Rel: June 27, 2025
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA OCTOBER TERM, 2024-2025
_________________________
SC-2024-0263 _________________________
Ex parte James E. Underwood and Braden Miles
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re: John Long
v.
James E. Underwood and Braden Miles)
(Walker Circuit Court: CV-19-900131)
PER CURIAM. SC-2024-0263
On April 14, 2017, Braden Miles, a deputy sheriff for the Walker
County Sheriff's Office, activated the lights and siren on his patrol car
and attempted to apprehend the driver of a motorcycle that he believed
to be stolen. The motorcyclist, however, refused to stop and led Deputy
Miles on a high-speed chase along a stretch of Alabama Highway 195.
The chase ended when the fleeing suspect lost control of the motorcycle,
swerved across the highway's centerline, and collided head-on with a
vehicle being driven by John Long. Long was injured in the collision. The
motorcyclist did not survive.
Long later sued Deputy Miles and James E. Underwood, the former
Sheriff of Walker County, in the Walker Circuit Court, seeking to recover
damages for injuries he had sustained in the collision with the fleeing
motorcyclist. As relevant here, Long asserted various negligence-based
claims against Deputy Miles and former Sheriff Underwood in their
individual capacities. Specifically, Long alleged that Deputy Miles had
negligently pursued the fleeing motorcyclist and that former Sheriff
Underwood had negligently failed to implement policies, procedures, and
training related to high-speed pursuits.
2 SC-2024-0263
Deputy Miles and former Sheriff Underwood moved to dismiss
Long's claims against them, arguing that they were entitled to immunity
because those claims arose from acts performed within the line and scope
of their duties. After the trial court declined to dismiss Long's claims on
immunity grounds, Deputy Miles and former Sheriff Underwood
petitioned this Court for mandamus relief from the trial court's denial of
their motion to dismiss.
As explained below, the claims against former Sheriff Underwood
must be dismissed because, as a former executive officer of the State, he
is entitled to immunity from liability for damages for acts performed
within the line and scope of his duties. Moreover, because our precedent
requires us to extend the same immunity to deputy sheriffs, Long's
claims against Deputy Miles must likewise be dismissed. We, thus, grant
the petition for a writ of mandamus and direct the trial court to dismiss
Long's action against former Sheriff Underwood and Deputy Miles.
Facts and Procedural History
According to Long's complaint, on April 14, 2017, Deputy Miles
attempted to stop the driver of a motorcycle because he believed the
motorcycle to be stolen and had observed the driver committing a traffic
3 SC-2024-0263
violation. When, instead of stopping, the motorcyclist accelerated to
speeds of more than 100 miles per hour, Deputy Miles "activated his
lights and siren and pursued the suspect …." The complaint alleges that
Deputy Miles subsequently "gave chase over a nine (9) mile stretch of a
winding and narrow county road, while reaching speeds of 115 [miles per
hour]." As the motorcyclist fled northbound on Alabama Highway 195
("AL-195"), with Deputy Miles in pursuit, Long was driving his car south
along AL-195. Shortly after passing Bennett Road in rural Walker
County, the motorcyclist failed to negotiate a curve in the road, lost
control of the motorcycle, and crossed over the highway's centerline --
striking Long's southbound car head-on. Long was injured in the
collision. The motorcyclist did not survive the crash.
In April 2019, Long sued Deputy Miles and former Sheriff
Underwood, in their individual capacities, in the trial court. In his
complaint, Long asserted federal constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 as well as state-law negligence-based claims. In particular, Long
alleged that Deputy Miles had negligently pursued the fleeing
motorcyclist, causing the suspect to lose control of his motorcycle and
collide into Long's car. Long additionally alleged that former Sheriff
4 SC-2024-0263
Underwood had negligently failed to (1) establish adequate policies
regarding high-speed pursuits and (2) properly train and supervise his
officers regarding such pursuits.
The case was removed to the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Alabama on the basis of federal-question
jurisdiction. The district court dismissed Long's federal claims with
prejudice and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his
state-law claims, remanding them to the trial court.
Deputy Miles and former Sheriff Underwood subsequently filed a
motion to dismiss in the trial court, asserting that they were immune
from Long's claims because those claims arose from actions taken within
the line and scope of their duties. The trial court entered an order denying
their motion to dismiss. Deputy Miles and former Sheriff Underwood now
petition this Court for a writ of mandamus directing the trial court to
dismiss the claims against them.
Discussion
In their petition, former Sheriff Underwood and Deputy Miles urge
us to conclude that the trial court erred in denying their motion to
dismiss. Specifically, former Sheriff Underwood argues that, because
5 SC-2024-0263
sheriffs are among the executive officers named in Art. V, § 112, of the
Alabama Constitution, they are immune from individual-capacity claims
for damages whenever those claims are based on acts performed within
the course and scope of their duties. He asserts that Long's complaint, on
its face, alleges negligence in the performance of decision- and policy-
making duties that fell squarely within the line and scope of his
employment as sheriff. Thus, he says, he must be afforded immunity from
Long's suit.
