Evans v. Tharp

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Illinois
DecidedApril 6, 2022
Docket3:21-cv-01066
StatusUnknown

This text of Evans v. Tharp (Evans v. Tharp) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Illinois primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Evans v. Tharp, (S.D. Ill. 2022).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

JULIUS EVANS, #Y48362, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) vs. ) Case No. 21-cv-01066-JPG ) KRISTOPHER THARP and ) MADISON COUNTY JAIL SHERIFF ) OFFICE, ) ) Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER GILBERT, District Judge: This matter is before the Court for preliminary review of the First Amended Complaint filed by Plaintiff Julius Evans on January 3, 2022. (Doc. 15). Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to complain about the conditions of his confinement at Madison County Jail. (Id. at 6-7). He seeks money damages against Captain Kristopher Tharp and Madison County Jail Sheriff Office. (Id.). The First Amended Complaint is now before the Court for preliminary review under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which requires the Court to screen prisoner complaints and filter out non- meritorious claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Any portion of a complaint that is legally frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim for relief, or requests money damages from an immune defendant must be dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). At this stage, the allegations are construed liberally in favor of the plaintiff. First Amended Complaint In the First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff includes a litany of complaints about the conditions of his confinement at Madison County Jail between February 14, 2018 and October 29, 2021. (Doc. 15, p. 6). These conditions include, but are not limited to, the following poor living conditions: denial of opportunities to exercise, cells and cellblocks without windows, inadequate exposure to outside air and sunlight, inadequate beds and bedding, poor ventilation, and overcrowding. (Id.). These conditions caused Plaintiff to develop back and hip pain, breathing

difficulties, weight gain, and general malaise. (Id.). Plaintiff wrote grievances to complain about the conditions and gave them to the captain. (Id. at 4). However, he received no response. (Id.). Discussion Based on the allegations summarized above, the Court designates the following count in the pro se First Amended Complaint: Count 1: Fourteenth or Eighth Amendment claim against Defendants for subjecting Plaintiff to unconstitutional conditions of confinement during his detention at the Jail from 2018 to 2021.

The parties and the Court will use these designations in all future pleadings and orders, unless otherwise directed by a judicial officer of this Court. Plaintiff’s claim of unconstitutional conditions of confinement is governed by the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause, if he was a pretrial detainee during the relevant time period. Smith v. Dart, 803 F.3d 304 (7th Cir. 2015). Under this standard, a pretrial detainee must make an objective showing that the complained of conditions were sufficiently serious, and he must also demonstrate that the defendants acted in an objectively unreasonable manner when subjecting the detainee to the conditions. Miranda v. County of Lake, 900 F.3d 335 (7th Cir. 2018). The same claim is governed by the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, if Plaintiff was a convicted person during the relevant time period. A two- part inquiry is used to evaluate such claims. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). To satisfy the objective component, the Court must determine whether the condition is sufficiently serious. Id. To satisfy the subjective component, the Court must determine whether each defendant responded to the serious risk of harm posed to the plaintiff’s health or safety with deliberate indifference. Id. The conditions described by Plaintiff include exposure “at all times” to the above-

referenced conditions over the course of three years. Construed liberally in favor of the pro se plaintiff, the conditions are sufficiently serious, standing alone or in combination, to support a claim under the Fourteenth and Eighth Amendments. Moreover, Captain Tharp’s denial of Plaintiff’s complaints regarding these conditions could rise to the level of objective unreasonableness, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, or deliberate indifference, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Accordingly, Count 1 shall receive further review against Captain Tharp. Plaintiff’s legal status shall be determined as the case proceeds. Madison County Jail Sheriff Office shall be dismissed from this action because this defendant is not a “person” subject to suit under Section 1983. Smith v. Knox Cnty. Jail, 666 F.3d 1037, 1040 (7th Cir. 2012); Powell v. Cook Cnty. Jail, 814 F. Supp. 757, 758 (N.D. Ill. 1993). The

Jail is not even a legal entity. See FED. R. CIV. P. 17(b) (defendant must have legal capacity to be sued). Federal courts look to state law when determining whether an entity has this capacity. Magnuson v. Cassarella, 812 F. Supp. 824, 827 (N.D. Ill. 1992). Under Illinois law, the county jail is not considered a suable entity. Isaacs v. St. Clair Cnty. Jail, No. 08-0417-DRH, 2009 WL 211158, at *3-4 (S.D. Ill. Jan. 29, 2009); Hedger v. Wexford, No. 18-cv-2081-JPG, 2019 WL 117986, at *2 (S.D. Ill. Jan. 7, 2019). Accordingly, this defendant shall be dismissed with prejudice. Disposition IT IS ORDERED that the First Amended Complaint (Doc. 15) survives screening, as follows: COUNT 1 will proceed against KRISTOPHER THARP in his individual capacity. Defendant Tharp is ORDERED to timely file an appropriate responsive pleading to the First

Amended Complaint and shall not waive filing a reply pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g). Pursuant to Administrative Order No. 244, Defendant Tharp need only respond to the issues stated in this Merits Review Order. IT IS ORDERED that COUNT 1 is DISMISSED with prejudice against MADISON COUNTY JAIL SHERIFF OFFICE because the allegations state no claim for relief against this defendant. The Clerk’s Office is DIRECTED to TERMINATE Defendant MADISON COUNTY JAIL SHERIFF OFFICE as a party in CM/ECF. Because this suit addresses one or more medical claims, the Clerk’s Office is DIRECTED to enter the standard qualified protective order under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act.

The Clerk of Court shall prepare for Defendant KRISTOPHER THARP (individual capacity only): (1) Form 5 (Notice of a Lawsuit and Request to Waive Service of a Summons), and (2) Form 6 (Waiver of Service of Summons). The Clerk is DIRECTED to mail these forms, a copy of the First Amended Complaint (Docs. 15), and this Memorandum and Order to Defendant’s place of employment. If Defendant fails to sign and return the Waiver of Service of Summons (Form 6) to the Clerk within 30 days from the date the forms were sent, the Clerk shall take appropriate steps to effect formal service on Defendant, and the Court will require Defendant to pay the full costs of formal service, to the extent authorized by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

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Related

Anthony N. Smith v. Knox County Jail
666 F.3d 1037 (Seventh Circuit, 2012)
Farmer v. Brennan
511 U.S. 825 (Supreme Court, 1994)
Magnuson v. Cassarella
812 F. Supp. 824 (N.D. Illinois, 1992)
Powell v. Cook County Jail
814 F. Supp. 757 (N.D. Illinois, 1993)
Alfredo Miranda v. County of Lake
900 F.3d 335 (Seventh Circuit, 2018)
Smith v. Dart
803 F.3d 304 (Seventh Circuit, 2015)

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Bluebook (online)
Evans v. Tharp, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/evans-v-tharp-ilsd-2022.