Opinion issued August 31, 2026
In The
Court of Appeals For The
First District of Texas ———————————— NO. 01-24-00497-CV ——————————— EVANGELINA LOPEZ GUZMAN ZARAGOZA, Appellant V. MIGUEL ZARAGOZA FUENTES, Appellee
On Appeal from the 245th District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 2014-30215
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This appeal arises from a Texas divorce action. Appellant Evangelina sought
a divorce from Appellee Miguel.1 She alleged that the parties married in New
1 Because both parties share the “Zaragoza” surname, we refer to the parties by their first names. Mexico in 1953, had children together, and remained married until their relationship
deteriorated. In 2014, Evangelina filed for divorce in Harris County, Texas.
Miguel responded that the parties were not married when Evangelina filed suit
because, according to him, a Mexican court had dissolved their marriage more than
fifty years earlier, in a 1959 divorce decree. He argued that Evangelina could not
establish an existing marriage for a Texas court to dissolve.
Evangelina disputed the validity of the Mexican 1959 decree. She asserted
that she had no knowledge of the decree, that it was invalid, and that it was procured
without due process. She argued that Texas courts should not recognize it.
In addition, she separately pursued litigation in Mexico to nullify or set aside
the decree. As far as our record reflects, that litigation remains pending.
This is not the parties’ first appeal in this Texas action. In 2018, this Court
reversed a prior divorce decree rendered in Evangelina’s favor. See Fuentes v.
Zaragoza, 555 S.W.3d 141 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, no pet.)
(“Fuentes I”). Our Court held that the property division and related awards were
unsupported by legally sufficient evidence. Id. at 149, 165. We remanded for further
proceedings and instructed the trial court to consider principles of international
comity in light of the ongoing proceedings in Mexico. Id. at 149, 160–61 (“[T]he
trial court must determine on remand whether comity requires deference to the
current Mexican proceedings addressing the 1959 divorce decree’s validity.”).
2 At issue here, in 2024, Miguel moved to dismiss the Texas action without
prejudice. He first argued that the trial court should recognize and give effect to the
1959 Mexican decree and dismiss this action because no marriage existed for the
court to dissolve. He also argued that, under international comity principles, Texas
should not proceed with this case while the parties litigated matters concerning the
Mexican decree in Mexico.
The trial court agreed as to the second point, the ongoing Mexican
proceedings. It determined that, under comity principles, it would defer Texas’s
process and decline to proceed now to allow Mexico to first resolve its litigation
concerning the decree. The trial court then dismissed without prejudice to refiling.
In doing so, the trial court was clear that it did not recognize or enforce the
1959 decree; that divorce decree is not currently recognized in Texas. This is
significant because, under controlling law, even if the decree is not nullified or set
aside in Mexico, the Texas trial court could not have recognized and given effect to
the Mexican decree without first determining that the decree satisfied due process
principles. See, e.g., Ashfaq v. Ashfaq, 467 S.W.3d 539, 541 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] 2015, no pet.) (“Due process requires that no other jurisdiction shall give
effect, even as a matter of comity, to a judgment elsewhere acquired without due
process.” (citation modified)); accord Fuentes I, 555 S.W.3d at 154. Yet here, the
trial court was clear that it has not made any due process determination.
3 Instead, as noted, the trial court invoked principles of international comity to
presently decline to proceed to allow the ongoing Mexican litigation concerning the
Mexican decree to conclude (at which point, the parties would be free to continue
their litigation here and the Texas court could determine what effect, if any, the
Mexican decree should have here).2 Evangelina appeals that decision.
The trial court has discretion in this area. It did not abuse its discretion in
determining that principles of international comity support allowing Mexico to
conclude its pending proceedings concerning the Mexican divorce decree before
Texas continues with this case (which asks the Texas trial court to resolve, among
other things, whether to recognize that very decree). We thus affirm the trial court
on that basis. That said, on this record and at this stage of the litigation (which has
been ongoing in Texas for approximately 10 years), we remand to the trial court as
to the remedy.
2 At the conclusion of the Mexican proceedings, one of two things would happen. If the decree is invalidated in Mexico, then it would be irrelevant to the Texas divorce proceeding, and the proceeding would continue. If, on the other hand, the Mexican courts do not set aside or nullify the decree, the decree would still need to be recognized in Texas before a Texas court could give it effect in this proceeding— i.e., it would need to satisfy the requirements for recognition here, including that it comports with due process principles. See infra pp. 17–19 and notes 9, 13–15. To be clear, the lack of a nullification by Mexican courts is not the same as a recognition by Texas courts.
