Ex Parte Colton Lane Hodges v. the State of Texas

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: August 14, 2025
• Docket: 13-25-00028-CR
• Status: Published

Opinion

NUMBER 13-25-00028-CR

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG

EX PARTE COLTON LANE HODGES

ON APPEAL FROM THE 25TH DISTRICT COURT OF GONZALES COUNTY, TEXAS

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Chief Justice Tijerina and Justices West and Fonseca Memorandum Opinion by Justice West

Appellant Colton Lane Hodges was indicted for continuous sexual abuse of a child

under fourteen (Count I), two counts of aggravated sexual assault of a child (Counts II–

III), and two counts of indecency with a child (Counts IV–V). See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.

§§ 21.02, 21.11, 22.021. Appellant appeals the denial of his application for writ of habeas

corpus seeking a reduction in his bond. We affirm. I. BACKGROUND

Hodges, while still a high school student, left his mother’s house despite her

objection and moved in with a friend’s family (the Roberts 1 Family). The Roberts Family

consisted of Taylor Roberts and her children: three boys and one girl named Eva (the

complainant). Hodges and the Roberts Family lived at two different locations: a home

owned by Roberts and a home owned by Sally Williams, Taylor Roberts’s mother. Hodges

was arrested and indicted for the crimes enumerated above, allegedly committed while

he lived with the Roberts Family. Originally, a single bond of $250,000 was set for all

counts. Hodges sought habeas relief, arguing his bond should be reduced. After a hearing

on the matter, the trial court reduced the bond to $100,000. This appeal followed, wherein

Hodges argues the reduced bail is still too high. See Ex Parte Sifuentes, 639 S.W.3d 842,

846 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2022, pet. ref’d) (noting that “[i]f the record shows that the

trial court heard evidence and addressed the merits [of a habeas application], the result

is appealable.”); Sanchez v. State, 340 S.W.3d 848, 852 n.6 (Tex. App.—San Antonio

2011, no pet.) (noting that “[a] habeas corpus proceeding is a separate and distinct

proceeding, independent of the cause instituted by an indictment” and “[a] trial court order

granting or denying habeas relief is therefore a final order, and an appeal from such an

order is not interlocutory”).

1 In this memorandum opinion, we use pseudonyms to protect the identity of the complainant and

her family. See TEX. CONST. art. I, § 30(a)(1) (providing that a crime victim has “the right to be treated . . . with respect for the victim’s dignity and privacy throughout the criminal justice process”); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. ch. 58, subch. C (“Confidentiality of Identifying Information of Sex Offense Victims”).

2 II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review the trial court’s pre-trial bail decision for an abuse of discretion. Ex Parte

Gill, 413 S.W.3d 425, 428 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (holding the “decision of a trial judge at

a habeas proceeding regarding the imposition or reduction of bail ‘will not be disturbed

by this Court in the absence of an abuse of discretion’” (quoting Ex Parte Spaulding, 612

S.W.2d 509, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981))); Ex Parte Rubac, 611 S.W.2d 848, 850 (Tex.

Crim. App. 1981). Accordingly, we will only reverse the trial court if it acts without

reference to any guiding rules and procedures or renders a ruling that is arbitrary and

unreasonable. Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 380 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990); Ex

Parte Gonzalez, 383 S.W.3d 160, 161 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2012, pet. ref’d). Even if

a trial court decides a matter in a different manner than an appellate court would in a

similar circumstance, this does not demonstrate that an abuse of discretion has occurred.

Ex Parte Scott, 122 S.W.3d 866, 868 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, no pet.) (citing

Montgomery, 810 S.W.2d at 380).

“The burden of proof is on the defendant to show that bail is excessive.” Ex Parte

Gomez, 624 S.W.3d 573, 576 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021). When reviewing the trial court’s

habeas ruling, “we view the record in the light most favorable to the ruling.” Id.

III. ANALYSIS

Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 17.15 “sets out rules for fixing the

amount of bail.” Id. It provides:

1. Bail and any conditions of bail shall be sufficient to give reasonable assurance that the undertaking will be complied with.

3 2. The power to require bail is not to be used to make bail an instrument of oppression.

3. The nature of the offense and the circumstances under which the offense was committed are to be considered, including whether the offense:

(A) is an offense involving violence as defined by Article 17.03; or

(B) involves violence directed against a peace officer.

