OPINION and JUDGMENT
DALTON, District Judge.
The present suit is one of libel and slander brought by the plaintiff, a citizen of Texas, against the defendant, a Virginia citizen. The amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional requirement, plaintiff having alleged his damages to be $750,000.
The defendant has moved to dismiss the case for failure to state a cause of
action upon which relief may be granted, that the statements made were privileged, and that the words are not libelous per se.
This court must decide if the complaint, viewed most favorably with respect to the. plaintiff, sets forth on its face allegations which, if proved, would entitle the plaintiff to recovery,
The suit concerns two letters
sent to various members of Lions International, The first letter was sent to all past dis
trict governors of this organization, and the second was sent to all Virginia members of Lions International. The plaintiff is currently president of the international organization and was at the time of the letters one of the organization’s vice-presidents. The defendant was the past international director of the organization.
The letters, which are fully set forth in the footnote, concern certain problems of voting irregularities at the organization’s Las Vegas convention. The second letter also voiced the defendant’s opposition to the elimination of the Board of Governors, who apparently act as a supreme court for the organization, from the' new constitution. The defendant expressed his view that Lions International had, since the elimination of the Board of Governors, departed from its stated goals and policies and had become more obsessed with politics within the organization. The portion of the letter directed towards the plaintiff appears at the bottom of page four of the second letter and reads as follows:
“It now appears that, beginning with the election of David Evans as Third Vice-President, and at all times since then (Dick Bryan, an exception, and an example of a President of good will being pilloried) the volunteer nature of our once dignified and unselfish host of men has been stolen from us, and has deteriorated to the ownership of political power seekers.
If you subscribe to these feelings and wish to join in an attempt at rehabilitation, please sign and return the bottom part of this letter with your pledge of supporting Lionism.”
The plaintiff contends that because of this section of the letter, he suffered humiliation, embarrassment, mental agony, injury to his feelings, reputation,' and good name, and has been held in contempt, calumny and ridicule. From the plaintiff’s complaint it is clear that only members of the organization saw the second letter which contained his name. This court is therefore faced with the following question — what are the bounds of an individual’s right to speak out
and voice his opinion concerning the ability and conduct of an individual, who is not considered a public official or a public figure, but who does hold a high office in a private organization of which the speaker is also a member, to other members of this organization and to people in general? Has an individual’s acceptance of high office in a private organization resulted in a decrease of protection against invasions of privacy and defamation of character?
The conflict between an individual’s First Amendment right of free speech and his right to privacy and freedom from defamation has in recent years received much attention by the Supreme Court.
See
Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing Ass’n., Inc. v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 90 S.Ct. 1537, 26 L.Ed.2d 6 (1970); St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 88 S.Ct. 1323, 20 L.Ed.2d 262 (1968); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 87 S.Ct. 1975, 18 L.Ed.2d 1094 (1967); reh. denied, Associated Press v. Walker, 389 U.S. 889, 88 S.Ct. 11, 19 L.Ed.2d 197 (1967) cert. denied, sub nom. Walker v. Associated Press, 391 U.S. 966, 88 S.Ct. 2036, 20 L.Ed.2d 880 (1968); Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 86 S.Ct. 669, 15 L.Ed.2d 597 (1966); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964).
The first cases dealing with this conflict concerned public officials — those people who are elected or appointed to positions in government. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964) was the landmark case in this area. The Court expressed its commitment to the idea that in a free and democratic society there should exist uninhibited, robust, and wide open public debates of the issues and candidates even though such discussion might well include “vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials.” The Court felt that people must be allowed their right to criticize. The thrust of
New York Times
is that when the interest of the public in public discussion is particularly strong, then the Constitution limits the protection afforded by the laws of defamation. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 86, 86 S.Ct. 669, 15 L.Ed.2d 597 (1966).
The cases which deal with criticism of public officials hold that a state cannot allow recovery to public officials for defamatory comments relating to his official conduct unless the official can prove actual malice, or that it was published with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard to its validity or non-validity. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 88 S.Ct. 1323, 20 L.Ed.2d 262 (1968); Beckley Newspapers Corp. v. Hanks, 389 U.S. 81, 88 S.Ct. 197, 19 L.Ed.2d 248 (1967); Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 86 S.Ct. 669, 15 L.Ed.2d 597 (1966); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964). It is important to notice that this test only applies to statements made concerning conduct in one’s official capacity. Therefore, while public officials are less protected, they are not wholly unprotected. The statement must relate to the individual’s public office and not to something purely personal.
