Everardo Navarrete Alvarez v. U.S. Attorney General

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
DecidedJune 3, 2025
Docket23-13286
StatusUnpublished

This text of Everardo Navarrete Alvarez v. U.S. Attorney General (Everardo Navarrete Alvarez v. U.S. Attorney General) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Everardo Navarrete Alvarez v. U.S. Attorney General, (11th Cir. 2025).

Opinion

USCA11 Case: 23-11622 Document: 39-1 Date Filed: 06/03/2025 Page: 1 of 5

[DO NOT PUBLISH] In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 23-11622 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________

EVERARDO NAVARRETE ALVAREZ, Petitioner, versus U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,

Respondent.

Petition for Review of a Decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals Agency No. A206-810-016 ____________________ USCA11 Case: 23-11622 Document: 39-1 Date Filed: 06/03/2025 Page: 2 of 5

2 Opinion of the Court 23-11622

No. 23-13286 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________

EVERARDO NAVARRETE ALVAREZ, Petitioner, versus U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,

Petition for Review of a Decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals Agency No. A206-810-016 ____________________

Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, and NEWSOM and GRANT, Cir- cuit Judges. PER CURIAM: Everardo Navarrete Alvarez, a native of Mexico, petitions for review of the order of the Board of Immigration Appeals USCA11 Case: 23-11622 Document: 39-1 Date Filed: 06/03/2025 Page: 3 of 5

23-11622 Opinion of the Court 3

affirming the denial of his application for cancellation of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b). He argues that the immigration judge erred when it applied the standard of exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to the undisputed facts of his case and violated his right to due process by considering his qualifying relatives as of the date of its decision, despite our precedent upholding this practice. See Diaz-Arellano v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 120 F.4th 722, 725 (11th Cir. 2024) (holding that the statute requires a noncitizen to “have a qualifying relative when the immigration court finalizes its decision on the application for cancellation of removal”). He also argues that the immigration judge violated due process by considering his arrest report when making a discretionary determination to deny his ap- plication. He also petitions for review of the denial of his motion to reconsider as a violation of due process. We dismiss the peti- tions. We review the decision of the Board, except to the extent that the Board expressly adopted or agreed with the immigration judge’s decision. Jathursan v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 17 F.4th 1365, 1372 (11th Cir. 2021). We review our subject-matter jurisdiction de novo. Ponce Flores v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 64 F.4th 1208, 1217 (11th Cir. 2023). Ordinarily, we lack jurisdiction to review any judgment re- garding the granting of relief under the cancellation of removal statute. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229b, 1252(a)(2)(B)(i). If an immigration judge “decides a noncitizen is [statutorily] eligible for cancellation of removal . . . [the] discretionary determination on whether or not to grant cancellation of removal in the particular case is not USCA11 Case: 23-11622 Document: 39-1 Date Filed: 06/03/2025 Page: 4 of 5

4 Opinion of the Court 23-11622

reviewable as a question of law.” Wilkinson v. Garland, 601 U.S. 209, 225 n.4 (2024) (emphasis omitted). But we retain jurisdiction to the extent that the petitioner raises a constitutional claim or question of law. Ponce Flores, 64 F.4th at 1217. To be reviewable, a legal or constitutional claim must be “colorable” such that it has “some possible validity.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omit- ted). “Where a constitutional claim has no merit, we do not have jurisdiction.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted, al- terations adopted). We lack jurisdiction to review Navarrete Alvarez’s petitions. The Board expressly adopted and affirmed the immigration judge’s decision denying his application for cancellation of removal. Alt- hough Navarrete Alvarez argues that the immigration judge did not make a discretionary determination, the immigration judge ex- plained that Navarrete Alvarez was required to prove he “war- rant[ed] such relief as a matter of discretion” and found that “sig- nificant adverse factors . . . cut against his desirability as a perma- nent resident” after ruling that he was also statutorily ineligible. We lack jurisdiction to review any challenge to the immigration judge’s discretionary decision to deny his application for cancella- tion of removal. See Wilkinson, 601 U.S. at 225 n.4. Navarrete Alvarez also does not raise a colorable constitu- tional challenge to that discretionary determination. See Ponce Flo- res, 64 F.4th at 1217. He argues he was deprived of due process be- cause the immigration judge considered his arrest report, but he “does not have a constitutionally protected liberty interest in USCA11 Case: 23-11622 Document: 39-1 Date Filed: 06/03/2025 Page: 5 of 5

23-11622 Opinion of the Court 5

obtaining cancellation of removal.” Id. at 1219. Because his due process challenge is meritless, we lack jurisdiction to review his challenge to the immigration judge’s discretionary determination. See id. at 1217. We need not consider Navarrete Alvarez’s challenges to his statutory eligibility. A noncitizen must be statutorily eligible and merit a favorable exercise of discretion to receive relief from re- moval. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(4)(A). “[C]ourts and agencies are not re- quired to make findings on issues the decision of which is unneces- sary to the results they reach.” INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 25 (1976). Because the immigration judge’s alternative discretionary determination is dispositive for his application for cancellation of removal, we need not review the immigration judge’s determina- tion that Navarrete Alvarez was statutorily ineligible. We also lack jurisdiction to consider Navarrete Alvarez’s pe- tition challenging the denial of his motion to reconsider. When re- view of an underlying order is barred under sec- tion 1252(a)(2)(B)(i), except to the extent that the petitioner raises a colorable constitutional claim or question of law, we similarly lack jurisdiction to consider an attack on that order by means of a motion to reopen or reconsider. See Ponce Flores, 64 F.4th at 1223– 24. Navarrete Alvarez’s due process claims are not colorable be- cause he has no “constitutionally protected liberty interest in the granting of a motion to [reconsider].” Id. at 1224. We DISMISS the petitions for review.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Pathmanathan Jathursan v. U.S. Attorney General
17 F.4th 1365 (Eleventh Circuit, 2021)
Rosendo Ponce Flores v. U.S. Attorney General
64 F.4th 1208 (Eleventh Circuit, 2023)
Wilkinson v. Garland
601 U.S. 209 (Supreme Court, 2024)
Hector Diaz-Arellano v. U.S. Attorney General
120 F.4th 722 (Eleventh Circuit, 2024)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Everardo Navarrete Alvarez v. U.S. Attorney General, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/everardo-navarrete-alvarez-v-us-attorney-general-ca11-2025.