Rel: September 26, 2025
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA SPECIAL TERM, 2025
_________________________
SC-2024-0648 _________________________
Ex parte John Sandifer
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
(In re: City of Huntsville
v.
John Sandifer)
(Madison Circuit Court: CC-22-3285; Court of Criminal Appeals: CR-2023-0354)
SC-2024-0649 _________________________ SC-2024-0648; SC-2024-0649; SC-2024-0651; SC-2024-0652
Ex parte Curtis Tanner
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
Curtis E. Tanner)
(Madison Circuit Court: CC-23-464; Court of Criminal Appeals: CR-2023-0353)
SC-2024-0651 _________________________
Ex parte Brodrick Fearn
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
Brodrick D. Fearn)
(Madison Circuit Court: CC-22-4774; Court of Criminal Appeals: CR-2023-0348)
SC-2024-0652 _________________________ 2 SC-2024-0648; SC-2024-0649; SC-2024-0651; SC-2024-0652
Ex parte Dillon Barrett
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
Dillon Barrett)
(Madison Circuit Court: CC-22-3440; Court of Criminal Appeals: CR-2023-0349)
STEWART, Chief Justice.
We granted the certiorari petitions of John Sandifer, Curtis Tanner,
Brodrick Fearn, and Dillon Barrett ("the petitioners") to consider
whether the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals in City of
Huntsville v. Fearn, [Ms. CR-2023-0348, Mar. 22, 2024] ___ So. 3d ___
(Ala. Crim. App. 2024), conflicts with authority from this Court and the
Court of Criminal Appeals concerning 1) the preservation requirements
applicable to de novo appeals from municipal courts to circuit courts and
2) the pleading requirements applicable to municipal-court complaints.
For the reasons expressed below, we affirm the judgments of the Court of
Criminal Appeals.
3 SC-2024-0648; SC-2024-0649; SC-2024-0651; SC-2024-0652
Facts and Procedural History
For the purposes of this opinion, only a brief summarization of the
factual and procedural history of these cases is necessary. The petitioners
were convicted in separate actions in the Huntsville Municipal Court
("the municipal court") of violating certain municipal ordinances of the
City of Huntsville ("the City"). Each petitioner appealed his municipal-
court conviction to the Madison Circuit Court ("the circuit court") for a
trial de novo, and, before those trials were held, the petitioners moved to
dismiss the complaints against them.
Each petitioner sought the dismissal of the complaint against him
based on the argument that the complaint omitted "an averment of
authorized ordination by the municipality" and, therefore, that the
complaint failed to charge an offense. Sandifer and Barrett additionally
argued that the complaints against each of them alleged violations of a
city ordinance adopting sections of the Alabama Code that did not exist
and did not enumerate a crime. It is undisputed that all the petitioners
raised these arguments for the first time in the circuit-court proceedings.
4 SC-2024-0648; SC-2024-0649; SC-2024-0651; SC-2024-0652
The circuit court granted each petitioner's motion to dismiss.1 The
City appealed the judgments of dismissal to the Court of Criminal
Appeals, and, after consolidating the cases, on March 22, 2024, that court
issued a unanimous opinion reversing the circuit court's judgments and
remanding the causes for further proceedings. See Fearn, supra.
Thereafter, the petitioners filed separate petitions for the writ of
certiorari in this Court, which this Court granted. This Court
consolidated these cases for the purpose of issuing one opinion.
This Court's Jurisdiction
At the outset, we must address the City's argument that certiorari
review is unavailable to the petitioners because, it contends, their
petitions were untimely filed. The petitioners filed their certiorari
petitions within seven days of the date the Court of Criminal Appeals
issued its order overruling their applications for rehearing, which is in
compliance with the time requirements set forth in Rule 39(c)(2), Ala. R.
App. P. However, the City nevertheless argues that the petitions were
1The circuit court's orders granting Tanner's and Sandifer's motions
to dismiss give no explanation. In both Barrett's and Fearn's cases, the circuit court granted their motions to dismiss because the "complaint as filed fails to confer jurisdiction on this Court." 5 SC-2024-0648; SC-2024-0649; SC-2024-0651; SC-2024-0652
untimely because the petitioners filed their applications for rehearing 14
days, instead of 7 days, after the Court of Criminal Appeals issued its
decision. Rule 40(c), Ala. R. App. P., requires that, in most cases, an
application for rehearing must be filed within 14 days of the questioned
decision. However, that rule provides that, "in the case of a rehearing
application in a pretrial appeal by the state in a criminal case, the
application … must be filed … within 7 days (1 week) after the release of
the decision." The City contends that its appeals to the Court of Criminal
Appeals should be treated as appeals taken by "the state." See Rule
15.7(a), Ala. R. Crim. P. (providing for pretrial appeals by the state and
stating that a municipality may appeal a pretrial order "in like manner").