Deputy Miles additionally argues that, as the alter egos of sheriffs,
deputy sheriffs enjoy the same immunity afforded to sheriffs. According
to him, because the acts that form the basis of his alleged liability in this
case were performed within the line and scope of his duties as a deputy
sheriff, immunity also bars Long's claims against him. We address each
argument in turn.
A. Whether Long's claims against former Sheriff Underwood must be dismissed
Alabama has a well-developed body of law concerning the immunity
afforded to sheriffs and other executive officers of the State. Our cases in
that line of authority recognize that, because sheriffs are among the
officers named in § 112 of the Alabama Constitution, they are generally 6 SC-2024-0263
immune from "suit based on state law claims arising out of the execution
of the duties of [their] office." Boshell v. Walker Cnty. Sheriff, 598 So. 2d
843, 844 (Ala. 1992) (plurality opinion); see also Oliver v. Townsend, 534
So. 2d 1038, 1044 (Ala. 1988) (holding that the defendant sheriffs, as
executive officers, were entitled to immunity from claims that they had
negligently and wantonly supervised prisoner's health); Hereford v.
Jefferson Cnty., 586 So. 2d 209, 210 (Ala. 1991) (holding that defendant
sheriff, "as an executive officer of the State of Alabama," was entitled to
immunity from claims arising out of his allegedly negligent and wanton
release of a prisoner); Ex parte Davis, 930 So. 2d 497, 500-01 (Ala. 2005)
(noting that "constitutional officers of this State" are entitled to
immunity from individual-capacity claims for damages "whenever the
acts that are the basis of the alleged liability were performed within the
course and scope of the officer's employment"); and Ex parte Hale, 6 So.
3d 452, 457 (Ala. 2008) (holding that breach-of-contract claim against
sheriff in his individual capacity was barred by immunity because the
7 SC-2024-0263
claim arose from "actions taken by [the defendant] in the execution of his
duties as sheriff."). 1
Importantly, the holdings in the above-mentioned decisions also
find meaningful support in the text and structure of the Alabama
Constitution. As previously noted, § 112 of the Alabama Constitution
establishes the composition of our executive branch and states that
"[t]he executive department shall consist of a governor, lieutenant governor, attorney-general, state auditor, secretary of state, state treasurer, superintendent of education, commissioner of agriculture and industries, and a sheriff for each county."
Art. V, § 112, Ala. Const. of 2022 (emphasis added). The Alabama
Constitution vests executive power in the independent executive officers
listed in § 112 -- and sheriffs are among the officers named.
1These cases affirm a sheriff's entitlement to immunity for acts performed within the line and scope of his or her duties, subject only to exceptions not applicable here. Our precedent recognizes only five limited exceptions to the immunity conferred on sheriffs -- each of which concern equitable relief (for instance, actions to compel a sheriff's performance of ministerial acts or to enjoin a sheriff from acting beyond his or her authority). See, e.g., Parker v. Amerson, 519 So.2d 442, 443 (Ala. 1987). We reject the argument that a sixth exception, as recognized in Ex parte Moulton, 116 So.3d 1119, 1141 (Ala. 2013), permitting, under certain circumstances, claims for damages against certain state officials, would apply to a claim against a sheriff. 8 SC-2024-0263
Furthermore, Art. III, §§ 42(b) and 42(c) of the Alabama
Constitution explicitly mandate a separation of powers among the State's
legislative, executive, and judicial branches. See Opinion of the Justices
No. 380, 892 So. 2d 332, 334 n.1 (Ala. 2004). Section 42(b) states that
"[t]he government of the State of Alabama shall be divided into three
distinct branches: legislative, executive, and judicial." Section 42(c)
further provides that,
"[t]o the end that the government of the State of Alabama may be a government of laws and not of individuals, and except as expressly directed or permitted in this constitution, the legislative branch may not exercise the executive or judicial power, the executive branch may not exercise the legislative or judicial power, and the judicial branch may not exercise the legislative or executive power."
(Emphasis added.) In short, the separation-of-powers doctrine set forth
in §§ 42(b) and 42(c) prohibits the judicial branch from encroaching on
the authority of the executive branch, and § 112 tells us exactly who is
vested with that executive authority.
The line of Alabama decisions acknowledging that sheriffs are
immune from individual-capacity damages suits based on acts taken
within the line and scope of their duties therefore reflects both (1) the
separation-of-powers doctrine embodied in §§ 42(b) and 42(c) and (2) "the
9 SC-2024-0263
unique constitutional status of sheriffs as executive officers." Suttles v.
