Evans v. County of Nevada

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 YVONNE EVANS and BILL EVANS, No. 2:21-cv-00471-TLN-DB

12 Plaintiffs, 13 v. ORDER 14 COUNTY OF NEVADA, a public entity, KEITH ROYAL, in his capacity as an 15 individual, and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive, 16 Defendants. 17 18 19 This matter is before the Court on Defendants County of Nevada (“County”) and Keith 20 Royal (collectively, “Defendants”) Motion to Dismiss. (ECF No. 7.) Plaintiffs Yvonne Evans 21 and Bill Evans (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) oppose the motion. (ECF No. 9.) Defendants replied. 22 (ECF No. 12.) For the reasons discussed herein, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to 23 Dismiss. 24 /// 25 /// 26 /// 27 /// 28 /// 1 I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 2 Plaintiffs were employees at the Nevada County Sheriff’s Office until 2011. (ECF No. 1 3 at 1–2.) Plaintiffs allege Yvonne Evans was terminated on May 23, 2011, and Bill Evans was 4 forced to resign on December 31, 2011. (Id. at 2.) The events at issue in this case, however, took 5 place in 2018. More specifically, Plaintiffs allege they lost a jury trial in state court involving 6 allegations that the County retaliated against them for making discrimination claims while they 7 were employed by the Sheriff’s Office. (Id. at 3.) Plaintiffs allege that on June 21, 2018, the 8 state court granted Plaintiffs’ motion for a new trial based on jury misconduct. (Id.) On July 5, 9 2018, the County allegedly notified Yvonne Evans that she needed to pay child support for her 10 son because her ex-husband was no longer working. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges she paid the child 11 support, yet the County nonetheless sought garnishment of wages from her current employer for 12 child support and health insurance. (Id. at 3–4.) Plaintiffs claim Defendants ordered the wage 13 garnishment in retaliation for Plaintiffs’ actions seeking and obtaining an order granting a new 14 trial in their state court case against the County. (Id. at 5.) 15 On March 15, 2021, Plaintiffs initiated this action against Defendants, asserting a single 16 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“§ 1983”) claim. (ECF No. 1.) Plaintiffs allege Defendants’ aforementioned 17 actions violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. (Id. at 6.) On July 29, 18 2021, Defendants moved to dismiss the Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19 (“Rule”) 12(b)(6). (ECF No. 7.) 20 II. STANDARD OF LAW 21 A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under 22 Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th 23 Cir. 2001). Rule 8(a) requires that a pleading contain “a short and plain statement of the claim 24 showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 25 U.S. 662, 677–78 (2009). Under notice pleading in federal court, the complaint must “give the 26 defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atlantic 27 v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal citation and quotations omitted). “This simplified 28 notice pleading standard relies on liberal discovery rules and summary judgment motions to 1 define disputed facts and issues and to dispose of unmeritorious claims.” Swierkiewicz v. Sorema 2 N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002). 3 On a motion to dismiss, the factual allegations of the complaint must be accepted as true. 4 Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972). A court must give the plaintiff the benefit of every 5 reasonable inference to be drawn from the “well-pleaded” allegations of the complaint. Retail 6 Clerks Int’l Ass’n v. Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746, 753 n.6 (1963). A plaintiff need not allege 7 “‘specific facts’ beyond those necessary to state his claim and the grounds showing entitlement to 8 relief.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570 (internal citation omitted). 9 Nevertheless, a court “need not assume the truth of legal conclusions cast in the form of 10 factual allegations.” U.S. ex rel. Chunie v. Ringrose, 788 F.2d 638, 643 n.2 (9th Cir. 1986). 11 While Rule 8(a) does not require detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an 12 unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A 13 pleading is insufficient if it offers mere “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the 14 elements of a cause of action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 15 (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 16 statements, do not suffice.”). Thus, ‘[c]onclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences 17 are insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.” Adams v. Johnson, 355 18 F.3d 1179, 1183 (9th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). Moreover, it is inappropriate to assume the 19 plaintiff “can prove facts that it has not alleged or that the defendants have violated the . . . laws 20 in ways that have not been alleged.” Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State 21 Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). 