Evans v. Vose
Procedural entryThis page is a short order in Evans v. Vose. Read the opinion of the Court — 89 F.3d 823 →
Opinion
USCA1 Opinion
July 5, 1996
[NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
____________________
No. 95-2299
DENNIS EVANS,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
GEORGE A. VOSE, ET AL.,
Defendants, Appellees.
____________________
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
[Hon. Mary M. Lisi, U.S. District Judge] ___________________
____________________
Before
Selya, Cyr and Boudin,
Circuit Judges. ______________
____________________
David J. Gentile on Motion for Summary Judgment for appellee. ________________
____________________
____________________
Per Curiam. We have reviewed carefully the record in __________
this case, including the transcript of appellant Dennis
Evans' disciplinary hearing. We summarily affirm the grant
of summary judgment to appellees.
Even if we assume without deciding that Evans has a
constitutionally protected liberty interest in good time
credits, he has still failed to allege sufficient facts to
support a claim that his rights to federal due process were
violated.
First, under federal due process standards, an inmate is
entitled to notice of the charges against him, not to notice
of each item of evidence which may be offered to prove the
charges. Consequently, providing an inmate with a copy of
the disciplinary report satisfies due process. See Langton v. ___ _______
Berman, 667 F.2d 231, 234 (1st Cir. 1981). Since Evans ______
admits that he received timely copies of the disciplinary
report against him prior to the disciplinary hearing, his
claim is without merit.1 1
Second, Evans alleges that he was denied a right to
present witnesses in his own defense. However, the record
indicates that Evans made only a reference at his
disciplinary hearing to a desire to call prison officials as
witnesses and that this claim was not pressed. Moreover,
____________________
1Evans' allegation that the notice violated the Morris 1
rules is not of federal constitutional dimension, and such a
violation, in and of itself, is not a sufficient predicate
for a federal due process claim.
-2-
even if we assume that the board erred in not allowing Evans
to call these witnesses, the error was harmless.
The only information those witnesses could have
provided, according to Evans, is that they had not seen Evans
have more than minimal contact with his alleged co-
conspirator in the time immediately preceding the discovery
of the escape attempt. Since Evans makes no claim that these
witnesses were present at all times during which
communication between Evans and his co-conspirator could have
occurred, their testimony would have done little to sustain
Evans' claim. Since Evans has not shown that he suffered any
prejudice from his inability to call these witnesses, he has
failed to show any violation of his due process rights. See ___
Forbes v. Trigg, 976 F.2d 308, 318 (7th Cir. 1992) (failure ______ _____
to allow inmate to call witnesses did not violate due process
since "[t]heir testimony could have added little"); see also ___ ____
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 566 (1974) (disciplinary _____ _________
board may deny request for witness on grounds of
irrelevance).
Evans' third claim is that there was insufficient
evidence in the record to support the finding of guilt. The
only witness upon which the board relied was the
investigating officer, who related to the board the testimony
of two confidential informants and vouched for their
reliability.
-3-
When a disciplinary board's finding of guilt relies
primarily on the evidence provided by a confidential
informant, due process requires that the board have adequate
information from which it could reasonably conclude that the
informant's evidence was reliable. See Langton, 667 F.2d at ___ _______
235. We find that the board had a sufficient basis for
finding that the informants' testimony met the reliability
requirement in this case.
In his testimony to the board, the investigating officer
made clear that his information about the escape attempt came
from two separate informants and that each informant had
provided reliable information in the past. He also testified
that physical evidence (escape tools) were found in the
possession of one of the informants. An investigator's
personal testimony of what a confidential informant stated,
along with his statement that the informant had proved
reliable in the past, is usually sufficient to meet the
reliability requirement of Wolff. See Hensley v. Wilson, 850 _____ ___ _______ ______
F.2d 269, 277 (6th Cir. 1988) ("[a]t a very minimum, the
investigator must report that a particular informant has
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