Ex Parte Elizondo

947 S.W.2d 202, 1996 WL 724666

• Court: Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas
• Decided: June 18, 1997
• Docket: 72235
• Status: Published

Opinions

OPINION

MEYERS, Judge.

In State ex rel. Holmes v. Court of Appeals, 885 S.W.2d 389, 397 (Tex.Crim.App. 1994), we accepted the proposition that the “execution of an innocent person would violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution” and announced that this Court would begin to entertain postconviction applications for the writ of habeas corpus alleging actual innocence as an independent ground for relief. The instant cause comes to us on one such application.

In 1984, applicant was convicted in a jury trial of aggravated sexual assault. His punishment was assessed at confinement in the penitentiary for life and a fine of $10,000.00. The Ninth Court of Appeals affirmed. Elizondo v. State, 697 S.W.2d 65 (Tex.App.— Beaumont 1985, PDR refd). But last year, the witness whose testimony was mainly responsible for convicting applicant recanted. As a result, applicant has filed the instant petition alleging that newly available evidence shows him to be innocent of the crime for which he was convicted.

I.

At the threshold, we must decide whether the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution forbids, not just the execution, but the incarceration as well of an innocent person. We need not pause long to answer this question. Although it is sometimes said that Due Process requires an especially high level of reliability in the mechanisms leading to a death sentence, Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 637-38, 100 S.Ct. 2382, 2389-90, 65 L.Ed.2d 392 (1980), it is reasonably clear that the basis for entertaining posteonviction habeas claims of actual innocence is not peculiar to capital eases. As the Supreme Court observed in Herrera v. Collins, upon which we based our holding in Holmes:

Petitioner asserts that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution prohibit the execution of a person who is innocent of the crime for which he was convicted. This proposition has an elemental appeal, as would the similar proposition that the Constitution prohibits the imprisonment of one who is innocent of the crime for which he was convicted. After all, the central purpose of any system of criminal justice is to convict the guilty and free the innocent.

506 U.S. 390, 398, 113 S.Ct. 853, 859, 122 L.Ed.2d 203, 215 (1993). Thus Herrera’s claim that a more exacting standard should be applied in his case because he was confined under a sentence of death was expressly rejected by the Court.

Petitioner asserts that this case is different because he has been sentenced to death.... [But] petitioner’s claim is not that some error was made in imposing a capital sentence upon him, but that a fundamental error was made in finding him guilty of the underlying murder in the first place. It would be a rather strange jurisprudence, in these circumstances, which held that under our Constitution he could not be executed, but that he could spend the rest of his life in prison.

Herrera, 506 U.S. at 405, 113 S.Ct. at 863, 122 L.Ed.2d at 219-20.

These remarks represent the views of at least five justices, including Justice O’Connor who, although she filed a concurring opinion in which she was joined by Justice Kennedy, also joined the opinion of the Court. Likewise, the dissenters seem to recognize no significant difference between cases in which the death penalty has been assessed and cases in which an actually innocent person has been merely incarcerated.

Whether petitioner is viewed as challenging simply his death sentence or also his continued detention, he still is challenging the State’s right to punish him.... [T]he legitimacy of punishment is inextricably entwined with guilt.

Herrera, 506 U.S. at 433-34, 113 S.Ct. at 878, 122 L.Ed.2d at 238 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).

We think it clear from these excerpts that the incarceration of an innocent person is as much a violation of the Due Process Clause as is the execution of such a person. It follows that claims, of actual innocence are cognizable by this.Court in a postconviction habeas corpus proceeding whether the punishment assessed is death or confinement. In either case, such claims raise issues of federal constitutional magnitude. Ex parte Bravo, 702 S.W.2d 189, 193 (Tex.Crim.App.1982)(habeas corpus will lie to review jurisdictional and constitutional defects in a judgment of conviction). To the extent that Ex parte Binder, 660 S.W.2d 103 (Tex.Crim.App.1983) and Ex parte May, 717 S.W.2d 84 (Tex.Crim.App.1986) are to the contrary, we expressly overrule them.

II.

In Holmes, we held that “in order to be entitled to relief on a claim of factual innocence the applicant must show that based on the newly discovered evidence and the entire record before the jury that convicted him, no rational trier of fact could find proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.” 885 S.W.2d at 398. However, no application of the standard was actually made in that case because no petition for the writ of habeas corpus was pending before this Court at that time. In the present context, therefore, a more complete explanation of this Court’s role and of the criteria we use to assess the merits of an actual innocence claim is indicated.

