Ex Parte Elliot Jerzain Ramos-Estrada v. the State of Texas

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: August 12, 2025
• Docket: 04-22-00632-CR
• Status: Published

Opinion

Fourth Court of Appeals San Antonio, Texas MEMORANDUM OPINION No. 04-22-00632-CR

EX PARTE Elliot Jerzain RAMOS-ESTRADA

From the County Court, Webb County, Texas Trial Court No. 2022CRB000724L1 Honorable Leticia Martinez, Judge Presiding

PER CURIAM

Sitting: Rebeca C. Martinez, Chief Justice Irene Rios, Justice Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice

Delivered and Filed: August 12, 2025

AFFIRMED

Appellant, Elliot Jerzain Ramos-Estrada, appeals the trial court’s order denying the

appellant’s request for habeas relief. For the reasons stated below, we affirm the judgment of the

trial court.

BACKGROUND

Appellant was arrested and charged with misdemeanor criminal trespass as a part of

Operation Lone Star (“OLS”). Appellant subsequently filed a pretrial application for writ of habeas

corpus, arguing that the State of Texas engaged in selective prosecution by choosing to prosecute

men for criminal trespass but not to prosecute similarly situated women for the same offense, in 04-22-00632-CR

violation of the Equal Protection clauses of the United States and Texas constitutions. The trial

court denied Appellant’s habeas application.

On December 13, 2023, this court reversed the trial court’s judgment and ordered the case

dismissed with prejudice. On December 11, 2024, the Court of Criminal Appeals vacated our

opinion and remanded the case to consider the merits of the appeal in light of its decision in Ex

parte Aparicio, 707 S.W.3d 189, 202 (Tex. Crim. App. 2024), cert. denied sub nom. Aparicio v.

Texas, No. 24-6057, 2025 WL 1787753 (U.S. June 30, 2025)

DISCUSSION

On appeal, Appellant argues that his selective-prosecution claim is cognizable in a pretrial

habeas proceeding and that the trial court erred by denying the application for writ of habeas

corpus.

A. Standard of Review

Generally, we review a trial court’s ruling on a pretrial application for a writ of habeas

corpus for an abuse of discretion. See Kniatt v. State, 206 S.W.3d 657, 664 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006);

Ex parte Jarreau, 623 S.W.3d 468 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2020, pet. ref’d). “However, when,

the resolution of the ultimate issue turns on the application of purely legal standards, we review

the trial court’s ruling de novo.” Jarreau, 623 S.W.3d at 472. We will uphold the trial court’s

ruling “if that ruling was supported by the record and was correct under any theory of law

applicable to the case.” Armendariz v. State, 123 S.W.3d 401, 404 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (citing

State v. Ross, 32 S.W.3d 853, 856 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000)). “That rule holds true even if the trial

court gave the wrong reason for its ruling.” Armendariz, 123 S.W.3d at 404 (citing Romero v.

State, 800 S.W.2d 539, 543 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990)).

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B. Cognizability

In his brief, Appellant argues that his pretrial application for writ of habeas corpus based

on a claim of selective prosecution is cognizable on appeal. The State, however, disputes this

argument.

From our review, the facts and arguments in this case are substantively the same as those

in Ex parte Aparicio, in which the Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that the appellant’s claim

of selective arrest and prosecution was cognizable under the facts of that case. 707 S.W.3d 189,

202 (Tex. Crim. App. 2024), cert. denied sub nom. Aparicio v. Texas, No. 24-6057, 2025 WL

1787753 (U.S. June 30, 2025). Accordingly, we conclude that Appellant’s claim is cognizable.

C. Selective Prosecution

To establish a prima facie case of “selective prosecution or selective enforcement, the

claimant must prove with ‘exceptionally clear evidence’ that: 1. The prosecutorial policy had a

discriminatory effect; and 2. it was motivated by a discriminatory purpose.” Id. at 204. (citations

omitted). The second prong requires the claimant “definitively show that an otherwise facially

neutral law is being administered in bad faith—that it was ‘directed so exclusively against a

particular class of persons . . . with a mind so unequal and oppressive’ that equal protection of the

law was denied.” Id. at 208 (emphasis in original) (quoting U.S. v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464–

65 (1996)). In other words, the claimant must show by “‘exceptionally clear evidence’ that the

OLS mindset administering the facially neutral criminal trespass law was ‘so unequal and

oppressive’ against him because he is male.” Id. at 210 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).

The evidence here is substantively the same as the evidence presented in Aparicio. Id. at

189. We therefore conclude, based on our review of the entire record and after considering the

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parties’ arguments, that the evidence is insufficient to show that the State of Texas’ policy was

motivated by a discriminatory purpose. Id. at 204.

CONCLUSION

Because Appellant failed to establish the second prong of his selective prosecution claim,

the trial court did not err in denying his application for writ of habeas corpus. Accordingly, we

affirm the trial court’s order denying Appellant’s pretrial application for writ of habeas corpus. We

also dismiss any other pending motions as moot.

DO NOT PUBLISH

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