Ex Parte Dennis Munzy v. the State of Texas

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: April 26, 2023
• Docket: 09-22-00147-CR
• Status: Published

Opinion

In The

Court of Appeals

Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

________________ NO. 09-22-00147-CR ________________

EX PARTE DENNIS MUNZY

________________________________________________________________________

On Appeal from the 253rd District Court Liberty County, Texas Trial Cause No. 22DC-WR-00431 ________________________________________________________________________

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Dennis Munzy appeals the denial of his Application for Writ of Habeas

Corpus after being charged with failure to comply with Sex Offender Requirement

Registration. On appeal, Munzy raises one ground for relief. He challenges the

constitutionality of the trial court’s decision to deny his bail, arguing the trial court

acted without authority to deny bail pursuant to Article 1, Section 11 of the Texas

Constitution. Munzy requests that this Court reverse the trial court’s denial of his

writ and remand this case. In response, the State agrees, stating the trial court abused

its discretion and acted without authority under the Texas Constitution to hold

1 Munzy without bail. The State also requests this Court to reverse the trial court’s

denial of his writ and remand this case.

Review of the Trial Court’s Setting of Bail

We have jurisdiction over an appeal from a trial court’s merit-based denial of

habeas proceedings. See Ex parte Hargett, 819 S.W.2d 866, 868-69 (Tex. Crim.

App. 1991). We review the denial of an application for writ of habeas corpus under

an abuse of discretion standard. Kniatt v. State, 206 S.W.3d 657, 664 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2006); Ex parte Klem, 269 S.W.3d 711, 718 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2008, pet.

ref’d). We consider the entire record and review the facts in the light most favorable

to the trial court’s ruling. Kniatt, 206 S.W.3d at 664; Klem, 269 S.W.3d at 718. We

afford almost total deference to the trial court’s rulings on the application of the law

to fact questions when the resolution of those questions turns on an evaluation of

credibility and demeanor. Klem, 269 S.W.3d at 718. If the trial court’s resolution of

the ultimate issues turns on an application of legal standards, we review the

determination de novo. Id.

Similarly, we review a trial court’s ruling on the setting of bail under an abuse

of discretion standard of review. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 17.15

(affording a trial court discretion to set bail); Ex parte Rubac, 611 S.W.2d 848, 850

(Tex. Crim. App. 1981). The trial court’s ruling will not be disturbed if it is within

the zone of reasonable disagreement. Clemons v. State, 220 S.W.3d 176, 178 (Tex.

2 App.—Eastland 2007, no pet.) (citing Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 391

(Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (op. on reh’g)).

An appearance bond secures the presence of a defendant in court for trial. Ex

parte Rodriguez, 595 S.W.2d 549, 550 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980). The United States

and Texas Constitutions prohibit excessive bail. U.S. CONST. amends. VIII, XIV;

Tex. Const. art. I, §§ 11, 13; Ex parte Sabur-Smith, 73 S.W.3d 436, 439 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.) (The right to reasonable bail is protected by the

United States and Texas Constitutions.). The trial court should set bail sufficient to

provide reasonable assurance the defendant will appear at trial, but not so high as to

be oppressive. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 17.15(a)(1), (2); Ex parte Ivey,

594 S.W.2d 98, 99 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980). Bail is excessive if it is “set in an amount

greater than [what] is reasonably necessary to satisfy the government’s legitimate

interests.” Ex parte Beard, 92 S.W.3d 566, 573 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, pet. ref’d)

(citing United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 753-54 (1987)). When setting the

amount of bail, the trial court weighs the State’s interest in assuring the defendant’s

appearance at trial against the defendant’s presumption of innocence. Id. The amount

of bail may be deemed oppressive when the trial court sets the bail at an amount “for

the express purpose of forcing [a defendant] to remain incarcerated[.]” Ex parte

Harris, 733 S.W.2d 712, 714 (Tex. App.—Austin 1987, no pet.).

3 Viewing the entire record in favor of the trial court’s ruling, we hold that the

trial court abused its discretion by not setting bail in this case. Ex parte Gill, 413

S.W.3d 425, 428 (Tex. 2013); Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 17.15. Accordingly,

we sustain Munzy’s sole issue, reverse the trial court’s order, and remand the case

for immediate further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

________________________________ JAY WRIGHT Justice

Submitted on December 6, 2022 Opinion Delivered April 26, 2023 Do Not Publish

Before Golemon, C.J., Horton and Wright, JJ.