Ex Parte Gabriel Lee Baca v. the State of Texas

CourtTexas Court of Appeals, 7th District (Amarillo)
DecidedApril 30, 2026
Docket07-26-00100-CR
StatusPublished

This text of Ex Parte Gabriel Lee Baca v. the State of Texas (Ex Parte Gabriel Lee Baca v. the State of Texas) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Texas Court of Appeals, 7th District (Amarillo) primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Ex Parte Gabriel Lee Baca v. the State of Texas, (Tex. Ct. App. 2026).

Opinion

In The Court of Appeals Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

No. 07-26-00100-CR

EX PARTE GABRIEL LEE BACA

On Appeal from the 251st District Court Randall County, Texas Trial Court No. W-26,003-C-2, Honorable Ana Estevez, Presiding

April 30, 2026 MEMORANDUM OPINION Before DOSS and YARBROUGH and PRATT, JJ.

The State of Texas appeals from the trial court’s order granting habeas corpus

relief to Gabriel Lee Baca under article 11.072 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. We

dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction.

In 2017, Baca was placed on deferred adjudication community supervision for two

counts of sexual assault of a child1 and was required to register as a sex offender.

1 See TEX. PENAL CODE § 22.011. Although he was discharged from community supervision in 2025, he remains subject to

a lifetime sex-offender registration requirement.

On January 19, 2026, Baca filed an article 11.072 application for writ of habeas

corpus, asserting that the lifetime registration requirement was unconstitutional as applied

to him. The trial court, thereafter, issued a sequence of conflicting orders addressing his

application. On February 17, 2026, the trial court signed an order denying Baca’s

application as frivolous.2 The following day, February 18, the trial court signed a new

order granting the habeas application, vacating Baca’s order of deferred adjudication, and

terminating the lifetime registration requirement. The State immediately appealed the

February 18 order. Days later, on February 24, the trial court signed a third order,

vacating the February 18 order—noting that it had been mistakenly signed—and

reinstating the February 17 order denying Baca’s application as frivolous. Baca filed a

motion for reconsideration and a notice of appeal from all three orders. The State’s and

Baca’s appeals were docketed separately.3

Because the trial court vacated its February 18 order granting relief, we directed

the parties to address whether the State’s appeal is now moot. The State contends that

the trial court was without authority to vacate a dispositive order under article 11.072,

arguing that the trial court lacks plenary power in post-conviction habeas proceedings.

2 See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 11.072, § 7 (“If the court determines from the face of an application or documents attached to the application that the applicant is manifestly entitled to no relief, the court shall enter a written order denying the application as frivolous.”).

3 Baca’s appeal from the three orders was docketed in cause 07-26-00148-CR.

2 Baca also urges the Court to proceed with the State’s appeal from the February 18 order

while abating his own appeal.4

In criminal cases, a trial court’s plenary power expires after sentencing and

adjournment for the day unless, within thirty days, the defendant files a motion for new

trial or a motion in arrest of judgment. See TEX. R. APP. P. 21.4, 22.3; State v. Aguilera,

165 S.W.3d 695, 697–98 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). We have found no authority addressing

the scope of a trial court’s plenary power following disposition of a habeas application,

and article 11.072 is silent on the issue. Article 11.072 nevertheless imposes a deadline

for disposition of the application: the trial court must enter a written order granting or

denying relief no later than the 60th day after the State files its answer to the application

for writ of habeas corpus. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 11.072, § 6. The State filed

its answer to Baca’s habeas application on February 17, 2026, making the trial court’s

deadline to dispose of the application April 18, 2026. Each of the three orders at issue

was signed within the statutory window.

We need not, however, resolve the unsettled question of whether, or to what

extent, the trial court retained plenary authority after its initial denial of relief as frivolous.

If plenary power expired upon the issuance of the February 17 order, then the February

18 and February 24 orders are void, leaving the February 17 order as the only effective

4 Baca contends that the February 18 order granting relief and containing findings of fact and

conclusions of law is the operative final disposition, citing to Ex parte Ali, Nos. 03-10-00206-CR, 03-10- 00207-CR, 2010 Tex. App. LEXIS 10018, at *6 (Tex. App.—Austin Dec. 16, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). In Ali, the appellate court held that when a trial court denies habeas relief without finding the application frivolous on its face, it must reach the merits and support its ruling with findings of fact and conclusions of law. Id.; see also TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 11.072, § 7. That circumstance is not present here. The February 17 order expressly concludes that Baca’s application is frivolous. Accordingly, Ex parte Ali is inapposite. 3 order. If plenary power continued—either for thirty days as a result of Baca filing a motion

for reconsideration or until April 18, 2026, under article 11.072, § 6—the trial court’s

February 24 order, which vacated the February 18 order and reinstated the February 17

order, governs the disposition. In either event, there is no live controversy regarding the

February 18 order from which the State appeals.

For these reasons, the State’s appeal from the February 18 order is moot. See

Mosley v. State, Nos. 01-08-00503-CR, 01-08-00504-CR, 2009 Tex. App. LEXIS 2107,

at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 26, 2009, no pet.) (per curiam) (mem. op., not

designated for publication) (dismissing appeal from vacated habeas order as moot). We,

therefore, lack jurisdiction to consider it. See State v. Curl, 28 S.W.3d 838, 841 (Tex.

App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2000, no pet.) (en banc) (“The courts of appeals are

without jurisdiction to entertain an appeal wherein all issues are moot.”).

Consequently, we dismiss the State’s appeal for want of jurisdiction.5

Per Curiam

Do not publish.

5 Baca’s appeal in cause number 07-26-00148-CR shall proceed in due course.

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Related

State v. Aguilera
165 S.W.3d 695 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 2005)
State v. Curl, Jerry Wayne
28 S.W.3d 838 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 2000)

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