Evans v. Buchanan

172 F. Supp. 508, 1959 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3455
CourtDistrict Court, D. Delaware
DecidedApril 24, 1959
DocketCiv. A. 1816-1822
StatusPublished
Cited by11 cases

This text of 172 F. Supp. 508 (Evans v. Buchanan) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Delaware primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Evans v. Buchanan, 172 F. Supp. 508, 1959 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3455 (D. Del. 1959).

Opinion

LAYTON, District Judge.

The chronological legal background of these cases is fully set out in Evans v. Buchanan, D.C.Del. July 15, 1957, 152 F.Supp. 886 and Evans v. Buchanan, 3 Cir., July 23, 1958, 256 F.2d 688.

It is sufficient here to say that on May 17, 1954, the Supreme Court of the United States declared that racial discrimination in the public school systems was unconstitutional, Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 74 S.Ct. 686, 98 L.Ed. 873, and on May 31, 1955, by a supplemental opinion, 349 U.S. 294, 75 S.Ct. 753, 99 L.Ed. 1083, announced that the primary responsibility for solving the many local problems which would inevitably arise from integration must rest upon the local school boards so long as they acted in good faith.

In the cases before me, a group of Negro children, through their guardians, brought class actions for injunctions in this Court to require their admission to the public schools of Delaware on a racially nondiscriminatory basis. The State School Board defended upon the ground that many local boards had refused to follow its directives as to integration and that it was powerless to enforce them upon what it conceived to be autonomous bodies. Judge Leahy granted summary judgment against the defendants holding that the defendant, State Board, had complete authority over the actions of the local boards and directing the former to file a plan of desegregation on a state-wide basis within a stated time. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. The time for the filing of the plan having expired pending the appeal, a supplemental order was entered on November 19, 1958, which together with minor amendments thereto, directed that the State Board of Education submit a plan of desegregation to this Court within 112 days, *510 .and setting a hearing thereon on Tuesday, March 17, 1959. 1

A plan has now been prepared and submitted in accordance with the requirements of the order. In simple terms, it provides for desegregation of the Delaware Public School System on a grade by grade basis over a period of twelve years beginning with all first grades at the Fall term, 1959. A three day hearing was held upon the plan followed by the filing of briefs and oral argument.

In its first opinion in Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, briefly mentioned above, the Supreme Court stated that [347 U.S. 483, 74 S.Ct. 692]:

“ * * * the plaintiffs * * * are, by reason of the segregation complained of, deprived of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.”

And in its second opinion it was held that [349 U.S. 294, 75 S.Ct. 756]:

“ * * * School authorities have the primary responsibility for elucidating, assessing, and solving these problems; courts will have to consider whether the action of school authorities constitutes good faith implementation of the governing constitutional principles * *
* * * Traditionally, equity has been characterized by a practical flexibility in shaping its remedies and by a facility for adjusting and reconciling public and private needs. These cases call for the exercise of these traditional attributes of equity power. At stake is the personal interest of the plaintiffs in admission to public schools as soon as practicable on a nondiserimina-tory basis. To effectuate this interest may call for elimination of a variety of obstacles in making the transition to school systems operated in accordance with the constitutional principles set forth in our May 17, 1954, decision. Courts of equity may properly take into account the public interest in the elimination of such obstacles in a systematic and effective manner * *
“ * * * Once such a start has been made, the courts may find that additional time is necessary to carry out the ruling in an effective manner. The burden rests upon the defendants to establish that such time is necessary in the public interest and is consistent with good faith compliance at the earliest practicable date. To that end, the courts may consider problems related to administration, arising from the physical condition of the school plant, the school transportation system, personnel, revision of school districts and attendance areas into compact units to achieve a system of determining admission to the public schools on a nonracial basis, and revision of local laws and regulations which may be necessary in solving the foregoing problems * * *.”

The plan of the State Board is the only one before me for consideration. Neither the plaintiffs nor any other interested party has offered an alternative. The plaintiffs apparently take the position that they are under no duty to offer a plan — rather, that it is the burden of the State Board to prepare a plan which, in all respects, must meet the requirements of the Brown cases. With this I agree. But to the extent that the plaintiffs at times seem to contend that no plan other than one calling for total desegregation is contemplated by the Brown decisions, I disagree. The language of the two opinions plainly permits a more gradual transition if the circumstances require.

Conditions which, if fairly found to exist, would call for something less *511 than full and immediate desegregation are (1) the problem of additional buildings or classrooms and teaching personnel in a given locality due to an increase in enrollment; (2) the difficulties attending the reshuffling of the extensive school transportation system because of the relocation of students in different schools; (3) the closing of some schools entirely and the merging of others into more convenient districts together with the drafting, presentation and passage of legislation without which certain of these objectives cannot be satisfactorily solved; (4) the financial burden occasioned by new buildings and additional personnel which will fall in part upon local taxpayers and in part upon the State; (5) the problem of meshing substantial numbers of Negroes into a hitherto all white school system where the educational achievement level of the former is significantly lower than that of the latter and (6) the impact of integration upon a predominantly Southern society. 2 The plaintiffs have objected to this latter consideration as irrelevant. I do not agree. My reasons will appear fully hereafter.

Before considering the plan itself, it is appropriate to state that, in my judgment, any thought of a total and imme-r diate integration of the Delaware School System is out of the question. I agree fully with the testimony of the witnesses in this respect.

The question may then well be asked why consideration should not be given to the immediate desegregation of some large segment of the System, such as the elementary or secondary grades. 3

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Related

Evans v. Buchanan
416 F. Supp. 328 (D. Delaware, 1976)
Mary Ann Evans, an Infant, by Helen Evans, Her Guardian Ad Litem v. Jane Ennis, Vincent A. Theisen, Marvel O. Watson, Roy A. Wentz, Ralph Grapperhaus, Harold B. English, Members of the State Board of Education, George R. Miller, Jr., State Superintendent of Public Instruction, Richard W. Comegys, Harry W. Moor, G. Francis Downs, Mary W. Jarrell, Members of the Board of Trustees of Clayton School District No. 119. Eugene Harris, an Infant, by Thomas Harris, His Guardian Ad Litem v. Jane Ennis, Vincent A. Theisen, Marvel O. Watson, Roy A. Wentz, Ralph Grapperhaus, Harold B. English, Members of the State Board of Education, George R. Miller, Jr., State Superintendent of Public Instruction, Max R. Corder, E. Crerar Bennet, Jr., Ernest C. MacKlin George A. Robbins, Members of the Board of Education of the Milford Special School District. Julie Coverdale, an Infant, by Annie E. Coverdale, Her Guardian Ad Litem v. Jane Ennis, Vincent A. Theisen, Marvel O. Watson, Roy A. Wentz, Ralph Grapperhaus, Harold B. English, Members of the State Board of Education, George R. Miller, Jr., State Superintendent of Public Instruction, Wilbur C. Root, Norman C. Hamsted, Harry Webb, Majorie Baker, Members of the Board of Trustees of Greenwood School District No. 91. Eyvonne Holloman, an Infant, by Flossie Holloman, Her Guardian Ad Litem v. Jane Ennis, Vincent A. Theisen, Marvel O. Watson, Roy A. Wentz, Ralph Grapperhaus, Harold B. English, Members of the State Board of Education, George R. Miller, Jr., State Superintendent of Public Instruction, Howard T. West, John T. Fisher, Norman Clifton, Albert Lank, Members of the Board of Trustees of Milton School District No. 8. David Creighton, an Infant, by Josephine Creighton, His Guardian Ad Litem v. Jane Ennis, Vincent A. Theisen, Marvel O. Waston, Roy A. Wentz, Ralph Grapperhaus, Harold B. English, Members of the State Board of Education, George R. Miller, Jr., State Superintendent of Public Instruction, Ford M. Warrington, Otis P. Carmine, Clarence J. Evans, Homer L. Disharoon, Jr., Members of the Board of Education of the Laurel Special School District. Marvin Denson, an Infant, by Clarence Denson, His Guardian Ad Litem v. Jane Ennis, Vincent A. Theisen, Marvel O. Watson, Roy A. Wentz, Ralph Grapperhaus, Harold B. English, Members of the State Board of Education, George R. Miller, Jr., State Superintendent of Public Instruction, Robert H. Stamm, Irene F. Larrimore, Oscar W. Allen, Jr., John C. Rawlins, Members of the Board of Education of the Seaford Special School District. Thomas J. Oliver, Jr., an Infant, by Thomas J. Oliver, His Guardian Ad Litem v. Jane Ennis, Vincent A. Theisen, Marvel O. Watson, Roy A. Wentz, Ralph Grapperhaus, Harold B. English, Members of the State Board of Education, George R. Miller, Jr., State Superintendent of Public Instruction, Raymond Townsend, George H. Bunting, William B. Chandler, Jr., Roland v. Cobb, Members of the Board of Trustees of John M. Clayton School
281 F.2d 385 (Third Circuit, 1960)
Evans v. Ennis
281 F.2d 385 (Third Circuit, 1960)

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Bluebook (online)
172 F. Supp. 508, 1959 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3455, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/evans-v-buchanan-ded-1959.