Roy, 75 So. 3d 90, 95 (Ala. 2010). Indeed, because the Alabama
Constitution explicitly designates the officers listed in § 112 as the
holders of the State's executive power, their immunity from liability for
damages predicated on acts performed within the scope of their duties is
needed to ensure that the judicial branch does not impermissibly
encroach on executive-branch authority. 2
Here, there are no allegations indicating that former Sheriff
Underwood was acting outside the line and scope of his duties as sheriff
when the conduct that is the basis of his alleged liability took place. To
the contrary, in his complaint, Long alleges only that former Sheriff
Underwood was negligent in the performance of his official duties. In
particular, he seeks to hold former Sheriff Underwood liable for his
actions (1) in hiring, training, and supervising the officers under his
authority and (2) in developing and implementing policies related to
high-speed pursuits. Those alleged actions arose from former Sheriff
2This long line of constitutional precedent concerns the separate
and distinct immunity that is conferred on executive officers of the State and, thus, does not stand in tension with our Court's decision in Ex parte Pinkard, 373 So. 3d 192 (Ala. 2022), which addressed a statutory officer's entitlement to State immunity. 10 SC-2024-0263
Underwood's performance of decision- and policy-making functions that
were clearly within the scope of his duties as sheriff. Thus, under the
principles embodied in both the Alabama Constitution and the relevant
line of Alabama precedent, former Sheriff Underwood is entitled to
immunity, and Long's claims against him must be dismissed.
B. Whether Long's claims against Deputy Miles must be dismissed
As previously noted, in the mandamus petition, Deputy Miles
argues that, because this Court has previously recognized that a deputy
sheriff is the alter ego of the sheriff for the purposes of immunity, he, too,
is entitled to immunity from Long's claims.
Deputy Miles is correct that prior decisions of this Court have "held
that deputy sheriffs are immune from suit to the same extent as sheriffs."
Alexander v. Hatfield, 652 So. 2d 1142, 1144 (Ala. 1994). Pursuant to
those decisions, deputies -- like sheriffs -- are entitled to immunity from
individual-capacity claims for damages "whenever the acts that form the
basis of the[ir] alleged liability were being performed within the line and
11 SC-2024-0263
scope of the[ir] … employment." Ex parte Donaldson, 80 So. 3d 895, 899
(Ala. 2011). 3
Nothing in Long's complaint suggests that Deputy Miles was acting
outside the scope of his employment. Indeed, the complaint's specific
factual allegations relating to Deputy Miles all concern his attempt to
apprehend a suspected criminal -- actions that fall squarely within the
duties of a sheriff and, consequently, his or her deputy. See § 36-22-
3(a)(4) and (b), Ala. Code 1975. Moreover, the complaint expressly
acknowledges that there was a legitimate explanation for Deputy Miles's
pursuit of the fleeing motorcyclist and that he was acting "pursuant to
the customs, policies or practices of the Walker County Sheriff’s Office."
The complaint does not allege that Deputy Miles's "actions were
undertaken for some personal motive … and not as a part of his duties as
a deputy sheriff." Ex parte Davis, 930 So. 2d at 501. Thus, because Long's
complaint fails to allege any facts showing that Deputy Miles acted
outside the line and scope of his duties, Deputy Miles is entitled to
immunity, and Long's claims against him must also be dismissed.
3Significantly, in his answer, Long also did not ask this Court to
reconsider the applicability of the principle that a sheriff's deputy is the alter ego of the sheriff for the purposes of immunity. 12 SC-2024-0263
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, we grant the petition for the writ of
mandamus and direct the trial court to dismiss Long's claims against
former Sheriff Underwood and Deputy Miles on immunity grounds.
PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED.
Stewart, C.J., and Bryan, McCool, and Lewis, JJ., concur.
Cook, J., concurs specially, with opinion.
Shaw, J., concurs in the result, with opinion.
Wise, Sellers, and Mendheim, JJ., concur in the result.
13 SC-2024-0263
COOK, Justice (concurring specially).
I concur with the Court's opinion, believing that, under the
circumstances of this case, former Sheriff James E. Underwood and
Deputy Braden Miles are entitled to immunity from John Long's claims
against them.
I write separately to address an issue not timely raised by the
parties: the effect of the Legislature's 2011 amendment to § 36-22-3, Ala.
Code 1975, on this Court's prior decisions concerning the immunity
afforded to deputy sheriffs.
Alabama Caselaw on Deputy-Sheriff Immunity
As the main opinion notes, our Court has repeatedly held that "[a]
deputy sheriff enjoys the immunity of the sheriff because of long-standing
precedent treating the deputy as an alter ego of the sheriff." Wheeler v.
George, 39 So. 3d 1061, 1093 (Ala. 2009). We have, thus, recognized that
deputies are entitled to immunity from liability for damages "whenever
the acts that form the basis of the[ir] alleged liability were being
performed within the line and scope of the[ir] … employment." Ex parte
Donaldson, 80 So. 3d 895, 899 (Ala. 2011).
14 SC-2024-0263
The above-mentioned standard for deputy-sheriff immunity traces
back to our decision in Hereford v. Jefferson County, 586 So. 2d 209 (Ala.
