Everardo Camacho-Castro v. Merrick Garland
This text of Everardo Camacho-Castro v. Merrick Garland (Everardo Camacho-Castro v. Merrick Garland) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
FILED NOT FOR PUBLICATION MAR 10 2023 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
EVERARDO CAMACHO-CASTRO, No. 17-72979
Petitioner, Agency No. A092-787-671
v. MEMORANDUM* MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted March 6, 2023** Pasadena, California
Before: KLEINFELD, WATFORD, and COLLINS, Circuit Judges.
To be granted a deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture
(CAT), an applicant must show that “it is more likely than not that he or she would
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). be tortured if removed to the proposed country of removal.” 8 C.F.R.
§ 1208.16(c)(2). Here, the immigration judge (IJ) found that Camacho-Castro had
not proved that he was more likely than not to be tortured if he were removed to
Mexico. “We review only the BIA’s decision except to the extent the decision
adopts or relies on the IJ’s reasoning, in which case we review both the IJ’s and the
BIA’s decisions.” Alanniz v. Barr, 924 F.3d 1061, 1065 (9th Cir. 2019).
Substantial evidence supports the IJ’s factual findings, so the facts of the
case do not compel us to reverse the IJ’s decision. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B);
Parussimova v. Mukasey, 555 F.3d 734, 738 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[W]e may reverse
only if the evidence in the record compels a contrary result.”). To prove that it is
more likely than not that the petitioner will be tortured if removed, the petitioner
must provide more than “generalized evidence of violence and crime,” but
evidence of a risk that is “particular” to the petitioner. Delgado-Ortiz v. Holder,
600 F.3d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir. 2010).
Although Camacho-Castro argues that his accent, demeanor, dress, and other
signs that he lived away from Mexico, or in the United States specifically, for a
time makes him a likely target for kidnapping, torture, extortion, and other harms if
he is returned to Mexico, Camacho-Castro’s fears are, as the IJ found, a speculative
“series of worst-case scenarios.” Blandino-Medina v. Holder, 712 F.3d 1338, 1348
2 (9th Cir. 2013). Although the IJ noted that Camacho-Castro had presented some
evidence of “crime directed at recent deportees,” the agency permissibly concluded
that the overall risk that respondent would personally be subjected to torture was
too “speculative” and that Camacho-Castro had therefore failed to carry his burden
to show that he was entitled to CAT relief. Camacho-Castro offers no evidence
that he specifically is more likely to be targeted than most others who came to
Mexico after spending a long time in the United States. Because substantial
evidence supports the IJ’s conclusion that Camacho-Castro did not provide
sufficient evidence that he would be tortured if returned to Mexico, we must deny
Camacho-Castro’s petition for review.
PETITION DENIED.
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