Ewalan v. Strange

District Court, W.D. Washington·Decided September 18, 2025·No. 3:25-cv-05397·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT TACOMA CASE NO. 3:25-cv-05397-KKE-DWC Plaintiff, v. ORDER DECLINING SERVICE OF CHERYL STRANGE, et al., GRANTING LEAVE TO AMEND, AND DENYING MOTION FOR Defendants. CONFLICT OF INTEREST

Plaintiff Joseph Lochuch Ewalan, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, initiated this prisoner civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Dkts. 1, 8. The District Court has referred this action to United States Magistrate Judge David W. Christel. The Court previously screened and declined to serve Plaintiff’s complaint but granted him leave to amend. Having reviewed and screened Plaintiff’s amended complaint in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court declines to direct service of the amended complaint but grants Plaintiff another opportunity to amend his filing to cure the deficiencies identified below. Also before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion for conflict of interest (Dkt. 14). For the reasons below, this motion is denied. ORDER DECLINING SERVICE OF AMENDED I. Background Plaintiff is a state prisoner currently confined at Stafford Creek Corrections Center (“SCCC”). Dkt. 12. The Court screened and declined to serve Plaintiff’s original complaint (Dkt. 9), advising Plaintiff that his filing suffered from three primary deficiencies. Dkt. 11. First, the

complaint did not provide a “short and plain statement of the claim” as required by Rule 8. Id. Second, the complaint appeared to raise separate, unrelated claims against two distinct sets of Defendants, in violation of Rule 20. Id. Third, Plaintiff had failed to allege facts showing certain named Defendants personally participated in the alleged constitutional violations. Id. The Court granted Plaintiff the opportunity to correct the identified deficiencies in an amended complaint that was not to exceed twenty pages. Id. Plaintiff’s amended complaint (Dkt. 12) is now before the Court for screening. The amended complaint repeats essentially the same factual allegations as his original complaint, which the Court outlined in the previous order declining to serve the complaint: In December 2019 or January 2020, Plaintiff was transferred to Washington State Penitentiary (“WSP”). Dkt. 9. At WSP, he states he received a number of accommodations and health status reports (“HSRs”) related to his health conditions, including single cell status, lower bunk, and a wedge pillow. Id. In 2024, Plaintiff requested a transfer to Monroe Correctional Complex (“MCC”) to take part in a particular mental health treatment program or, in the alternative, to Washington Corrections Center (“WCC”) to take part in a parenting program that he asserted would mitigate his mental health issues by helping him connect with his children. Id. Plaintiff filed multiple grievances seeking to expedite his transfer. Id. In December 2024, Plaintiff states he was moved to WCC while “in transit” to a new facility. Id. At WCC, he learned his HSRs had been terminated and that he would be transferred back to SCCC. Id.

In January or February 2025, Plaintiff states he was denied access to legal services at the SCCC law library by Defendant Paula Main. Id. After Plaintiff threatened to file a grievance or initiate legal action, Plaintiff alleges Defendant Badley Heden made an unnecessary emergency call that resulted in over ten officers swarming Plaintiff and handcuffing him without incident. Id. When he was handcuffed, Plaintiff contends Defendant Weld “threatened to throw [him] in the hole without ORDER DECLINING SERVICE OF AMENDED investigation[ ] for threatening to sue[.]” Id. Plaintiff states he was later found guilty of a serious rule violation after Defendant Heden alleged Plaintiff used physical force, intimidation, or coercion against him. Id.

Dkt. 11 at 2–3.

Plaintiff divides his amended complaint into three counts. See Dkt. 12. In Count One, he alleges Defendants Cheryl Strange, Joane Miller, Garry Botton, S. Thompson, T. Morrisey, Shelley Hanson, S. Garner, D. Feist, K. Casperson, J. Kerschner, and Erick Mairilo violated his constitutional rights under the First and Eighth Amendments based on his transfer to SCCC and the termination of his HSRs. Id. at 3–6, 10–24, 37. In Count Two, he alleges Defendants Krumins, Lewis, Hardesty, Miller, Kozuki, and Chad Anderson violated his Eighth Amendment rights when he was found ineligible for a specific mental health program. Id. at 6–8, 25–29, 37. Finally, in Count Three, he alleges Defendants Paula L. Main, Badley Heden, and Rogers Weld violated his First Amendment rights through denial of library services and retaliation for protected speech. Id. at 9, 26, 30–36, 38. II. Screening of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint (Dkt. 12) Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, the Court must screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must “dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint: [ ] is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted[.]” Id. at (b); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); see Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193 (9th Cir. 1998). The Court is required to liberally construe pro se documents. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). However, the pleadings must raise the right to relief beyond the speculative level and must provide “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements ORDER DECLINING SERVICE OF AMENDED of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). A. Unrelated Claims As the Court noted in its previous order declining service, a plaintiff cannot pursue

unrelated claims against different defendants in one lawsuit. Plaintiffs may join claims against different defendants in a single action only if (1) the claims arise out of the same transaction or occurrence, or series of transactions and occurrences, and (2) there are commons questions of law or fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2); see also Coughlin v. Rogers, 130 F.3d 1348, 1351 (9th Cir. 1997); Desert Empire Bank v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 623 F.2d 1371, 1375 (9th Cir. 1980). “[T]he mere fact that all Plaintiffs’ claims arise under the same general law does not necessarily establish a common question of law or fact.” Coughlin v. Rogers, 130 F.3d 1348, 1351 (9th Cir. 1997). Here, although Counts One and Two name different Defendants, the underlying facts of these claims are sufficiently related to allow Plaintiff to pursue them in a single action. However, Plaintiff has not shown the claims in Count Three “arise out of the same transaction or

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