Ex parte Carson

U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Maryland

Ex parte Carson

5 F. Cas. 171, 4 Hughes 215, 1873 U.S. App. LEXIS 1438

CourtU.S. Circuit Court for the District of Maryland

DecidedNovember 24, 1873

StatusPublished

This text of 5 F. Cas. 171 (Ex parte Carson) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Maryland primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Ex parte Carson, 5 F. Cas. 171, 4 Hughes 215, 1873 U.S. App. LEXIS 1438 (circtdmd 1873).

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Opinion

BOND, Circuit Judge.

We are of the opinion after consideration of the arguments presented in this cause that the third section of the act of congress of 1833, under which this petition is filed, is not applicable to criminal indictments. We are of opinion that the petitioner must file his petition under the seventh section of the act, alleging the fact that the act for which he is prosecuted and indicted was done in his capacity as an officer of the United States, and in pursuance of his duty as such, and in execution of the power with which he was clothed. Upon consideration of such petition, and proof of the facts alleged, the court would discharge the party, and, if satisfied the facts were not proven as alleged, would remand the prisoner to the state court for trial. This petition is not filed under the seventh, but under the third, section of the act of 1833; and, as we are of the opinion that this section applies only to civil causes, it must be dismissed and the cause remanded.

[A second petition, filed January 7, 1874, sought relief under the seventh section of the act of March 2, 1833. A writ of habeas corpus was granted, and on the return thereof the following opinion was delivered:]

BOND. Circuit Judge. From a consideration of the facts and the arguments of counsel in this case, while I am of opinion that the homicide for which this petitioner is in custody was accidental, yet, as the burden of proof in support of the facts alleged in his petition is upon the prisoner to show that justification which is contemplated by ihe seventh section of the act of 1S33, I cannot satisfy myself that he has fully and affirmatively done so. This he must do before I have jurisdiction to discharge him, and I can •only therefore now dismiss the petition.

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BOND, Circuit Judge.

We are of the opinion after consideration of the arguments presented in this cause that the third section of the act of congress of 1833, under which this petition is filed, is not applicable to criminal indictments. We are of opinion that the petitioner must file his petition under the seventh section of the act, alleging the fact that the act for which he is prosecuted and indicted was done in his capacity as an officer of the United States, and in pursuance of his duty as such, and in execution of the power with which he was clothed. Upon consideration of such petition, and proof of the facts alleged, the court would discharge the party, and, if satisfied the facts were not proven as alleged, would remand the prisoner to the state court for trial. This petition is not filed under the seventh, but under the third, section of the act of 1833; and, as we are of the opinion that this section applies only to civil causes, it must be dismissed and the cause remanded.

[A second petition, filed January 7, 1874, sought relief under the seventh section of the act of March 2, 1833. A writ of habeas corpus was granted, and on the return thereof the following opinion was delivered:]

BOND. Circuit Judge. From a consideration of the facts and the arguments of counsel in this case, while I am of opinion that the homicide for which this petitioner is in custody was accidental, yet, as the burden of proof in support of the facts alleged in his petition is upon the prisoner to show that justification which is contemplated by ihe seventh section of the act of 1S33, I cannot satisfy myself that he has fully and affirmatively done so. This he must do before I have jurisdiction to discharge him, and I can •only therefore now dismiss the petition.

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Bluebook (online)

5 F. Cas. 171, 4 Hughes 215, 1873 U.S. App. LEXIS 1438, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ex-parte-carson-circtdmd-1873.