The area into which the court moved after
New York Times
and
St. Amant
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OPINION and JUDGMENT
DALTON, District Judge.
The present suit is one of libel and slander brought by the plaintiff, a citizen of Texas, against the defendant, a Virginia citizen. The amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional requirement, plaintiff having alleged his damages to be $750,000.
The defendant has moved to dismiss the case for failure to state a cause of
action upon which relief may be granted, that the statements made were privileged, and that the words are not libelous per se.
This court must decide if the complaint, viewed most favorably with respect to the. plaintiff, sets forth on its face allegations which, if proved, would entitle the plaintiff to recovery,
The suit concerns two letters
sent to various members of Lions International, The first letter was sent to all past dis
trict governors of this organization, and the second was sent to all Virginia members of Lions International. The plaintiff is currently president of the international organization and was at the time of the letters one of the organization’s vice-presidents. The defendant was the past international director of the organization.
The letters, which are fully set forth in the footnote, concern certain problems of voting irregularities at the organization’s Las Vegas convention. The second letter also voiced the defendant’s opposition to the elimination of the Board of Governors, who apparently act as a supreme court for the organization, from the' new constitution. The defendant expressed his view that Lions International had, since the elimination of the Board of Governors, departed from its stated goals and policies and had become more obsessed with politics within the organization. The portion of the letter directed towards the plaintiff appears at the bottom of page four of the second letter and reads as follows:
“It now appears that, beginning with the election of David Evans as Third Vice-President, and at all times since then (Dick Bryan, an exception, and an example of a President of good will being pilloried) the volunteer nature of our once dignified and unselfish host of men has been stolen from us, and has deteriorated to the ownership of political power seekers.
If you subscribe to these feelings and wish to join in an attempt at rehabilitation, please sign and return the bottom part of this letter with your pledge of supporting Lionism.”
The plaintiff contends that because of this section of the letter, he suffered humiliation, embarrassment, mental agony, injury to his feelings, reputation,' and good name, and has been held in contempt, calumny and ridicule. From the plaintiff’s complaint it is clear that only members of the organization saw the second letter which contained his name. This court is therefore faced with the following question — what are the bounds of an individual’s right to speak out
and voice his opinion concerning the ability and conduct of an individual, who is not considered a public official or a public figure, but who does hold a high office in a private organization of which the speaker is also a member, to other members of this organization and to people in general? Has an individual’s acceptance of high office in a private organization resulted in a decrease of protection against invasions of privacy and defamation of character?
The conflict between an individual’s First Amendment right of free speech and his right to privacy and freedom from defamation has in recent years received much attention by the Supreme Court.
See
Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing Ass’n., Inc. v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 90 S.Ct. 1537, 26 L.Ed.2d 6 (1970); St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 88 S.Ct. 1323, 20 L.Ed.2d 262 (1968); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 87 S.Ct. 1975, 18 L.Ed.2d 1094 (1967); reh. denied, Associated Press v. Walker, 389 U.S. 889, 88 S.Ct. 11, 19 L.Ed.2d 197 (1967) cert. denied, sub nom. Walker v. Associated Press, 391 U.S. 966, 88 S.Ct. 2036, 20 L.Ed.2d 880 (1968); Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 86 S.Ct. 669, 15 L.Ed.2d 597 (1966); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964).
The first cases dealing with this conflict concerned public officials — those people who are elected or appointed to positions in government. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964) was the landmark case in this area. The Court expressed its commitment to the idea that in a free and democratic society there should exist uninhibited, robust, and wide open public debates of the issues and candidates even though such discussion might well include “vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials.” The Court felt that people must be allowed their right to criticize. The thrust of
New York Times
is that when the interest of the public in public discussion is particularly strong, then the Constitution limits the protection afforded by the laws of defamation. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 86, 86 S.Ct. 669, 15 L.Ed.2d 597 (1966).
The cases which deal with criticism of public officials hold that a state cannot allow recovery to public officials for defamatory comments relating to his official conduct unless the official can prove actual malice, or that it was published with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard to its validity or non-validity. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 88 S.Ct. 1323, 20 L.Ed.2d 262 (1968); Beckley Newspapers Corp. v. Hanks, 389 U.S. 81, 88 S.Ct. 197, 19 L.Ed.2d 248 (1967); Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 86 S.Ct. 669, 15 L.Ed.2d 597 (1966); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964). It is important to notice that this test only applies to statements made concerning conduct in one’s official capacity. Therefore, while public officials are less protected, they are not wholly unprotected. The statement must relate to the individual’s public office and not to something purely personal.
The area into which the court moved after
New York Times
and
St. Amant
concerned people who did not hold public office, but who had for some reason come into the public’s eye as spokesmen for the public generally on various issues and topics. These people were termed public figures. The first case concerning such people was Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 87 S.Ct. 1975, 18 L.Ed.2d 1094 (1967), reh. denied, Associated Press v. Walker, 389 U.S. 889, 88 S.Ct. 11, 19 L.Ed.2d 197 (1967), cert. denied sub nom. Walker v. Associated Press, 391 U.S. 966, 88 S.Ct. 2036, 20 L.Ed.2d 880 (1968).
In
Butts
the Court held that a public figure who was not a public official could also recover damages for defamatory falsehoods where there is an
apparent and substantial danger to the person’s reputation, after a showing of unreasonable conduct which would be an extreme departure from the general standards of investigation and reporting practiced by responsible publishers. The
New York Times
decision, the court felt, should not be limited only to public officials. Therefore the principals of
New York Times
were applied to public figures. Accordingly, the Court in Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing Ass’n., Inc. v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 90 S.Ct. 1537, 26 L.Ed.2d 6 (1970) held that a plaintiff public figure must establish the utter falseness of the statement and that they were made with malice or with knowledge of its falsity or in reckless disregard of its truth or lack of truth. These are the same tests which were applied in
New York Times.
Therefore, it is clear that the designation of a person as a public figure does result in a decrease of protection against invasions of privacy and defamation of character. Tilton v. Cowles Publishing Co., 76 Wash.2d 707, 459 P.2d 8 (1969).
When the Court applied the rules of
New York Times
concerning public officials to public figures, it also continued the proposition that statements about these people were only protected insofar as they'related to the public activities, duties, responsibilities, actions, qualifications, and ability of these people. Comments directed more towards the public official or figure in his personal and private life were not protected. The statements must bear some relation to the individual’s public role.
In the present case we have neither a public official nor a true public figure. The plaintiff, because of his organizational position, might be more aptly called. an organization figure. Aside from his friends, he is well known only to those people within his organization and only because of his position. The question then is whether these people are subject to similar restrictions concerning their right to redress for allegedly defamatory statement as described in
New York Times
and
Butts?
Again there must be a balance between competing interests. On the one hand such individuals, because they occupy less'than a public figure position, desire to have and should have a high degree of protection of their right to privacy and freedom from defamation. Yet, on the other hand, the members of the organization have the guaranteed right of free speech. These people should be allowed their right to dissent. It appears to this court that one who is termed an organization figure should not be allowed to employ his rights against defamation and invasion of privacy to censure, control, and suppress the right of the members of his organization to disagree and dissent with him and his policies in his organizational capacity. The democratic nature of our society is not limited solely to government, but is pervasive throughout its entire structure.
The effect of
New York Times
and
Butts
has been that within limits statements made concerning public officials and figures are qualifiedly privileged. That is to say that but for the existence of this right of individuals under the First Amendment as interpreted by the Supreme Court, there would exist a course of action for libel and slander.
The rule seems to be that when the communication upon which the action is based is one of qualified privilege, then the question is not whether the charge is true or false, but only whether the privilege has been abused to the extent that there exists actual malice, or an utterance with knowledge of its falsity, or a complete and utter disregard for its truth or falseness. Marsh v. Commercial and Savings Bank of Winchester, Va., 265 F.Supp. 614 (W.D. Va.1967). See, e.g., Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing Ass’n., Inc. v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 90 S.Ct. 1537, 26 L.Ed.2d 6 (1970); St. Amant v. Thompson, 390
U.S. 727, 88 S.Ct. 1323, 20 L.Ed.2d 262 (1968). It also appears to be the rule that a privileged communication must be made in good faith upon a subject matter in which the communicating party has an interest, or honestly believes he has such an interest or duty to a person having a corresponding interest or duty and which contains defamatory information which would be actionable had the privilege not existed. Marsh v. Commercial and Savings Bank of Winchester, Va., 265 F.Supp. 614 (W.D.Va. 1967).
An examination of
New York Times, St. Amant, Butts
and other cases reveals that they are in accordance with this statement, although they contain no specific language to this effect. The general proposition is that the communication must be made upon a topic in which the speaker has an interest. Because the general public has an interest in all public affairs, every person can be deemed to have an interest in the topic. Likewise, the speaker must communicate to someone having a corresponding .interest; yet, because the general public has an interest in these people, they have a corresponding interest with the speaker. Thus with respect to public officials and figures, the public at large is given the right to dissent. In the present case, because the plaintiff is not a public figure or public official, the class of people who have an interest in the topic is not as broad and extensive. Therefore if the ideas expressed in
New York Times
and
Butts
are to be extended to organization figures, there must be some restrictions placed on who may dissent and to whom such dissent may be expressed.
After careful consideration and analysis of the problem, this court holds that people who, by assuming their leadership role, may be classified as organization figures, have decreased their right to privacy and freedom from defamation. These rights, however, have been decreased only with respect to the other members of or people who have a direct, substantial, and significant interest in the same organization. Following
New York Times
and
Butts,
the Constitutional limitation of the protection afforded by the laws of defamation extends only to comments criticism, and dissent with respect to this particular individual’s capacity and function within the organization. Only criticism of an individual in his official capacity will be privileged. Personal attacks will not be tolerated by the courts. Thus, comments and criticism of an organization’s top leaders, by members of the same organization or by outside individuals whose relationship to the organization is direct, substantial, and significant, to other members of the same organization or people having a direct, substantial, and significant interest in this organization which concern actions, decisions, policy and other related matters taken, done, or acted upon by these people in their official capacity, will be protected and privileged.
In order for these people to recover in defamation action, these individuals must prove 1) actual malice, or 2) an utter disregard for the truth or falseness of the statement, or 3) knowledge of its falseness, or 4) that the statement is not directed at an organization' figure in his official capacity with the organization, or 5) that the statement was made by someone not substantially, directly and significantly interested in or a member of the organization or 6) that the statement, although made by someone directly, substantially and significantly interested in or a member of the organization, was made or directed to one or more persons who are not members of or directly, substantially, and significantly interested in this organization.
Applying principals to the present case, the court finds that the reference to the plaintiff was made by a
member of the plaintiff’s organization to other members of the same organization and was directed at the plaintiff in his official capacity with the organization. The plaintiff’s name appeared only once in a four page letter. The tone of the letter was such as to indicate a displeasure and dissatisfaction with the organization itself more than with the plaintiff in his official capacity. The defendant is expressing more his opinion about the organization than he is asserting an actual fact. In his opinion the organization has become more political than charitable.
Being an opinion, it is not subject to a jury finding of truth or falseness. Indeed, comments such as the defendant has expressed about this organization and its leader are precisely the type which the court feels must be protected if the democratic nature of our society is to continue. The court can find no actual malice, nor as previously stated is it subject to a finding of truth or falseness. Having met the criteria established by this court for organization figures, the court finds that the defendant’s statement was privileged and as such there can be no recovery under the law of defamation, nor from the plaintiff’s complaint is there sufficient evidence upon which a jury could find malice or any one of the other above enumerated grounds.
The effect of this opinion is that leaders of private organizations may be made the object of and subject of criticism and attack by other people whose interest in the organization is direct, substantial, and significant and that by assuming these high positions the law will not afford them a remedy for every adverse sarcastic comment made against them in their official capacity. The defendant’s motion to dismiss is hereby granted, and each party to pay their own cost.