Ewton, Steven Charles
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Opinion
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TEXAS
NO. WR-94,985-01
EX PARTE STEVEN CHARLES EWTON, Applicant
APPLICATION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS CAUSE NO. 1355716-A IN THE 351ST DISTRICT COURT FROM HARRIS COUNTY
NEWELL, J., filed a concurring opinion in which HERVEY, RICHARDSON and WALKER, JJ., joined.
This case requires us to decide whether Applicant’s attorney’s
failure to file a notice of appeal deprived Applicant of an appeal, not
whether that appeal would ultimately be successful. The Court
concludes that Applicant’s counsel rendered ineffective assistance in
failing to file a notice of appeal and I join the Court’s order granting
Applicant an out of time appeal. Counsel’s failure deprived Applicant Ewton — 2
of a proceeding he desired, and under Garza v. Idaho, he is entitled to
that appeal regardless of whether Applicant validly waived his right to
appeal. 1 Though the focus on Applicant’s waiver is ultimately a
distraction from the actual issue before us, I would make a few
observations in response to the State’s arguments in this regard.
First, Applicant’s general waiver of appeal executed prior to
sentencing cannot act as a valid non-negotiated waiver because it was
not knowing or intelligent. As we held in Ex parte Delaney, a
defendant cannot knowingly or intelligently waive an appeal of the
sentencing portion of a hearing revoking deferred adjudication
probation prior to the actual sentencing hearing. 2 So, to the extent
that the State seeks to argue that Applicant’s waiver was a general,
non-negotiated waiver, that argument must fail because it was
executed prior to the sentencing hearing in this case.
Second, Applicant did not enter into a plea bargain that deprived
him of his right to appeal. 3 In Jones v. State, we clarified that a
negotiated waiver of an appeal as part of an open plea does not
1 Garza v. Idaho, 139 S.Ct. 738, 747 (2019).
2 Ex parte Delaney, 207 S.W.3d 794, 798-99 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (“simply knowing the range of punishment for the offense is not enough to make the consequences of a waiver known with certainty, because it still does not allay the concern that unanticipated errors may occur at the punishment phase of trial”).
3 See Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(a)(2). Ewton — 3
amount to a plea bargain that forecloses the ability to appeal under
Rule 25.2 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 4 This is because in the
case of an open plea, the trial court does not follow a set punishment
recommendation from the State. In this case, Applicant pleaded true
to the allegations in the State’s motion to adjudicate without an
agreed sentence. Applicant did not enter into a plea bargain that
deprived him of his ability to appeal the sentencing at the hearing on
the motion to adjudicate his deferred adjudication community
supervision.
Third, I do not believe the record established that Applicant
negotiated a waiver of his right to appeal in exchange for his plea of
true. The State’s abandonment of the new offense allegation
contained in the motion to adjudicate appears on a document dated
five months before the plea itself. Characterizing that abandonment
notation as “undated” doesn’t establish when it was made or that it
was made in exchange for Applicant’s plea. But even assuming it was
made in exchange for Applicant’s plea, I question whether it
4 Jones v. State, 488 S.W.3d 801, 808 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (recognizing the case was “not a plea-bargain case because there was no agreed punishment recommendation” that would deprive the defendant of his ability to appeal and holding instead that the defendant had negotiated a waiver of his appeal); see also Dears v. State, 154 S.W.3d 610, 613 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (holding that Rule 25.2 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure apply only to plea bargains with regard to guilty pleas, not pleas of true on revocation motions). Ewton — 4
constitutes consideration for Applicant’s plea of true given that any
finding on that allegation would not have prevented the State from
proceeding with a prosecution of Applicant for that new offense. 5 It
may have been part of an agreement, but the record does not
establish that it was. And regardless, prejudice is still presumed when
an attorney fails to file a desired notice of appeal even when a
defendant has signed a waiver of appeal. 6
Ordinarily, I might suggest a remand for further record
development on Applicant’s writ, but, as mentioned above, the
question in this case is not whether Applicant’s waiver of appeal was
valid. The question is whether counsel failed to file Applicant’s notice
of appeal despite Applicant’s expressed desire to appeal. The record
establishes this constitutional violation. And had Applicant been given
the appeal he desired, the court of appeals would have been
5 State v. Waters, 560 S.W.3d 651, 663 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018) (“a subsequent criminal prosecution is not barred following a trial judge’s finding of ‘not true’ at a revocation hearing”). Additionally, the abandonment of the allegation would not have prevented the State from introducing evidence of the new law violation to justify the maximum sentence that Applicant ultimately received. The State’s decision to abandon the allegation is not on par with the State’s consent to a waiver of a jury trial that authorizes a judge to assess punishment. See, e.g., Ex parte Broadway, 301 S.W.3d 694, 698 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). Neither is it on par with the State’s abandonment of an enhancement allegation that changes the range of punishment. See, e.g., Jones, 488 S.W.3d at 807.
6 Garza, 139 S.Ct. at 749 (“Accordingly where, as here, an attorney performed deficiently in failing to file a notice of appeal despite the defendant’s express instructions, prejudice is presumed ‘with no further showing from the defendant on the merits of his underlying claims.’”). Ewton — 5
responsible for sorting out whether Applicant waived his appeal. 7
Placing Applicant back in the position he would have been had he been
given the opportunity to appeal allows Applicant the proceeding he
was deprived of to play out as it should have. 8 However limited
Applicant’s right to appeal might have been, it still included the right to
have a court of appeals determine whether he had waived that right to
appeal. 9 Applicant’s victory in this regard may be a pyrrhic one, but it
is one he is nonetheless entitled to.
With these thoughts I join the Court’s order granting habeas
corpus relief.
Filed: October 11, 2023
Publish
7 See, e.g., Dears, 154 S.W.3d at 615 (holding a court of appeals is obligated to review the record to ascertain whether a certification that an appeal has been waived is correct). 8 Garza, 139 S.Ct.
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