4. The ability to make bail shall be considered, and proof may be taken on this point.

5. The future safety of a victim of the alleged offense, law enforcement, and the community shall be considered.

6. The criminal history record information for the defendant . . . shall be considered, including any acts of family violence, other pending criminal charges, and any instances in which the defendant failed to appear in court following release on bail.

7. The citizenship status of the defendant shall be considered.

TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 17.15. In addition, courts may consider employment

history, family ties, length of residency, criminal history, previous bond compliance, other

outstanding bonds, and aggravating facts of the charged offense. Gomez, 624 S.W.3d at

576.

A. Nature and Circumstances of the Offense

Of all the factors, “[t]he primary factors are the length of the sentence . . . and the

nature of the offense.” Rubac, 611 S.W.2d at 849; Gonzalez, 383 S.W.3d at 161 (citing

Ex Parte Rodriguez, 595 S.W.2d 549, 550 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1980); In re Hulin,

31 S.W.3d 754, 761 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, no pet.) (“Pretrial bond in these

kind[s] of cases should be set sufficiently high to secure the presence of the accused at

4 trial because the accused’s reaction to the prospect of a lengthy prison sentence might

be not to appear.”)

Here, Count I of the indictment is a first-degree felony punishable by imprisonment

“for life, or for any term of not more than 99 years or less than 25 years.” TEX. PENAL.

CODE ANN. § 21.02(h). Counts II–III are first degree felonies, punishable by imprisonment

“for life or for any term of not more than 99 years or less than 5 years” and/or “a fine not

to exceed $10,000.” Id. §§ 22.021(e), 12.32. Counts IV–V are second degree felonies

punishable by imprisonment “for any term of not more than 20 years or less than 2 years”

and/or “a fine not to exceed $10,000.” Id. §§ 12.33, 21.11(d). All of these are “offenses

involving violence” as defined in article 17.03 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure.

See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 17.03(b-3)(2)(G), (H), (L); see also id. art.

17.15(3)(A). Additionally, the foregoing punishments related to separate counts may be

assessed to run consecutively. See id. art. 42.08(a).

Factually, the indictment alleges that Hodges penetrated Eva’s anus and mouth

with his sexual organ, touched Eva’s breasts, and caused Eva to touch his genitals. At

the time, Eva was a seven-year-old girl with dyslexia, and Hodges was seventeen.

According to the evidence at the habeas hearing, Eva made two outcries. First, after being

caught talking about sex on the school bus, she described to her school counselor being

sexually abused by two people: Hodges and Damian (one of her three brothers). She

further stated the abuse made her uncomfortable, but she did not know how to make

Hodges and Damian stop. Second, she approached Williams holding a “rubber” and

stated, “I know what this is, and I know what they do with it.” One of Eva’s brothers told

5 Williams that they just blew the “rubbers” up and popped them. Damian has since

admitted to committing sexual abuse as alleged by Eva.

Hodges argues the following supports a greater bond reduction: (1) Eva told the

counselor that she was in her first grade teacher’s class when the abuse occurred, but

Hodges only lived with the Roberts Family when Eva was in second grade; and

(2) Hodges slept in a different room than Eva, was not left alone with Eva, and would not

have had access to Eva.

Regarding the first assertion, Eva’s counselor stated children of Eva’s age and

condition have a “very loose” “concept of time.” Further, the trial court could have found

the allegations against Hodges to be credible, despite the time discrepancy, especially

given that Damian admitted to the abuse Eva alleged against him. See Ex Parte Reyes-

Martinez, 653 S.W.3d 273, 280 (Tex. App.—Austin 2022, no pet.) (“The trial court is the

exclusive judge of witness credibility, and we afford it ‘considerable discretion in making

those challenging determinations.’”)

Regarding the second assertions, Hodges cites the testimony of Roberts and

Williams as support. However, Roberts testified that she worked and sometimes went to

sleep earlier than her kids (including Eva), making her unaware of what happened

between her kids and Hodges during those times. Related to her knowledge of whether

Hodges was left alone with Eva, Roberts merely testified “not that I know of.” (emphasis

added). When asked if, to her knowledge, Eva ever woke Hodges up or was alone with

Hodges, Roberts responded, “No. But I would fall asleep sometimes before my daughter.”

(emphasis added). When defense counsel stated Eva “didn’t have much interaction with

6 [Hodges],” Roberts stated, “Not too much that I know of, no.” (emphasis added). Roberts

further testified that she had no idea that one of her sons was sexually abusing Eva.

