Evans v. Ameritech

12 F. Supp. 2d 655, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11799, 1998 WL 433205
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Michigan
DecidedJuly 21, 1998
DocketCIV. A. 98-40039
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 12 F. Supp. 2d 655 (Evans v. Ameritech) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Michigan primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Evans v. Ameritech, 12 F. Supp. 2d 655, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11799, 1998 WL 433205 (E.D. Mich. 1998).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

GADOLA, District Judge.

This is an ERISA action. Plaintiff Paulette Evans claims that her monthly long-term disability benefits are being improperly reduced by the amount she is receiving as a monthly disability pension benefit.

Presently before this court is a motion for summary judgment filed by defendant Amer-itech and Ameritech Disability Service Center (collectively “Ameritech”). This court heard oral argument on the motion on July 8, 1998. Upon consideration of the parties’ written submissions, the arguments advanced at the hearing, the record and all relevant authorities, this court will grant defendants’ motion for the reasons set forth below.

FACTS

Plaintiff began her employment with Michigan Bell Telephone Company (now known as “Ameritech”) on or about November 7, 1966. In 1992, work-related hand and arm injuries rendered plaintiff disabled from work and plaintiff began receiving benefits under Am-eritech’s short-term Sickness and Accident Disability Plan (“SADP”). On April 27,1993, after plaintiffs 52 weeks of SADP benefits expired, plaintiff began receiving benefits under Ameritech’s Long Term Disability Plan *657 (“LTD Plan”), 1 which was then being administered by Metropolitan Life Insurance Company (“Metropolitan”). 2

Plaintiff received notification that effective January 1, 1998, the LTD Plan would no longer be administered by Metropolitan, but would instead be administered by Sedgwick James at the Ameritech Disability Service Center (“ADSC”). After'taking over administration of the LTD Plan, ADSC began to evaluate plaintiffs claim for LTD benefits. The ADSC discovered that plaintiff was receiving a monthly disability pension benefit of $780.96. The ADSC determined that pursuant to the terms of the LTD Plan, this monthly disability pension benefit should have been utilized to offset the amount of plaintiffs LTD benefit. 3 On April 3, 1997, the ADSC sent plaintiff a letter which stated as follows:

... LTD benefits have been overpaid at the monthly rate of $780.96 between 4/27/93 and 4/1/97. Since this overpayment appears to be a mistake made by the prior LTD administrator, the ADSC will waive your claim overpayment which has accumulated to the amount of $36,809.25. However, the ADSC will adjust your claim to reflect the receipt of [pension benefits] and future [LTD] benefits will be payable in the amount of 404.38 monthly to you in accordance with the Ameritech LTD Policy-

On December 22, 1997, plaintiff instituted this lawsuit against Ameritech and the ADSC alleging that in 1993, Michigan Bell promised not to off-set her LTD benefits with her disability pension benefits. Plaintiff alleges that the recent decision to offset her LTD benefits with her disability pension benefits constitutes a breach of contract (Count I), misrepresentation (Count II) and fraud (Count III).

In an opinion and order dated April 16, 1998, this court dismissed plaintiffs claims of misrepresentation (Count II) and fraud (Count III), finding these claims to be preempted. This court declined to dismiss the breach of contract claim (Count I), however, finding that claim to be a superseding claim under ERISA’s civil enforcement provision, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B).

Standards of Review

In their present motion, defendants seek summary judgment on plaintiffs ERISA claim. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e) empowers the court to render summary judgment “forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). There is no genuine issue of material fact when the “record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). The court must decide “whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” In re Dollar Corp., 25 F.3d 1320, 1323 (6th Cir. *658 1994) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)). “The mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat the otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505. In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the court must consider all evidence together with all inferences to be drawn therefrom “in light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.” Watkins v. Northwestern Ohio Tractor Pullers Ass’n., Inc., 630 F.2d 1155, 1158 (6th Cir.1980).

If the movant meets the standard specified at Rule 56(c), then the opposing party must come forth with “specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” First National Bank v. Cities Service Co., 391 U.S. 253, 270, 88 S.Ct. 1575, 20 L.Ed.2d 569 (1968); Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). The non-moving party “is not entitled to a trial merely on the basis of allegations; significant probative evidence must be presented to support the complaint.” Kraft v. United States, 991 F.2d 292, 296 (6th Cir.1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 976, 114 S.Ct. 467, 126 L.Ed.2d 419 (1993); Gregg v. Allen-Bradley Co., 801 F.2d 859, 861 (6th Cir.1986). And, “if the adverse party does not respond, summary judgment, if appropriate shall be entered against the adverse party.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); Rizzo v. Goode,

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
12 F. Supp. 2d 655, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11799, 1998 WL 433205, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/evans-v-ameritech-mied-1998.