Ex Parte Alton Granville v. the State of Texas

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: September 11, 2025
• Docket: 02-25-00234-CR
• Status: Published

Opinion

In the Court of Appeals Second Appellate District of Texas at Fort Worth ___________________________

No. 02-25-00234-CR ___________________________

Ex parte Alton Granville

On Appeal from the 371st District Court Tarrant County, Texas Trial Court No. 1681920

Before Sudderth, C.J.; Kerr and Walker, JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Justice Walker MEMORANDUM OPINION

I. INTRODUCTION

While Appellant Alton Dean Granville Jr was on community supervision, the

trial court amended his conditions of community supervision, remanded him into

custody, and ordered that he serve a term of confinement and treatment in an

intermediate sanction facility (ISF). Granville filed an application for a writ of a

habeas corpus, alleging that he was illegally confined and restrained because the ISF

amendment (1) was excessive, oppressive, unreasonable, and created an undue

hardship and burden; (2) was illegal and capricious and based upon no risk and needs

assessment, no violations nor any good or sufficient cause; and (3) punished him a

third time for the same conduct. The trial court denied his application for a writ of

habeas corpus, and Granville filed this appeal. Because the trial court did not abuse

its discretion by denying the application, we will affirm the trial court’s order.

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In July 2023, Granville pleaded guilty, pursuant to a plea agreement, to the

offense of injury to a child with intent to commit bodily injury.1 See Tex. Penal Code

Ann. § 22.04(f). The trial court placed him on ten years deferred-adjudication

community supervision and imposed various conditions of community supervision,

A grand jury indicted Granville for six various counts of child sexual abuse. 1

The parties agreed to amend the indictment to include a seventh count—injury to a child. The State waived counts one through six.

2 including that he not leave the county without permission, not view pornography, not

have contact with the victim, and not show deception on polygraph examinations.

Granville violated the conditions of his community supervision on several occasions,

and consequently, the trial court ordered various sanctions and amendments to his

community supervision.

In January 2024, Granville traveled outside of the county without permission,

so the trial court ordered him to wear a GPS monitor. In July 2024, Granville was

asked during a monitoring polygraph examination whether he—after being placed on

community supervision—had sexual contact with anyone under seventeen years of

age or engaged in a sex crime. Granville responded in the negative but showed

deception in his responses to both questions. During the polygraph examination,

Granville admitted that he had viewed pornography while on community supervision.

When confronted with the polygraph examination results, Granville denied having

sexual contact with a minor but admitted to having oral sex performed on him up to

fifteen times in a park. He was ordered to complete 56 hours of community service

restitution and install a device-monitoring software on his phone.

In January 2025, Granville underwent a maintenance polygraph examination

and was asked whether he had viewed pornography since January 2024. He

responded in the negative but showed deception in his response. When confronted

with the polygraph examination results, he admitted that he had viewed pornography

sometime in October 2024.

3 On February 11, 2025, Granville spoke with his community supervision officer,

and they discussed his previous violations and sanctions. Granville’s community

supervision officer reiterated that he could not view pornography or show deception

on any polygraph examination. Because he had viewed pornography, Granville was

ordered to complete 56 hours of community service restitution.

On February 26, 2025, Granville underwent another polygraph examination.

He was asked whether he had viewed pornography since August 2024 and whether he

had communicated with the victim. He responded in the negative, but again, showed

deception in his responses to both questions. In March 2025, Granville met with his

community supervision officer who explained that, despite the past sanctions and

amendments, he had continued to violate the conditions of his community

supervision and show deceptive results in the polygraph examinations. Granville

recognized that he had failed the polygraph examinations and provided various

reasons for the deceptive results. His community supervision officer explained that

because of the violations, she was going to recommend that he complete ISF.

However, Granville disagreed with the polygraph examination results and the ISF

recommendation.

On March 24, 2025, the State filed a petition to proceed to adjudication,

alleging that Granville had been ordered to attend ISF but that he had refused to

participate. Granville filed a motion to quash the State’s petition, arguing that

attending ISF was not a condition of his community supervision.

4 On April 21, 2025, the trial court heard Granville’s motion to quash. At the

hearing, Allysa Deleon-Martinez, an employee with the Tarrant County Community

Supervision and Corrections Department (CSCD), testified that CSCD had “made

several attempts to work with [Granville] to get him to comply with the terms of his

[community supervision].”2 But despite CSCD’s attempts, Granville had cussed at a

supervision officer and had “a bad attitude about his own admissions during the

course of his [community supervision].”3

Deleon-Martinez explained that CSCD had spoken with Granville “about the

potential sanction or condition that he may have to attend ISF if he failed to continue

to comply with the terms of [community supervision].” Because of Granville’s

continued violations, CSCD had recommended that he complete ISF. She further

explained that Granville did not agree with the ISF recommendation and that he

wanted the trial court judge to make the determination to send him to ISF. However,

before CSCD could request the trial court amend Granville’s conditions of

community supervision to include ISF, the State had filed its petition to proceed to

adjudication, alleging that he had refused to participate in ISF as instructed by the trial

court.

