but also the community more generally.” Id.
The evidence in this case showed that, if appellant makes bond, he will live with his mother and pregnant sister, who will soon bring a female infant into the household. The evidence also showed that appellant allegedly sexually assaulted his toddler daughter while alone with her. Appellant’s brief includes a description of
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how the alleged offense came to light: “The victim could not communicate verbally and only indicated to her mother about the offense using a limited vocabulary that described a burning or itching sensation on her genitals.” This description shows that the offense was allegedly committed against a toddler with limited communication skills. Appellant has several young nieces, one nephew, and a pregnant sister who is expecting a girl. Appellant’s mother testified that a number of children reside at the trailer park where she lives, and where appellant would reside. This evidence supports the reasonable conditions restricting appellant’s access to children by imposing a curfew, limiting his proximity to and communication with children, and requiring an ankle monitor. See Buks, 654 S.W.3d at 523–24 (recognizing that home confinement and electronic monitoring are “expressly permitted conditions of pretrial bail in Texas” and upholding restrictions on travel near children to protect victim); Ex parte Dupuy, 498 S.W.3d 220, 236 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, no pet.) (noting that the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure authorizes bond conditions such as home confinement or curfew and electronic monitoring as “reasonable conditions relating to the safety of the victim and community.”); Ex parte Herrera, Nos. 05-14-00598-CR, 05-14-00626-CR, 05-14-00627-CR, 2014 WL 4207153, at *7 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 26, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.) (in case in which appellant was charged with three offenses of aggravated child sexual
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assault of child under age fourteen, upholding conditions restricting appellant’s attendance at church and other activities to protect victim and community).
We conclude that appellant has not established that the trial court abused its discretion in denying appellant’s supplemental application for writ of habeas corpus concerning the bond conditions requiring the wearing of an ankle monitor, imposing a curfew, and restricting appellant’s proximity to places where children congregate and his communications with children. We overrule appellant’s second issue.
We affirm the trial court’s orders denying appellant’s application and supplemental application for writ of habeas corpus.
Jennifer V. Caughey
Justice
Panel consists of Justices Caughey, Johnson, and Dokupil. Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).