Ex Parte Christhian Micheal Espinosa Valdez v. .

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: July 30, 2025
• Docket: 04-23-00231-CR
• Status: Published

Opinion

Fourth Court of Appeals San Antonio, Texas MEMORANDUM OPINION No. 04-23-00231-CR

EX PARTE Christhian Micheal ESPINOSA VALDEZ

From the County Court, Kinney County, Texas Trial Court No. 14074CR Honorable Susan D. Reed, Judge Presiding 1

PER CURIAM

Sitting: Rebeca C. Martinez, Chief Justice Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice Adrian A. Spears II, Justice

Delivered and Filed: July 30, 2025

AFFIRMED

Appellant, Christhian Michel Espinosa Valdez, appeals the trial court’s order denying his request for habeas relief. For the reasons stated below, we affirm the trial court’s order.

BACKGROUND

Appellant was arrested and charged with misdemeanor criminal trespass as a part of Operation Lone Star (“OLS”). Appellant subsequently filed a pretrial application for writ of habeas corpus, arguing that the State of Texas engaged in selective prosecution by choosing to prosecute men for criminal trespass but not to prosecute similarly situated women for the same offense, in violation of the Equal Protection clauses of the United States and Texas constitutions. The trial court denied Appellant’s habeas application.

1 Senior Judge Susan D. Reed signed the order denying the habeas corpus relief at issue in this appeal. 04-23-00231-CR

DISCUSSION

On appeal, Appellant argues that his selective-prosecution claim is cognizable in a pretrial habeas proceeding and that the trial court erred by denying his application for writ of habeas corpus.

A. Standard of Review

Generally, we review a trial court’s ruling on a pretrial application for a writ of habeas corpus for an abuse of discretion. See Kniatt v. State, 206 S.W.3d 657, 664 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); Ex parte Jarreau, 623 S.W.3d 468 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2020, pet. ref’d). “However, when, the resolution of the ultimate issue turns on the application of purely legal standards, we review the trial court’s ruling de novo.” Jarreau, 623 S.W.3d at 472. We will uphold the trial court’s ruling “if that ruling was supported by the record and was correct under any theory of law applicable to the case.” Armendariz v. State, 123 S.W.3d 401, 404 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (citing State v. Ross, 32 S.W.3d 853, 856 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000)). “That rule holds true even if the trial court gave the wrong reason for its ruling.” Armendariz, 123 S.W.3d at 404 (citing Romero v. State, 800 S.W.2d 539, 543 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990)).

B. Cognizability

In his brief, Appellant argues his pretrial application for writ of habeas corpus based on a claim of selective prosecution is cognizable on appeal. The State, however, disputes this argument.

From our review, the facts and arguments in this case are substantively the same as those in Ex parte Aparicio, in which the Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that the appellant’s claim of selective arrest and prosecution was cognizable under the facts of that case. 707 S.W.3d 189, 202 (Tex. Crim. App. 2024), cert. denied sub nom. Aparicio v. Texas, No. 24-6057, 2025 WL 1787753 (U.S. June 30, 2025). Accordingly, we conclude that Appellant’s claim is cognizable.

C. Selective Prosecution

To establish a prima facie case of “selective prosecution or selective enforcement, the claimant must prove with ‘exceptionally clear evidence’ that: 1. The prosecutorial policy had a discriminatory effect; and 2. it was motivated by a discriminatory purpose.” Aparicio, 707 S.W.3d at 204 (citations omitted). The second prong requires the claimant “definitively show that an otherwise facially neutral law is being administered in bad faith—that it was ‘directed so exclusively against a particular class of persons . . . with a mind so unequal and oppressive’ that equal protection of the law was denied.” Id. at 208 (emphasis in original) (quoting U.S. v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464–65 (1996)). In other words, the claimant must show by “‘exceptionally clear evidence’ that the OLS mindset administering the facially neutral criminal trespass law was ‘so unequal and oppressive’ against him because he is male.” Id. at 210 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).

The evidence here is substantively the same as the evidence presented in Aparicio. Id. at 189. We therefore conclude, based on our review of the entire record and after considering the

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parties’ arguments, that the evidence is insufficient to show that the State of Texas’ policy was motivated by a discriminatory purpose. Id. at 204.

CONCLUSION

Because Appellant failed to establish the second prong of his selective prosecution claim, the trial court did not err in denying his application for writ of habeas corpus. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order denying Appellant’s pretrial application for writ of habeas corpus. We also dismiss any other pending motions as moot.

DO NOT PUBLISH

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