22 Ultimately, a court may not dismiss a complaint in which the plaintiff has alleged “enough 23 facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim 24 has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the 25 reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 26 678. While the plausibility requirement is not akin to a probability requirement, it demands more 27 than “a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. This plausibility inquiry is “a 28 context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and 1 common sense.” Id. at 679. Thus, only where a plaintiff fails “nudge[] [his or her] claims . . . 2 across the line from conceivable to plausible[,]” is the complaint properly dismissed. Id. at 680 3 (internal quotations omitted). 4 If a complaint fails to state a plausible claim, “‘[a] district court should grant leave to 5 amend even if no request to amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that the pleading 6 could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.’” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 7 1130 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (quoting Doe v. United States, 58 F.3d 494, 497 (9th Cir. 1995)); 8 see also Gardner v. Martino, 563 F.3d 981, 990 (9th Cir. 2009) (finding no abuse of discretion in 9 denying leave to amend when amendment would be futile). 10 III. ANALYSIS 11 Plaintiffs allege a single § 1983 claim against Defendants for retaliating against them in 12 violation of the Equal Protection Clause. (ECF No. 1 at 6.) Plaintiffs allege they are members of 13 a protected class of “former employees of [the County] who opposed discrimination by seeking 14 and obtaining a new trial against [the County] for claims based on retaliation for making claim of 15 sexual harassment.” (ECF No. 1 at 6.) Plaintiffs further allege “[u]nlike other employees of the 16 Nevada County Sheriff’s Department who did not file complaints of discrimination or oppose it, 17 Plaintiffs were subjected to improper wage garnishment post-termination.” (Id.) 18 “The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment commands that no state shall 19 ‘deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,’ which is essentially a 20 direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.” City of Cleburne v. Cleburne 21 Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). Normally, to state an equal protection claim “a 22 plaintiff must show that the defendants acted with an intent or purpose to discriminate against the 23 plaintiff based upon membership in a protected class.” Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 24 686 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998)). 25 In moving to dismiss, Defendants argue, among other things, that Plaintiffs’ retaliation 26 claim is not viable as an Equal Protection claim. (ECF No. 7-1 at 5.) In opposition, Plaintiffs 27 rely on a single, out-of-circuit case. (ECF No. 9 at 1–2 (citing Vega v. Hempstead Union Free 28 Sch. Dist., 801 F.3d 72 (2d Cir. 2015)).) Plaintiffs argue Vega “support[s] their position that they 1 are members of a protected class for purposes of § 1983.” (Id. at 3.) In Vega, the Second Circuit 2 concluded that a claim of retaliation for a filing a discrimination complaint was actionable under 3 the Equal Protection Clause. 801 F.3d at 81. However, Vega is at odds with recent Ninth Circuit 4 authority. In Doe v. Pasadena Unified Sch. Dist., 810 F. App’x 500, 502 (9th Cir. 2020), the 5 Ninth Circuit found that the plaintiff’s Equal Protection claim failed because the defendant 6 retaliated against the plaintiff “not because of her immigration status, but rather because of her 7 threat to complain” about the defendant’s school lunch policy. Id. at 503. The court explained 8 that the plaintiff’s claim “amount[ed] to a First Amendment retaliation claim, not an Equal 9 Protection claim.” Id. at 502. Notably, the “vast majority of circuit courts . . . have held that the 10 Equal Protection Clause cannot sustain a pure claim of retaliation” under similar circumstances. 11 Wilcox v. Lyons, 970 F.3d 452, 461 (4th Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 2754 (2021) (citing 12 cases from the Third, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits and noting that the 13 Second Circuit is the only court to reach a contrary conclusion). Plaintiffs fail to persuade the 14 Court that it should follow the Second Circuit rather than the Ninth Circuit and majority of other 15 circuit courts that have confronted this issue. 16 For all these reasons, the Court concludes Plaintiffs’ claim of retaliation based on moving 17 for a new trial as to discrimination claims against the County — not based on any protected 18 characteristics — is not viable as an Equal Protection claim. Because the Court cannot say the 19 Complaint could not possibly be cured by amendment, the Court will grant Plaintiffs leave to 20 amend. Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130. 21 /// 22 /// 23 /// 24 /// 25 /// 26 /// 27 /// 28 /// 1 IV. CONCLUSION 2 Based on the foregoing, the Court hereby GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF 3 | No. 7) with leave to amend. Plaintiffs shall file an amended complaint not later than thirty (30) 4 | days from the electronic filing date of this Order. Defendants’ responsive pleading is due twenty- 5 | one (21) days after the electronic filing date of Plaintiffs’ amended complaint. If Plaintiffs 6 | choose not to amend the Complaint, the case will be automatically dismissed. 7 IT IS SO ORDERED. 8 | DATED: January 31, 2022 9 /) 10 “ / of yf HAA

12 United States District Judge 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28