Everetts v. Personal Touch Holding Corp.

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. New York
DecidedJanuary 22, 2024
Docket2:21-cv-02061
StatusUnknown

This text of Everetts v. Personal Touch Holding Corp. (Everetts v. Personal Touch Holding Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Everetts v. Personal Touch Holding Corp., (E.D.N.Y. 2024).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------X For Online Publication Only MICHAEL EVERETTS, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated,

Plaintiff, OPINION & ORDER 21-CV-02061 (JMA) (ARL) -against- FILED CLERK PERSONAL TOUCH HOLDING CORP., 2:41 pm, Jan 22, 2024

Defendant. U.S. DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------X LONG ISLAND OFFICE AZRACK, United States District Judge:

In the above-captioned case, Plaintiff Michael Everetts (“Plaintiff”), on behalf of himself and all other similarly situated, filed an unopposed motion for preliminary approval of class action settlement. (See ECF No. 37.) After careful review, the Court grants Plaintiff’s unopposed motion, with one modification to the Schedule and Deadlines. I. Legal Background. As a preliminary matter, the Court finds it necessary to explain the preliminary approval standards that it considered; the Proposed Order does not make it sufficiently clear. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e) requires judicial approval for any class action settlement. A class action settlement approval procedure typically occurs in two stages: (1) preliminary approval, where “prior to notice to the class a court makes a preliminary evaluation of fairness,” and (2) final approval, where “notice of a hearing is given to the class members, [and] class members and settling parties are provided the opportunity to be heard on the question of final court approval.” In re Payment Card Interchange Fee & Merch. Disc. Antitrust Litig., 330 F.R.D. 11, 27 (E.D.N.Y. 2019). “Even at the preliminary approval stage, the Court’s role in reviewing the proposed settlement ‘is demanding because the adversariness of litigation is often lost after the agreement to settle.’” In re GSE Bonds Antitrust Litig., 414 F. Supp. 3d 686, 692 (E.D.N.Y. 2019) (quoting Zink v. First Niagara Bank, N.A., 155 F.Supp.3d 297, 308 (W.D.N.Y. 2016) (citation omitted)). On December 1, 2018, new amendments to Rule 23 took effect which altered the standards

that guide a court’s preliminary approval analysis. Prior to these changes, Rule 23 did not specify a standard, and courts in the Second Circuit interpreted Rule 23 to only require the settlement to be “within the range of possible final approval.” In re NASDAQ Market-Makers Antitrust Litig., 176 F.R.D. 99, 102 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); see also In re GSE Bonds Antitrust Litig., 414 F. Supp. 3d ----- --------------------- at 692. Under the new, more exacting standards, a district court must consider whether the court “will likely be able to: (i) approve the proposal under Rule 23(e)(2); and (ii) certify the class for purposes of judgment on the proposal.” In re Payment Card., 330 F.R.D. at 28 (emphasis in original). II. Likelihood of Approval Under Rule 23(e)(2) and the Grinnel Factors. To be likely to approve a proposed settlement under Rule 23(e)(2), the Court must find “that it is fair, reasonable, and adequate.” In re GSE Bonds Antitrust Litig., 414 F. Supp. 3d at 692. The newly amended Rule 23 enumerates four factors for the Court to consider as part of this inquiry: (1) adequacy of representation, (2) existence of arm’s-length negotiations, (3) adequacy of relief, and (4) equitableness of treatment of class members. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2). Prior to the 2018 amendments, courts in the Second Circuit considered whether a settlement was “fair, reasonable, and adequate” under nine factors set out in City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 463 (2d Cir. 1974). The Advisory Committee Notes to the 2018 amendments indicate that the four new Rule 23 factors were intended to supplement rather than displace these “Grinnell” factors. See 2018 Advisory Notes to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, Subdiv. (e)(2) (“2018 Advisory Note”). The Court considered both sets of factors, recognizing where they—and that they—overlap.1 The Rule 23(e)(2) and Grinnell factors weigh in favor of preliminary approval of the settlement. Accordingly, the Court finds that it will likely be able to approve the settlement proposal under Rule 23(e)(2).

III. Likelihood of Certification of the Class. To preliminarily approve the settlement proposal, the Court must also find that it will likely be able to certify the class for purposes of judgment on the proposal. In re Payment Card., 330 F.R.D. at 28. A court may certify a class for settlement purposes where the proposed settlement class meets the requirements for Rule 23(a) class certification, as well as one of the three subsections of Rule 23(b). In re Am. Intern. Grp., Inc. Sec. Litig., 689 F.3d 229, 238 (2d Cir.

1 The Grinnell factors are:

(1) the complexity, expense and likely duration of the litigation; (2) the reaction of the class to the settlement; (3) the stage of the proceedings and the amount of discovery completed; (4) the risks of establishing liability; (5) the risks of establishing damages; (6) the risks of maintaining the class through the trial; (7) the ability of the defendants to withstand a greater judgment; (8) the range of reasonableness of the settlement fund in light of the best possible recovery; and (9) the range of reasonableness of the settlement fund to a possible recovery in light of all the attendant risks of litigation.

In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 260 F.R.D. 81, 88 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (citing City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 463 (2d Cir. 1974)), abrogated on other grounds by Goldberger v. Integrated Res., Inc., 209 F.3d 43 (2d Cir. 2000); see also D’Amato v. Deutsche Bank, 236 F.3d 78, 86 (2d Cir. 2001). ----------------------

The amended Rule 23(e)(2) requires courts to consider whether:

(A) the class representatives and class counsel have adequately represented the class; (B) the proposal was negotiated at arm’s length; (C) the relief provided for the class is adequate, taking into account: (i) the costs, risks, and delay of trial and appeal; (ii) the effectiveness of any proposed method of distributing relief to the class, including the method of processing class-member claims, if required; (iii) the terms of any proposed award of attorney's fees, including timing of payment; and (iv) any agreement required to be identified under Rule 23(e)(3); and (D) the proposal treats class members equitably relative to each other.

FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2). 2012). The Court concludes that the settlement class likely meets each of Rule 23(a)’s four threshold requirements: (1) numerosity, (2) commonality, (3) typicality, and (4) adequacy of representation. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). In addition to finding that the class satisfies Rule 23(a),

the Court also determines that the settlement class likely meets the requirements of Rule 23(b)(3). Here, “questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and ... a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). IV. Modification.

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