De Haven, J.
The petitioner, Foss, was indicted by the grand jury of the county of Plumas for the crime of embezzlement. At the date of the finding of this indictment the petitioner was in Honolulu, and there remained until February, 1894, when, upon the request of the American minister, and upon “ a requisition to that effect” from the governor of the state of California, he was surrendered by the provisional government of the Hawaiian Islands to the agent appointed by the governor to receive and convey him back to this state, there to be tried for the offense with which he was charged in the indictment referred to.
The treaty between the United States and the government of the Hawaiian Islands in relation to the ex[350]*350tradition of fugitives from the justice of either of such countries does not provide for the extradition of a person charged with the crime of embezzlement, and the warrant issued by the Hawaiian government for the arrest of the petitioner, and for his delivery to the agent appointed by the governor of this state to receive him into custody, does not refer to the treaty, but the proceedings preliminary to the issuance of such warrant were conducted in accordance with the rules prescribed by the treaty to effect the extradition of a person charged w'ith either of the offenses for which extradition is there provided. The petitioner, upon his return to this state, was brought before the superior court of Plumas county, in which the said indictment against him was pending, and he then moved to set the indictment aside. The motion was granted, and he was discharged from custody, and within two hours thereafter a complaint was filed with a justice of the peace charging him with the same embezzlement named in the indictment previously set aside, and he was again arrested, and after examination held to answer the charge before the superior court of Plumas county; and he is now in the custody of the sheriff of that county awaiting his trial.
The petitioner claims that his imprisonment, under the circumstances here stated, is illegal, and he seeks to be discharged therefrom under the writ of habeas corpus upon -which he has been brought before this court.
In support of this general contention he insists that his arrest in the foreign country, and enforced return to this state, and detention here for the purpose of being tried for the crime charged in the indictment, was, and is, in violation of his rights under the treaty between the United States and the government of the Hawaiian Islands. That treaty, in article XIV, provides: “ The contracting parties mutually agree to surrender, upon official requisition, to the authorities of each, all persons who, being charged with the crimes of murder, piracy, arson, robbery, forgery, or the utterance of forged paper, committed within the jurisdiction of either, shall be [351]*351found within the territories of the other, provided that tins shall only be done upon such evidence of criminality as, according to the laws of the place where the person so charged shall be found, would justify his apprehension and commitment for trial, if the crime had there been committed.” (9 U. S. Stats. at Large, 981.) It is argued that the treaty, in thus enumerating the offenses for which fugitives who have sought an asylum in either- country shall be delivered into the custody of the other upon demand of its government, in effect prohibits the surrender by either nation of a person charged with any other than one of the mentioned crimes; that the treaty is to be construed as containing an implied stipulation upon the part of the United States that a person committing any other crime against its laws than one of those named in the treaty, and who thereafter escapes to Hawaii, shall not be subject to arrest and return to the United States, there to be tried for such non-enumerated crime, even though the government of Hawaii should voluntarily surrender him for that purpose as a matter of comity. In our opinion the language of this treaty will not bear such a construction. It is, of course, true that, when a treaty provides for the extradition of fugitives charged with particular crimes, the reciprocal duty of delivering up to the justice of the other persons charged with crime is confined to the particular cases for which the treaty has provided. (Commonwealth v. Hawes, 13 Bush, 697; 26 Am. Rep. 242; United States v. Rauscher, 119 U. S. 407, 411, 412.) Thus, in Commonwealth v. Hawes, just cited, it is said: “The right of one government to demand and receive from another the custody of an offender who has sought asylum upon its soil depends upon the existence of treaty stipulations between them, and in all cases is derived from, and is measured and restricted by, the provisions, express and implied, of the treaty.”
But while this is so, the existence of a treaty which provides for extradition for certain crimes does not deprive either nation of the power and right to exercise [352]*352its own discretion in cases not coming within the terms of the treaty. It is only to the extent that the treaty imposes an obligation to surrender persons charged with particular offenses that there is any restriction placed upon the sovereign right of the nation in which the fugitive is found, to either permit or refuse to permit his arrest and return to the country from which he has fled. In other words, in relation to persons charged with offenses not named in the treaty, each government, as an incident of its sovereignty, may either grant or deny to the fugitive an asylum within its jurisdiction.' This conclusion is so obviously correct that no extended argument is necessary to sustain it, and the principle is thus stated in section 269 of volume 2 of Wharton’s International Law Digest: “ The rule expressio unius est ex-clusio alterius applies to extradition treaties; and under such treaties process can be sustained only for enumerated offenses. This, however, would not preclude in extraordinary cases, and an appeal, not on the basis of the treaty, but on the ground of comity, for surrender of a fugitive charged with a non-enumerated offense, when such offense is one which would justify such an extraordinary measure.....Thus, in 1796, the secretary of state (Mr. Pickering), ‘expresses his concurrence with Mr. Liston (British minister at Washington), in the opinion that while the reciprocal delivery of murderers and forgers is expressly stipulated in the 27th article of our treaty with Great Britain, the two governments are left at liberty to deliver other offenders as propriety and mutual advantage shall direct.....The attorney general has just called, and thinks the opinion expressed to be correct.’ (Mr. Pickering to the president, June 3, 1796. MSS. Dom. Let.) In a letter of same date to the governor of Vermont, Mr. Pickering says: ‘The reciprocal delivery of murderers and forgers is positively stipulated by the 27th article of the treaty; the conduct of the two governments with respect to other offenders is left, as before the treaty, to their mutual discretion, but this discretion will doubtless advise [353]*353the delivery of culprits for offenses which'affect the great interests of society.’ ”
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
De Haven, J.
The petitioner, Foss, was indicted by the grand jury of the county of Plumas for the crime of embezzlement. At the date of the finding of this indictment the petitioner was in Honolulu, and there remained until February, 1894, when, upon the request of the American minister, and upon “ a requisition to that effect” from the governor of the state of California, he was surrendered by the provisional government of the Hawaiian Islands to the agent appointed by the governor to receive and convey him back to this state, there to be tried for the offense with which he was charged in the indictment referred to.
The treaty between the United States and the government of the Hawaiian Islands in relation to the ex[350]*350tradition of fugitives from the justice of either of such countries does not provide for the extradition of a person charged with the crime of embezzlement, and the warrant issued by the Hawaiian government for the arrest of the petitioner, and for his delivery to the agent appointed by the governor of this state to receive him into custody, does not refer to the treaty, but the proceedings preliminary to the issuance of such warrant were conducted in accordance with the rules prescribed by the treaty to effect the extradition of a person charged w'ith either of the offenses for which extradition is there provided. The petitioner, upon his return to this state, was brought before the superior court of Plumas county, in which the said indictment against him was pending, and he then moved to set the indictment aside. The motion was granted, and he was discharged from custody, and within two hours thereafter a complaint was filed with a justice of the peace charging him with the same embezzlement named in the indictment previously set aside, and he was again arrested, and after examination held to answer the charge before the superior court of Plumas county; and he is now in the custody of the sheriff of that county awaiting his trial.
The petitioner claims that his imprisonment, under the circumstances here stated, is illegal, and he seeks to be discharged therefrom under the writ of habeas corpus upon -which he has been brought before this court.
In support of this general contention he insists that his arrest in the foreign country, and enforced return to this state, and detention here for the purpose of being tried for the crime charged in the indictment, was, and is, in violation of his rights under the treaty between the United States and the government of the Hawaiian Islands. That treaty, in article XIV, provides: “ The contracting parties mutually agree to surrender, upon official requisition, to the authorities of each, all persons who, being charged with the crimes of murder, piracy, arson, robbery, forgery, or the utterance of forged paper, committed within the jurisdiction of either, shall be [351]*351found within the territories of the other, provided that tins shall only be done upon such evidence of criminality as, according to the laws of the place where the person so charged shall be found, would justify his apprehension and commitment for trial, if the crime had there been committed.” (9 U. S. Stats. at Large, 981.) It is argued that the treaty, in thus enumerating the offenses for which fugitives who have sought an asylum in either- country shall be delivered into the custody of the other upon demand of its government, in effect prohibits the surrender by either nation of a person charged with any other than one of the mentioned crimes; that the treaty is to be construed as containing an implied stipulation upon the part of the United States that a person committing any other crime against its laws than one of those named in the treaty, and who thereafter escapes to Hawaii, shall not be subject to arrest and return to the United States, there to be tried for such non-enumerated crime, even though the government of Hawaii should voluntarily surrender him for that purpose as a matter of comity. In our opinion the language of this treaty will not bear such a construction. It is, of course, true that, when a treaty provides for the extradition of fugitives charged with particular crimes, the reciprocal duty of delivering up to the justice of the other persons charged with crime is confined to the particular cases for which the treaty has provided. (Commonwealth v. Hawes, 13 Bush, 697; 26 Am. Rep. 242; United States v. Rauscher, 119 U. S. 407, 411, 412.) Thus, in Commonwealth v. Hawes, just cited, it is said: “The right of one government to demand and receive from another the custody of an offender who has sought asylum upon its soil depends upon the existence of treaty stipulations between them, and in all cases is derived from, and is measured and restricted by, the provisions, express and implied, of the treaty.”
But while this is so, the existence of a treaty which provides for extradition for certain crimes does not deprive either nation of the power and right to exercise [352]*352its own discretion in cases not coming within the terms of the treaty. It is only to the extent that the treaty imposes an obligation to surrender persons charged with particular offenses that there is any restriction placed upon the sovereign right of the nation in which the fugitive is found, to either permit or refuse to permit his arrest and return to the country from which he has fled. In other words, in relation to persons charged with offenses not named in the treaty, each government, as an incident of its sovereignty, may either grant or deny to the fugitive an asylum within its jurisdiction.' This conclusion is so obviously correct that no extended argument is necessary to sustain it, and the principle is thus stated in section 269 of volume 2 of Wharton’s International Law Digest: “ The rule expressio unius est ex-clusio alterius applies to extradition treaties; and under such treaties process can be sustained only for enumerated offenses. This, however, would not preclude in extraordinary cases, and an appeal, not on the basis of the treaty, but on the ground of comity, for surrender of a fugitive charged with a non-enumerated offense, when such offense is one which would justify such an extraordinary measure.....Thus, in 1796, the secretary of state (Mr. Pickering), ‘expresses his concurrence with Mr. Liston (British minister at Washington), in the opinion that while the reciprocal delivery of murderers and forgers is expressly stipulated in the 27th article of our treaty with Great Britain, the two governments are left at liberty to deliver other offenders as propriety and mutual advantage shall direct.....The attorney general has just called, and thinks the opinion expressed to be correct.’ (Mr. Pickering to the president, June 3, 1796. MSS. Dom. Let.) In a letter of same date to the governor of Vermont, Mr. Pickering says: ‘The reciprocal delivery of murderers and forgers is positively stipulated by the 27th article of the treaty; the conduct of the two governments with respect to other offenders is left, as before the treaty, to their mutual discretion, but this discretion will doubtless advise [353]*353the delivery of culprits for offenses which'affect the great interests of society.’ ”
The crime with which the petitioner is charged not being an extraditable offense under the treaty between the United States and the government of the Hawaiian Islands, it must be presumed that the surrender of the petitioner was made by the latter in the exercise of its own sovereign discretion and as an act of comity. This violated no right secured to the petitioner by the treaty referred to, as that treaty does not in terms, or by necessary implication, deny to that government the right to surrender, or deprive the United States of the right upon such surrender to receive into its custody, fugitives charged with offenses not enumerated in the treaty. The cases of United States v. Rauscher, 119 U. S. 407; Commonwealth v. Hawes, 13 Bush, 697; 26 Am. Rep. 242; United States v. Watts, 8 Saw. 370; Ex parte Hibbs, 26 Fed. Rep. 421, cited and relied upon by petitioner, do not sustain his contention upon this point. Those cases simply declare that when a defendant has been surrendered in pursuance of a treaty for trial upon a specific, charge named therein, he cannot be placed upon trial for any other than the particular offense named in the extradition proceeding. This rule is well settled, but it has no application whatever to the case presented by the petitioner here.
It is also contended in behalf of petitioner that he was only surrendered by the government of the Hawaiian Islands for trial upon the indictment referred to in the warrant issued by that government commanding his arrest and delivery into the custody of the agent authorized to convey him back to this state, and that when this indictment was set aside he had fully met his accusation and was entitled to a reasonable time' within which to return to the foreign asylum, and that he cannot be lawfully detained here to answer the complaint upon which he is now held for trial before the superior court. If it should be conceded that a fugitive from justice, surrendered by a foreign government on grounds [354]*354of comity, has the same right to his discharge upon habeas corpus, when imprisoned upon a different charge than that for which he was delivered up, as if he had been extradited under the provisions of a treaty, and arrested and detained for trial upon another offense than that named in the extradition proceedings, in violation of the implied provisions of the treaty, still we do not think the petitioner here would be entitled to a discharge upon the facts appearing in this record. The order setting aside the indictment did not operate as an acquittal of the petitioner for the offense therein charged, and is not a bar to his further prosecution for the same offense by indictment or information. And as he is now held by virtue of an order of commitment based upon a complaint charging him with the identical offense named in the indictment set aside, and to answer which he was surrendered by the Hawaiian government for trial by the state, the petitioner should be remanded.
Petitioner remanded.
Beatty, C. J., Harrison, J., and Garoutte, J., concurred.