Granville’s community supervision chronological records, which documented 2

the entirety of his supervision, were admitted as an exhibit at the hearing.

Throughout his supervision, Granville had consistently refused to assume 3

responsibility for his offense.

5 Following testimony and argument, the trial court dismissed the State’s petition

to adjudicate, amended Granville’s conditions of community supervision, ordered that

he complete ISF, and remanded him into custody for “cussing at officers and going

where he’s not supposed to go and other things.” On April 23, 2025, Granville filed a

motion for reconsideration of the ISF amendment, which the trial court denied.

On May 7, 2025, Granville filed an application for a writ of habeas corpus,

contending that his confinement and restraint were illegal because the trial court’s ISF

amendment (1) was excessive, unreasonable, and created an undue hardship and

burden; (2) was illegal and capricious and based on no risk and needs assessment, no

violations and no good or sufficient cause; and (3) punished him for a third time for

the same purported conduct. The State filed a response, arguing that the application

should be denied and proposing findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial

court4 adopted the State’s proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law as its own

and denied Granville’s application for a writ of habeas corpus without a hearing.

Granville filed this appeal.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The statutory remedy allowing habeas corpus relief in community-supervision

cases is limited and exclusive. See State v. Guerrero, 400 S.W.3d 576, 582 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2013). Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 11.072 “establishes the

The trial court referred the matter to a criminal law magistrate and 4

subsequently ratified and adopted the actions taken by that magistrate.

6 procedures for an application for a writ of habeas corpus in a felony or misdemeanor

case in which the applicant seeks relief from an order or a judgment of conviction

ordering community supervision.” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 11.072, § 1. “At

the time the application is filed, the applicant must be, or have been, on community

supervision, and the application must challenge the legal validity of . . . the conditions

of community supervision.” Id § 2(b)(2). “An applicant may challenge a condition of

community supervision under [Article 11.072] only on constitutional grounds.” Id

§ 3(c).

An applicant seeking habeas corpus relief must prove his claim by a

preponderance of the evidence. See Ex parte Torres, 483 S.W.3d 35, 43 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2016); Kniatt v. State, 206 S.W.3d 657, 664 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). In reviewing

the trial court’s ruling on a habeas corpus application, we view the facts in the light

most favorable to the trial court’s ruling and will uphold it absent an abuse of

discretion. See Kniatt, 206 S.W.3d at 664.

IV. DISCUSSION

A. FIRST AND SECOND ISSUES

In his first and second issues, Granville complains that the trial court’s ISF

amendment is (1) excessive, unreasonable, and creates an undue hardship and burden

and (2) illegal and capricious and based on no risk and needs assessment. As the

foundation for his position, Granville contends that the ISF amendment “was not

based on an assessment using an instrument that is valid” and that “it detrimentally

7 impacts [his] work and ability to meet financial obligations.” We construe Granville’s

first and second issues as complaints that the trial court failed to comply with Texas

Code of Criminal Procedure Article 42A.301(a)—that it had amended his conditions

without considering the results of a risk and needs assessment. Article 42A.301(a)

provides that:

The judge of the court having jurisdiction of the case shall determine the conditions of community supervision after considering the results of a risk and needs assessment conducted with respect to the defendant. The assessment must be conducted using an instrument that is validated for the purpose of assessing the risks and needs of a defendant placed on community supervision. The judge may impose any reasonable condition that is not duplicative of another condition and that is designed to protect or restore the community, protect or restore the victim, or punish, rehabilitate, or reform the defendant. In determining the conditions, the judge shall consider the extent to which the conditions impact the defendant’s:

(1) work, education, and community service schedule or obligations; and

(2) ability to meet financial obligations.

Tex. Code. Crim Proc. Ann. art. 42A.301(a).

However, an applicant pursuing an Article 11.072 writ of habeas corpus may

challenge “a condition of community supervision under this article only on

constitutional grounds.” Id. art. 11.072 § 3(c) (emphasis added). A claim that the trial

court failed to adhere to a statute or rule—such as Article 42A.301—is typically

treated as a violation of the statute or rule and not the constitution. See, e.g., Gray v.

State, 159 S.W.3d 95, 97–98 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (holding that violation of the state

8 statute designed to protect constitutional right to jury chosen from fair cross-section

of community was still treated as a statutory error).

Here, Granville’s first and second issues attack the ISF amendment on the

ground that the trial court had not adhered to the requirements set out in

Article 42A.301(a). See Tex. Code. Crim Proc. Ann. art. 42A.301(c). He does not

explain how this alleged error rises to the level of a constitutional violation.