4 BACKGROUND
Our earlier opinion contains a detailed background explanation. Fuentes I,
555 S.W.3d at 149–53. We recount additional information relevant to this appeal.
A. The parties’ marriage, the divorce filing underlying this appeal, and the disputed 1959 Mexican decree.
Evangelina and Miguel are citizens of Mexico. They married in a civil
ceremony in New Mexico in 1953. It is undisputed that the parties later lived together
for many years and had several children together. No party makes any argument here
about common law marriage.
In 2014, Evangelina filed this divorce action in Houston, Texas.
Miguel filed a plea to the jurisdiction, asserting that the parties had divorced
in 1959 in Mexico, so there was no marriage to dissolve. Miguel argues that the 1959
decree shows that the couple divorced in Mexico at that time.
Evangelina responded, disputing the validity of the decree. She argues in this
case that she had no notice of the 1959 decree and it was not procured in a manner
consistent with due process principles. She argues Texas should not recognize it.
She separately challenged the 1959 decree in Mexico.
5 B. The Mexican proceedings concerning the 1959 decree.
1. Evangelina’s “nullity” action in Mexico.
In addition to disputing the validity of the Mexican 1959 decree in Texas (and
arguing that Texas should not recognize it), Evangelina pursued proceedings in
Mexico challenging the 1959 decree.3
In 2015, Evangelina filed a nullity action in Mexico seeking to nullify or set
aside the 1959 decree. That litigation proceeded through several Mexican courts. In
2018, at Evangelina’s request, Mexico’s Supreme Court granted an amparo writ of
relief; that allowed the nullity action to proceed, and the case was remanded to a
civil court in Chihuahua, Mexico.
Mexican litigation continued for several years. The record reflects that the
parties disputed not only the validity of the 1959 decree, but also the proper
mechanism under Mexican law for challenging the decree and the procedural rules
governing that challenge.4
3 She initially filed a criminal complaint in Mexico, alleging that Miguel forged the decree. Evangelina also brought challenges through additional Mexican proceedings concerning the criminal complaint. The record is unclear as to the status of those proceedings. 4 The Mexican courts ruled in Evangelina’s favor in some of these proceedings, including, for example, when an intermediate appellate court sustained her objections to a 2019 “compliance resolution” that was issued to implement the Supreme Court’s amparo judgment.
6 2. The 2022 settlement agreement and current, ongoing litigation.
In October 2022, a settlement agreement was executed in Mexico. The
agreement provides that Evangelina would withdraw her nullity action and dismiss
the case. The agreement was executed by Evangelina’s Mexican counsel acting on
her behalf.
In accordance with the agreement, Evangelina withdrew the nullity claim
challenging the validity of the 1959 decree, and the court entered an order dismissing
the case with prejudice.
Shortly after, however, Evangelina challenged the settlement and withdrawal,
asserting that her Mexican counsel lacked authority to enter the agreement or
withdraw the nullity action. She pursued additional proceedings and appeals in the
Mexican court system, seeking to undo the withdrawal and reinstate the nullity
proceeding.5
Those proceedings remained pending at the time of the trial court’s hearing at
issue.
5 In 2022, Evangelina appealed her (former) attorneys’ dismissal of the nullity claim; this was rejected by a Mexican intermediate court of appeals in 2023. Evangelina then filed an amparo petition seeking relief from that decision; that proceeding remained pending at the time of the trial court’s June 2024 hearing.
7 C. This case’s Texas history.
In 2015, after denying a jurisdictional challenge by Miguel based on the 1959
Mexican decree, the Texas trial court signed a final divorce decree, awarding
Evangelina half of the community estate. Miguel appealed.
In 2018, our Court issued Fuentes I, reversing and remanding. 555 S.W.3d at
149. There, we confirmed jurisdiction, then overturned the monetary and property
awards as unsupported by the evidence. See id. at 149, 155, 165. We noted the
pending proceedings in Mexico and instructed the trial court to consider comity
principles on remand. See id. at 149, 161. We also instructed that “[t]he trial court
must apply the requirements of Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 308b.” Id. at 161.
D. The trial court’s proceedings on remand and the order under review.
On remand, the trial court initially denied Miguel’s request for dismissal or
abatement on comity grounds, and the case continued in Texas.6 Litigation also
continued in Mexico. During that period, the 2022 settlement agreement was
6 On remand, Miguel initially filed an answer, a motion to abate, and motions asking the trial court to defer to the Mexican proceedings under principles of comity and forum non conveniens. The parties submitted extensive briefing and materials. On May 6, 2020, following a hearing by submission, then-presiding Judge Longino denied Miguel’s motions for dismissal or abatement. That ruling was later memorialized in a signed order.
8 executed, the nullity action was withdrawn, and Evangelina began challenging the
settlement and withdrawal in Mexico.7
In 2024, Miguel filed the instant Motion to Dismiss Without Prejudice. He
argued that, under comity principles, Texas should not proceed with this case now,
while the parties continued active litigation concerning the Mexican decree in
Mexico. (As noted, he also urged the trial court to recognize the 1959 decree and
dismiss on that basis; the trial court did not do so.)
On June 3, 2024, the trial court held a hearing. At the end of the hearing, the
trial court concluded “that comity is going to require that I give deference to the
court proceedings in Mexico” and dismissed the case.
After an abatement from our Court, the trial court entered findings of fact and
conclusions of law explaining the basis for its ruling. The trial court found that “as
of June 3, 2024, the question of validity of the Settlement Agreement and the appeal
of the dismissal of the Nullity claim challenging the 1959 Decree remains pending
in the Mexican Courts.” The court further clarified that it was “not recognizing or
enforcing a judgment or arbitration award based on foreign law,” but was instead
“extending comity to the ongoing proceedings between the parties in Mexico.”
(Emphasis added). The court concluded in relevant part:
7 In 2024, before filing his motion to dismiss, Miguel moved to stay or abate the Texas proceeding until Mexico’s Supreme Court resolved Evangelina’s amparo petition. Our record does not reflect a ruling on that motion.
9 9. This Court further concludes that comity requires deference to the current proceedings pending in Mexico regarding the challenge to the validity of the Settlement Agreement and the pending appeal of the dismissal of the nullity claim. The Court’s conclusion is based on its review of all submissions and arguments of the parties, and all evidence presented, including testimony presented at the hearing conducted on June 3, 2024. The Court’s conclusion is also based on the applicable law regarding deference to judicial proceedings in foreign countries pursuant to international comity. See, e.g., Acain [v. Int’l Plant Services, LLC, 449 S.W.3d 655, 660–61 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, pet. denied)]. *** 14. The Court concluded that Mexico has an interest in determining the validity of the Settlement Agreement signed October 26, 2022 and the appeal of the dismissal of the Nullity claim challenging the validity of the 1959 Divorce Decree, as the parties are Mexican citizens, actively litigating the validity of both of the Settlement agreement and the appeal of the dismissal of the Nullity claim in Mexico and the active status of those proceedings in Mexico warranted a comity deference. 15. The Court concludes that it should exercise its discretion and dismiss the above-captioned cause, without prejudice, until the issue of the validity of the October 26, 2022 Settlement Agreement and reinstatement of the Nullity claim’s challenge of the 1959 Divorce Decree’s validity have been fully and finally adjudicated by the Mexican Court. Evangelina timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that principles of
international comity warranted allowing the pending Mexican proceedings
concerning the 1959 Mexican decree to conclude before the Texas case continued.
10 A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law.
Texas courts are generally bound to exercise jurisdiction vested in them by
the Texas Constitution and cannot delegate their judicial prerogative where
jurisdiction exists. Acain v. Int’l Plant Services, LLC, 449 S.W.3d 655, 659 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, pet. denied). But Texas courts may, in appropriate
circumstances, pause or dismiss Texas proceedings in a particular case according to
principles of international comity.8 See id. at 659–60; Fuentes I, 555 S.W.3d at 160
(“Texas courts may defer to the sovereignty of foreign nations according to
principles of international comity.”).
“Although courts in this country have long recognized the principles of
international comity and have advocated them in order to promote cooperation and
reciprocity with foreign lands, comity remains a rule of practice, convenience, and
expediency rather than of law.” Next Invs., LLC v. Bank of China, 12 F.4th 119, 131
(2d Cir. 2021) (quoting source and internal quotation marks omitted).
We apply an abuse of discretion standard of review to a trial court’s decision
to invoke principles of comity and decline to proceed in a case, pending the
8 International comity “is the recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens or of other persons who are under the protection of its laws.” Acain, 449 S.W.3d at 659 (quoting Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 164 (1895)); see also TEX. R. CIV. P. 308b(a)(1) (“Comity means the recognition by a court of one jurisdiction of the laws and judicial decisions of another jurisdiction.”). 11 resolution of ongoing foreign proceedings. See Fuentes I, 555 S.W.3d at 160
(collecting cases). In this context, “a trial court abuses its discretion if it acts
arbitrarily, unreasonably, or without regard to guiding legal principles.” Acain, 449
S.W.3d at 659. In matters involving factual disputes, “a trial court does not abuse its
discretion if it bases its decision on conflicting evidence and some evidence supports
its decision.” Id. (quoting source and internal quotation marks omitted).
Under our Court’s Acain precedent, when a trial court considers, under
principles of international comity, declining to presently proceed, we look to
Sections 402 and 403 of the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law.9 Id. at
660–61. Section 402 sets forth instances in which a state has jurisdiction to prescribe
law.10 But under Section 403, “[e]ven when one of the bases for jurisdiction under
9 This inquiry is distinct from the inquiry required before a Texas court may recognize or give effect to a foreign judgment. Before a Texas court gives effect to a foreign judgment, it must determine whether recognition would be consistent with due process principles and Texas public policy. See Fuentes I, 555 S.W.3d at 154–55, 161; Ashfaq, 467 S.W.3d at 541–43. Additionally, Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 308b governs the procedure for determining whether to recognize or enforce “a judgment or arbitration award based on foreign law in a suit involving a marriage relationship or a parent-child relationship under the Family Code.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 308b(b)(1). Other statutory schemes govern other situations. See, e.g., TEX. FAM. CODE §§ 159.102(23); 159.601–159.616 (procedures for registration, enforcement, and modification of child-support orders rendered by other American states or foreign countries); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 36A.004 (standards for recognition of foreign-country money judgments). 10 Section 402 provides: Subject to § 403, a state has jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to:
12 § 402 is present, a state may not exercise jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect
to a person or activity having connections with another state when the exercise of
such jurisdiction is unreasonable.” Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law
§ 403(1) (A.L.I. 1987). Thus, with a basis for jurisdiction under Section 402, the
question for the trial court becomes whether presently proceeding in Texas would
be unreasonable under Section 403.
Section 403 identifies the following factors as relevant to determining
reasonableness:
(a) the link of the activity to the territory of the regulating state; (b) the connections, such as nationality, residence, or economic activity, between the regulating state and the person principally responsible for the activity regulated; (c) the character of the activity to be regulated, the importance of regulation to the regulating state, the extent to which other states
(1) (a) conduct that, wholly or in substantial part, takes place within its territory; (b) the status of persons, or interests in things, present within its territory; (c) conduct outside its territory that has or is intended to have substantial effect within its territory; (2) the activities, interests, status, or relations of its nationals outside as well as within its territory; and (3) certain conduct outside its territory by persons not its nationals that is directed against the security of the state or against a limited class of other state interests. Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 402 (A.L.I. 1987).
13 regulate such activities, and the degree to which the desirability of such regulation is generally accepted; (d) the existence of justified expectations that might be protected or hurt by the regulation; (e) the importance of the regulation to the international political, legal, or economic system; (f) the extent to which the regulation is consistent with the traditions of the international system; (g) the extent to which another state may have an interest in regulating the activity; and (h) the likelihood of conflict with regulation by another state.
Id. § 403(2).
The Restatement factors are not exhaustive, and their weight depends on the
facts of the particular case. Id. § 403 cmt. b. The burden falls on the party urging
comity. See Acain, 449 S.W.3d at 664; Int’l Transactions, Ltd. v. Embotelladora
Agral Regiomontana, SA de CV, 347 F.3d 589, 594 (5th Cir. 2003).
Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 308b, in turn, governs the procedure for
determining whether, as a matter of comity, to recognize or enforce a judgment based
on foreign law “in a suit involving a marriage relationship or a parent-child
relationship under the Family Code.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 308b(b)(1).11 Under that rule
and related law, before the 1959 Mexican divorce decree at issue could be given
effect here, the trial court would need to determine whether to recognize it. But here,
11 The Rule has two exceptions that are inapplicable here. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 308b(b)(2), (3).
14 the trial court did not yet reach that determination; it instead decided as a matter of
comity to decline to continue with the Texas proceedings for now (and thus to defer
a determination on whether to recognize the Mexican decree) to first allow Mexico
to conclude its own ongoing proceedings concerning that decree. Rule 308b(f)
enables the trial court to issue any order necessary to preserve the principles of
comity while protecting against violations of constitutional rights and public policy.
TEX. R. CIV. P. 308b(f)(3).
B. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that comity supports declining to proceed in Texas now, to allow the ongoing Mexican litigation concerning the 1959 decree to conclude.
The question before us is whether the trial court abused its discretion in
determining that comity supports declining to proceed in Texas, for now, to allow
the ongoing Mexican proceedings concerning the Mexican decree to conclude before
Texas proceedings continue. On this record, the court did not abuse its discretion.
A valid marriage is a prerequisite to a Texas divorce. Ex parte Threet, 333
S.W.2d 361, 363–64 (Tex. 1960). As we explained in Fuentes I, “[a] valid marriage
must exist for a trial court to have subject-matter jurisdiction over a suit for the
spouses’ divorce,” and if the marriage was previously dissolved, then “the court
lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to again dissolve that marriage.” Fuentes I, 555
S.W.3d at 153.
15 Evangelina met her initial burden to establish a prima facie marriage by
producing evidence that she and Miguel married in New Mexico in 1953. See Ex
parte Threet, 333 S.W.2d at 364. The dispute is not whether the parties ever married,
but whether that marriage continued to exist when Evangelina filed this Texas
divorce action in 2014.
As explained, Miguel contends the marriage was dissolved by a 1959 decree
issued by a Mexican court. Evangelina disputes the decree’s validity. She contends
that it was procured without notice and due process, as well as through irregular or
fraudulent proceedings. She urges the Texas court not to recognize the Mexican
decree. Unless and until Texas recognizes that foreign decree, this record reflects a
marriage and no divorce.
Apart from the Texas arguments and issues, the Mexican divorce decree and
related Mexican process (including a settlement agreement and nullity action
concerning that decree) remain the subject of pending litigation in Mexico.
That is, at the time that the trial court ruled based on principles of comity,
there was ongoing litigation in Mexico concerning the validity of the very Mexican
decree that, in turn, the parties are fighting about in Texas.
Indeed, as explained above, Evangelina challenged the 1959 decree in Mexico
through a nullity proceeding. That proceeding has generated substantial litigation in
the Mexican courts. In 2022, the parties executed a settlement agreement in Mexico
16 that Miguel contends resolved the Mexican litigation. But Evangelina disputes the
validity of that agreement and has pursued further proceedings in Mexico
challenging the settlement and seeking reinstatement of her nullity action. Those
proceedings were pending at the time of the trial court’s ruling at issue.12
The possible outcomes of the Mexican proceedings underscore their
significance to this Texas case. If the Mexican courts were to determine that the 1959
decree is invalid, then Miguel could not use that (invalid) decree in Texas to defeat
the existence of a marriage. That would resolve this 1959 Mexican decree issue, and
Evangelina’s Texas divorce filing would proceed (we offer no comment on the
merits of that proceeding).
If, on the other hand, the Mexican courts determine that the decree, the 2022
settlement agreement, or the withdrawal of the nullity action is valid under Mexican
law, then the 1959 decree dispute would continue in Texas court. We emphasize that
that determination would not itself end the Texas inquiry. Before a Texas court can
12 Miguel filed a Motion for Judicial Notice, asserting that, while this appeal was pending, the Mexican proceedings concluded. Evangelina opposed the motion. At oral argument, the parties appeared to acknowledge that the Mexican proceedings remain ongoing. In any event, we need not resolve the motion to decide this appeal. The relevant question is whether the trial court abused its discretion based on the record before it when it ruled, and the Mexican proceedings were undisputedly ongoing when the trial court made the decision before us. See Brazoria Civic Club v. Brazoria Cnty. Appraisal Dist., 694 S.W.3d 854, 866 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2024, no pet.) (“An appellate court’s review of the merits of a trial court’s ruling is limited to the record in the trial court when the trial court ruled, and the appellate court does not consider events that occurred after the trial court’s ruling.”).
17 give effect to a foreign judgment, the Texas court must determine that the judgment
was obtained in a manner consistent with our notions of due process;13 it must also
assess whether recognition would violate Texas policy. See Fuentes I, 555 S.W.3d
at 154–55, 161; Ashfaq, 467 S.W.3d at 541–43; see also TEX. R. CIV. P 308b.
“Recognition of a foreign judgment in the absence of due process constitutes an
abuse of discretion.” Fuentes I, 555 S.W.3d at 154. Indeed, “due process requires
that no other jurisdiction shall give effect, even as a matter of comity, to a judgment
elsewhere acquired without due process.” Id. (quoting Ashfaq, 467 S.W.3d at
13 This examination looks to our understanding of constitutionally adequate process. See, e.g., In re Marriage of San Emeterio, No. 13-24-00255-CV, 2026 WL 961754, at *3, *6–7 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Apr. 9, 2026, no pet.) (collecting cases and explaining that “[d]ue process at a minimum requires notice and an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” (quoting source omitted)); In re Marriage of Sabir & Javed, No. 05-23-00837-CV, 2024 WL 3507200, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas, July 23, 2024, no pet.) (“While we agree that the Pakistani court was not required to comply with Texas law or procedure, we also conclude that the record lacks evidence of any notice to Wife of the Pakistani proceedings until after a judgment was rendered, and therefore, Wife was deprived of minimum due process.”); see also Int’l Transactions, 347 F.3d at 594 (“Notice is an element of our notion of due process and the United States will not enforce a judgment obtained without the bare minimum requirements of notice.”); Bank Melli Iran v. Pahlavi, 58 F.3d 1406, 1411–13 (9th Cir. 1995) (refusing to enforce Iranian judgment and concluding that Iranian system did not comport with due process standards); Turner Entm’t Co. v. Degeto Film GmbH, 25 F.3d 1512, 1519–20 (11th Cir. 1994) (international comity turns on whether the foreign judgment was rendered by a competent court under proceedings consistent with “civilized jurisprudence,” with an opportunity to defend that satisfies “American notions of due process”); In re Application of Alves Braga, 789 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1308 (S.D. Fla. 2011). This inquiry ensures that, if we are recognizing a foreign judgment, adequate process existed underlying that foreign judgment.
18 541);14 accord In re E.H., 450 S.W.3d 166, 172 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
2014, pet. denied); see also Int’l Transactions, 347 F.3d at 594 (“Under the law of
the United States, a foreign judgment cannot be enforced in a U.S. court unless it
was obtained under a system with procedures compatible with the requirements of
due process of law.”). Thus, the due process and other appropriate inquiries would
need to occur in Texas before the decree could be recognized or enforced.15
In short, the ongoing Mexican proceedings do not necessarily resolve critical
questions for the Texas divorce case. But they could do so.
The trial court did not attempt to resolve the question of whether the 1959
decree is valid. The court did not address whether the decree was procured in a
14 The Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution “does not require a domestic court to give binding effect to a foreign country judgment when the validity of the judgment is disputed.” Fuentes I, 555 S.W.3d at 154; see also Reading & Bates Constr. Co. v. Baker Energy Res. Corp., 976 S.W.2d 702, 714–15 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. denied) (“Texas, like its sister states, is not constitutionally required to give full faith and credit to the judgments of foreign countries.” (emphasis in original)); In re E.H., 450 S.W.3d 166, 170 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. denied) (“Generally, however, states are not required to give full faith and credit to foreign country judgments.”); Schacht v. Schacht, 435 S.W.2d 197, 202 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1968, no writ) (declining to recognize Mexican divorce decree where wife was not served with process, and explaining that Full Faith and Credit Clause of U.S. Constitution “does not require that binding effect and validity be given a judgment of a foreign country such as Mexico, more especially where such judgments are shown to be invalid”). 15 As explained, Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 308b generally applies to the recognition or enforcement of a foreign judgment in a suit involving a marriage relationship under the Family Code.
19 manner consistent with due process principles. Nor did the court purport to recognize
or enforce the decree.
Instead, it invoked comity principles to allow the pending Mexican
proceedings to resolve before Texas proceedings (including Texas’s determination
of whether to recognize that Mexican decree) continued. On this record, that decision
was within the trial court’s discretion.
An examination of the Section 403 Restatement factors supports the trial
court’s comity decision. The trial court acted within its discretion in concluding that
it would be unreasonable to currently proceed with the litigation in Texas, while
litigation concerning the very decree at issue here remained ongoing in Mexico. This
inquiry turns on reasonableness. See Acain, 449 S.W.3d at 660.
To begin, one relevant Restatement factor is the extent to which another state
may have an interest in regulating the activity (the seventh factor). The trial court
could have reasonably found that this factor favors comity. Mexico’s interest is
substantial because the Mexican proceedings concern matters connected to Mexican
law and judicial authority. The 1959 decree at issue (and subject to challenge) was
rendered by a Mexican court; the nullity proceeding concerning it was filed there;
the settlement agreement and withdrawal occurred in connection with that litigation;
and the parties are Mexican citizens. Mexico has a strong interest in regulating these
matters relating to its own decree. Texas, on the other hand, could address the
20 Mexican decree and whether to recognize it here under Texas’s recognition inquiry
(if the decree is not first invalidated in Mexico) after Mexico concludes its process.
So too with another Restatement factor, the character of the activity to be
regulated, the importance of regulation to the regulating state, the extent to which
other states regulate such activities, and the degree to which the desirability of such
regulation is generally accepted (the third factor). Mexico has a substantial sovereign
interest in the character of the complained-of activity—the validity of a divorce
decree issued in Mexico—and in supervising litigation over a related settlement
agreement and withdrawal filed in its judicial system.
The trial court also could have reasonably found that the likelihood of conflict
factor (the eighth factor) favors comity. If both Texas and Mexico are addressing the
same decree at the same time, there is a real risk of some inconsistent determination.
That risk supports temporarily allowing the Mexican process concerning the decree
to proceed before Texas determines what effect, if any, the Mexican decree should
have here. See Turner Entm’t Co. v. Degeto Film GmbH, 25 F.3d 1512, 1521 (11th
Cir. 1994) (“[T]he prospect of ‘dueling courts,’ conflicting judgments, and attempts
to enforce conflicting judgments raise major concerns of international comity.”).
Additionally, the trial court could reasonably have determined that parties’
justified expectations (the fourth factor) support comity. The validity of the decree
has been litigated in Mexico for years. Evangelina pursued the Mexican nullity
21 proceeding, obtained relief in the Mexican appellate process allowing that challenge
to proceed, and then pursued further proceedings challenging the subsequent
settlement and withdrawal of her nullity action. The parties could justifiably expect
Mexican courts to conclude their process.