Thus, the City argues that, because the applications for rehearing were
filed more than 7 days after the decision of the Court of Criminals
Appeals, they were untimely and of no effect and that the petitions for
the writ of certiorari were, therefore, also untimely. We disagree.
Even if we were to hold that the petitioners' applications for
rehearing were untimely, the filing of a timely application for rehearing
is not a jurisdictional act. Indeed, the Court of Criminal Appeals is
authorized under Rule 2(b), Ala. R. App. P., to "exercise its discretion …
6 SC-2024-0648; SC-2024-0649; SC-2024-0651; SC-2024-0652
to extend the time for filing an application for a rehearing or to place a
case on rehearing ex mero motu." State v. Martin, 56 So. 3d 709, 725 (Ala.
Crim. App. 2009), aff'd, 56 So. 3d 726 (Ala. 2010). 2 Here, the Court of
Criminal Appeals accepted the petitioners' applications for rehearing,
and these certiorari petitions were timely filed seven days from the date
the Court of Criminal Appeals issued its order overruling their
applications for rehearing. Accordingly, our jurisdiction has been
properly invoked. See Rule 39(c)(2).
Analysis
I. The Circuit Court's Subject-Matter Jurisdiction
First, we note that, in the circuit court, the sufficiency of the
municipal-court complaints against the petitioners was treated as a
matter affecting the subject-matter jurisdiction of the circuit court. On
this point, the Court of Criminal Appeals correctly determined that any
defects in the municipal-court complaints did not divest the circuit court
2Rule 2(b), Ala. R. App. P., provides this Court and the intermediate
appellate courts with the authority to "suspend the requirements or provisions of any of these rules … on [the court's] own motion." That authority, however, does not allow an appellate court to extend the time for taking an appeal or this Court to extend the time for filing a petition for the writ of certiorari. 7 SC-2024-0648; SC-2024-0649; SC-2024-0651; SC-2024-0652
of its subject-matter jurisdiction because that jurisdiction is derived from
§ 12-11-30(3), Ala. Code 1975, which permits appeals of municipal-court
convictions to circuit courts. "Jurisdiction is '[a] court's power to decide a
case or issue a decree.' Black's Law Dictionary 867 (8th ed. 2004).
Subject-matter jurisdiction concerns a court's power to decide certain
types of cases. … That power is derived from the Alabama Constitution
and the Alabama Code." Ex parte Seymour, 946 So. 2d 536, 538 (Ala.
2006) (citing Woolf v. McGaugh, 175 Ala. 299, 303, 57 So. 754, 755 (1911),
and United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630-31 (2002)). "The United
States Supreme Court has long held that 'defects in an indictment do not
deprive a court of its power to adjudicate a case.' " Id. (quoting Cotton,
535 U.S. at 630).
II. Whether the Petitioners Waived Their Challenges to the Municipal-Court Complaints
Next, we turn to the question whether the petitioners waived their
challenges to the municipal-court complaints by failing to raise those
challenges in the municipal court. The Court of Criminal Appeals held
that the petitioners had waived any challenge to alleged deficiencies in
the municipal-court complaints because they had raised their challenges
for the first time in the circuit-court proceedings. The court further 8 SC-2024-0648; SC-2024-0649; SC-2024-0651; SC-2024-0652
explained that the petitioners were required to "raise their arguments
concerning the alleged defects in their complaints in a pretrial motion in
the municipal court, ... 'at the time of or before entering a plea,' " citing
Rule 15.2(a) and quoting Rule 15.3(a)(2), Ala. R. Crim. P. Fearn, ___ So.
3d at ___. 3
In Ex parte Sorsby, 12 So. 3d 139, 146 (Ala. 2007), this Court stated
that "[a] trial de novo is '[a] new trial on the entire case -- that is, on both
questions of fact and issues of law -- conducted as if there had been no
trial in the first instance.' " (Quoting Black's Law Dictionary 1544 (8th
ed. 1990).)4 In Ex parte Sorsby, this Court considered the applicability of
certain Rules of Criminal Procedure to appeals from municipal-court and
district-court convictions for trials de novo in circuit courts. This Court
determined that, as applied to such appeals, Rule 14.4(a), Ala. R. Crim.
