Rel: January 19, 2024
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA OCTOBER TERM, 2023-2024
_________________________
SC-2023-0201 _________________________
Ex parte Emma Louie, Garry Rice, and Toice Goodson
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re: Ester Eaton and Anthony Eaton
v.
Emma Louie, Garry Rice, and Toice Goodson)
(Greene Circuit Court: CV-16-900019)
STEWART, Justice.
Emma Louie, Garry Rice, and Toice Goodson ("the defendants")
have petitioned this Court for a writ of mandamus directing the Greene SC-2023-0201
Circuit Court ("the trial court") to enter a summary judgment on the basis
that the claims asserted against them by Ester Eaton and Anthony Eaton
("the plaintiffs") are barred by State-agent immunity. For the following
reasons, we grant the petition and issue a writ directing the trial court to
enter a summary judgment in favor of the defendants.
Background
The material facts are undisputed. The defendants assert that they
are entitled to State-agent immunity by virtue of their employment with
the Greene County Board of Education ("the Board"). At the time of the
incident underlying the plaintiffs' claims, Louie served as the Board's
superintendent, Rice was employed as the Greene County High School
("GCHS") principal, and Goodson was employed as the GCHS vice
principal.
Ester Eaton began working as a substitute teacher in October 2014,
when she received the Board's approval. On April 7, 2015, Ester was
called to substitute at GCHS. When she arrived, Goodson assigned Ester
to supervise a classroom with both students who had been referred to the
Alternative Program and students who had been assigned to in-school
suspension ("ISS"). ISS was instituted by GCHS officials as an
2 SC-2023-0201
alternative to suspending a student from school. The Alternative
Program served as an alternative-learning placement for 6th- through
12th-grade students in Greene County schools exhibiting disruptive
behaviors or problems associated with certain code-of-conduct violations.
The Board relocated the Alternative Program to GCHS from a different
school in March 2015. Upon the relocation, GCHS officials placed the
Alternative Program students in the classroom previously established for
students assigned to ISS ("the ALT/ISS classroom"). GCHS officials also
routinely used the ALT/ISS classroom as a temporary placement for
students with possible disciplinary violations that GCHS officials had not
yet had the opportunity to address.
The ALT/ISS classroom was ordinarily supervised by Officer
Stinson, and occasionally by Officer Garner, who were certified police
officers assigned to GCHS as school-resource officers. On April 7, 2015,
Officer Stinson and numerous teachers were absent from GCHS, and
Rice was at a work-related conference in another city. Goodson initially
assigned Officer Garner to supervise the students in the ALT/ISS
classroom; however, Goodson assigned Ester to take over the ALT/ISS-
classroom supervision because he needed Officer Garner's assistance in
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supervising the hallways in response to threats of impending violence
among multiple male students. Goodson had also requested and received
additional local law-enforcement presence at GCHS to address the
threat.
T.F. and C.F. are sisters who were in the ALT/ISS classroom on
April 7. Around lunchtime, Goodson placed T.Y. in the ALT/ISS
classroom, as a result of her being tardy to class, until he had the
opportunity to speak with her to obtain more information. Although T.Y.
told Goodson that it was not a good idea to put her in that classroom with
T.F. and C.F., Goodson did not believe that there was a serious potential
for physical violence between those students. 1 When T.Y. entered the
ALT/ISS classroom, she and C.F. had a brief argument. Ester had T.Y.
sit in a chair next to her desk to keep the students separated.
Approximately 20 minutes later, Goodson brought four or five additional
students with whom T.Y. apparently had issues into the ALT/ISS
1When T.F. and C.F. arrived at GCHS, T.F. told Officer Garner that
she and T.Y. were having issues. Officer Garner advised Goodson, and Goodson spoke with T.F. and C.F. regarding the issues with T.Y. Goodson referred all three to the GCHS counselor. The counselor did not report any concerns to Goodson, and Goodson believed that the situation had been resolved. 4 SC-2023-0201
classroom. Goodson and Officer Garner checked the ALT/ISS classroom
every three to five minutes while patrolling the hallways, and Ester
never reported any concerns to them.
