Opinion issued August 28, 2025
In The
Court of Appeals For The
First District of Texas ———————————— NO. 01-25-00593-CR NO. 01-25-00594-CR NO. 01-25-00595-CR ——————————— EX PARTE COREY D. JAMES
On Appeal from the 338th District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Case Nos. 1920960, 1920961, 1920962
MEMORANDUM OPINION
In three separate causes, Appellant Corey D. James was charged with
(1) murder, for which bond was set at $200,000, (2) aggravated assault with a deadly
weapon, for which bond was sent at $75,000, and (3) assault of a pregnant person,
for which bond was set at $20,000. James filed pretrial applications for writ of habeas corpus in each case, requesting that his bonds be reduced. The trial court
held a hearing on the writ applications. During the hearing, James presented his
mother as a witness, and the State offered a police offense report into evidence,
which was admitted under seal. No other testimony or evidence was presented.
Following the parties’ arguments, the trial court denied James’ writ applications.
James appeals. Without requesting briefing, we affirm. See TEX. R. APP. P. 31.2(b).
Standard of Review
We review a trial court’s decision to grant or deny habeas corpus relief for
abuse of discretion. See Ex parte Gill, 413 S.W.3d 425, 428 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013)
([T]he decision of a trial judge at a habeas proceeding regarding the imposition or
reduction of bail will not be disturbed by this Court in the absence of an abuse of
discretion.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Ex parte Rubac, 611
S.W.2d 848, 849–50 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) (reviewing bail pending appeal for
abuse of discretion); Montalvo v. State, 315 S.W.3d 588, 592 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] 2010, no pet.) (same). When a habeas appeal pertains to pretrial bail, we
“measure the trial court’s ruling against the relevant criteria by which the ruling was
made.” Montalvo, 315 S.W.3d at 593; see also Ex parte Dixon, No. PD-0398-15,
2015 WL 5453313, at *2 (Tex. Crim. App. Sept. 16, 2015) (not designated for
publication) (“Habeas courts determine the bearing of the evidence on the relevant
bail criteria only in the first instance. On appellate review, it is the duty of the
2 reviewing court to measure the ultimate ruling of the habeas court against the
relevant bail factors to ensure that the court did not abuse its discretion.” (emphasis
in original)).
This Court will disturb the trial court’s ruling only if it falls outside the zone
of reasonable disagreement. See Ex parte Allen, 619 S.W.3d 813, 816 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2020, pet. ref’d). “To determine whether a trial court abused
its discretion [in ruling on a request to reduce bail], we must decide whether the trial
court acted without reference to any guiding rules or principles; in other words,
whether the act was arbitrary or unreasonable.” Ex parte Reescano, No.
01-25-00448-CR, 2025 WL 2201385, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Aug.
1, 2025, no pet. h.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (citation omitted).
In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a habeas claim, we view the record and
evidence in the light most favorable to the court’s ruling. Ex parte Gomez, 624
S.W.3d 573, 576 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021). The mere fact that a trial court may decide
a matter within its discretion differently than an appellate court would in a similar
circumstance does not demonstrate that an abuse of discretion has occurred.
Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 380 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990). It is the
appellant’s burden to establish that the trial court abused its discretion in its bail
determination. Ex parte Rubac, 611 S.W.2d at 849; Ex parte McManus, 618 S.W.3d
404, 407 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2021, no pet.) (“In a proceeding seeking a reduction
3 in the amount of pretrial bail, the accused bears the burden of proof to show that the
bail is excessive.”); Ex parte Beard, 92 S.W.3d 566, 568 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002,
pet. ref’d) (“The burden is on the accused to prove that bail is excessive.”).
Applicable Law
The United States and Texas Constitutions protect the right to be free from
excessive bail. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; TEX. CONST. art. 1, § 11. The primary
purpose of bail is to secure the presence of the defendant in court for trial. Ex parte
Vasquez, 558 S.W.2d 477, 479 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977); Ex parte Dupuy, 498 S.W.3d
220, 230 (Tex. App.—Houston 14th Dist.] 2016, no pet.). “Determining the
appropriate bail amount is a balancing act between the defendant’s presumption of
innocence and the State’s interest in assuring the defendant’s appearance at trial.”