Other factors are more neutral—but they do not weigh strongly against comity
or show an abuse of discretion here. The trial court could reasonably have
determined that first Restatement factor, the link of the activity to Texas, was neutral
or, at the least, did not weigh heavily against comity. Texas has an obvious interest
in this divorce proceeding: Evangelina filed suit in Harris County, the case has been
pending here for years, and the parties have Texas property and other Texas
connections. But the specific issues on which the trial court premised its comity
determination concern the validity of a Mexican decree, a nullity action filed in
Mexico, a settlement agreement executed in connection with that Mexican litigation,
and the authority and conduct of counsel in those proceedings. Those matters are
substantially connected to Mexico.
The same is true as to the second factor—the connections of the parties to
Texas and Mexico. Both parties are Mexican citizens, and the Mexican proceedings
involve the validity of a Mexican decree and related proceedings between those
parties. Evangelina’s residence in Texas and Miguel’s Texas contacts weigh in the
opposite direction. But they do not eliminate Mexico’s substantial connection here.
22 The final Restatement factors (the fifth and sixth factors) do not alter this
dynamic. Nothing in this record suggests the dispute implicates the international
political, legal, or economic system in the manner contemplated by these factors.
Nor does either party identify a practice or convention that would affect the analysis.
Moreover, as noted and in addition to this analysis, in Fuentes I, our Court
instructed the trial court, on remand, to consider principles of comity and the
ongoing proceedings in Mexico. 555 S.W.3d at 161 (“[T]he trial court must
determine on remand whether comity requires deference to the current Mexican
proceedings addressing the 1959 divorce decree’s validity.”). Our Court also
instructed the trial court to “apply the requirements of Texas Rule of Civil Procedure
308b in making this determination.” Id. Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 308b(f)(3),
in turn, enabled the trial court to issue any order necessary to preserve the principles
of comity while protecting against violations of constitutional rights and public
policy. TEX. R. CIV. P. 308b(f)(3).16
* * *
In total—and emphasizing that proceedings concerning the validity of the
very Mexican decree in dispute here were ongoing in Mexico at the time the trial
16 As explained, Rule 308b sets the procedure for determining whether, under comity principles, to recognize or enforce a judgment based on foreign law in a Texas family-law suit. This trial court did not yet purport to decide whether to recognize a judgment. It invoked comity principles to allow Mexico to first conclude its ongoing litigation concerning its decree.
23 court decided this issue—we cannot say that the trial court acted arbitrarily,
unreasonably, or without reference to guiding legal principles in concluding that
proceeding here now would be unreasonable. See Acain, 449 S.W.3d at 659. This is
a reasonableness analysis layered on a reasonable analysis. The trial court did not
abuse its discretion in declining to proceed now.
C. We remand as to the remedy.
We remand, however, for the trial court to address the appropriate remedy for
its comity determination and to consider whether a temporary stay or abatement
(rather than dismissal) may be proper in this circumstance. At the June 2024 hearing,
Evangelina’s counsel stated that, if the trial court was going to take any action on
the basis of comity, it should abate the case rather than dismiss it. Moreover, as
explained, the trial court did not yet make a determination about whether to
ultimately recognize the Mexican decree; contrary to Miguel’s urging, the trial court
did not recognize the decree and then dismiss this case because of it. The trial court
instead elected, as a matter of comity, to decline to proceed, for now, to allow
Mexico to resolve its ongoing litigation concerning the decree. Rule 308b(f)
empowered the trial court to issue “any order necessary to preserve the principles of
comity . . . while protecting against violations of constitutional rights and public
policy.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 308b(f)(3). In light of these considerations, on this record,
an examination of potential remedies is warranted.
24 Our Court has explained that a trial court may abate (or stay) or dismiss based
on comity, depending on the circumstances. See Fuentes I, 555 S.W.3d at 160. With
abatement, the case is paused and “all proceedings in a suit” are “suspen[ded],” but
all filings remain part of the file. 3V, Inc. v. JTS Enters., Inc., 40 S.W.3d 533, 539
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, no pet.). A stay likewise pauses for some
period of time. See, e.g., Crown Leasing Corp. v. Sims, 92 S.W.3d 924, 927 (Tex.
App.—Texarkana 2002, no pet.). With a dismissal without prejudice, on the other
hand, when the foreign proceedings resolve, the parties would have to begin anew.
CTL/Thompson Tex., LLC v. Starwood Homeowner’s Ass’n, Inc., 461 S.W.3d 627,
630 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2015, pet. denied) (“[A] dismissal without prejudice
means that the same claims may be refiled in an entirely new cause.”).
