Ex Parte Anderson
Opinion
Relator, a convict in the State penitentiary, presented to Honorable Max Rogers, Judge of the District Court of Walker *140 County, his application for the writ of habeas corpus alleging that he was illegally detained of his liberty by the penitentiary authorities. He sought his outright discharge from custody.
The basis of relator’s contention is that, under the provisions of Chapter 180, Acts of the Forty-ninth Legislature in 1945, page 245, appearing as Article 6184-L of Vernon’s Civil Statutes 1 , granting to convicts 20 days per month commutation of sentence for good conduct, he has served the sentence imposed against him.
Judge Rogers granted the writ of habeas corpus and developed the facts, and has certified the record to this Court for final determination, as provided by Article 119, C. C. P., as amended.
Said Act of 1945 was an amendment of Chapter 361, Acts of the Forty-eighth Legislature in 1943. The Act of 1943 extended to all convicts 20 days per month reduction of sentence as commutation for good conduct. The Act of 1945 amended that provision so as to extend commutation to convicts according to classification, as found and fixed by the Classification Committee. The maximum commutation allowed was 20 days per month to convicts of Class 1, which was the same as that extended to all convicts by the Act of 1943.
Relator was classified in Class 1. He was a convict in the penitentiary at the time of the effective date of the Act of 1945. *141 It follows, then, that — as to him — the amendment of 1945 made no effectual change in the commutation for good behavior to which he was entitled.
It is relator’s contention that commutation under the Acts should be computed by allowing the 20 days monthly commutation as a part of each month — in other words, that for each 10 days he actually serves he is entitled to a credit of 30 days upon the sentence, or for each 30 days served he is entitled to a credit of 90 days on his sentence.
The penitentiary authorities — respondents here — contend that the 20 days computation is added to each 30 days served. In other words, when a convict serves 30 days, he is entitled to a credit of 50 days on the sentence.
As we understand the record, if relator’s construction be correct, he has served the sentence imposed; if respondent’s construction be correct, he has not served his sentence and is not entitled to his discharge.
The power of the Legislature to authorize, by statute, reduction of sentences of convicts for good conduct is generally *142 accepted. That power rests upon the fact that the commutation is allowed as a reward for the good conduct and behavior of a prisoner. 41 Am. Jur., p. 914, sec. 41. So then, in order for a convict to be entitled to commutation, he must first earn it in accordance with the statute and the requirements thereof.
A statute that extends to convicts commutation of sentence as a mere gift or as a matter of clemency would be violative of Article 4, Sec. 11, of our State Constitution, which places the matter of clemency to convicts exclusively in the hands of the Board of Pardons and the Governor of this State.
The fact, then, that a convict must first earn, by his own conduct commutation extended by the Legislature is a distinguishing feature. Commutation is earned by the convict. Clemency is extended as an act of grace by the authorities having that power under the Constitution.
Such being the construction to be placed upon a commutation statute, it follows that in the instant case relator was entitled to only the 20 days credit when he, by his own good conduct, had earned it. It also follows that the construction placed upon the Act by the penitentiary authorities was the correct interpretation. Moreover, if relator’s construction of the Act be accepted, the 20 days credit would necessarily arise as a matter of grace or a gift by the Legislature and the Act would therefore constitute clemency.
It has been suggested that the Act of 1945, in so far as it creates three separate classes of convicts — two of which receive commutation of sentence for good conduct, while the third receives no commutation — without any primary standard being fixed by the Legislature by which to determine the different classifications is an unauthorized delegation of power by the Legislature of this State.
If the Act of 1945 be subject to this claimed invalidity, relator’s status would not be changed, for the 20 days commutation which he is being allowed is the same under both the Act of 1943 and the Act of 1945. If the Act of 1945 should fail, the Act of 1943 would be effective. For this reason, the constitutional question is not decided.
The penitentiary authorities having correctly applied the 20-day commutation as an addition to each 30. days of sentence *143 served, the relief prayed for by relator is denied, and relator is remanded.
The foregoing opinion of the Commission of Appeals has been examined by the Judges of the Court of Criminal Appeals and approved by the Court.
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192 S.W.2d 280 (Ex Parte Anderson) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.