Everly v. Fowler

CourtSuperior Court of Maine
DecidedJune 18, 2015
DocketKENre-14-36
StatusUnpublished

This text of Everly v. Fowler (Everly v. Fowler) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Maine primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Everly v. Fowler, (Me. Super. Ct. 2015).

Opinion

STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT KENNEBEC, ss. CIVIL ACTION DOCKET NO. RE-14-36

MICHAEL T. EVERLY,

Plaintiff, v. DECISION AND ORDER ON MOTION TO DISMISS CLYDE A. FOWLER, JR.,

Defendant,

and

MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, INC. as nominee forT AYLOR, BEAN & WHITTAKER MORTGAGE CORP., et al.

Parties in Interest.

This matter is before the Court on Defendant Clyde A. Fowler's motion to dismiss

for failure to join indispensible parties under M.R Civ. P. 12(b)(7). Plaintiff Michael

Everly brought an action alleging four counts against Defendant Fowler: Count I:

Nuisance; Count II: Declaratory Judgment; Count III: Injunction; and Count IV:

Easement by Prescription.

BACKGROUND

The Complaint, taken as true, sets forth the following facts. Plaintiff sues

Defendant Fowler for violating Plaintiff's express easement to use a certain Lot# 3 of a

subdivision known as Tobey's Belgrade Lakes Development. In this subdivision, there

are approximately 133 lots, and 56 lot owners. Some, but not all, of the lots in the

subdivision are on the shore of Long Pond.

1 Plaintiff owns Lot# 81 and Lot# 8:2, >vhich are back lots and not on the shore.

Defendant Fowler owns Lot# 1:20 and Lot# 3 (to which Plaintiff purportedly has

easement rights). Lot# 3 is on the shore of Long Pond, but Lot# 120 is not.

Plaintiff's deed ostensibly shows the existence an easement: "Also conveyed

hereby is a right-of-way over Third Street and Lake Shore Drive to Lot #3-Beach Lot,

and the right to the use of said Lot #3- Beach Lot, for Beach purposes at your own risk."

Importantly, it seems that all back lots in the subdivision were sold with this easement.

Complaint~ 8. In fact, advertising materials for the development indicate that buyers will

have easement rights to Lot# 3.

Defendant Fowler's deed to Lot# 3 recognizes the existence of Plaintiff's

easement. It reads,

Excepting from this conveyance all rights of way and all other rights conveyed by the said Tobey Lumber Company herein prior to this date, whether the deeds given by said Tobey Lumber Company have been recorded in the ... Registry of Deeds or not and reserving from this conveyance to said Tobey Lumber Company, its successors or assigns, ... the right to the use, in common with others, of Lot #3(three) as delineated on said Plan for beach purposes.

Id. ~ 30.

When Defendant Fowler purchased Lot# 3, he allegedly cleared the lot of trees,

excavated thirty percent of the lot, excavated pavement that went to the water, instilled a

fence across the right of way, placed a boulder in the right of way, employed a dog to

discourage use of the right of way, played loud music when Lot owners came to use the

right of way, and performed other actions that upset the Plaintiff's prior unencumbered

use of Lot# 3 for boating and swimming.

2 Plaintiff sues to enforce his express rights and his prescriptive rights to Lot# 3.

Plaintiff specifically prays that Defendant Fowler be enjoined from interfering vvith

Plaintiff's rights to Lot# 3 and to deconstruct any structures that he has erected. In

addition, Plaintiff sues for nuisance damages. In the instant motion, Defendant Fowler

moves to dismiss for failure to join all other subdivision lot owners as neGessary parties

(hereinafter referred to as "the 56 Additional Lot Owners").

DISCUSSION

1. Joinder

a. Rule 19

Rule 19(a) sets the standard as to what persons are "needed for just adjudication"

and must be joined in the action. Rule 19(a) reads:

(a) Persons to Be Joined if Feasible. A person who is subject to service of process shall be joined as a party in the action if (1) in the person's absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties, or (2) the person claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition of the action in the person's absence may (i) as a practical matter impair or impede the person's ability to protect that interest, or (ii) leave any of the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of the claimed interest. If the person has not been so joined, the court shall order that the person be made a party.

As the language of the Rule makes clear, joinder is required in circumstances where the

absence of unnamed parties vvould prevent a judgment from fully adjudicating the

underlying dispute, expose those who are already parties to multiple or inconsistent

obligations, or prejudice the interests of absent parties. See Larrabee v. Town of Knox,

2000 ME 15, ~~ 7-9, 744 A.2d 544. Furthermore, joinder "protects unjoined but

interested parties by assuring that their interests will not be prejudiced without their

3 participation and it protects active parties by assuring that issues will not have to be

relitigated." Ocwen Fed. Bank, FSB v. Gile, 2001 ME 120, ~ 14,777 A.2d 275.

b. Applicable Case Law

The Court finds no Law Court case that has explicitly addressed whether all

persons who hold an easement over a servient parcel must be joined as necessary parties

in a suit by one of them to enforce that easement. The Court reviewed the relevant case

law on this issue, and ultimately concludes that the 56 Additional Lot Owners are not

necessary parties, and need not be joined.

To begin, the Court examines a case most similar to the case at bar- Sleeper v.

Loring. In Sleeper, the plaintiffs were back lot owners in a subdivision, and they owned

an express easement over a certain lot 40A, which easement "[ran] to the shore" of a lake.

The plaintiffs built a dock on lot 40A, but the town's code enforcement officer ordered

the dock removed. The plaintiffs then sued seeking declaratory judgment as to the scope

of their rights to the easement. The trial court granted summary judgment to the

defendant on the issue of whether the plaintiffs could maintain a dock on lot 40A. Sleeper

v. Loring, 2012 Me. Super. LEXIS 57 (Me. Super. Ct., May 15, 2012). On appeal, the

Law Court reversed the grant of summary judgment, and, sua sponte, remanded the case

to the trial court to decide whether to join absent persons. 2013 ¥E 112, '22. The Law

Court's remand instmctions were as follows:

[B]ecause there are other back lot owners within the ... subdivision with an easement over lot 40A and there may be other fee owners of lot 40A who are not parties to these proceedings and whose interests may be prejudiced by the court's findings on remand, the court should determine whether additional parties exist who must be joined to this action pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 19(a), and should so order.

4 !d.~ :2:2. On remand, Justice Cole of the Superior Court found that all necessary persons

\vere already parties to the action. Sleeper v. Loring, CUMSC-AP-1 0-:20 (Me. Super. Ct.,

Cum. Cnty., Sept. :29, :2014). First, the court noted that no other known parties claim a fee

interest lot 40A. In addition, despite the fact that 60 lot owners had an easement over lot

40A, those already parties had the strongest interest in litigating the issue of the scope of

the easement. !d. at 1. As to the 60 lot owners who had an easement, it would have been

administratively burdensome to require the existing parties to determine the record owner

of each lot, including mortgagees holding title, and contact each of them regarding

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Related

Efstathiou v. Payeur
456 A.2d 891 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 1983)
Larrabee v. Town of Knox
2000 ME 15 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 2000)
Ocwen Federal Bank, FSB v. Gile
2001 ME 120 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 2001)
Stoner v. Bureau of Professional & Occupational Affairs
10 A.3d 364 (Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania, 2010)
Sanseverino v. Gregor
2011 ME 8 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 2011)
Shirley Gauthier v. Jacqueline E. Gerrish
2015 ME 60 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 2015)
Muther v. Broad Cove Shore Ass'n
2009 ME 37 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 2009)

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Everly v. Fowler, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/everly-v-fowler-mesuperct-2015.