Williams testified that when Hodges and the Roberts Family were at her house, Eva

“usually” slept in Williams’s room. When asked if Eva was ever left alone with Hodges,

Williams testified, “No, not at—I mean, she would walk in the room when the boys were

there, because they were in there playing on their phones, and she wanted to go and see

what they were doing, but no.” Williams further testified that she was not around Hodges

twenty-four hours a day and that she was unaware that one of her grandsons was sexually

abusing Eva. Thus, Hodges has failed to prove his second assertions.

Hodges faces substantial punishment. He is a young person who could spend the

rest of his life in prison if convicted on just one of the first three counts. And the other

counts also carry substantial punishments. A bond sufficient to secure his presence at

trial is required. See Hulin, 31 S.W.3d at 761. The nature of the offense is particularly

aggravating considering the age and vulnerability of the complainant. See Gomez, 624

S.W.3d at 576. This factor weighs in favor of the trial court’s denial of further bail

reduction. See Ex Parte Ramirez-Hernandez, 642 S.W.3d 907, 918 (Tex. App.—San

Antonio 2022, no pet.) (finding the nature and circumstances factor weighed in favor of a

high bail considering sexual assault charges).

B. Ability to Make Bail

“The ability to make bond is one of many factors to be considered; however, it does

not control the amount of bail and will not automatically render an amount excessive.”

Clemons v. State, 220 S.W.3d 176, 178 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2007, no pet.) (citing Ex

7 Parte Charlesworth, 600 S.W.2d 316 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980); Ex Parte Branch, 553

S.W.2d 380, 382 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977)). “If the ability to make bond in a specified

amount controlled, then the role of the trial court in setting bond would be eliminated, and

the accused would be in the position to determine what his bail should be.” Id. (citing

Branch, 553 S.W.2d at 382). Further, “[t]o show that he is unable to make bail, a

defendant must show that his funds and his family’s funds have been exhausted.” Reyes,

653 S.W.3d at 281 (quoting Milner v. State, 263 S.W.3d 146, 149 (Tex. App.—Houston

[1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.) (internal citations omitted)). “Unless he does so, he must ‘usually

show that he made an unsuccessful effort to furnish bail before bail can be determined to

be excessive.’” Id. (quoting Milner, 263 S.W.3d at 149 (internal citations omitted)).

Moreover, “[w]here the assets and savings of an appellant’s family, and not his own, are

at stake, there may be ‘little or no incentive for him to appear.’” Id.

Here, Hodges has failed to show that his funds and his family’s funds have been

exhausted. 2 He submitted an affidavit for purposes of obtaining court appointed counsel

which states his employment, income, assets, and liabilities are “N/A.” An order was

entered by the trial court appointing Hodges counsel after finding he was “too poor to

employ counsel.” But Hodges no longer has court-appointed counsel and is represented

privately. Moreover, Hodges’s mother testified that she is unable to pay bond for Hodges,

but there is no evidence regarding the details of her financial condition or that of other

2 Related to his ability to make bail, Hodges relies primarily on a declaration and testimony he

provided at an indigency hearing in February 2025. However, “we must review the trial court’s ruling in light of what was before the court at the time the ruling was made.” Allen v. State, 473 S.W.3d 426, 443–44 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, pet. granted) (citing Willover v. State, 70 S.W.3d 841, 845 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002)). Accordingly, we do not consider any evidence that was not in the record at the time of the trial court’s December 13, 2024, denial of habeas corpus.

8 family members or friends who may be able to assist Hodges in posting bond. See Reyes,

653 S.W.3d at 282 (Tex. App.—Austin 2022, no pet.) (finding lack of specific and detailed

evidence concerning the family’s financial circumstances—such as family members’

income or savings—could cause the trial court to conclude set bail amount was

reasonable). Hodges argues that he was “homeless,” but his mother testified that he

simply decided to leave her house despite her objection and started living with his friend.

Furthermore, Hodges’s counsel argued in the application for writ of habeas corpus that

$5,000 was reasonable and adequate to secure his presence, but at the habeas hearing,

he requested Hodges’s release on a personal recognizance bond despite the

unavailability of such. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 17.03 (b-2) (1) (barring

release on personal bond for offenses involving violence).

Hodges has also failed to show an unsuccessful attempt to furnish bail. There is

nothing in the record supporting this contention. Additionally, it appears no assets of

Hodges will be used to furnish bail—indicating that, even if his bail was posted, he may

have little incentive to appear.

This factor weighs in favor of the trial court’s denial of further bail reduction.

