Evelyn Essa, Plaintiff v. Genzyme Corporation, Defendant

2020 DNH 179
CourtDistrict Court, D. New Hampshire
DecidedOctober 8, 2020
Docket19-cv-222-SM
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 2020 DNH 179 (Evelyn Essa, Plaintiff v. Genzyme Corporation, Defendant) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. New Hampshire primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Evelyn Essa, Plaintiff v. Genzyme Corporation, Defendant, 2020 DNH 179 (D.N.H. 2020).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Evelyn Essa, Plaintiff

v. Case No. 19-cv-222-SM Opinion No. 2020 DNH 179

Genzyme Corporation, Defendant

O R D E R

Evelyn Essa brings this action against her former employer,

Genzyme Corporation, alleging that she was the victim of

unlawful age discrimination and wrongfully (constructively)

discharged from her job. Genzyme denies that it discriminated

against Essa in any way or that she was constructively

discharged. It moves for summary judgment on all claims in

Essa’s complaint. Essa objects.

For the reasons discussed, Genzyme’s motion for summary

judgment is granted.

Standard of Review

When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court is

“obliged to review the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and to draw all reasonable inferences in the

nonmoving party’s favor.” Block Island Fishing, Inc. v. Rogers,

844 F.3d 358, 360 (1st Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). Summary

judgment is appropriate when the record reveals “no genuine

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In this

context, a factual dispute “is ‘genuine’ if the evidence of

record permits a rational factfinder to resolve it in favor of

either party, and ‘material’ if its existence or nonexistence

has the potential to change the outcome of the suit.” Rando v.

Leonard, 826 F.3d 553, 556 (1st Cir. 2016) (citation omitted).

“As to issues on which the party opposing summary judgment

would bear the burden of proof at trial, that party may not

simply rely on the absence of evidence but, rather, must point

to definite and competent evidence showing the existence of a

genuine issue of material fact.” Perez v. Lorraine Enters., 769

F.3d 23, 29–30 (1st Cir. 2014). In other words, “a laundry list

of possibilities and hypotheticals” and “[s]peculation about

mere possibilities, without more, is not enough to stave off

summary judgment.” Tobin v. Fed. Express Corp., 775 F.3d 448,

451–52 (1st Cir. 2014). See generally Anderson v. Liberty

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986).

2 Factual Background

The facts underlying Essa’s claims are somewhat

complicated. Consequently, they warrant a fairly detailed

recounting. Essa began working for Genzyme in 2013, with twenty

years of experience as a sales representative at other

pharmaceutical companies. Initially, she worked in the Southern

Arizona area, as a full-time Senior Area Business Manager – a

pharmaceutical sales representative position. In late 2014, she

requested a transfer to New Hampshire, which Genzyme approved.

Essa began working in New Hampshire in January of 2015.

She was 64 years old at the time. Her supervisor was Ryan

Emerson, the Regional Business Director responsible for Essa’s

new territory. As part of her job, Essa provided information to

healthcare providers and patients about a Genzyme product called

Aubagio, which is used to treat multiple sclerosis (“MS”). She

was responsible for organizing and attending informational

programs at which MS patients (whom Genzyme calls “Patient

Ambassadors”) shared their personal experiences with other

attendees, and physicians provided information about treatment

options.

During the period of Essa’s employment, Genzyme contracted

with two entities to help sales representatives organize those

3 educational programs: VPR Patient Outreach and American Health

Media. Parenthetically, the court notes that this area is

highly regulated and, while the parties do not discuss it in

detail, it is clear from the record that Genzyme had to be quite

careful about how it advertised and conducted those patient

outreach programs, how (and by whom) treatment information was

provided to attendees, and how (and by whom) information about

those attendees was collected.

After Essa transferred to New Hampshire, she asked her new

supervisor, Emerson, if she could continue to work with a man

named Wayne Twitchell, who runs an organization called MS

Encouragement Organization (“MSEO”). Twitchell and MSEO

organize support groups for MS patients in various states. Essa

had worked with Twitchell and his organization while she was in

Arizona to assist her in sharing information about Genzyme’s

products with MSEO members and MS patients who attended MSEO

support group meetings. Although Emerson was not familiar with

Twitchell or his organization, he agreed to allow Essa to

continue working with them. He did, however, send an email to

Twitchell to make clear the role that he expected Twitchell and

MSEO to play in Genzyme-sponsored patient programs, and to

ensure that neither Twitchell nor MSEO caused any regulatory

compliance issues for Genzyme. To that end, he explained that

4 Genzyme representatives “should have complete ownership of

program logistics” and those programs “can’t appear to be co-

sponsored” by MSEO. Rather, they must be marketed as Genzyme

events, using Genzyme-approved marketing and promotional

materials. Additionally, Emerson informed Twitchell that, as

required by Genzyme’s standard practices, all patient RSVP’s to

Genzyme-sponsored programs should be directed to American Health

Media (“AHM”), the entity with which Genzyme had contracted to

handle such matters. See Email from Emerson to Twitchell

(document no. 23-14).

As time went on, Emerson became increasingly concerned that

Twitchell was not complying with those instructions, which led

to friction between the two men. Given Essa’s close

relationship with Twitchell (and her reliance upon his services

to help her promote the Genzyme product she represented), Essa

perceived that friction as a threat to her ability to perform

her job.

About three months into her tenure in New Hampshire, in

March of 2015, Essa suffered what she describes as a cardiac

emergency. She was transported to the hospital, where she

remained for two days. At the same time, Essa alleges that

“Emerson started a dispute with Mr. Twitchell,” – that is, the

5 email referenced above - and made various “demands” about the

patient information programs. In Essa’s view, those “demands”

were unreasonable and aimed at undermining her relationship with

Twitchell and MSEO. She also ascribes significance to the

timing of Emerson’s actions, suggesting that he deliberately

waited until she was in the hospital to contact Twitchell. The

implications of that claim are unclear.

Essa’s characterization of Emerson’s email to Twitchell

(and her speculation about Emerson’s timing and underlying

motivation), is both odd and a bit misleading. See Plaintiff’s

Memorandum (document no. 23-1) at 5. Emerson merely stated how

he (and Genzyme) expected the Genzyme-sponsored patient programs

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Essa v. Genzyme Corporation
D. New Hampshire, 2020

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
2020 DNH 179, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/evelyn-essa-plaintiff-v-genzyme-corporation-defendant-nhd-2020.