Ewing v. City of Sedro Woolley

Opinion

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3 4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT AT SEATTLE 7 KEVIN S. EWING, CASE NO. 2:24-cv-01307-JNW 8 Plaintiff, ORDER 9 v. 10 CITY OF SEDRO-WOOLLEY; BROCK 11 D. STILES; JAMES M. ZACHOR; HEATHER SHAND; KEVIN L. 12 ROGERSON; DOES 1-10,

13 Defendants. 14 This matter comes before the Court on pro se Plaintiff Kevin S. Ewing’s 15 motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of his case. Dkt. No. 41. “‘Motions for 16 reconsideration are disfavored,” LCR 7(h)(1), and “‘should not be granted, absent 17 highly unusual circumstances, unless the district court is presented with newly 18 discovered evidence, committed clear error, or if there is an intervening change in 19 the controlling law.’” Marlyn Natraceuticals, Inc. v. Mucos Pharma GmbH & Co., 20 571 F.3d 873, 880 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting 389 Orange St. Partners v. Arnold, 179 21 F.3d 656, 665 (9th Cir.1999)). “A motion for reconsideration ‘may not be used to 22 raise arguments or present evidence for the first time when they could reasonably 23 1 have been raised earlier in the litigation.’” Id. (quoting Kona Enters., Inc. v. Est. of 2 Bishop, 229 F.3d 877, 890 (9th Cir. 2000)). “Whether… to grant reconsideration is

3 committed to the sound discretion of the court.” Navajo Nation v. Confederated 4 Tribes & Bands of the Yakama Indian Nation, 331 F.3d 1041, 1046 (9th Cir. 2003). 5 Generally, Ewing argues that the Court’s Dismissal Order, Dkt. No. 39, 6 “constitutes a manifest error of law and fact, trampling the inviolable right to a jury 7 trial enshrined in the Seventh Amendment, the statutory mandates of 42 U.S.C. § 8 1983, and the bedrock principle that a judge’s discretion evaporates when a

9 complaint alleges civil rights violations and demands a jury’s adjudication.” Dkt. 10 No. 41 at 1. Specifically, Ewing attempts three arguments for reconsideration. 11 First, he argues that his complaint triggers an “absolute right to a jury 12 trial[.]” Dkt. No. 41 at 2. Ewing is simply wrong. Where, as here, a complaint fails to 13 state a claim on which relief may be granted, a jury trial serves no valid purpose; 14 judgment on the pleadings—as a matter of law—is appropriate. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15 12(b)(6); Bell Atl. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). For the reasons explained

16 in the Court’s Dismissal Order, Ewing states no claim on which relief may be 17 granted. 18 Second, Ewing argues that “[t]his Court’s dismissal thwarts Congress’s 19 intent” in enacting Section 1983 and therefore represent judicial overreach. Dkt. 20 No. 41 at 3–5. This argument also fails. For the reasons explained in the Court’s 21 Order, Ewing does not state a valid Section 1983 claim. See Dkt. No. 39 at 11–12.

22 Third, Ewing argues that “only a jury—not this Court—can resolve this 23 matter” because “[t]he judge has no discretion to intercede where the Constitution, 1 Congress, and common law demand a trial by jury.” Dkt. No. 41 at 2. But again, 2 Ewing has not stated a jury-triable claim.

3 In sum, because Ewing has articulated no legal or factual error in the Court’s 4 Order dismissing his case, his motion for reconsideration is DENIED. Dkt. No. 41. 5 It is so ORDERED. 6 Dated this 6th day of March, 2025. 7 a Jamal N. Whitehead 8 United States District Judge 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21

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