Ex parte Cardenas, 557 S.W.3d 722, 730 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi-Edinburg
2018, no pet.) (internal quotation omitted).
In considering whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying James’
applications for writs of habeas corpus requesting that his bail amounts be reduced,
we apply the factors enumerated in Article 17.15 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
See Ex parte Perez, Nos. 02-10-00450-CR, 02-10-00451-CR, 2011 WL 255292, at
*1–4 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Jan. 27, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for
publication). Article 17.15 instructs trial courts to consider the following factors in
setting a defendant’s amount of bail:
4 1. The bail and any conditions shall be sufficient to give reasonable assurance that the undertaking will be complied with. 2. The power to require bail is not to be so used as to make it an instrument of oppression.
3. The nature of the offense and the circumstances under which it was committed are to be considered.
4. The ability to make bail shall be considered, and proof may be taken on this point.
5. The future safety of a victim of the alleged offense, law enforcement, and the community shall be considered.
6. The criminal history record information for the defendant shall be considered, including any acts of family violence, other pending criminal charges, and any instances in which the defendant failed to appear in court following release on bail.
7. The citizenship status of the defendant shall be considered.
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 17.15. In addition to the Article 17.15 factors, trial
courts also may consider the following factors in setting the amount of bail:
1. the accused’s work record;
2. the accused’s family and community ties; 3. the accused’s length of residency;
4. the accused’s prior criminal record;
5. the accused’s conformity with previous bond conditions;
6. the existence of other outstanding bonds, if any; and 7. aggravating circumstances alleged to have been involved in the charged offense.
5 Smith v. State, 829 S.W.2d 885, 887–88 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, pet.
ref’d) (citing Ex parte Rubac, 611 S.W.2d at 849–50).
We review the same bail criteria to ensure the court did not abuse its
discretion. “On appellate review, it is the duty of the reviewing court to measure the
ultimate ruling of the habeas court against the relevant bail factors to ensure that the
court did not abuse its discretion.” Ex parte Dixon, 2015 WL 5453313, at *2 (citing
TEX. CODE CRIM PROC. art. 17.15; TEX. CONST. art. 1, §§ 11, 13). We determine
whether a bail amount is reasonable “on a case-by-case basis, weighing factors
unique to each defendant and each offense.” Ex parte Cardenas, 557 S.W.3d at 730;
see also Ex parte Beard, 92 S.W.3d at 571 (noting case law is “of relatively little
value in addressing the ultimate question of the appropriate amount of bail” because
bail “cases are so individualized that generalization from results reached in others is
difficult”).
Discussion
We review the relevant bail factors based on the limited record before us to
ensure the trial court did not abuse its discretion. 1
1 The record does not include the indictments or the trial court’s orders setting bond or bond conditions.
6 A. Sufficiently high bail
We first consider whether the bail is “sufficient to give reasonable assurance
that the undertaking will be complied with.” Here, the $200,000 bail in the murder
case, $75,000 in the aggravated-assault-with-deadly-weapon case, and $20,000 in
the assault-of-a-pregnant-person case were sufficient to give reasonable assurance
that James will appear in court. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 17.15(1).
B. Whether bail is oppressive and the ability to pay it
The second factor, the requirement that bail not be used as “an instrument of
oppression,” and the fourth factor, the ability to make bail, are related. See id. art.
17.15(2), (4). We thus consider them together.
Bail set in a particular amount “becomes oppressive when it is based on the
assumption that the defendant cannot afford bail in that amount and when it is set
for the express purpose of forcing the defendant to remain incarcerated.” Ex parte
Moreno, No. 01-20-00312-CR, 2021 WL 4733239, at *9 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] Oct. 12, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (citing Ex
parte Nimnicht, 467 S.W.3d 64, 70 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2015, no pet.)); Ex
parte Durst, 148 S.W.3d 496, 499 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.)