1991). There, we first held that the immunity conferred on sheriffs also
extends to their deputies and provided a single reason for that extension:
our prior caselaw embracing the principle that " '[t]he deputy sheriff is
the alter ego of the sheriff.' " Id. at 210 (quoting Mosely v. Kennedy, 245
Ala. 448, 450, 17 So. 2d 536, 537 (1944)). Applying that principle in
Hereford, we explained that, " '[i]f the deputy's acts are generally
considered the acts of the sheriff [under Alabama law], it is logical that
those acts should also enjoy the immunity covering the sheriff's own
acts.' " Id. (quoting Carr v. City of Florence, 916 F.2d 1521, 1526 (11th
Cir. 1990)). And, guided by that same reasoning, our Court -- in the over
three decades since we announced our decision in Hereford -- has
repeatedly treated a sheriff and his or her deputy as one officer for the
purposes of immunity.
The Legislature's 2011 Amendment to § 36-22-3, Ala. Code 1975
In June 2011, the Legislature amended § 36-22-3, Ala. Code 1975,
which prescribes the duties of a sheriff, to provide as follows:
"Any of the duties of the sheriff set out in subsection (a) or as otherwise provided by law may be carried out by deputies, 15 SC-2024-0263
reserve deputies, and persons employed as authorized in Section 14-6-1[, Ala. Code 1975,] as determined appropriate by the sheriff in accordance with state law. Persons undertaking such duties for and under the direction and supervision of the sheriff shall be entitled to the same immunities and legal protections granted to the sheriff under the general laws and the Constitution of Alabama …, as long as he or she is acting within the line and scope of his or her duties and is acting in compliance with the law."
§ 36-22-3(b) (emphasis added).
This Court has yet to address the 2011 amendment's impact on our
prior decisions holding that deputy sheriffs are entitled to the exact same
immunity as sheriffs. As discussed above, those decisions provide that
deputy sheriffs, as the alter egos of the sheriff, are entitled to immunity
from liability for damages "whenever the acts that form the basis of
the[ir] alleged liability were being performed within the line and scope of
the[ir] … employment." Ex parte Donaldson, 80 So. 3d at 899.
In contrast to those prior decisions, § 36-22-3(b) appears to provide
that, to qualify for the immunity granted to the sheriff under the
Alabama Constitution, a deputy sheriff must act both "within the line
and scope of his or her duties and … in compliance with the law."
(Emphasis added.) Significantly, § 36-22-3(b)'s requirement that deputies
act "in compliance with the law" does not appear to be contemplated by
16 SC-2024-0263
our current precedent, which requires only that the deputies act "within
the line and scope of the[ir] … employment." Ex parte Donaldson, 80 So.
3d at 899.
Likely Questions in a Future Case
In a future case, I assume our Court will be asked to consider the
impact of the Legislature's 2011 amendment to § 36-22-3, unless the
Legislature amends this statute further. For instance, our Court may be
asked to consider the following questions:
1. Can § 36-22-3(b)'s requirement that deputies act "in
compliance with the law" be read in harmony with our
caselaw on deputy-sheriff immunity?
2. If not, is the "alter-ego" theory of deputy-sheriff immunity
embraced by our precedent based upon the common law
(which can ordinarily be altered by legislative action, see Reed
v. Brunson, 527 So. 2d 102 (Ala. 1988) (holding that
legislation modifying the common law was a valid exercise of
the Legislature's police power)), or upon this Court's
interpretation of the Alabama Constitution?
17 SC-2024-0263
3. If that doctrine is based upon the Alabama Constitution
rather than the common law, does our deputy-sheriff-
immunity caselaw correctly interpret the Alabama
Constitution (and, if not, should it be overruled)? In other
words, is § 36-22-3(b) constitutional? See Magee v. Boyd, 175
So. 3d 79, 105 (Ala. 2015) (recognizing the judiciary's function
as the "ultimate interpreter of the Alabama Constitution");
Opinion of the Justices. No. 368, 716 So. 2d 1149, 1155 (Ala.
1998) (opinion of Lyons, J.) (explaining that the "Legislature
may, through statute, inform this Court's judgment as to the
meaning of a constitutional provision; however, it has long
been held that courts, ultimately, must determine the
meaning of constitutional provisions").
These are difficult questions. Overruling existing precedent --
especially precedent that we have repeatedly affirmed for over 30 years
-- should be done only after very careful consideration. See Bryan A.
Garner et al., The Law of Judicial Precedent 333, 352 (2016).
On the other hand, our Court must follow the instructions of the
Legislature except in the rare circumstances when its actions are
18 SC-2024-0263
inconsistent with the Constitutions of the State of Alabama or the United
States. We should strive, whenever possible, to construe statutes as
consistent with our Constitution. See Jay Mitchell, Textualism in
Alabama, 74 Ala. L. Rev. 1089, 1117 (2023) ("A statute should be
interpreted in a way that avoids placing its constitutionality in doubt.").
While our Court is tasked with determining the meaning of the
Constitution, we are tasked with determining only what it says -- not
what we might want it to say. Our Court has made clear that we are "not
at liberty to rewrite statutes or to substitute [our] judgment for that of
the Legislature." Ex parte Carlton, 867 So. 2d 332, 338 (Ala. 2003).
