Evans v. Lawson

351 F. Supp. 279, 1972 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11573
CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Virginia
DecidedOctober 16, 1972
DocketCiv. A. 72-C-101-A
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 351 F. Supp. 279 (Evans v. Lawson) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Virginia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Evans v. Lawson, 351 F. Supp. 279, 1972 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11573 (W.D. Va. 1972).

Opinion

OPINION and JUDGMENT

DALTON, District Judge.

The present suit is one of libel and slander brought by the plaintiff, a citizen of Texas, against the defendant, a Virginia citizen. The amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional requirement, plaintiff having alleged his damages to be $750,000.

The defendant has moved to dismiss the case for failure to state a cause of *281 action upon which relief may be granted, that the statements made were privileged, and that the words are not libelous per se.

This court must decide if the complaint, viewed most favorably with respect to the. plaintiff, sets forth on its face allegations which, if proved, would entitle the plaintiff to recovery,

The suit concerns two letters 1 sent to various members of Lions International, The first letter was sent to all past dis *283 trict governors of this organization, and the second was sent to all Virginia members of Lions International. The plaintiff is currently president of the international organization and was at the time of the letters one of the organization’s vice-presidents. The defendant was the past international director of the organization.

The letters, which are fully set forth in the footnote, concern certain problems of voting irregularities at the organization’s Las Vegas convention. The second letter also voiced the defendant’s opposition to the elimination of the Board of Governors, who apparently act as a supreme court for the organization, from the' new constitution. The defendant expressed his view that Lions International had, since the elimination of the Board of Governors, departed from its stated goals and policies and had become more obsessed with politics within the organization. The portion of the letter directed towards the plaintiff appears at the bottom of page four of the second letter and reads as follows:

“It now appears that, beginning with the election of David Evans as Third Vice-President, and at all times since then (Dick Bryan, an exception, and an example of a President of good will being pilloried) the volunteer nature of our once dignified and unselfish host of men has been stolen from us, and has deteriorated to the ownership of political power seekers.

If you subscribe to these feelings and wish to join in an attempt at rehabilitation, please sign and return the bottom part of this letter with your pledge of supporting Lionism.”

The plaintiff contends that because of this section of the letter, he suffered humiliation, embarrassment, mental agony, injury to his feelings, reputation,' and good name, and has been held in contempt, calumny and ridicule. From the plaintiff’s complaint it is clear that only members of the organization saw the second letter which contained his name. This court is therefore faced with the following question — what are the bounds of an individual’s right to speak out *284 and voice his opinion concerning the ability and conduct of an individual, who is not considered a public official or a public figure, but who does hold a high office in a private organization of which the speaker is also a member, to other members of this organization and to people in general? Has an individual’s acceptance of high office in a private organization resulted in a decrease of protection against invasions of privacy and defamation of character?

The conflict between an individual’s First Amendment right of free speech and his right to privacy and freedom from defamation has in recent years received much attention by the Supreme Court. See Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing Ass’n., Inc. v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 90 S.Ct. 1537, 26 L.Ed.2d 6 (1970); St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 88 S.Ct. 1323, 20 L.Ed.2d 262 (1968); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 87 S.Ct. 1975, 18 L.Ed.2d 1094 (1967); reh. denied, Associated Press v. Walker, 389 U.S. 889, 88 S.Ct. 11, 19 L.Ed.2d 197 (1967) cert. denied, sub nom. Walker v. Associated Press, 391 U.S. 966, 88 S.Ct. 2036, 20 L.Ed.2d 880 (1968); Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 86 S.Ct. 669, 15 L.Ed.2d 597 (1966); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964).

The first cases dealing with this conflict concerned public officials — those people who are elected or appointed to positions in government. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964) was the landmark case in this area. The Court expressed its commitment to the idea that in a free and democratic society there should exist uninhibited, robust, and wide open public debates of the issues and candidates even though such discussion might well include “vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials.” The Court felt that people must be allowed their right to criticize. The thrust of New York Times is that when the interest of the public in public discussion is particularly strong, then the Constitution limits the protection afforded by the laws of defamation. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 86, 86 S.Ct. 669, 15 L.Ed.2d 597 (1966).

The cases which deal with criticism of public officials hold that a state cannot allow recovery to public officials for defamatory comments relating to his official conduct unless the official can prove actual malice, or that it was published with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard to its validity or non-validity. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 88 S.Ct. 1323, 20 L.Ed.2d 262 (1968); Beckley Newspapers Corp. v. Hanks, 389 U.S. 81, 88 S.Ct. 197, 19 L.Ed.2d 248 (1967); Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 86 S.Ct. 669, 15 L.Ed.2d 597 (1966); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964). It is important to notice that this test only applies to statements made concerning conduct in one’s official capacity. Therefore, while public officials are less protected, they are not wholly unprotected. The statement must relate to the individual’s public office and not to something purely personal.

The area into which the court moved after New York Times and St. Amant

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Bluebook (online)
351 F. Supp. 279, 1972 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11573, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/evans-v-lawson-vawd-1972.