Ex Parte Luis Miguel Bernal Morales v. the State of Texas

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: September 17, 2025
• Docket: 04-24-00502-CR
• Status: Published

Opinion

Fourth Court of Appeals San Antonio, Texas MEMORANDUM OPINION No. 04-24-00502-CR

EX PARTE Luis Miguel BERNAL MORALES

From the County Court, Kinney County, Texas Trial Court No. 11134CR Honorable Susan D. Reed, Judge Presiding

PER CURIAM

Sitting: Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice Adrian A. Spears II, Justice Velia J. Meza, Justice

Delivered and Filed: September 17, 2025

AFFIRMED

Appellant, Luis Miguel Bernal Morales, appeals the trial court’s order denying his request

for habeas relief. For the reasons stated below, we affirm the trial court’s order.

BACKGROUND

Appellant was arrested and charged with misdemeanor criminal trespass as a part of

Operation Lone Star (“OLS”). Appellant subsequently filed a pretrial application for writ of habeas

corpus, arguing that the State of Texas engaged in selective prosecution by choosing to prosecute

men for criminal trespass but not to prosecute similarly situated women for the same offense, in

violation of the Equal Protection clauses of the United States and Texas constitutions. The trial

court denied Appellant’s habeas application. 04-24-00502-CR

DISCUSSION

On appeal, Appellant argues that his selective-prosecution claim is cognizable in a pretrial

habeas proceeding and that the trial court erred by denying his application for writ of habeas

corpus.

A. Standard of Review

Generally, we review a trial court’s ruling on a pretrial application for a writ of habeas

corpus for an abuse of discretion. See Kniatt v. State, 206 S.W.3d 657, 664 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006);

Ex parte Jarreau, 623 S.W.3d 468 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2020, pet. ref’d). “However, when,

the resolution of the ultimate issue turns on the application of purely legal standards, we review

the trial court's ruling de novo.” Jarreau, 623 S.W.3d at 472. We will uphold the trial court’s ruling

“if that ruling was supported by the record and was correct under any theory of law applicable to

the case.” Armendariz v. State, 123 S.W.3d 401, 404 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (citing State v. Ross,

32 S.W.3d 853, 856 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000)). “That rule holds true even if the trial court gave the

wrong reason for its ruling.” Armendariz, 123 S.W.3d at 404 (citing Romero v. State, 800 S.W.2d

539, 543 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990)).

B. Cognizability

In his brief, Appellant argues his pretrial application for writ of habeas corpus based on a

claim of selective prosecution is cognizable on appeal. The State, however, disputes this argument.

From our review, the facts and arguments in this case are substantively the same as those

in Ex parte Aparicio, in which the Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that the appellant’s claim

of selective arrest and prosecution was cognizable under the facts of that case. 707 S.W.3d 189,

202 (Tex. Crim. App. 2024), cert. denied sub nom. Aparicio v. Texas, No. 24-6057, 2025 WL

1787753 (U.S. June 30, 2025). Accordingly, we conclude that Appellant’s claim is cognizable.

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C. Selective Prosecution

To establish a prima facie case of “selective prosecution or selective enforcement, the

claimant must prove with ‘exceptionally clear evidence’ that: 1. The prosecutorial policy had a

discriminatory effect; and 2. it was motivated by a discriminatory purpose.” Aparicio, 707 S.W.3d

at 204 (citations omitted). The second prong requires the claimant “definitively show that an

otherwise facially neutral law is being administered in bad faith—that it was ‘directed so

exclusively against a particular class of persons . . . with a mind so unequal and oppressive’ that

equal protection of the law was denied.” Id. at 208 (emphasis in original) (quoting U.S. v.

Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464–65 (1996)). In other words, the claimant must show by

“‘exceptionally clear evidence’ that the OLS mindset administering the facially neutral criminal

trespass law was ‘so unequal and oppressive’ against him because he is male.” Id. at 210 (emphasis

in original) (citations omitted).

The evidence here is substantively the same as the evidence presented in Aparicio. Id. at

189. We therefore conclude, based on our review of the entire record and after considering the

parties’ arguments, that the evidence is insufficient to show that the State of Texas’ policy was

motivated by a discriminatory purpose. Id. at 204.

CONCLUSION

Because Appellant failed to establish the second prong of his selective prosecution claim,

the trial court did not err in denying his application for writ of habeas corpus. Accordingly, we

affirm the trial court's order denying Appellant’s pretrial application for writ of habeas corpus. We

also dismiss any other pending motions as moot.

PER CURIAM DO NOT PUBLISH

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