When a trial court recognizes a foreign judgment, for instance, dismissal may,
at times, follow. Take the following example. If a trial court recognizes a foreign
divorce decree—after going through the Rule 308b process and after concluding that
the foreign decree satisfied due process principles—then at that point there would
be no marriage to dissolve, and the Texas court would lack jurisdiction. See Ashfaq,
467 S.W.3d at 544 (holding that trial court acted within its discretion in recognizing
Pakistani divorce as valid as matter of comity and affirming dismissal); In re
Marriage of San Emeterio, No. 13-24-00255-CV, 2026 WL 961754, at *1, *6–7
(Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Apr. 9, 2026, no pet.) (affirming dismissal
25 for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction because trial court did not abuse discretion in
recognizing Mexican divorce judgment).
But this record does not reflect the recognition of a foreign judgment. Nor
does this case involve a situation in which the foreign proceedings have concluded.
Instead, it is precisely because the foreign proceedings are ongoing that the trial court
reached its comity decision (and why the trial court had discretion to do so).
This is likewise not a situation in which the conclusion of the foreign
proceedings would resolve the Texas litigation. To the contrary, as explained, if the
1959 decree is invalidated in Mexico, the divorce proceedings would continue here
in Texas. And if the decree is not invalidated in Mexico, then a Texas court would
still need to determine whether to recognize that decree in Texas. Thus, the case
would need to come back to Texas regardless. Moreover, should the Texas court
decline to recognize the decree (for instance, were the court to conclude that it did
not satisfy our notions of due process), then the Texas divorce proceedings would
continue.
This litigation has been ongoing in Texas for approximately ten years. It has
gone up and down to our Court, and substantial work has gone into the case. Those
points might potentially support a temporary stay or abatement rather than dismissal.
See, e.g., Turner Entm’t Co., 25 F.3d at 1523 (ordering stay rather than dismissal
where German court had rendered judgment but appeal and fee determination
26 remained pending); Posner v. Essex Ins. Co., Ltd., 178 F.3d 1209, 1224 (11th Cir.
1999) (concluding comity was appropriate but trial court should have stayed, rather
than dismissed, claims over which it had jurisdiction); Royal & Sun All. Ins. Co. of
Can. v. Century Int’l Arms, Inc., 466 F.3d 88, 96 (2d Cir. 2006) (“As a lesser
intrusion on the principle of obligatory jurisdiction, which might permit the district
court a window to determine whether the foreign action will in fact offer an efficient
vehicle for fairly resolving all the rights of the parties, . . . a stay is an alternative
that normally should be considered before a comity-based dismissal is
entertained.”); cf. Griffith v. Griffith, 341 S.W.3d 43, 54 (Tex. App.—San Antonio
2011, no pet.) (“Under the doctrine of comity, a Texas court would usually stay its
proceeding pending adjudication of the first filed suit pending in another state.”).17
Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 43.2 empowers courts of appeals to affirm
or reverse judgments in whole or in part, to modify and affirm as modified, and to
reverse and remand for further proceedings. See TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2; see also Crown
Leasing, 92 S.W.3d at 928 (affirming on comity rationale but modifying remedy:
“[B]ased on the principles of comity, a stay is the proper form of relief when two
identical suits are filed and pending in different states. . . . Accordingly, we modify
17 See Farmers Ins. Co. v. Cooper, 916 S.W.2d 698, 701 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1996, no writ) (noting “(1) promoting justice; (2) avoiding prejudice; and (3) promoting judicial economy” as factors on whether to abate extracontractual causes of action).
27 the trial court’s judgment to institute a stay, as opposed to an abatement, and we
affirm the judgment as modified.”).
Here, the record does not reflect adequate development of this remedy issue
by the trial court. We reverse in part as to the order of dismissal and remand for the
trial court to examine potential remedies under the circumstances.
CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court’s decision to decline to proceed now, in light of
comity principles and the ongoing litigation in Mexico. We reverse the portion of
the trial court’s order dismissing the case, and we remand for the court to assess the
appropriate remedy.
On remand, the trial court may conduct further proceedings as necessary and
consider the current status of the Mexican proceedings. If those proceedings remain
pending and the court determines that a stay or abatement is warranted, it may
require periodic status reports, identify the Mexican proceedings whose resolution
will govern the duration of the suspension, or lift the stay or abatement when those
proceedings conclude or when suspension is otherwise no longer warranted. When
the relevant Mexican proceedings conclude, or if the trial court otherwise determines
that further suspension is no longer warranted, the court may proceed with the case
in accordance with this opinion and applicable Texas law.
28 Finally, we note that the trial court appears to have misunderstood the due
process inquiry relating to the recognition of a foreign judgment; the court seemed
to understand that inquiry to focus only on Mexican law. Going forward, we instruct
the court to proceed in accordance with this opinion.
We affirm the portion of the trial court’s order affording comity to Mexico’s
ongoing proceedings, we reverse the portion of the trial court’s order dismissing the
case, and we remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Jennifer Caughey Justice
Panel consists of Justices Gunn, Caughey, and Morgan.
Justice Morgan, concurring.