Ex Parte Luis Fernando Reyes-Juarez v. the State of Texas

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: September 29, 2025
• Docket: 08-23-00295-CR
• Status: Published

Opinion

COURT OF APPEALS EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS EL PASO, TEXAS ————————————

No. 08-23-00295-CR ————————————

Ex Parte Luis Fernando Reyes-Juarez, Appellant

On Appeal from the County Court Kinney County, Texas Trial Court No. 12856CR

MEMORANDUM OPINION This matter comes before us on remand from the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals to

determine whether Appellant Luis Fernando Reyes-Juarez, who sought a pretrial writ of habeas

corpus based on his claim that he was the subject of selective prosecution, made a prima facie

showing that he was unlawfully arrested and prosecuted for criminal trespass because of his

gender. We conclude that he did not, and we therefore affirm the trial court’s order denying his

pretrial application for a writ of habeas corpus.

I. BACKGROUND

Reyes-Juarez, a noncitizen, was arrested for allegedly trespassing on private property in

Kinney County, Texas in January 2022 as part of the State’s Operation Lonestar (OLS) policy to address the influx of illegal border crossings from Mexico to Texas.1 He filed a pretrial application

for a writ of habeas corpus in the county court, arguing the State was selectively prosecuting him

in violation of his equal protection rights because the State was only arresting male noncitizens for

alleged trespassing in a five-county area near the border during the same timeframe pursuant to

the OLS policy. The county court denied relief, and Reyes-Juarez appealed to the Fourth Court of

Appeals. The appeal was transferred to this Court pursuant to a Texas Supreme Court docket

equalization order.2

This Court reversed the county court’s judgment and remanded the matter to the county

court with instructions to grant Reyes-Juarez’s habeas petition and dismiss his case, relying on the

Fourth Court of Appeals’ opinion in Ex parte Aparicio.3 In Aparicio, the Fourth Court of Appeals

held that Aparicio, another male noncitizen who was arrested for allegedly trespassing pursuant to

the OLS policy, was the subject of selective prosecution and was therefore entitled to habeas

relief.4 We concluded that because Reyes-Juarez relied on substantially the same evidence and the

same arguments in bringing his selective prosecution claim, he was also entitled to habeas relief

in accordance with the court’s opinion in Aparicio.5

The State filed a petition for discretionary review of our decision with the Court of Criminal

Appeals, contending Reyes-Juarez’s claim was not cognizable in a pretrial writ of habeas corpus

proceeding without addressing the merits of Reyes-Juarez’s gender discrimination claim. While

1 See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 30.05(a). 2 See Tex. R. App. P. 41.3 (requiring a transferee court to apply the precedent of the transferor court). 3 Ex parte Reyes-Juarez, No. 08-23-00295-CR, 2024 WL 150235, at *5–6 (Tex. App.—El Paso Jan. 12, 2024), petition for discretionary review granted, judgment vacated sub nom. Ex parte Ramos-Morales, No. PD-0412-24, 2024 WL 5074598, at *1 (Tex. Crim. App. Dec. 11, 2024) (not designated for publication) (citing Ex parte Aparicio, 672 S.W.3d 696, 701 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2023) rev’d, 707 S.W.3d 189 (Tex. Crim. App. 2024), cert. denied sub nom. Aparicio v. Texas, No. 24-6057, 2025 WL 1787753 (U.S. June 30, 2025)). 4 Ex parte Aparicio, 672 S.W.3d at 701. 5 Ex parte Reyes-Juarez, 2024 WL 150235, at *5–6.

2 the State’s petition was pending in Reyes-Juarez’s case, the Court of Criminal Appeals reversed

the Fourth Court of Appeals’ decision in Aparicio, holding that, although Aparicio’s claim was

cognizable in a pretrial habeas petition, he did not meet his burden of establishing a prima facie

case that he was unlawfully arrested and prosecuted because of his gender, and he was therefore

not entitled to habeas relief.6 Specifically, it held that Aparicio failed to present clear evidence to

establish that the OLS policy of arresting only men for criminal trespass at the border was

motivated by a discriminatory purpose.7 Instead, the high court held, the State’s motivation was

one of practical necessity stemming from the unprecedented influx of immigrants crossing the

border in the five-county region, the majority of which were male, and the limited jail facilities in

the region.8 The court therefore determined that the OLS policy or “mindset” of arresting only

men for trespass was “more likely” motivated by the “limited resources” the State had to address

the “ongoing emergency” at the border “rather than gender discrimination.”9 Accordingly, the

court concluded that Aparicio failed to meet his burden of “demonstrating a prima facie case that

he [was] arrested and prosecuted because of his gender,” and as such, he did not meet the

“‘demanding’ standard required for judicial interference in the State’s discretion in administering

criminal justice policy and priorities (emphasis in original).”10

Aparicio thereafter filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court of the

United States. After the Supreme Court denied review in Aparicio, the Court of Criminal Appeals

issued its opinion in Reyes-Juarez’s case, in which the court refused review of the State’s petition

6 Ex parte Aparicio, 707 S.W.3d 189, 210 (Tex. Crim. App. 2024), cert. denied sub nom. Aparicio v. Texas, No. 24- 6057, 2025 WL 1787753 (U.S. June 30, 2025). 7 Id. at 208–10. 8 Id. at 209–10. 9 Id. at 210. 10 Id.

3 on the issue of cognizability but granted review on its own motion on the issue of whether Reyes-

Juarez “ma[d]e a prima facie showing that he was arrested and prosecuted because of his gender.”11

The court then vacated our judgment in Reyes-Juarez’s case and remanded his case to this Court

for resolution of his appeal from the trial court’s denial of his pretrial habeas petition “in light of

[its] opinion in Aparicio.”12

II. DECISION ON REMAND

On remand, the State filed a supplemental brief asserting that Reyes-Juarez’s claim for

habeas relief was identical to Aparicio’s, and that there are no factual distinctions that would

warrant a different finding.13 We agree.14

As we recognized in our first opinion in this matter, Reyes-Juarez was arrested for criminal

trespass under the same OLS policy that was in effect in the same five-county region in which

Aparicio was arrested and detained.15 And Reyes-Juarez relied on substantially the same evidence

and arguments that Aparicio did in attempting to establish that the OLS policy of only arresting

males for criminal trespass in that region was motivated by gender discrimination. 16 In fact,

Reyes-Juarez relied heavily on the Fourth Court of Appeals’ opinion in Aparicio, in which the

11 See Ex parte Ramos-Morales, et al., Nos. PD-0107-24, PD-0411-24, PD-0412-24 & PD-0413-24, 2024 WL 5074598 (Tex. Crim. App. Dec. 11, 2024) (not designated for publication). The opinion also addressed three other cases in a similar procedural posture that were still pending in our Court at the time. 12 Id. 13 Reyes-Juarez has not filed a supplemental brief. 14 Because we agree with the State that Reyes-Juarez did not meet his burden of establishing a prima facie case of gender discrimination, we do not address the State’s alternative argument that Reyes-Juarez’s claim was not cognizable in an application for a pretrial writ of habeas corpus. 15 Ex parte Reyes-Juarez, 2024 WL 150235, at *6. 16 Id. at * 1, *6.

4 court found that the OLS policy at issue was constitutionally unlawful, in making his claim for

relief.17

Accordingly, because the Court of Criminal Appeals found in Aparicio’s case that this

same OLS policy or “mindset” was justified in light of the emergency situation at the border, and

because there are no facts that would distinguish Reyes-Juarez’s situation from Aparicio’s, we

conclude that, like Aparicio, Reyes-Juarez has failed to establish a prima facie case that he was

unlawfully arrested and prosecuted with criminal trespass because of his gender. We therefore

conclude that the trial court acted properly in denying Reyes-Juarez’s application for a pretrial writ

of habeas corpus.

III. CONCLUSION

We affirm the trial court’s judgment denying Reyes-Juarez’s application for a pretrial writ

of habeas corpus, and we remand this matter to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance

with our opinion.

LISA J. SOTO, Justice

September 29, 2025

Before Salas Mendoza C.J., Palafox and Soto, JJ.

(Do Not Publish)

17 Id.