We conclude that Granville’s first and second issues are complaints of a

statutory violation and that these issues do not challenge the ISF amendment on

constitutional grounds. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 11.072, § 3(c). Therefore,

because Granville’s first and second issues do not attack the ISF amendment on a

constitutional ground, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by

denying his application for a writ for habeas corpus. See Kniatt, 206 S.W.3d at 664.

We overrule Granville’s first and second issues.

B. THIRD ISSUE

Granville’s third issue challenges the ISF amendment on the ground that it

“punishes [him] a third time for the same purported conduct.” Unlike his first two

issues, we construe this issue to be a challenge on constitutional grounds—a claim of

double jeopardy. See U.S. Const. amend. V. The double jeopardy clause of the

United States Constitution protects against three abuses: (1) a second prosecution for

the same offense after acquittal; (2) a second prosecution for the same offense after

9 conviction; and (3) multiple punishments for the same offense. Ex Parte Rhodes,

974 S.W.2d 735, 738 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998).

The granting of community supervision is a privilege, not a right. See Flores v.

State, 904 S.W.2d 129, 130 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (“[T]here is no fundamental right

to receive probation; it is within the discretion of the trial court to determine whether

an individual defendant is entitled to probation”). “Consistent with its broad

discretionary powers in deciding whether to grant community supervision, a trial court

likewise has broad discretion in determining the conditions to be imposed.” Speth v.

State, 6 S.W.3d 530, 533 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). “The judge may impose any

reasonable condition that is not duplicative of another condition and that is designed

to . . . punish, rehabilitate, or reform the defendant.” Tex. Code Crim. Proc.

art. 42A.301(a).

Granville frames the ISF amendment as a duplicative punishment for “going to

places he’s not supposed to go”—leaving the county without permission—when he

had already been “punished” for that conduct by requiring him to wear a GPS

monitor. We disagree with such a limited view of the trial court’s reasoning for the

ISF amendment.

At the hearing, the trial court explained that it was ordering Granville to

complete ISF for “cussing at officers and going where he’s not supposed to go and

other things.” (emphasis added) Although the trial court did not articulate what it

meant by “other things,” it had evidently considered additional aspects of Granville’s

10 performance on community supervision—beyond just his leaving the county—when

it ordered the ISF amendment. See Applin v. State, 341 S.W.3d 528, 534 (Tex. App.—

Fort Worth 2011, no pet.) (affirming imposition of jail-time condition without any

specific fact findings as to why the trial court imposed the condition).

Here, despite the trial court’s prior sanctions and amendments, Granville’s

performance on community supervision contained failures of compliance, including

viewing pornography, displaying pervasive deception in the polygraph examinations,

and cussing at a supervision officer. Because the trial court’s reasoning is not clearly

articulated, we cannot say whether viewing pornography or displaying deception in

the polygraph examinations were among the “other things” that the trial court

considered when it ordered the ISF amendment. But the record contains evidence of

Granville’s other violations on which the trial court may have based its ISF

amendment, and it is evident that the trial court’s decision was not based solely on his

leaving the county without permission.

The ISF amendment was the trial court’s response to Granville’s reoccurring

violations that had been unsuccessfully remediated through prior intervention. Thus,

the ISF amendment was not a duplicative punishment, but was instead yet another

attempt to dissuade Granville from future violations by way of punishment,

rehabilitation, or reformation. See id. Because of Granville’s subsequent violations,

we conclude that the trial court had sufficient cause to order the ISF amendment.

Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling, we cannot

11 conclude that the ISF amendment is a duplicative punishment for the same offense.5

Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying his

application for a writ for habeas corpus on double jeopardy grounds. See Kniatt,

206 S.W.3d at 664. We overrule Granville’s third issue.

V. CONCLUSION

Having overruled Granville’s three issues, we affirm the trial court’s order

denying relief on his application for a writ of habeas corpus.

/s/ Brian Walker

Brian Walker Justice

Do Not Publish Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

Delivered: September 11, 2025

5 Even if Granville’s leaving the county without permission had been the sole reason for the ISF amendment, we are not convinced that it would offend double jeopardy protections. The double jeopardy clause, among other things, protects against multiple punishments for the same offense. Ex Parte Rhodes, 974 S.W.2d at 738. Leaving the county without permission is not an offense found in the Texas Penal Code; rather, it is a violation of a condition of his community supervision. We also note that double jeopardy protections do not apply to community supervision proceedings. See Combest v. State, No. 01-13-00712-CR, 2015 WL 831994, at 4 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Feb. 26, 2015, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designed for publication). For example, the trial court may impose conditions for one violation and then later find that same violation “true” for purposes of revocation. Applin, 341 S.W.3d at 534.