Further, our Court has repeatedly made clear that "public-policy
arguments should be directed to the legislature, not to this Court." Ex
parte Ankrom, 152 So. 3d 397, 420 (Ala. 2013).
Moreover, the Alabama Constitution includes a separation-of-
powers clause that provides that, "[t]o the end that the government of the
State of Alabama may be a government of laws and not of individuals, …
the judicial branch may not exercise the legislative or executive power."
Art. III, § 42(c), Ala. Const. of 2022. Thus, unless a statute is
unconstitutional, substituting our own meaning for the words used in a
19 SC-2024-0263
statute "turn[s] this Court into a legislative body, and doing that, of
course, would be utterly inconsistent with the doctrine of separation of
powers." DeKalb Cnty. LP Gas Co. v. Suburban Gas, Inc., 729 So. 2d 270,
276 (Ala. 1998). 4
Would Application of the Statute Have Changed the Outcome of This Mandamus Petition?
Sometimes, there may be no difference between the immunity
provided to a sheriff and the immunity provided to a deputy, even if we
4I believe that we are required to apply the "original public meaning" of the words in a statute or our Constitution, thus ensuring that we do not apply our own subjective meaning to the words used. New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira, 586 U.S. 105, 113 (2019) (" '[I]t's a "fundamental canon of statutory construction" that words generally should be "interpreted as taking their ordinary ... meaning ... at the time Congress enacted the statute. " ' Wisconsin Central Ltd. v. United States, 585 U.S. 274, 284 (2018) (quoting Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979))."). Because our Court is in the judicial branch, our role is limited, and applying the "original public meaning" of the words in a statute helps this Court to stay within its constitutional role, which is a fundamental part of democracy. See Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts, § 7, pp. 82-83 (Thomson/West 2012) ("Originalism is the only approach to text that is compatible with democracy. When government-adopted texts are given a new meaning, the law is changed; and changing written law, like adopting written law in the first place, is the function of the first two branches of government -- elected legislators and … elected executive officials and their delegates."). See also Jay Mitchell, Textualism in Alabama, 74 Ala. L. Rev. 1089, 1092 (2023) ("[T]he meaning of a law is its original public meaning, not its modern meaning.").
20 SC-2024-0263
read § 36-22-3(b) as conditioning immunity on a deputy's compliance with
the law. For instance, if Long had raised § 36-22-3(b) in this case, the
result might well have been the same as the one we reach today. Indeed,
Long's complaint does not appear to allege any violations of the law and
also expressly alleges that Deputy Miles had engaged his patrol car's
lights and siren during the pursuit.5 Because Long fails to allege any
facts showing that Deputy Miles acted either outside the line and scope
of his duties or illegally, Deputy Miles may have been entitled to
immunity even if the additional requirement set forth in § 36-22-3(b)
applied.
5I additionally note that, because it is undisputed that the patrol
car driven by Deputy Miles never made any contact with Long's vehicle, I fail to see how Deputy Miles could have proximately caused Long's injuries. Our Court explained in Ex parte City of Warrior, 369 So. 3d 116 (Ala. 2022) that " ' " ' "[t]he rule governing the conduct of [a] police [officer] in pursuit of an escaping offender is that he must operate his car with due care and, in doing so, he is not responsible for the acts of the offender. " ' " ' " Id. at 126 (citations omitted; emphasis added). Further, we stated that, " ' " ' "[a]lthough pursuit may contribute to the reckless driving of the pursued, the officer is not obliged to allow him to escape. " ' " ' " Id. (citations omitted); see also Doran v. City of Madison, 519 So. 2d 1308, 1313 (Ala. 1988) (holding that, when a fleeing offender injures a third party, it is the offender's conduct, and not the conduct of the pursuing police officers, that is the proximate cause of the third party's injuries). 21 SC-2024-0263
Regardless, because the parties did not timely raise the issue of
§ 36-22-3(b)'s effect on our deputy-sheriff-immunity caselaw, now is not
the time to reach these difficult questions.
22 SC-2024-0263
SHAW, Justice (concurring in the result).
I respectfully concur in the result. John Long filed a complaint
against Sheriff James Underwood and Deputy Sheriff Braden Miles, in
their official and individual capacities, seeking damages for, among other
things, negligence. Our extensive body of existing caselaw clearly
establishes that, under Ala. Const. 1901 (Off. Recomp.), Art. I, § 14,6
Underwood and Miles are immune from suit in this case. This is not a
new holding.
The State of Alabama acts through people. The executive
department, which executes the law and thus performs most of the "acts"
of the State, is made up of nine positions: "The executive department
shall consist of a governor, lieutenant governor, attorney-general, state
auditor, secretary of state, state treasurer, superintendent of education,
commissioner of agriculture and industries, and a sheriff for each
county." Ala. Const. 1901 (Off. Recomp.), Art. V, § 112. The people in
these positions perform the acts of the executive department; when
6The facts underlying this case, and its commencement, occurred
before the Alabama Constitution of 2022 was adopted, and all references in this writing are to the Alabama Constitution of 1901 (Official Recompilation). As to the content of the provisions discussed, there is no material difference between the two constitutions. 23 SC-2024-0263
acting in the course and scope of their duties, they are performing the
actions of the State, and thus, practically speaking, they are the State.
Our Constitution further provides that "the State of Alabama shall never
be made a defendant in any court of law or equity." § 14. We have long
recognized that § 14 does not provide immunity merely when the State is
simply named as a defendant in a complaint; § 14 can also protect from
suit the people who perform actions for the State. In terms of the
executive department, those people include the people occupying the
positions listed in § 112.
There are other positions, and people in those positions, who can
perform actions on behalf of the State and its agencies, subdivisions, and
other entities. Those positions are not created by § 112 but by law,
including statutes and regulations, and other inherent powers. In the
context of the immunity provided by § 14, we have recognized a
distinction between those people, who I will refer to as "statutory
officers," and the "constitutional officers" listed in § 112:
"When determining whether a State interest in an action against a state official or employee in his or her individual capacity is sufficient to trigger the immunity granted by § 14, our cases distinguish between the standards applied to those state agents or employees whose positions exist by virtue of legislative pronouncement and those who 24 SC-2024-0263
serve as the constitutional officers of this State. We have held that State-agent immunity may bar an action against a state agent or employee under the principles announced in Ex parte Cranman, 792 So. 2d 392 (Ala. 2000). See Ex parte Butts, 775 So. 2d 173 (Ala. 2000) (adopting, by majority, the Cranman restatement of the rule governing State-agent immunity). However, this Court has consistently held that a claim for monetary damages made against a constitutional officer in the officer's individual capacity is barred by State immunity whenever the acts that are the basis of the alleged liability were performed within the course and scope of the officer's employment."
Ex parte Davis, 930 So. 2d 497, 500-01 (Ala. 2005) (emphasis added). See
also Ex parte Lawley, 38 So. 3d 41, 46 (Ala. 2009) (recognizing and
applying the distinction between "statutory officers" and "constitutional
officers" and the different immunity provided to each); Reynolds v.
Calhoun, 650 F. Supp. 3d 1272, 1276 (M.D. Ala. 2023) ("[T]he Alabama
Supreme Court has two distinct lines of cases for officers created by
legislative statute and those created by the Alabama Constitution.").
These "two different forms of immunity" are "rooted in the unique
constitutional status of" constitutional officers provided by § 112. Suttles
v. Roy, 75 So. 3d 90, 93, 95 (Ala. 2010). Suits against constitutional
officers "for actions taken in the line and scope of their employment
inherently constitute actions against the State, and such actions are
25 SC-2024-0263
prohibited by § 14." Ex parte Shelley, 53 So. 3d 887, 895 (Ala. 2009)
(emphasis added).
In addressing this distinct form of § 14 immunity for constitutional
officers, we have had more occasion to discuss its application to sheriffs,
as compared to other § 112 constitutional officers. 7 In Parker v. Amerson,
519 So. 2d 442, 442-43 (Ala. 1987), this Court stated: "A sheriff is an
executive officer of the State of Alabama, who is immune from suit under
Article I, § 14, Alabama Constitution of 1901, in the execution of the
duties of his office …." In that case, a sheriff who was alleged to have
"committed negligent and wanton acts ... while executing his
discretionary duties of hiring a jailer" was held to be immune from suit.
519 So. 2d at 446. In Ex parte Purvis, 689 So. 2d 794, 795 (Ala. 1996),
the plaintiff claimed that a sheriff and his deputy "were responsible for
implementing and enforcing appropriate policies and procedures for
7But this immunity applies to other § 112 constitutional officers as
well. Wheeler v. George, 39 So. 3d 1061, 1092-93 (Ala. 2009) (holding that the Governor is entitled to the "same immunity" as a sheriff in a suit based on actions taken within the course and scope of the Governor's duties). See also Ex parte Worley, 46 So. 3d 916, 925 (Ala. 2009) (plurality opinion) (discussing the application of § 14 immunity, and the relevance of § 112, to the Secretary of State).
26 SC-2024-0263
approaching, detaining, and apprehending dangerous fugitives; that they
had failed to carry out their duties; and that their failure had proximately
caused her injuries."8 This Court, noting that it was undisputed that the
sheriff and the deputy "were both acting within the line and scope of their
employment," concluded that they were immune under § 14. Id. As
Parker, Ex parte Purvis, and numerous other cases indicate, the analysis
focuses on whether the constitutional officers, here a sheriff and a deputy
sheriff, were executing their duties or acting within the line (or course)
and scope of their employment; the "capacity" in which they are sued is
of no consequence. See, e.g., Ex parte Burnell, 90 So. 3d 708, 710 (Ala.
