Evans v. Marczewski

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Wisconsin
DecidedFebruary 17, 2022
Docket2:21-cv-01470
StatusUnknown

This text of Evans v. Marczewski (Evans v. Marczewski) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Wisconsin primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Evans v. Marczewski, (E.D. Wis. 2022).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN

LADELL A. EVANS,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 21-cv-1470-bhl

ETHAN MARCZEWSKI, CO FISKE, and RYAN BLOUNT,

Defendants.

SCREENING ORDER

Plaintiff Ladell Evans, who is currently serving a state prison sentence at the Green Bay Correctional Institution and representing himself, filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. §1983, alleging that his civil rights were violated. This matter comes before the Court on Evans’ motion for leave to proceed without prepaying the full filing fee and to screen the complaint. MOTION TO PROCEED WITHOUT PREPAYING THE FILING FEE Evans has requested leave to proceed without prepaying the full filing fee (in forma pauperis). A prisoner plaintiff proceeding in forma pauperis is required to pay the full amount of the $350.00 filing fee over time. See 28 U.S.C. §1915(b)(1). Evans has filed a certified copy of his prison trust account statement for the six-month period immediately preceding the filing of his complaint, as required under 28 U.S.C. §1915(a)(2), and has been assessed and paid an initial partial filing fee of $45.92. Evans’ motion for leave to proceed without prepaying the filing fee will be granted. SCREENING OF THE COMPLAINT The Court has a duty to review any complaint in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity and must dismiss any complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised any claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief

from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §1915A(b). In screening a complaint, the Court must determine whether the complaint complies with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and states at least plausible claims for which relief may be granted. To state a cognizable claim under the federal notice pleading system, a plaintiff is required to provide a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that [he] is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). It must be at least sufficient to provide notice to each defendant of what he or she is accused of doing, as well as when and where the alleged actions or inactions occurred, and the nature and extent of any damage or injury the actions or inactions caused. “The pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,

555 (2007)). “The tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. A complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 556. “[T]he complaint’s allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. at 555 (internal quotations omitted). ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINT Evans alleges that on August 29, 2021, he informed Defendants Ethan Marczewski and CO Fiske that he “was feeling like causing self-harm.” According to Evans, Marczewski and Fiske ignored him and left his cell door. Evans alleges that for about four hours, Fiske ignored multiple acts of self-harm, including cutting the back his hand, banging his head on the window, door, and

wall, and biting his arms. Evans explains that he began to feel suicidal and tied a sheet around his neck, but another officer stopped him. Evans asserts that the warden and security director are responsible for training officers. Dkt. No. 1 at 2, 4. THE COURT’S ANALYSIS The Eighth Amendment prohibits “cruel and unusual punishments” and “imposes a duty on prison officials to take reasonable measures to guarantee an inmate’s safety and to ensure that inmates receive adequate care.” Phillips v. Diedrick, No. 18-C-56, 2019 WL 318403 at *2 (E.D. Wis. Jan. 24, 2019) (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994)). Prison staff have a duty to prevent inmates from causing serious harm to themselves. Pittman ex rel. Hamilton v. Cty.

of Madison, 746 F.3d 766, 775-76 (7th Cir. 2014). To state a claim, a plaintiff must set forth factual allegations from which the Court can reasonably infer that the defendants (1) were aware of an objectively serious risk of harm to the plaintiff; and (2) knowingly or recklessly disregarded that risk. Szopinski v. Koontz, 832 F. App’x 449, 451 (7th Cir. 2020) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 846). Further, the “risk of future harm must be sure or very likely to give rise to sufficiently imminent dangers.” Davis-Clair v. Turck, 714 Fed. App’x 605, 606 (7th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted). Evans’ allegations are too vague to state a claim. The Court cannot reasonably infer from his generic allegation that he informed Marczewski and Fiske that “he was feeling like causing self-harm” that Defendants were aware of an objectively serious risk of harm to Evans or that they knew that the risk of future harm was sure or very likely to give rise to sufficiently imminent dangers. Similarly, it is unclear what Evans means when he alleges that Fiske ignored multiple acts of self-harm. Evans does not clarify if Fiske observed him harming himself, if he spoke to Fiske about his self-harm, or if Fiske was merely working at the time Evans engaged in self-harm.

Without additional information about Evans’ interactions with both Marczewski and Fiske, the Court cannot reasonably infer that they were personally deliberately indifferent to the risk Evans posed to himself. The Court will give Evans an opportunity to file an amended complaint that provides additional information to cure the deficiencies identified in this decision. If Evans wants to proceed with this lawsuit, he must file an amended complaint by March 16, 2022. Evans should draft his amended complaint as if he is telling a story to someone who knows nothing about what happened. This means that he should explain in short and plain statements: (1) what happened to make him believe he has a legal claim; (2) when it happened; (3) who was involved and how he

interacted with those involved; and (4) how the Court can assist him in relation to those events. Evans should ensure that his amended complaint can be understood by someone who is not familiar with the facts of his case. Finally, Evans is advised that an amended complaint replaces the prior complaint and must be complete in itself without reference to the original complaint. See Duda v. Bd. of Educ. of Franklin Park Pub.

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Related

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Farmer v. Brennan
511 U.S. 825 (Supreme Court, 1994)
Reginald Pittman v. County of Madison, Illinois
746 F.3d 766 (Seventh Circuit, 2014)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Evans v. Marczewski, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/evans-v-marczewski-wied-2022.