At the outset, we perceive an anomaly in our Holmes opinion, which describes the ultimate criterion for relief under the actual innocence test as if our task were to decide whether the evidence of guilt could support a conviction in light of the newly discovered evidence of innocence. Such characterization is misleading because, if habeas corpus relief is to be conditioned upon a finding that no rational juror could convict the applicant after introduction of the newly discovered evidence, it becomes theoretically impossible for any habeas applicant to sustain his burden because exculpatory evidence can never outweigh inculpatory evidence under this standard of sufficiency. See Holmes, 885 S.W.2d at 417-18 (Clinton, J., dissenting).

When we conduct a legal sufficieney-of-the-evidenee review as prescribed by Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979), we do not weigh the evidence tending to establish guilt against the evidence tending to establish innocence. Nor do we assess the credibility of witnesses on each side. We view the evidence in a manner favorable to the verdict of guilty. In practice, this means we assume that the jury weighed lightly the exculpatory evidence and disbelieved entirely the exculpatory witnesses. We make this assumption no matter how powerful the exculpatory evidence may seem to us or how credible the defense "witnesses may appear. If the inculpatory evidence standing alone is enough for rational people to believe in the guilt of the defendant, we simply do not care how much credible evidence is on the other side.¹

Of course, we have lately come to hold that the courts of appeals do have authority to conduct factual sufficiency reviews on direct appeal, and we have indicated that we also have such authority, in capital cases in which exculpatory evidence may be weighed against inculpatory evidence. Clewis v. State, 922 S.W.2d 126, 130 & 136 (Tex.Crim.App.1996). But this kind of evidentiary review is quite different from that in which the evidence is examined to determine whether, viewing it in a light most favorable to the verdict, any rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Indeed, one of the most significant differences between the so-called “factual” and the so-called “legal” or “constitutional” sufficiency-of-the-evidence standards is that the latter does not permit a weighing of inculpatory against exculpatory evidence.

Because, in evaluating a habeas claim that newly discovered or available evidence proves the applicant to be innocent of the crime for which he was convicted, our task is to assess the probable impact of the newly available evidence upon the persuasiveness of the State’s case as a whole, we must necessarily weigh such exculpatory evidence against the evidence of guilt adduced at trial. The Jackson v. Virginia standard of evidentiary sufficiency is simply not appropriate to this purpose.

Though the Carrier standard requires a substantial showing, it is by no means equivalent to the Jackson standard.... First, under Jackson, the assessment of the credibility of the witnesses is generally beyond the scope of review. In contrast, under the [Carrier standard] the newly presented evidence may indeed call into question the credibility of the witnesses presented at trial_ [Further,] [u]nder Jackson, the question whether the trier of fact has power to make a finding of guilt requires a binary response; either the trier of fact has power as a matter of law or it does not.... Thus, though under Jackson, the mere existence of sufficient evidence to convict would be determinative of petitioner’s claim, that is not true under Carrier.

Of course, any person who has once been finally convicted in a fair trial should not be permitted to wage, and we do not permit him to wage, a collateral attack on that conviction without making an exceedingly persuasive case that he is actually innocent. It is thus entirely reasonable to insist, and we continue to insist, that an applicant for habeas relief based on a claim of actual innocence must “demonstrate that the newly discovered evidence, if true, creates a doubt as to the efficacy of the verdict sufficient to undermine confidence in the verdict and that it is probable that the verdict would be different [on retrial].” Holmes, 885 S.W.2d at 398. But it is not reasonable to hold, and we reject the implication of Holmes, that confidence in a verdict is undermined only when newly discovered evidence renders the State’s case legally or constitutionally insufficient for conviction.