2012) (holding that a jail warden "being sued for money damages for
actions that arose out of his performance of his duties as a deputy sheriff"
was immune from a suit by an inmate who was injured when she slipped
and fell in a shower area of the jail); Ex parte Fielding, 86 So. 3d 354, 358
(Ala. 2011) (holding that a deputy "acting within the line and scope of his
employment as a deputy sheriff" was entitled to immunity from the tort
claims asserted against him in both his individual and official capacity);
8Deputy sheriffs, as the "alter egos" of sheriffs, are immune from
suit to the same extent as sheriffs. Drain v. Odom, 631 So. 2d 971, 972 (Ala. 1994), and Wright v. Bailey, 611 So. 2d 300, 303 (Ala. 1992). 27 SC-2024-0263
Ex parte Donaldson, 80 So. 3d 895, 899 (Ala. 2011) (holding that because
sheriffs "are constitutional officers," and because deputy sheriffs act as
their alter egos, "a claim for monetary damages made against a deputy
sheriff in his or her individual capacity is barred by [§ 14] whenever the
acts that form the basis of the alleged liability were being performed
within the line and scope of the deputy sheriff's employment"); Ex parte
Sumter Cnty., 953 So. 2d 1235, 1240 (Ala. 2006) (plurality opinion)
("[S]heriffs and deputy sheriffs are executive officers of this State" under
§ 112, and "claims against sheriffs and deputy sheriffs" are barred by §
14 when the sheriffs or their deputies are " 'acting within the line and
scope of their employment.' "); Ex parte Blankenship, 893 So. 2d 303, 305
(Ala. 2004) (stating that, because it was undisputed that a deputy sheriff
was acting within the course and scope of his employment at the time he
was involved in an automobile accident, § 14 bars an action against the
deputy sheriff for damages arising out of the accident "because an action
against a sheriff -- or a deputy sheriff -- for damages arising out of the
performance of his duties is essentially a suit ' "against the state" ' "
(citations omitted)); Ex parte McWhorter, 880 So. 2d 1116, 1117 (Ala.
2003) (holding, where it was undisputed that a deputy sheriff "was acting
28 SC-2024-0263
within the line and scope of his employment as a deputy sheriff" at the
time of a motor-vehicle accident, that the deputy was immune from a suit
seeking damages for negligence and wantonness arising from that
accident); Ex parte Haralson, 871 So. 2d 802, 806-07 (Ala. 2003) (holding
that a deputy sheriff was immune under § 14 in a suit stemming from a
motor-vehicle accident because he was "on duty" and performing an
"activity [that] falls within the official duties of a deputy sheriff");
Alexander v. Hatfield, 652 So. 2d 1142, 1144 (Ala. 1994) (holding that a
deputy sheriff was immune from a suit in her individual and official
capacities seeking damages for negligent and/or bad-faith service of
process; the deputy was "on duty" when she attempted to serve the
papers); Boshell v. Walker Cnty. Sheriff, 598 So. 2d 843, 844 (Ala. 1992)
(plurality opinion) (upholding the dismissal of a complaint against a
sheriff sued for the alleged "assault and false arrest" by the sheriff's
deputy because "a sheriff, as an executive officer of the State of Alabama,
is immune, under ... § 14 ..., from suit based on state law claims arising
out of the execution of the duties of his office"); Hereford v. Jefferson
Cnty., 586 So. 2d 209, 209-10 (Ala. 1991) (upholding, on the basis of § 14
immunity, the dismissal of a suit against a sheriff, in his official and
29 SC-2024-0263
individual capacities, seeking damages for negligence and wantonness
stemming from the mistaken release of an inmate); and White v.
Birchfield, 582 So. 2d 1085, 1088 (Ala. 1991) ("[T]he sheriff cannot be held
liable under the theory of respondeat superior for the actions of his jailer
because he is an officer of the state and the hiring of the jailer is one of
his official duties. Thus, he is immune from this type of suit under Article
I, § 14, Alabama Constitution of 1901.").
However, sheriffs, and presumably other § 112 constitutional
officers, are not immune from certain types of actions.
"A sheriff ... is immune from suit ... in the execution of the duties of his office, except for actions brought (1) to compel him to perform his duties, (2) to compel him to perform ministerial acts, (3) to enjoin him from enforcing unconstitutional laws, (4) to enjoin him from acting in bad faith, fraudulently, beyond his authority, or under mistaken interpretation of the law, or (5) to seek construction of a statute under the Declaratory Judgment Act if he is a necessary party for the construction of the statute."