P., which requires defendants to reserve issues for appeal when entering
3Rule 15.2(a), Ala. R. Crim. P., requires a defendant to raise in a
pretrial motion "[o]bjections based on defects in the commencement of the proceeding or in the charge, other than lack of subject matter jurisdiction or failure to charge an offense." (Emphasis added.)
4Tanner, Fearn, and Barrett further contend that Rule 15.2(d), Ala.
R. Crim. P., expressly permitted them to raise their "failure to charge an offense" challenges to the municipal-court complaints "at any time during the pendency of the proceeding." 9 SC-2024-0648; SC-2024-0649; SC-2024-0651; SC-2024-0652
a guilty plea, and Rule 26.9(b)(4), Ala. R. Crim. P., which requires
defendants to move to withdraw a guilty plea before appealing, limited
the statutory authority of the circuit court to conduct, and the defendant's
right to receive, a de novo review. This Court explained that an appeal to
a circuit court for a trial de novo is to be tried " 'as if no trial had ever
been had, and just as if it had originated in the circuit court.' " Id. (quoting
Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Lancaster, 121 Ala. 471, 473, 25 So. 733,
735 (1899))(emphasis omitted). Recently, in Alabama Department of
Revenue v. Greenetrack, Inc., 369 So. 3d 640, 655 (Ala. 2022), this Court
again stated: "As held by an unbroken line of authority in this state, a
trial de novo means a new trial 'as if no trial had ever been had, and just
as if it had originated in the circuit court.' " (Quoting Lancaster, 121 Ala.
at 473, 25 So. at 735, and citing Ex parte Sorsby, 12 So. 3d at 146, and
Ball v. Jones, 272 Ala. 305, 309, 132 So. 2d 120, 122 (1961).)
Even more recently, this Court explained that "the idea that 'an
appeal from a trial de novo does not mean that the slate is thrown away'
refers to the principle that a conviction in a district court is not rendered
obsolete by an appeal for a trial de novo to a circuit court." Ex parte
Ramirez, [Ms. SC-2024-0532, Jan. 17, 2025] ___ So. 3d ___, ___ (Ala.
10 SC-2024-0648; SC-2024-0649; SC-2024-0651; SC-2024-0652
2025). "It is in that sense 'that the slate is [not] thrown away.' " Id. at ___.
"There is nothing to indicate, however, that that principle means that all
the procedural aspects that occurred in the district-court proceeding are
forwarded and applied to the proceeding before the circuit court in
conducting a trial de novo." Id. at ___. In determining on certiorari review
that the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals in Ramirez v. State,
[Ms. CR-2023-0282, June 28, 2024] ___ So. 3d ___ (Ala. Crim. App. 2024),
conflicted with Ex parte Sorsby and Clark v. City of Mobile, 357 So. 2d
675 (Ala. Crim. App. 1978), this Court reaffirmed: "It is apparent from
Alabama's established authority that an appeal to a circuit court for a
trial de novo means that the trial de novo is an entirely new proceeding
and is treated as if no trial had ever been conducted in the lower court."
Id. at ___. See also State v. Shiver, [Ms. CR-2023-0604, Nov. 8, 2024] ___
So. 3d ___, ___ (Ala. Crim. App. 2024) (relying on the principles espoused
in Ex parte Sorsby in holding that whether a defendant "received
reasonable notice of the amended charge before her district-court trial
should not have been of any concern to the circuit court" in de novo
proceedings, because " 'review in the circuit court is by trial de novo
without any consideration being given to the prior proceedings in the
11 SC-2024-0648; SC-2024-0649; SC-2024-0651; SC-2024-0652
district court' "(citation omitted)). Accordingly, the petitioners were
permitted to raise the failure of the municipal-court complaints to charge
an offense as a challenge during "the pendency of the proceeding[s],"
which, based on the foregoing authorities, encompassed not only the
municipal-court proceedings but also the de novo circuit-court
proceedings. See Ex parte Sorsby and Rule 15.2(d) (providing that a
defendant may raise "the failure of the charge to state an offense … at
any time during the pendency of the proceeding").
III. Whether the Municipal-Court Complaints Complied with the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure
Notwithstanding our conclusion that the petitioners did not waive
their challenges, the Court of Criminal Appeals alternatively held that
the petitioners were not entitled to have the municipal-court complaints
dismissed because the complaints complied with the Alabama Rules of
Criminal Procedure. More specifically, the court explained that, all that
is required for a charging instrument to be valid under Rule 13.2(a), Ala.
R. Crim. P., "is that the charging instrument include a 'plain, concise
statement of the charge in ordinary language sufficiently definite to
inform a defendant of common understanding of the offense charged and
with that degree of certainty which will enable the court, upon conviction, 12 SC-2024-0648; SC-2024-0649; SC-2024-0651; SC-2024-0652
to pronounce the proper judgment.' " Fearn, ___ So. 3d at ___ (quoting
Rule 13.2(a)). The court further explained:
"Charging instruments that comply with Rule 13.2(a), Ala. R. Crim. P., are sufficient to satisfy the due-process requirement of informing the accused of the charges against him or her, even if it does not cite a specific statute (or incorrectly cites a statute). See [State v.] Thomas, 200 So. 3d [35,] 42 [(Ala. Crim. App. 2015)](holding that a Uniform Traffic Ticket and Complaint was not defective even though it did not cite a specific section of the Alabama Code that had been violated), see also Whitt v. State, 827 So. 2d 869, 877 (Ala. Crim. App. 2001) (' " 'Where an indictment contains language which conveys the meaning of a statute, see § 15-8- 21, Code of Alabama (1975), the violation of a code section may be satisfactorily charged despite the failure to cite the statute.' " Raper v. State, 584 So. 2d 544, 548 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991) (quoting Carroll v. City of Huntsville, 505 So. 2d 389, 391 (Ala. Crim App. 1987)).')."
Fearn, ___ So. 3d at ___. The Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that
the municipal-court complaints were "written in terms that would
properly inform a defendant of the offenses charged" and were "not so
defective as to warrant the [petitioners] any relief." Id. at ___ (citing Moye
v. City of Foley, 632 So. 2d 1012, 1014-15 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993) (holding
that the municipal-court complaints filed against Moye "fully comply
13 SC-2024-0648; SC-2024-0649; SC-2024-0651; SC-2024-0652
with the requirement of Rule 13.2(a), Ala. R. Crim. P.," and thus were
"sufficient to provide [Moye] with the required notice")). 5
The petitioners argued before the Court of Criminal Appeals that
the circuit court had properly dismissed the complaints against them
because the City had failed to plead material elements of the applicable
municipal ordinances and the circuit court could not take judicial notice
of the ordinances. The Court of Criminal Appeals acknowledged that,
"historically, complaints alleging a violation of a municipal ordinance had
to contain certain formalities such as alleging that the ordinance had
been adopted before the commission of the offense to show that there had
not been an ex post facto violation." Fearn, ___ So. 3d at ___ (citing Harris
v. City of Vestavia Hills, 49 Ala. App. 171, 173-74, 269 So. 2d 626, 627-28
(1972)). Notwithstanding those historical formalities, the Court of
Criminal Appeals explained that the adoption of the Alabama Rules of
Criminal Procedure had dispensed with those requirements. The court
reasoned:
5The petitioners have not challenged the Court of Criminal Appeals'
decision that the municipal-court complaints were sufficient because the complaints complied with Rule 13.2(a), and they have not presented argument or authority alleging any conflict with that decision. 14 SC-2024-0648; SC-2024-0649; SC-2024-0651; SC-2024-0652
"[T]he Committee Comments to Rule 13.2, Ala. R. Crim. P., explained that the rule-based pleading requirements were 'designed to simplify the pleading in criminal matters … and [to] eliminate[] the necessity of formal averments.' Furthermore, Rule 13.2(d), Ala. R. Crim. P., which states that an indictment or charging instrument does not 'need [to] negative any defense or affirmative defense contained in any statute creating or defining the offense charged,' also supports the conclusion that the City was not required to anticipate the issues raised by the [petitioners] and preemptively disprove the defense by including an allegation in each complaint that the applicable ordinances had been adopted prior to the acts alleged in the complaints."
Fearn, ___ So. 3d at ___.
Tanner, Fearn, and Barrett argue that the foregoing holding
ignores differences between municipal and state prosecutions and
conflicts with authority requiring a municipality to plead and prove the
ordinance alleged to have been violated. They assert that, because the
City failed to plead material elements of the applicable municipal
ordinances and the circuit court could not take judicial notice of the
ordinances, the circuit court properly dismissed the actions on the basis
that the complaints failed to charge an offense.6 In support, those three
6Those three petitioners argue that, because the City is a class 3
municipality, the circuit court was not permitted to take judicial notice of the City's municipal ordinances. See § 11-45-11, Ala. Code 1975 ("All courts of the State of Alabama shall take judicial notice of all municipal ordinances of each Class 1 or Class 2 municipality."), and § 11-40-12, Ala. 15 SC-2024-0648; SC-2024-0649; SC-2024-0651; SC-2024-0652
petitioners rely on, among other authorities, Harris, supra, in which the
Court of Criminal Appeals held that a municipal-court complaint must
include, among other things, an averment " 'that the ordinance was duly
adopted and ordained prior to the commission of the offense, by the
proper municipal authorities' " and explained that " '[t]he mere
statement, as a legal conclusion, that the acts of the accused were
committed "in violation of an ordinance," will not suffice.' " 7 49 Ala. App.
At 173-74, 269 So. 2d at 627 (quoting Young v. City of Attalla, 25 Ala.
App. 255, 255, 144 So. 128, 128 (1932))(emphasis omitted). They also
Code 1975 (providing classifications for municipalities). The City argues that, regardless of whether the circuit court could take judicial notice of the municipal ordinances, "judicial notice is not necessary at the pleadings stage" because it " 'is a matter of evidence, and not pleading.' " City's brief in case nos. SC-2024-0649 and SC-2024-0651 at 49 and City's brief in case no. SC-2024-0652 at 48-49 (quoting Statham v. Statham, 211 So. 2d 456, 459 (Ala. 1968), and citing 31 C.J.S. Evidence § 6, p. 822).
7Sandifer also cites Harris, in addition to the Committee Comments
to Rule 2.3, Ala. R. Crim. P., and § 15-7-1, Ala. Code 1975, in arguing that the complaint against him did not designate the proper public offense or any statute enumerating a crime, and he asserts that the complaint failed to contain a sufficient averment of "authorized ordination." However, Sandifer's argument appears to be related only to whether he was entitled to raise those objections in the circuit court. He does not develop any argument related to whether the Court of Criminal Appeals' decision, insofar as it held that the municipal-court complaints were sufficient, conflicts with any other precedent. 16 SC-2024-0648; SC-2024-0649; SC-2024-0651; SC-2024-0652
provide parenthetical citations to Ex parte Woodson, 578 So. 2d 1049
(Ala. 1991), Bailey v. City of Ragland, 136 So. 3d 498 (Ala. Crim. App.
2013), Truman v. City of Enterprise, 606 So. 2d 1151 (Ala. Crim. App.
1992), and Ex parte Hall, 843 So. 2d 746 (Ala. 2002), in arguing that the
substance and adoption of the ordinance are material elements of a
municipal offense that a city must plead and prove.
However, as the City points out, Harris and many of the other cases
upon which the petitioners rely predate the adoption of Rule 13.2, which
was "designed to simplify the pleading in criminal matters … and …
eliminates the necessity of formal averments." Committee Comments to
Rule 13.2. The Committee Comments explain that, along with Rule 13.5,
Ala. R. Crim. P., Rule 13.2 "should work to eliminate most circumstances
where the state is precluded from prosecuting a defendant due to a
pleading technicality."
Further, the cases presented by the petitioners that were decided
after the adoption of the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure (e.g.,
Woodson, Bailey, Truman, and Hall) each involved a city's failure to meet
its burden of proof at trial by presenting evidence of the ordinance. Those
cases do not address a municipality's pleading requirements, and they do
17 SC-2024-0648; SC-2024-0649; SC-2024-0651; SC-2024-0652
not support the proposition that the adoption of the municipal ordinance
is a material element of the offense that must be pleaded in a municipal-
court complaint. Accordingly, the Court of Criminal Appeals' holding on
this point is correct.8
Conclusion
The petitioners did not waive their arguments challenging the
failure of the municipal-court complaints to state a charge by raising that
defense for the first time in their de novo appeals in the circuit court, and
they were not required to raise those challenges in pretrial motions in
the municipal court. See Ex parte Sorsby and Rule 15.2. Nevertheless,
the municipal-court complaints were sufficient under the Alabama Rules
of Criminal Procedure, and, on that basis, we affirm the judgments of the
Court of Criminal Appeals.
SC-2024-0648 -- AFFIRMED.
SC-2024-0649 -- AFFIRMED.
8Although Tanner, Fearn, and Barrett initially raised in their certiorari petitions the issue whether the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure abrogated the heightened pleading standards for municipalities, especially when coupled with a circuit court's inability to take judicial notice of certain municipal ordinances, as one of first impression before this Court, they have abandoned that argument in their appellate briefs. 18 SC-2024-0648; SC-2024-0649; SC-2024-0651; SC-2024-0652
SC-2024-0651 -- AFFIRMED.
SC-2024-0652 -- AFFIRMED.
Shaw, Wise, Bryan, Sellers, Mendheim, Cook, and Lewis, JJ.,
concur.
McCool, J., recuses himself.