At some point, C.F., T.F., and another student, S.W., rushed toward
Ester and T.Y. Ester stood up, and they began striking her in the face
and head. Ester briefly lost consciousness, and she was transported to an
emergency room for treatment. Ester suffered, among other injuries,
severe bruising, swelling in her arm, a torn rotator cuff, and hearing loss
in her right ear.2
The plaintiffs sued the defendants, asserting claims of negligence;
negligent and wanton hiring, supervision, and training; and loss of
consortium. The plaintiffs alleged, generally, that the defendants had
violated the Board's policies by placing unauthorized students in the
ALT/ISS classroom and by assigning Ester to supervise that classroom.
The defendants eventually moved for a summary judgment,
asserting, among other grounds, that they were entitled to State-agent
2Two other female students joined in the attack. It is not clear from
the materials presented with the mandamus petition whether Ester was the target of the attack or whether she was caught in the middle. It is also unclear whether T.Y. was attacked. 5 SC-2023-0201
immunity. The defendants supported their motion with deposition
testimony of Louie, Rice, Goodson, and Ester; the plaintiffs' responses to
interrogatories; the incident report made by Ester; and copies of the
pleadings.
The plaintiffs filed a response in opposition to the defendants'
summary-judgment motion in which they argued that the defendants
had failed to follow specific policies and procedures contained in the 2014-
2015 GCHS Faculty Handbook ("the faculty handbook") and the 2014-
2015 Information Guide for Students and Parents ("the information
guide"). To their response, the plaintiffs attached the faculty handbook,
the information guide, and deposition testimony of Ester, Goodson, Rice,
Officer Garner, and Glenda Hodges, a substitute teacher who had
previously supervised students in the Alternative Program.
Rice testified that the information guide and the faculty handbook
contained guidelines -- not mandatory rules or policies. Goodson's
testimony, likewise, indicated that the provisions in the information
guide allowed room for discretion. Louie testified that the information
guide contained "expectations" that administrators should use to inform
their decisions but that they were permitted to deviate from those
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expectations if the circumstances warranted. Louie explained that the
administrators are the individuals actually present in the schools and
that they have to have the flexibility to consider the circumstances to
decide the best course of action and consequences.
Rice, Goodson, and Louie all testified that no policy or rule required
the Alternative Program to be held at a certain location or prevented a
teacher or a substitute teacher from supervising the students in the
Alternative Program or ALT/ISS classroom. In addition, Rice's and
Goodson's testimony indicated that, although Officer Stinson ordinarily
supervised the ALT/ISS classroom and Officer Garner sometimes filled
in, there was no rule or policy requiring a school-resource officer to
supervise the students in the Alternative Program.
Both Rice's and Goodson's testimony indicated that ISS was an
appropriate disciplinary measure and that it was not in violation of the
provisions in the information guide or the faculty handbook. Rice and
Louie testified that local school administrators are authorized to develop
rules to assist in enforcing the "Student Code of Conduct" section in the
information guide, which provides: "Each classification is followed by a
disciplinary procedure to be implemented by the principal or his or her
7 SC-2023-0201
designees. In addition, [t]he Board … authorizes the administration at
the local school to develop specific, local school rules and regulations
which will assist in enforcing the student Code of Conduct."
Hodges testified that Ester should not have been assigned to
supervise the ALT/ISS classroom because she was a substitute teacher
and was not "certified." Hodges also testified that the Alternative
Program should be held at a location separate from GCHS. Officer
Garner testified that he was surprised that Goodson had assigned Ester
to supervise the ALT/ISS classroom and that a school-resource officer
should be assigned to supervise that classroom.
After a hearing, the trial court granted the defendants' motion for
a summary judgment with regard to the plaintiffs' claims of negligent
and wanton hiring, supervision, and training but denied the defendants'
motion with regard to the plaintiffs' other claims of negligence and loss
of consortium. The defendants timely filed a petition for a writ of
mandamus in this Court.
Standard of Review
A petition for a writ of mandamus is an appropriate method by
which an appellate court may review the denial of a summary-judgment
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motion based on the defense of State-agent immunity. Ex parte Nall, 879
So. 2d 541, 543 (Ala. 2003) (citing Ex parte Rizk, 791 So. 2d 911, 912 (Ala.
2000)). To obtain the extraordinary remedy of a writ of mandamus, the
petitioner must demonstrate: " '(1) a clear legal right to the order sought;
(2) an imperative duty upon the respondent to perform, accompanied by
a refusal to do so; (3) the lack of another adequate remedy; and (4) the
properly invoked jurisdiction of the court.' Ex parte BOC Group, Inc., 823
So. 2d 1270, 1272 (Ala. 2001)." Id. at 543.
Discussion
The test for State-agent immunity set forth in Ex parte Cranman,
792 So. 2d 392 (Ala. 2000)(plurality opinion), which was adopted by the
Court in Ex parte Butts, 775 So. 2d 173 (Ala. 2000), provides that a State
agent is entitled to immunity from civil liability for negligence alleged to
have occurred while the State agent was engaged in certain conduct. As
relevant here, a State agent shall be immune if his or her conduct
involved " 'formulating plans, policies, or designs' "; " 'exercising his or her
judgment in the administration of a department or agency of government
[… while] hiring, firing, transferring, assigning, or supervising
personnel' "; or " 'exercising judgment in the discharge of duties imposed
9 SC-2023-0201
by statute, rule, or regulation in … educating students.' " Ex parte Butts,
775 So. 2d at 177-78 (quoting Ex parte Cranman, 792 So. 2d at 405); see
also § 36-1-12, Ala. Code 1975. "Educating students includes not only
classroom teaching, but also supervising and educating students in all
aspects of the educational process." Ex parte Trottman, 965 So. 2d 780,
783 (Ala. 2007). The State agent's entitlement to immunity can be
defeated in circumstances in which "the State agent acted willfully,
maliciously, fraudulently, in bad faith, or beyond his or her authority."
Ex parte Estate of Reynolds, 946 So. 2d 450, 452 (Ala. 2006).
A State agent bears the initial burden of demonstrating entitlement
to immunity, and, once entitlement to immunity is shown, the plaintiff
bears the burden of establishing, by substantial evidence, an exception to
immunity. Ex parte Estate of Reynolds, 946 So. 2d at 452. In this case,
there is no dispute that the defendants met their burden of
demonstrating that they were entitled to immunity. The plaintiffs assert,
however, that the defendants were stripped of immunity because they
acted beyond their authority by not following established policies and
procedures contained in the faculty handbook and the information guide.
This Court has acknowledged that a plaintiff may demonstrate that a
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State agent acted beyond authority by showing that the agent failed " ' "to
discharge duties pursuant to detailed rules or regulations, such as those
stated on a checklist." ' " Ex parte Estate of Reynolds, 946 So. 2d at 452
(quoting Giambrone v. Douglas, 874 So. 2d 1046, 1052 (Ala. 2003),
quoting in turn Ex parte Butts, 775 So. 2d at 178). Accordingly, we must
determine whether the plaintiffs established, by substantial evidence,
that the defendants violated provisions in the faculty handbook or the
information guide and, if so, whether such provisions qualify as "the type
of 'detailed rules or regulations' that would remove [the defendants']
judgment in the performance of required acts." Ex parte Spivey, 846 So.
2d 322, 333 (Ala. 2002)(citing Ex parte Butts, 775 So. 2d at 178).
The plaintiffs' claims against the defendants center primarily on
alleged violations of provisions in the information guide. "[T]he threshold
question is whether a rule or directive in" the information guide, or the
faculty handbook, sets "forth a sufficiently specific, mandatory duty
governing the conduct of the [defendants] at issue in this case." Ex parte
Herring, [Ms. SC-2022-0981, Oct. 27, 2023] ___ So. 3d ___, ___ (Ala. 2023).
The defendants, relying on, among other authorities, Moore v.
Tyson, 333 So. 3d 668 (Ala. 2021), argue that the information guide and
11 SC-2023-0201
the faculty handbook contain general guidelines and not specific rules
that would remove an administrator's discretion. In Moore, the Moores
sued a teacher and a school administrator after their child was injured
when the teacher left the classroom to use the restroom. The Moores
argued that the teacher had acted beyond her authority by violating
provisions related to student supervision contained in the local board of
education's policy manual and certain training videos. The trial court in
that case entered a summary judgment in favor of the teacher and school
administrator based on State-agent immunity. The Moores appealed, and
this Court held that they had not presented any "detailed rule or
regulation that prohibited [the teacher] from leaving the students in her
classroom unattended in order to use the restroom." 333 So. 3d at 676.
This Court further held that the statements in the policy manual and the
training videos indicating that teachers should provide "effective
supervision" were " 'general statements' and '[were] not the type of
"detailed rules or regulations" that would remove [the teacher's]
judgment in the performance of required acts.' " Id. (quoting Ex parte
Spivey, 846 So. 2d at 333, quoting in turn Ex parte Butts, 775 So. 2d at
178).
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The plaintiffs assert that Moore is distinguishable because it did
not involve detailed policies or procedures. The plaintiffs assert that this
case involves specific, established rules and policies similar to those
considered in, among other cases, N.C. v. Caldwell, 77 So. 3d 561 (Ala.
2011), and Ex parte Yancey, 8 So. 3d 299 (Ala. 2008). 3 Caldwell and Ex
parte Yancey do not support the plaintiffs' position because the policies
at issue in those cases explicitly established restrictions on the State
agent's discretion while, in this case, as explained below, the information
guide and faculty handbook do not contain explicit, detailed rules that
the defendants are alleged to have violated.
The plaintiffs argue that the defendants acted beyond their
authority by violating certain provisions in the information guide related
3In Caldwell, 77 So. 3d at 569, this Court held that a genuine issue
of material fact existed as to whether a teacher had engaged in conduct that constituted an explicit violation of school-board policy, thus precluding a summary judgment, and, in Ex parte Yancey, 8 So. 3d at 307, this Court held that a teacher's conduct was a "clear violation of the policy set forth in the student handbook, to which [the teacher was] bound."
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to the Alternative Program. 4 The "Alternative Program" section in the
information guide provides, in its entirety:
"The Alternative Program is designed primarily as an alternative-learning placement for students who exhibit disruptive behavior and/or problems associated with Class III Violations. The major goal of the Alternative Program is to provide a curriculum designed to meet the individual needs, abilities, and interests of students referred for alternative placement.
"The Alternative Program is staffed with certified personnel and support staff. Students may be referred to the Alternative Program in grades 6-12 or based on extenuating circumstances. Acceptance to the Alternative Program is based upon the recommendation of the Truancy Officer and Supervisor of the Truancy Officer.
"Parents are responsible for providing daily transportation for students admitted to the Alternative Program. A waiver may be obtained for special students with documented hardships.
"Upon successfully completing placement in the Alternative Program, the students are placed back into the regular school setting and monitored for progress.
"All students placed in the Alternative Program must abide by the policies of the Greene County Board of Education including the rules listed in the Student Code of Conduct and
4With the exception of a few arguments directed specifically against
Rice and Goodson, most of the plaintiffs' arguments are broadly directed against all the defendants. The plaintiffs do not identify any purported regulation or policy that Louie, specifically, violated, nor do they explain how Louie, specifically, acted beyond her authority or otherwise lost her entitlement to immunity. 14 SC-2023-0201
additional rules developed specifically to facilitate a speedy transition back to the parent school."
The plaintiffs assert that the Alternative Program is required to be
held in a location separate from GCHS and that that " 'program is to be
staffed with certified personnel and support staff.' " Plaintiffs' brief at 17
(purportedly quoting the information guide). The plaintiffs contend that
the defendants acted beyond their authority by placing the Alternative
Program at GCHS, combining the students in that program with
students assigned to ISS, 5 and placing Ester in the ALT/ISS classroom to
supervise because, they assert, she is a substitute teacher and not
"certified."
The "Alternative Program" section of the information guide neither
requires the Alternative Program class to be held at a location separate
from GCHS nor requires, or prohibits, a particular physical location for
the program. Likewise, the "Alternative Program" section does not
contain a directive requiring the Alternative Program "to be" staffed with
certified personnel, as the plaintiffs contend. Instead, that section states
5The plaintiffs assert that Rice, specifically, acted beyond his authority by combining students from the Alternative Program in the same classroom with students assigned to ISS. 15 SC-2023-0201
that the program "is staffed with certified personnel and support staff,"
and nothing in that section defines "certified personnel" or addresses
what qualifications "certified personnel" must possess. Certainly,
nothing in the information guide prohibited Goodson from assigning a
substitute teacher like Ester to temporarily supervise the students in the
ALT/ISS classroom to enable the school-resource officer to respond to a
pressing security/safety issue at the school. Indeed, "[t]his is precisely
the type of situation that requires an exercise of discretion, based on the
circumstances as they are known to the [State agent] at that time."
Edwards v. Pearson, 309 So. 3d 1216, 1224 (Ala. 2020)(plurality
opinion)(holding that school bus driver's actions when faced with an
exigent circumstance required the exercise of discretion and, therefore,
were not beyond her authority).
The plaintiffs also assert that Goodson violated the guidelines
listed in the tardy policy in the information guide by placing T.Y. in ISS.
However, the plaintiffs' argument is based on the faulty premise that
Goodson was disciplining T.Y. by assigning her to ISS. To the contrary,
Goodson testified that, because of the escalating security situation on the
morning of April 7, 2015, he placed T.Y. temporarily in the ALT/ISS
16 SC-2023-0201
classroom so that she could be supervised until he had an opportunity to
discuss the situation with her to determine what discipline, if any, should
be imposed. The plaintiffs have not provided any specific rule or
regulation that prohibited such action under the circumstances faced by
Goodson on April 7, 2015. See Edwards, 309 So. 3d at 1224.
The plaintiffs also argue that the defendants acted beyond their
authority by implementing and using ISS as a disciplinary measure
because, they assert, there is no authority for the creation or use of ISS
"in the Greene County handbook." 6 Plaintiffs' brief at 21. However, the
"Student Code of Conduct" section in the information guide expressly
provides for the creation of "a disciplinary procedure to be implemented
by the principal or his or her designees. In addition, [t]he Board …
authorizes the administration at the local school to develop specific, local
school rules and regulations which will assist in enforcing the student
Code of Conduct." Moreover, the plaintiffs have not identified a specific,
detailed rule or regulation that they allege prohibited the defendants
from implementing or using ISS. Accordingly, because the plaintiffs have
6It is not clear whether the plaintiffs' reference to the "Greene County handbook" is actually a reference to the information guide, the faculty handbook, or some other source. 17 SC-2023-0201
not identified "a sufficiently specific, mandatory duty governing the
conduct" of any of the defendants, Ex parte Herring, ___ So. 3d at ___,
the plaintiffs have not established that the defendants acted beyond their
authority by implementing and using ISS at GCHS.
Ultimately, the plaintiffs failed to establish that the information
guide or the faculty handbook -- the only sources of guidelines the
defendants are alleged to have violated -- contain specific,
nondiscretionary rules or regulations that were required to be strictly
followed by the defendants or that any guidelines in the information
guide or the faculty handbook constituted detailed rules or regulations
removing the defendants' discretion in the performance of their job
functions. See Ex parte Spivey, 846 So. 2d at 333, and Moore, 333 So. 3d
at 676. As a result, the plaintiffs have not demonstrated that the
defendants acted beyond their authority, and, accordingly, the
defendants' conduct is covered by State-agent immunity.
Conclusion
Because the plaintiffs' claims against the defendants are barred by
State-agent immunity, the defendants have established a " 'clear legal
right' to summary judgments in their favor." Ex parte Spivey, 846 So. 2d
18 SC-2023-0201
at 334 (citing Ex parte Duvall, 782 So. 2d 244, 248 (Ala. 2000)).
Accordingly, we grant the defendants' mandamus petition and issue a
writ directing the trial court to enter a summary judgment in their favor
on all of the plaintiffs' claims.
PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED.
Parker, C.J., and Shaw, Wise, Sellers, Mendheim, Mitchell, and
Cook, JJ., concur.
Bryan, J., dissents.