In Holmes, we took this unusual expression of the standard directly from Justice Byron White’s perfunctory concurring opinion in Herrera v. Collins. Holmes, 885 S.W.2d at 398-99. In that case, Herrera sought to reverse his death sentence because some witnesses came forward years later to implicate his brother. Most justices of the Supreme Court, including Justice White, refused to hold that Herrera’s claim of actual innocence was independently cognizable in a federal habeas corpus proceeding. Indeed, they specifically declined to decide that ques-

Schlup, 513 U.S. at 330-31, 115 S.Ct. at 868-69, 130 L.Ed.2d at 838 (emphasis added). Justice O’Connor also expressed the view in a separate opinion that Jackson "would be ill-suited as a burden of proof.” Id. at 333, 115 S.Ct. at 870, 130 L.Ed.2d at 840 (O'Connor, concurring). tion because the facts plainly showed Herrera to be guilty of the crime under any standard. The Court simply reasoned that, even if it were unconstitutional to execute an innocent person, it would not be unconstitutional to execute Herrera since he was not innocent.

In subscribing to this view, Justice White, writing only for himself and without elaboration, surmised that a habeas petitioner, even under the most generous standard, would at least be required to show that no rational juror could have convicted him in light of the newly discovered evidence. Clearly, what Justice White meant by this is that, to sustain a claim of actual innocence, a habeas petitioner should, at a minimum, be able to persuade the court that the new evidence raises a reasonable doubt about his guilt. According to Justice White, Herrera had not even approached this minimum level of persuasion, so it was not necessary to consider what further level of persuasion would have been required for him to prevail on the merits.

But the three justices who would have granted Herrera partial relief did address the question. Writing for these justices, Justice Blackmun argued:

The government bears the burden of proving the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, but once the government has done so, the burden of proving innocence must shift to the convicted defendant. The actual-innocence inquiry is therefore distinguishable from review for sufficiency of the evidence, where the question is not whether the defendant is actually innocent but whether the government has met its constitutional burden of proving the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. When a defendant seeks to challenge the determination of guilt after he has been validly convicted and sentenced, it is fair to place on him the burden of proving his innocence, not just raising doubt about his guilt.

Herrera, 506 U.S. at 443, 113 S.Ct. at 883, 122 L.Ed.2d at 244 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).

On reflection, we now acknowledge that Jackson is not a suitable standard for describing the applicant’s burden of proof in a collateral proceeding where he does not attack the rationality of a factfinder’s verdict. See fn 1, supra. On the other hand, Justice Blaekmun’s formulation, because it focuses on the applicant’s burden of proof, directs the habeas court, as factfinder, to weigh the newly discovered, exculpatory evidence against the inculpatory evidence offered at trial for the purpose of determining whether it affirmatively shows the applicant to be innocent. Thus, Justice Blackmun continues:

Because placing the burden on the petitioner to prove innocence creates a presumption that the conviction is valid, it is not necessary or appropriate to make further presumptions about the reliability of newly discovered evidence generally. Rather, the court charged with deciding such a claim should make a case-by-case determination about the reliability of the newly discovered evidence under the circumstances. The court then should weigh the evidence in favor of the prisoner against the evidence of his guilt. Obviously, the stronger the evidence of the prisoner’s guilt, the more persuasive the newly discovered evidence must be.

Id. This is a far more fitting approach to the resolution of factual issues, focusing on the burden and quantum of proof required for an affirmative finding in the first instance rather than on the standard associated with a deferential review of that finding. Accordingly, we now hold that, in the exercise of our postconviction habeas jurisdiction under article 11.07 and 11.071 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, our job is not to review the jury’s verdict but to decide whether the newly discovered evidence would have convinced the jury of applicant’s innocence.

The further question is, what level of confidence must the habeas court have in concluding that the applicant has met his burden. Justice Blackmun and those who joined him in Herrera suggested that “to obtain relief on a claim of actual innocence, the petitioner must show that he is probably innocent.” But the Supreme Court has since indicated that a higher standard is applicable to Herrera-type claims.

In Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 115 S.Ct. 851, 130 L.Ed.2d 808 (1995), the petitioner raised a claim of actual innocence in an effort to bring himself within the “narrow class of cases” impheating fundamental miscarriage of justice as an exception to a showing of cause and prejudice for failure to raise the claim in an earlier writ. The Court took pains to distinguish between Sehlup’s claim and the claim presented by the petitioner in Herrera. Schlup’s claim of innocence did not alone provide a basis for relief, but was tied to a showing of constitutional error at trial. Herrera’s claim of actual innocence had nothing to do with the proceedings leading to his conviction; he simply claimed that execution of an innocent man would violate the Eighth Amendment. The Court expounded upon the differences between the two situations, emphasizing the greater burden that must be borne in order to prevail in a naked claim of actual innocence:

Schlup’s claim thus differs in at least two important ways from that presented in Herrera, First, Schlup’s claim of innocence does not by itself provide a basis for relief. Instead, his claim for relief depends critically on the validity of his Strickland and Brady claims. Schlup’s claim of innocence is thus “not itself a constitutional claim, but instead a gateway through which a habeas petitioner must pass to have his otherwise barred constitutional claim considered oh the merits.” Herrera, 506 U.S. at [404], 113 S.Ct. 853 [at 862], 122 L.Ed.2d 303; see also [Schlup v. Delo,] 11 F.3d [738], at 740 [(8th Cir. 1993)].

More importantly, a court’s assumptions about the validity of the proceedings that resulted in conviction are fundamentally different in Schlup’s case than in Herrera’s. In Herrera, petitioner’s claim was evaluated on the assumption that the trial that resulted in his conviction had been error-free. In such a case, when a petitioner has been “tried before a jury of his peers, with the full panoply of protections that our Constitution affords criminal defendants,” 506 U.S., at [419], 113 S.Ct. 853 [at 870], 122 L.Ed.2d 203, it is appropriate to apply an “extraordinarily high” standard of review. Id., at [426], 113 S.Ct. 853 [at 874], 122 L.Ed.2d 203 (O’Connor, J., concurring).

Schlup, in contrast, accompanies ' his claim of innocence with an assertion of constitutional error at trial. For that reason, Schlup’s conviction may not be entitled to the same degree of respect as one, such as Herrera’s, that is the product of an error-free trial. Without any new evidence of innocence, even the existence of a concededly meritorious constitutional violation is not in itself sufficient to establish a miscarriage of justice that would allow a habeas court to reach the merits of a barred claim. However, if a petitioner such as Schlup presents evidence of innocence so strong that a court cannot have confidence in the outcome of the trial unless the court is also satisfied that the trial was free of non-harmless constitutional error, the petitioner may pass through the gateway and argue the merits of his underlying claims.

Consequently, Schlup’s evidence of innocence need carry less of a burden. In Herrera (on the assumption that petitioner’s claim was, in principle, legally well-founded), the evidence of innocence would have had to be strong enough to make his execution “constitutionally intolerable” even if his conviction was the product of a fair trial. For Schlup, the evidence must establish sufficient doubt about his guilt to justify the conclusion that his execution would be a miscarriage of justice unless his conviction was the product of a fair trial.

... If there were no question about the fairness of the criminal trial, a Herrera-type claim would have to fail unless the federal habeas court is itself convinced that those new facts unquestionably establish Schlup’s innocence. On the other hand, if the habeas court were merely convinced that those new facts raised sufficient doubt about Schlup’s guilt to undermine confidence in the result of the trial without the assurance that that trial was untainted by constitutional error, Sehlup’s threshold showing of innocence would justify a review of the merits of the constitutional claims.

Schlup, 513 U.S. at 315-17, 115 S.Ct. at 861-62, 130 L.Ed.2d at 828-29 (footnotes omitted). This discussion makes clear that an exceedingly high standard applies to the assessment of claims of actual innocence that are not accompanied by a claim of constitutional error at trial. Where the trial has been constitutionally error-free, a conviction is entitled to the greatest respect. The ha-beas court must be convinced that the “new facts unquestionably' establish [the applicant’s] innocence.” Id.

Accordingly, we adhere to the views of the Supreme Court, as expressed in Schlup, that in the case of a Herrera-type claim, the habeas court must be “convinced that [the] new facts unquestionably establish [the applicant’s] innocence.” Schlup did not elaborate, however, as to the level of confidence invoked by use of the phrase “unquestionably establish.” But we know that it is a higher level of confidence than “more likely than not,” since that is the standard applicable to Schlup-type claims. In the context of a Schlup-type claim the Supreme Court explained that a “petitioner must show that the constitutional error ‘probably’ resulted in the conviction of one who was actually innocent.” Id. at 322, 115 S.Ct. at 864, 130 L.Ed.2d at 833 (setting forth Camer standard, which was later held applicable to Schlup type claims). The Court further articulated the “probably resulted” standard as follows:

The petitioner must show that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in the light of the new evidence.