(stating that where bail amount was set “solely to prevent [defendant] from getting
out of jail,” “bail [was] being used as an instrument of oppression”). We thus
consider whether the record reflects the trial court made its decision regarding bail
7 “for the purpose of forcing [James] to remain incarcerated pending trial.” Milner v.
State, 263 S.W.3d 146, 149 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.).
During the hearing, James’ mother testified she cannot afford the current bail
amounts. She makes around $50,000 per year but stated that she and James do not
own any assets. She testified she tried to gather money to pay the bail amounts but
does not have family and friends in the Houston area who could provide financial
support for her and James. She expressed she could reasonably afford bonds of
$50,000 for the murder charge, $50,000 for the aggravated assault charge, and
$10,000 for the assault-of-a-pregnant person charge.
On cross-examination, James’ mother agreed around twelve other people had
come to the hearing in support of James but that she had asked only one of them for
money. And the record is silent as to whether James or anyone on his behalf
contacted a bondsman in attempt to secure bonds.
Based on the record and the limited evidence before the trial court on this
factor, we cannot conclude that the trial court set bail in these three cases for the sole
purpose of keeping James incarcerated or that the court utilized bail as a means to
oppress him or prolong his incarceration. See Ex parte Grant, No. 01-23-00889-CR,
2024 WL 924433, at *5 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 5, 2024, no pet.)
(mem. op., not designated for publication) (noting “nothing in our record shows that
the trial court intentionally set a high bail amount to keep [appellant] incarcerated”);
8 Ex parte Moreno, 2021 WL 4733239, at *13 (affirming trial court’s denial to lower
bail from $1,000,000 in capital murder case despite appellant’s arguing she could
not afford bail because she was indigent). Nothing supports that the trial court set
the bail amounts solely because she wanted James to remain incarcerated. See Ex
parte Harris, 733 S.W.2d 712, 714 (Tex. App.—Austin 1987, no pet.) (holding this
factor weighed against trial court’s decision where trial court stated, “I’d rather see
him in jail than to see someone’s life taken.”).
The trial court also could have reasonably concluded James did not provide
sufficient evidence about his and his family’s and friends’ ability to cumulatively
provide money to furnish bail in the amounts set by the trial court because numerous
friends and family members attended the hearing but James’ mother had asked only
one of them for money and there was no evidence regarding any attempts to work
with bondsmen to secure bonds. See Ex parte Bartolo, No. 01-22-00544-CR, 2022
WL 17254957, at *7 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Nov. 29, 2022, pet. ref’d)
(mem. op., not designated for publication) (“Generally, to show that he cannot make
bail, a defendant must demonstrate that his funds and his family’s funds have been
exhausted.”); Ex parte Martinez, No. 10-17-00420-CR, 2018 WL 1958016, at *3
(Tex. App.—Waco Apr. 25, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for
publication) (affirming denial of writ requesting reduction in bail amount and stating
9 appellant did not “detail either his or his family’s specific assets and financial
resources, nor did he explain what efforts, if any, were made to furnish the bond”).
Moreover, even assuming James could not afford the bail amounts set, it
would not automatically establish the amounts were excessive. See Ex parte
Tomlinson, No. 14-02-00784-CR, 2002 WL 31008642, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] Sept. 5, 2002, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Ex
parte Bogia, 56 S.W.3d 835, 837 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, no pet.)
(stating that “accused’s ability or inability to make bond is relevant, but not
controlling”) (citing Ex parte Dueitt, 529 S.W.2d 531, 532 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975)).
When considering whether a particular bail amount is reasonable, Article 17.15
requires consideration of a defendant’s ability to make bail. Ex parte Martinez, 2018
WL 1958016, at *3. But an “inability to make bail, even to the point of indigence,
does not control over the other factors.” Id. (quoting Ex Parte Brossett, 524 S.W.3d
213, 276 (Tex. App.—Waco 2016, pet. ref’d)). The ability to make bail is to be
regarded, and proof may be taken upon this point as one of many factors to be
considered by the trial court. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 17.15; see also Ex
parte Martinez, 2018 WL 1958016, at *3 (holding trial court did not abuse discretion
in denying retired military veteran’s request to reduce bail despite appellant’s and
sister’s testimony that he could not make amount of bail and taking into
consideration other factors). Indeed, “[i]f the ability to make bond in a specified
10 amount controlled, then the role of the trial court in setting bond would be
completely eliminated, and the accused would be in the unique posture of
determining what his bond should be.” Ex parte Nimnicht, 467 S.W.3d at 68.