Parker, 519 So. 2d at 442-43.9 These "exceptions" were drawn from those
articulated in Aland v. Graham, 287 Ala. 226, 250 So. 2d 677 (1977). The
9Additionally, a sheriff or deputy sheriff might not be immune for
conduct that is deemed outside the course and scope of their duties. See, e.g., Ex parte Haralson, 853 So. 2d 928, 933 (Ala. 2003) ("It is conceivable that Griffith could prove facts that would show that at the time of the 30 SC-2024-0263
Aland "exceptions" are also used in cases involving statutory officers, and
have been expanded and modified over the years:
" 'There are six general categories of actions that do not come within the prohibition of § 14: (1) actions brought to compel State officials to perform their legal duties; (2) actions brought to enjoin State officials from enforcing an unconstitutional law; (3) actions to compel State officials to perform ministerial acts; (4) actions brought against State officials under the Declaratory Judgments Act, Ala. Code 1975, § 6-6-220 et seq., seeking construction of a statute and its application in a given situation; (5) valid inverse condemnation actions brought against State officials in their representative capacity; and (6) actions for injunction or damages brought against State officials in their representative capacity and individually when it was alleged that they had acted fraudulently, in bad faith, beyond their authority, or in a mistaken interpretation of law. …'
"Ex parte Alabama Dep't of Fin., 991 So. 2d 1254, 1256-57 (Ala. 2008). The sixth 'exception' to § 14 immunity was restated in Ex parte Moulton, 116 So. 3d 1119, 1141 (Ala. 2013), as follows:
" '(6)(a) actions for injunction brought against State officials in their representative capacity where it is alleged that they had acted fraudulently, in bad faith, beyond their authority, or in a mistaken interpretation of law, … and (b) actions for damages brought against State officials
accident Deputy Haralson was on a personal errand or otherwise had departed from the line and scope of his employment."). 31 SC-2024-0263
in their individual capacity where it is alleged that they had acted fraudulently, in bad faith, beyond their authority, or in a mistaken interpretation of law, subject to the limitation that the action not be, in effect, one against the State.' "
Ex parte Hampton, 189 So. 3d 14, 17-18 (Ala. 2015).
In discussing the various forms of immunity that exist in this State,
our caselaw has used different terms to describe the people who occupy
the numerous positions within our government: state officials, state
officers, executive officers, state agents, state employees, etc. While the
constitutional officers designated in § 112, including sheriffs, might
accurately be described with such terms, we must be careful not to
assume that certain prior decisions, and the exceptions to immunity
addressed in them, are discussing the distinct form of immunity
applicable to constitutional officers. The second part of the "sixth
exception," dealing with actions for damages brought against "State
officials" when it is alleged that they had acted fraudulently, in bad faith,
beyond their authority, or in a mistaken interpretation of law, Ex parte
Hampton, supra, is used in determining whether statutory officers are
immune from suits brought against them in their individual capacities.
However, as the caselaw cited above illustrates, the immunity afforded
32 SC-2024-0263
constitutional officers looks to whether they were executing their duties
or acting within the line and scope of their employment, and bars both
official-capacity and individual-capacity suits. See, e.g., Ex parte Davis,
930 So. 2d at 500 ("[A] claim for monetary damages made against a
constitutional officer in the officer's individual capacity is barred."). See
also Tinney v. Shores, 77 F.3d 378, 383 (11th Cir. 1996) (noting that
"Alabama case law makes it clear" that the then-applicable version of the
sixth "exception" does not apply to a sheriff's immunity). In Poiroux v.
Rich, 150 So. 3d 1027 (Ala. 2014), numerous government officials,
including several sheriffs, were sued over the collection of certain bail-
bond fees. This Court addressed the "exceptions" discussed in Ex parte
Hampton, supra, but, as to the claims against the sheriffs, this Court
found that none of the exceptions articulated in Parker applied and thus
held that the sheriffs were immune from suit. Poiroux, 150 So. 3d at
1038. The "exceptions" to these different forms of immunity have
developed along different paths. 10
10In Birmingham Broadcasting (WVTM-TV) LLC v. Hill, 303 So. 3d
1148, 1159 (Ala. 2020), the plaintiff "contend[ed]" that a sheriff's and a deputy sheriff's actions in that case were "subject" to the sixth "exception" discussed in Ex parte Moulton, 116 So. 3d 1119, 1141 (Ala. 2013). In addressing that "contention," and without actually holding that the 33 SC-2024-0263
This Court's decision in Ex parte Pinkard, 373 So. 3d 192 (Ala.
2022), addressed § 14 immunity in the context of statutory officers,
specifically overruling an analysis developed in Barnhart v. Ingalls, 275
So. 3d 1112 (Ala. 2018). However, the distinct immunity afforded
constitutional officers long preexisted Barnhart and was not impacted by
that decision or Pinkard. See Reynolds, 650 F. Supp. 3d at 1277 ("Cases
granting State immunity to sheriffs -- even in individual-capacity
suits -- were not discussed or overruled in Pinkard ….").
In this case, the alleged tortious conduct by Underwood and Miles
clearly involved acts or omissions performed in the course and scope of
their duties as a sheriff and a deputy sheriff, respectively. None of the
"exceptions" in Parker, supra, are applicable to these claims. Underwood
and Miles are thus immune from Long's negligence claims. This form of
immunity afforded to sheriffs and their deputies is not new and has long
been applied in this State.
"exception" applied to sheriffs and their deputies, this Court held that the evidence "failed to demonstrate" that the sheriff and deputy sheriff had "acted in bad faith or … under a mistaken interpretation of the law." Id. at 1160. That decision did not hold that the sixth "exception" applies to suits against constitutional officers. 34