Id. at 327, 115 S.Ct. at 867, 130 L.Ed.2d at 836. The “probably resulted” and “more likely than not” language was interpreted to mean essentially the same thing. The question is, in the HerreraAype situation presented here, what level of confidence is required to implement the “unquestionably establish” language. We know from Schlup that it must be an “extraordinarily high” standard. Id. at 315-16, 115 S.Ct. at 861, 130 L.Ed.2d at 828. We hold that in the case of a Herrera-type claim of actual innocence,

the petitioner must show by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in light of the new evidence.

In other words, we interpret the “unquestionably establish” language to mean the same thing as “clear and convincing.”

It is important to remember that applicant’s habeas petition in this case is not an attack on the jury’s verdict. Nowhere does applicant claim that the verdict is invalid or should be invalidated. What he wants is a new trial based on newly discovered evidence which he claims proves his innocence. We have held that such a claim is cognizable in habeas corpus because punishment of an innocent person violates the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution. Holmes, 885 S.W.2d 389. Consequently, if applicant can prove by clear and convincing evidence to this Court, in the exercise of its habeas corpus jurisdiction, that a jury would acquit him based on his newly discovered evidence, he is entitled to relief. We turn now to a consideration of the proof adduced for that purpose by applicant in the instant cause.

III.

Applicant’s conviction for aggravated sexual assault, the validity of which is here challenged, was based solely upon the testimony of his step-son Robert, one of the alleged victims in that case. This inculpatory testimony was given in court both by the victim himself and by the hearsay report of his step-mother and of a police officer who was dispatched to investigate the complaint made by his step-mother. A sexually explicit picture drawn by Robert at school and a sexually suggestive note written by him to one of his female classmates were also received in evidence because it was the seizure of these items by the child’s teacher during class that precipitated the subsequent interrogation of Robert by his father and the police, leading eventually to the criminal prosecution of applicant for aggravated sexual assault. However, neither the drawing nor the note actually intimated that the child had been sexually abused or assaulted, either by applicant or by any other person. No other incriminating evidence was offered or received at trial.

Robert’s testimony was, as might be expected, perfunctory. But it did clearly state that Robert and his younger brother were both made to view sexually explicit videotapes by their natural mother and by applicant, her husband. The children were also, according to the testimony adduced at trial, made to perform fellatio on applicant, to have oral sexual contact with their mother’s breasts, and to have anal intercourse both with their mother and with applicant. They were ten and eight years old, respectively, at the time these events allegedly occurred.

It is now more than thirteen years later, and the children are grown men. Both now claim that the testimony given by Robert at trial was false. They say that their natural father relentlessly manipulated and threatened them into making such allegations against applicant in order to retaliate against their natural mother, his ex-wife, for marrying applicant years before. Of course, we cannot know beyond all doubt whether this allegation is true. Them father, who is still alive and able to testify, denies it. But their claim is not implausible on its face, and particularly given the complete lack of any other inculpatory evidence in the ease, direct or circumstantial, we think that another jury hearing the evidence, including the newly discovered mature recantation of Robert’s juvenile testimony, would view the new evidence as the more credible and would acquit applicant. The habeas court, which had the opportunity to view the witnesses, concluded that Robert had testified falsely at trial. The record supports a finding that the recantation in this case is more credible than the trial testimony was. Robert’s recantation not only voids his trial testimony which implicated applicant, but constitutes affirmative evidence of applicant’s innocence. We are convinced by clear and convincing evidence that no rational jury would convict him in light of the new evidence. Accordingly, ap-' plicant is entitled to relief.

The Director of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division is, therefore, ordered to return applicant to the custody of the county from which he was received so that he may answer the charges against him.

McCORMICK, P.J., and WHITE,* MANSFIELD, and KELLER, JJ., dissent to this opinion.

1 . The Supreme Court has recently stated that Jackson is not appropriate for assessing claims of actual innocence based on new evidence and coupled with a claim of constitutional error at trial. In Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 330-31, 115 S.Ct. 851, 868-69, 130 L.Ed.2d 808, 838 (1995), the Court differentiated between Úie Jackson standard and the standard set forth in Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986), which governs the miscarriage of justice inquiry applicable to a petitioner who has been sentenced to death and raises actual innocence as an exception to a showing of cause and prejudice in a successive writ. Under Carrier, a petitioner must show that "a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327, 115 S.Ct. at 867, 130 L.Ed.2d at 836. The Court explained: