Evans v. Bowser

87 F. Supp. 3d 1, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42110, 2015 WL 1478510
CourtDistrict Court, District of Columbia
DecidedMarch 31, 2015
DocketCivil Action No. 76-cv-0293 (ESH)
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 87 F. Supp. 3d 1 (Evans v. Bowser) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, District of Columbia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Evans v. Bowser, 87 F. Supp. 3d 1, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42110, 2015 WL 1478510 (D.D.C. 2015).

Opinion

ORDER

ELLEN SEGAL HUVELLE, United States District Judge

Pursuant to the “2010 Revision to the 2001 Plan for Compliance and Conclusion of Evans v. Fenty,”1 (“2010 Plan”), Special Master Clarence J. Sundram has submitted a Report and Recommendation regarding defendants’ certification of compliance with the remaining outcome criteria for Goal A.1, Individualized Habilitation Plans. (See Special Master’s Report and Recommendation Regarding Individualized Ha-bilitation Plans — Part II, Dec. 9, 2014 [ECF No. 1506], as amended, see Errata, Jan. 7, 2015 [ECF No. 1510] (“R & R-Part II”); Director’s Certification of Compliance, Evans Goal A.1, Individualized Ha-bilitation Plan (Outcome Criteria ii, iii, vii, viii, ix, x, xii, xvi and xvii), June 30, 2014 (filed with the Court as Exhibit 1 to the R & R-Part II [ECF No. 1506-1]) (“Certification-Part II”).) Following the Special Master’s first Report and Recommendation regarding Goal A.1 (see Special Master’s Report and Recommendation Regarding Individualized Habilitation Plans, Oct. 15, 2013 [ECF No. 1418] (“R & R-Part I”) and the Court’s Order approving and adopting that Report and Recommendation (see Order, Nov. 27, 2013 [ECF No. 1426]), eight criteria from Goal A.1 remained outstanding in full (ii, iii, vii, ix, x, xii, xvi, xvii), and one criterion (viii) remained outstanding in part. The Special Master now recommends that the Court find that defendants (1) have met their burden of proof of compliance with respect to criteria ii, vii, xvi, and xvii; (2) have achieved partial compliance with respect to criteria iii, viii, x (part C), and xii (parts BD); and (3) have not met their burden of proof of compliance with respect to criteria ix and the remaining parts of criteria iii, viii, x (parts A, B and part of D), and xii (part A). Plaintiffs have not filed any objections, but defendants challenge the Special Master’s adherence to the 2010 Plan’s threshold for “high” compliance as well as his recommended findings of noncompliance as to criteria viii, x.D, and xii.A. (Defs.’ Objections to the R & R-Part II at 1, Jan. 8, 2015 [ECF No. 1512-1] (“Objections”).) For the reasons explained herein, the Court will partially sustain defendants’ objection as to criteria viii, but will otherwise approve and adopt the pending Report and Recommendation in its entirety.2

I. THRESHOLD FOR “HIGH” COMPLIANCE

Under the 2010 Plan, the standard of compliance for Goal A.1 is “high” (2010 Plan at 12),3 which is defined as follows:

[4]*4This threshold requires compliance with the indicator at a rate generally exceeding 90 percent compliance. Where instances of noncompliance with the indicator are found, none can involve a serious and substantive violation of the Court Order with significant adverse impact upon class members (i.e., actual harm or a serious risk of harm) in the judgment of the Court and Special Master (e.g., excusable noncompliance may involve failure to comply with documentation or some aspect of process, without significant adverse impact). Generally speaking, this level of compliance will be expected for important programmatic aspects of the Court Orders.

(2010 Plan at 6 (emphasis added).)

In defendants’ Certification-Part II, they suggested, for the first time, that the 2010 Plan’s definition of “high compliance” was too demanding. (Certification-Part II at 3.) They pointed out therein that they had never “agreed” to a/ 90% threshold for “high” compliance, that certain outcome criteria do not lend themselves to numerical analysis, and that requiring 90% compliance was virtually unprecedented in any intellectual and developmental disability service delivery system across the country.4 (Certification-Part II at 3.) After an extensive discussion, the Special Master concluded that, while determining a numerical “rate” of compliance was not always easy, none of defendants’ concerns merited jettisoning the approach established by the 2010 Plan. {See R & R-Part II at 3-7.)

Defendants now object to the Special Master’s “discussion” of the threshold of compliance, raising the same arguments they made in their certification, and ask the Court for two specific things: (1) that a percentage compliance rate of less than 90% on a particular JMQ question should not be “summarily held as a showing of non-compliance”; and (2) that “the [90%] threshold of [high] compliance can and should be revisited by this Court in evaluating the remaining elements of the 2010 Plan and the underlying court orders in recognition of the progress that has been made as evidenced by the Court orders to date finding compliance with 59 of 70 or more than 84 percent of the outcome criteria in the 2010 Exit Plan.” (Objections at 1213.)

The Court agrees with defendants’ first point, which does not actually conflict with anything said by the Special Master in his Report and Recommendation. The 90% threshold for “high” compliance is to be measured with respect to the outcome criteria in the 2010 Plan; it does not require a score of 90% or above for each individual question on the Joint Monitoring Questionnaire (“JMQ”) assigned to that outcome criterion. Thus, an underlying JMQ score may fall below the 90% threshold without precluding defendants from demonstrating compliance.

As for defendants’ second point, it is not entirely clear what defendants mean by asking the Court to “revisit” the standard for high compliance, but the Court does not believe that any such change is necessary. As defendants acknowledge, [5]*5“high” compliance at 90% is the standard set forth in the 2010 Plan and approved by the Court, and they maintain that they are not suggesting “that the 90 percent compliance standard should be fully obviated at this late date and a wholesale revision to another standard should be adopted.” (Objections at 10.) As the Special Master notes, “it can hardly be concluded that the subsequent 2010 revision of the 2001 Plan set an unreasonable threshold for demonstrating compliance.” (R & R-Part II at 5.) Moreover, although certain outcome criteria may lend themselves more to quantitative analysis, the Court agrees with the Special Master that that does not render the approach of the 2010 Plan unworkable, but rather that “[i]n interpreting and enforcing compliance, the Court has had no difficulty in assessing whether the evidence proffered by the parties met the obligations embodied in these orders.” (R & R-Part II at 5; see also id. at 4 (“[T]hese thresholds of compliance have been used consistently in the certification process since 2010 by the Court Monitor in the Joint Monitoring review, by the Plaintiffs, by the Independent Compliance Administrator, by the Defendants themselves, by the Special Master and by the Court— without objection from any party until now.”). Accordingly, the Court agrees with the Special Master that there is no need to alter the 2010 Plan’s requirement that sets 90% as the threshold for achieving a “high” standard of compliance and that all of defendants’ valid concerns can be accommodated within the existing compliance framework.

II. CRITERION viii

Criterion viii for Goal A.1 requires that “[consumers receive the services and supports identified in the ISP on a timely basis.” (2010 Plan at 11 (emphasis added).) In the first R &

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87 F. Supp. 3d 1, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42110, 2015 WL 1478510, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/evans-v-bowser-dcd-2015.