Evans v. Taylor, No. Fa95 32 83 26 S (Dec. 19, 2000)

2000 Conn. Super. Ct. 16138
CourtConnecticut Superior Court
DecidedDecember 19, 2000
DocketNo. FA95 32 83 26 S
StatusUnpublished

This text of 2000 Conn. Super. Ct. 16138 (Evans v. Taylor, No. Fa95 32 83 26 S (Dec. 19, 2000)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Connecticut Superior Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Evans v. Taylor, No. Fa95 32 83 26 S (Dec. 19, 2000), 2000 Conn. Super. Ct. 16138 (Colo. Ct. App. 2000).

Opinion

[EDITOR'S NOTE: This case is unpublished as indicated by the issuing court.]

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE: MODIFICATION OF CUSTODY AND VISITATION CT Page 16139
Defendant Christine Taylor seeks a modification of the joint custody order that was entered at the time the parties' marriage was dissolved. Taylor now wants sole legal custody of Joshua Evans, whom she and plaintiff Marc Evans adopted during their marriage. Evans opposes the motion for sole custody and seeks to expand his visitation rights. For the reasons stated below, the court finds that joint legal custody was not in the best interests of the child at the time of the dissolution of the marriage and further finds that joint legal custody is not presently in the best interests of the child. Accordingly, the mother is granted sole legal custody. The father's visitation rights are expanded.

I
The court will first address the custody issue. During the parties' marriage, they adopted Joshua Evans, who was born on July 29, 1994. The adoptive parents were divorced in November of 1997 after a trial wherein they contested only financial issues. Before the trial, the parties entered into a custody and visitation agreement, which they submitted to the court, Driscoll, J. The agreement provides that the parents are to have joint legal custody of Joshua Evans and Defendant Christine Taylor is to have physical custody. The court adopted the agreement and incorporated it into the judgment.

This court's authority to modify custody orders is set forth in General Statutes § 46b-56. "[Our Supreme Court] has limited the broad discretion given the trial court to modify custody orders under General Statutes § 46b-56 by requiring that modification of a custody award be based upon either a material change of circumstances which alters the court's finding of the best interests of the child . . . or a finding that the custody order sought to be modified was not based upon the best interests of the child . . . ." (Citations omitted.) Hall v. Hall,186 Conn. 118, 129 439 A.2d 447 (1982). Walshon v. Walshon,42 Conn. App. 651, 657, 681 A.2d 376 (1996). "It is not uncommon for the parties in a dissolution of marriage to focus their attention primarily on the termination of the marriage relationship. Unfortunately, under this pressure some custody awards may be made which are not in the best CT Page 16140 interests of the child. This court has always held that the paramount consideration in custody matters is the welfare of the child." Simons v.Simons, 172 Conn. 341, 347, 374 A.2d 1040 (1977). This court's primary focus must be on the best interests of the child, i.e. "the child's interest in sustained growth. development, well-being, and in the continuity and stability of its environment." Cappetta v. Cappetta,196 Conn. 10, 16, 490 A.2d 996 (1985).

This court has heard testimony from a psychologist, two social workers, the parties, and two lay witnesses. After considering all the evidence, this court finds that the observations of the three professional witnesses should be given considerable weight.

Between April 14, 1999 and November 11, 1999, Harry Adamakos, a licensed clinical psychologist who specializes in the treatment of children and families, met with and administered psychological tests on Ms. Taylor, Mr. Evans, and Joshua Evans. Dr. Adamakos has a doctorate in psychology. He noted that Joshua was caught in the middle of his parents' conflict and was in a high level of anxiety. At the end of his thirty-one page report (Defendant's Exhibit 2), Dr. Adamakos states the following:

This evaluation clearly underscored a conclusion that Mr. Evans and Ms. Taylor continue to engage in a power struggle that puts their son square in the middle. Both parents appear to remain extremely angry at each other, and each exudes their hostility in a manner that leads this examiner to believe that Joshua must be exposed to a high level of vitriol on a fairly regular basis. Each parent seems compelled to blame the other's past and present behaviors as the cause of the current problems. That each parent tends to be so focused on the other parent drastically diminishes their ability to focus on what it is that they can do differently. Importantly, their ongoing post-dissolution battle clearly reduces their ability to focus on their son's needs.

It is problematic enough that Joshua must exist in two distinct psychological worlds — one with father and one with mother. Indeed, in his experience, when these two worlds overlap with each other, it is oftentimes accompanied by acrimony and perceived violence. It is extremely troublesome that he is exposed to the ongoing anger and hostility in a fairly regular way even when he is . . . physically with only one of his parents. It is forcefully recommended that CT Page 16141 the parents cease and desist from such behavior. Both Mr. Evans and Ms. Taylor demonstrate enough psychological upset and disturbance around these issues, that both should strongly consider their own individual psychotherapy, especially if they cannot stop directly exposing Joshua to their anger. Joshua's awareness of his parents' hostilities was striking in how salient and vivid it is. This awareness directly contributes to his own insecurity and feelings that his world is an unsafe place.

Joshua is a young boy who appears to be at extremely high risk for ongoing psychological difficulties. While it is a certainty that his parents' ongoing acrimony contributes greatly to his problems, there was also considerable evidence to suggest some biological disposition for developmentally related problems. At this juncture, rather than blame forces in Joshua's environment as the cause of his problems, it would seem more prudent to focus on interventions and recommendations that might maximize Joshua's chances to improve his psychological functioning. . . .

. . . [T]he present circumstances are far from satisfactory, as Mr. Evans and Ms. Taylor have close to zero capacity to parent together in any meaningful fashion. This is not likely to change sufficiently in . . . [the next] . . . few years, years critical to Joshua's development.

Based upon this psychological evaluation and the conclusions and recommendations tendered so far, it is respectfully recommended that the court consider granting sole legal custody and primary physical custody to Ms. Taylor. It is quite clear that a joint custody is not in Joshua's best interest, and the results of this evaluation would strongly support the notion that his interests are better served with his mother as primary legal and physical custodian. While Ms. Taylor is struggling to meet Joshua's needs, it appears as though she has attempted to do so in the best way she can.

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Related

Simons v. Simons
374 A.2d 1040 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1977)
Hall v. Hall
439 A.2d 447 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1982)
Faria v. Faria
456 A.2d 1205 (Connecticut Superior Court, 1982)
Cappetta v. Cappetta
490 A.2d 996 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1985)
Blake v. Blake
541 A.2d 1201 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1988)
Walshon v. Walshon
681 A.2d 376 (Connecticut Appellate Court, 1996)
Szczerkowski v. Karmelowicz
759 A.2d 1050 (Connecticut Appellate Court, 2000)

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Bluebook (online)
2000 Conn. Super. Ct. 16138, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/evans-v-taylor-no-fa95-32-83-26-s-dec-19-2000-connsuperct-2000.