Further, as the Court of Criminal Appeals has clarified, the Legislature, in placing
“a mandatory duty” on trial courts to consider the safety of the community when
fixing bail, “requires trial courts to consider a fact that is not related to the amount
the defendant can afford to pay.” Ex Parte Kretzer, No. PD-1279-11, 2012 WL
1882245, at *1 (Tex. Crim. App. May 16, 2012) (not designated for publication)
(citation omitted).
We further note that the bail amounts set in these cases is on par with or lower
than other cases involving a defendant charged with a first-degree, second-degree,
and third-degree felony offenses. See, e.g., Ex parte Fernandez, No.
05-24-00221-CR, 2024 WL 3249077, at *4 (Tex. App.—Dallas July 1, 2024, no
pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (“$200,000 has been held to not be
outside the range of reasonable disagreement for bail on a charge of aggravated
assault with a deadly weapon.”); Ex parte Wilson, No. 06-21-00116-CR, 2022 WL
68224, at *4 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Jan. 7, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated
for publication) (“[O]ur sister courts have regularly found that a $100,000.00 bond
for a third-degree felony offense is not excessive or so high that it constitutes an
instrument of oppression.”); Ex parte Stocker, No. 14-20-00467-CR, 2020 WL
11 7711348, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Dec. 29, 2020, pet. ref'd) (mem.
op., not designated for publication) (concluding that $500,000 is reasonable bail for
first-degree charged offense and $200,000 is reasonable bail for second-degree
charged offense); Ex parte Tata, 358 S.W.3d 392, 399 n.6 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] 2011, pet. dism'd) (“[T]his Court has previously approved bail amounts
ranging from $100,000 to $600,000 for first degree felony offenses[.]”).
We conclude the second and fourth factors do not weigh in favor of James’
requested relief.
C. The nature of the offense
The third factor contemplates “the nature of the offense and the circumstances
under which it was committed.” The nature of the offense and the length of possible
sentence are key considerations in determining the reasonableness of bail. Ex parte
Rubac, 611 S.W.2d at 849 (highlighting these as primary factors); see also Ex parte
Nimnicht, 467 S.W.3d at 67 (“When determining reasonable bail, a trial court shall
give the most weight to the nature of the offense and the length of possible
sentence.”).
James has been charged with murder for the shooting death of 21-year-old
Carnell Meeks and aggravated assault with a deadly weapon for shooting
56-year-old Regina Hall. Per the police report, James was an acquaintance of Meeks
and Hall. On January 23, 2025, James and Meeks allegedly engaged in a physical
12 fight regarding a videogame system. Witnesses stated James, who lived in his own
apartment, had come into the house where his father and his father’s girlfriend lived
and taken a videogame system that may have belonged to Meeks. During or
following the fight, James fired a gun at Meeks, who did not have a gun. James
allegedly fired multiple shots, one of which struck Hall. James purportedly fled the
scene on foot and surrendered himself to police on January 27, 2025. A witness
stated she had seen James carrying a gun in the past.
The admitted police report did not pertain to the charge for assault of a
pregnant person, and there is scant evidence in the record regarding that offense, but
James’ mother testified the complainant in that charge is the mother of James’ child.
James’ mother testified she learned about that case in 2024, meaning it is unrelated
to the 2025 scenario that led to the murder and aggravated-assault charges. James’
counsel argued that the complainant has filed an affidavit of non-prosecution in the
assault-of-a-pregnant-person charge, but nothing in the record supports this or
indicates the charge has been dropped.
James’ charged offenses have the following punishment ranges: (1) murder, a
first-degree felony with a punishment range of five to ninety-nine years’
confinement or life imprisonment; (2) aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, a
second-degree felony with a punishment range of two to twenty years’ confinement;
and (3) assault of a pregnant person, a third-degree felony with a punishment range
13 of two to ten years’ confinement. See TEX. PENAL CODE §§ 12.32–.34, 19.02, 22.01,
22.02.
The alleged circumstances of the offenses, and the ranges of punishment
should James be found guilty, weigh in favor of the trial court’s ruling. In re
Hulin, 31 S.W.3d 754, 759 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, no pet.) (“The primary
factors to be considered in determining what constitutes reasonable bail are the
punishment that can be imposed and the nature of the offense.”); Ex parte Bartolo,
2022 WL 17254957, at *5 (“The serious and violent nature of the first-degree felony
offense of murder with which appellant is charged and the potential sentence
appellant faces related to charged-felony offense weigh against a determination that
the bail amount sent by the trial court was excessive.”); see also Ex Parte Reescano,
2025 WL 2201385, at *6.
D. Safety of the victims, law enforcement, and community The fifth factor involves safety concerns. James’ mother said he did not have
a history of violence with her, and she does not think he would pose a danger to the
community if released on bond. But she also testified she was unaware of the facts
involved in the murder and aggravated-assault charges filed against James. And she
admitted the three charges filed against James are very serious, and that his conduct
did not set a good example for his three younger siblings.
14 Based on the violent nature of the instant offenses, which involved two
separate scenarios of James allegedly committing violence against acquaintances
(including the mother of his child), the trial court reasonably could have concluded
that James poses a threat to the community. This factor supports the trial court’s
decision. See Burns v. State, No. 05-23-01013-CR, 2024 WL 909840, at *5 (Tex.
App.—Dallas Mar. 4, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication)
(noting that “trial court could have concluded appellant posed a threat to the
community,” “[c]onsidering the seriousness and violence of the charged offense [of
burglary of habitation with to commit murder,” and that “this factor weighs against
a determination the amount of bail was excessive.”).
E. Other factors
Trial courts may also consider factors such as the accused’s work record, his
family and community ties, his length of residence, his prior criminal record, his
conformity with previous bond conditions, the existence of other outstanding bonds,
if any, and aggravating circumstances allegedly involved in the charged offense.
Smith, 829 S.W.2d at 887–88 (citing Ex parte Rubac, 611 S.W.2d at 849).
James’ mother testified that James does not have any prior criminal
convictions or a juvenile record and has never failed to appear for court or had any
bond violations. She stated he is not a flight risk and has no means of leaving the
15 country. She testified he has held three prior jobs. She also said James has friends
and family in the area that can provide him with emotional support.
James’ mother testified that if James is released on bond, he would stay with
her, and she would comply with the court’s conditions of release. She runs a tax
company from her house, which means she would be at the house all day to monitor
James. She said James would not leave her house if he was on 24-hour per day house
arrest. She would also ensure he appeared for court dates.
These facts weigh in favor of a reduction in the bond amounts. See Ex parte
Estrada, 640 S.W.3d 246, 253 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2021, pet. ref’d)
(several factors “favor[ed] a lower, more achievable bail amount,” such as appellant
had significant ties to area, always lived in Texas, maintained employment, and
appellant’s family members testified at bail hearing that they would ensure
conditions set by court would be followed, and appellant planned to reside with
family upon release from custody).
Nonetheless, considering all of the Article 17.15 factors and the supplemental
factors as a whole, we conclude that the trial court weighed the relevant factors and
properly exercised its discretion in denying James’ request to lower his bonds. The
trial court expressly stated on the record that it had considered the Article 17.15
factors and, based on those factors, denied the bail-reduction request.
16 Conclusion
Based on the record before this Court, we cannot conclude the trial court
abused its discretion by denying James’ applications for writ of habeas corpus. The
serious and violent nature of the charged offenses, a potential life sentence, and the
lack of evidence proving James exhausted all means of raising money weigh against
the mitigating factors. We thus affirm the trial court’s judgments denying James’
applications for writs of habeas corpus.
PER CURIAM
Panel consists of Chief Justice Adams and Justices Caughey and Johnson.
Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).