C. Safety of the Victim and the Community

Hodges’s mother stated that he could live with her. She lives four miles from

Smiley, Texas, and twelve miles from Nixon, Texas. The victim lives in Nixon and goes

to school in Smiley. 3 Additionally, it is uncertain if Hodges will stay with his mother or if

3 We take judicial notice that Nixon-Smiley Elementary School is in Smiley. See TEX. R. EVID. 201

(a)–(d); San Jacinto River Auth. v. Yollick, 623 S.W.3d 454, 461 n.10 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2021, no pet.) (taking judicial notice of geographical facts); W. Hills Harbor Owners Ass’n v. Baker, 516 S.W.3d 215, 219

9 his mother is capable of supervising him. He left her home before he finished high school,

choosing instead to be “homeless.” 4 The school counselor testified that Eva was “very

anxious” for the first year after the alleged abuse occurred “because she really didn’t fully

understand what was going on.” Eva would tell the counselor during counseling sessions

that “[i]t’s hard for me to think about what I had to tell you.” Further, the trial court could

have concluded the gravity and nature of the charges, as discussed above, indicate

Hodges poses a danger to the community. See Milner, 263 S.W.3d at 151 (finding gravity

and nature of charges impact the analysis under the safety to the community factor). This

factor weighs heavily in favor of the trial court’s denial of further bail reduction.

D. Community and Family Ties

Hodges failed to prove strong community and family ties. There is no evidence

indicating the amount of time he has lived in the area. He does not depend on a local job

for income. There is no evidence of any relatives living in the area other than his mother

and sister who live four miles outside Smiley. And Hodges left his mother’s house before

he finished high school over her objection and argues he was “homeless.” Thus, this

factor weighs in favor of the trial court’s denial of further bail reduction. See Ex Parte

Scott, 122 S.W.3d 866, 871 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, no pet.) (finding minimal

(Tex. App.—El Paso 2017, no pet.) (“[A]n appellate court may take judicial notice of a fact for the first time on appeal of matters not contained within the appellate record.”); Griego v. State, 345 S.W.3d 742, 747 n.5 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2011, no pet.) (taking judicial notice of location, direction, and trajectories); Tovar v. Bd. of Trustees of Somerset Indep. Sch. Dist., 994 S.W.2d 756, 762 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 1999, pet. denied) (finding courts may take judicial notice of address locations on streets by consulting maps).

4 Again, according to Hodges’s mother, he just moved in with a friend.

10 evidence on community ties could cause the trial court to conclude community ties were

insufficient to assure appearance at trial).

E. Criminal History, Compliance with Bonds, Citizenship

Despite Hodges carrying the burden of proof, he did not address these factors with

evidence or argument. See Gomez, 624 S.W.3d at 576. Thus, these factors weigh neither

in favor nor against the trial court’s denial of further bail reduction.

F. Summary

Here, Hodges failed to satisfy his burden of proving his $100,000 bond is excessive

by showing factors analyzed above weigh in his favor. See Gomez, 624 S.W.3d at 576;

see also Ex Parte Owen, No. 10-16-00188-CR, 2016 WL 6953107, at *4 (Tex. App.—

Waco Nov. 23, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (affirming bail of

$1,000,000 for an accused who was indigent for the purposes of court appointed counsel

but was charged with a third degree felony enhanced to carry a punishment range of

twenty-five to ninety-nine years or life imprisonment plus a fine of up to $10,000); Ex Parte

Campbell, No. 02-13-00313-CR, 2013 WL 5041031, at *5 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Sept.

12, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (affirming a total bond of

$3,000,000 where accused claimed indigence and was charged with three counts of

aggravated sexual assault of child, one count of attempted aggravated sexual assault of

a child, and one count of indecency with a child); Ex Parte Flores, No. 06-20-00124-CR,

2021 WL 744773, at *4 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Feb. 26, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op., not

designated for publication) (affirming bond of $1,000,000 where accused was charged

with aggravated sexual assault, a first degree felony); O’Brien v. State, No. 01-12-00176-

11 CR, 2012 WL 2922545, at *5 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] July 5, 2012, no pet.) (mem.

op., not designated for publication) (affirming bond of $750,000.00 where accused

allegedly committed theft of property worth more than $200,000, a first degree felony).

Given the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion.

We reject Hodge’s sole issue.

IV. CONCLUSION

We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

JON WEST Justice

Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

Delivered and filed on the 14th day of August, 2025.