UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA _________________________________________ ) EVANGELICAL COMMUNITY ) HOSPITAL, et al., ) ) Plaintiffs, ) ) v. ) ) Case No. 21-cv-01368 (APM) XAVIER BECERRA, ) ) Defendant. ) _________________________________________ )
MEMORANDUM OPINION
I.
Plaintiffs Evangelical Community Hospital (“Evangelical”) and Memorial Healthcare
Center (“Memorial”) are two acute-care hospitals that participate in the Medicare program.
Medicare funding is provided to Plaintiffs in the form of a reimbursement from the Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services (“CMS”). To obtain a reimbursement, providers such as
Plaintiffs submit a cost report to a Medicare contractor, who reviews the report and determines the
amount of reimbursement to which the provider is entitled.
Plaintiffs each received four separate reimbursement determinations from their Medicare
contractor covering the cost reporting periods ending in December 2008, 2009, 2010, and 2012
(for Memorial) and in June 2011, 2012, 2013, and 2014 (for Evangelical). Finding fault with the
reimbursement determinations, Plaintiffs initiated a formal hearing process by making a request
for a hearing (“RFH”) before the relevant administrative body tasked with adjudicating Medicare
reimbursement disputes, the Provider Reimbursement Review Board (“the Board”). Each of
Plaintiffs’ hearing requests raised four distinct issues, which were identical across all eight of the hearing requests they made. One of those issues, what the parties referred to as “Issue 4,” is the
subject of the instant action. 1 While the scope and specificity of Issue 4 is contested, Issue 4 raised
the specter of an “incorrect[] calculati[on]” made when determining Plaintiffs’ entitlement to a
Disproportionate Share Hospital payment—an additional reimbursement available to providers
who serve a high percentage of low-income patients.
Through the administrative hearing process, Plaintiffs sought expedited judicial review
(“EJR”) of their claims—an expedited pathway to federal court, through which Plaintiffs can
obtain review of questions of law over which the Board lacks authority. The Board denied
Plaintiffs’ EJR requests and dismissed Issue 4 from all eight appeals. The Board first determined
that Plaintiffs’ issue statements concerning Issue 4 in their RFH were overly vague, in violation of
the agency’s regulations and the Board’s rules. The Board found, in the alternative, that to the
extent Plaintiffs’ RFH could be interpreted to encompass the more granular set of issues discussed
in Plaintiffs’ final moving papers before the Board, Plaintiffs’ failure to raise those issues in their
preliminary moving papers rendered the issues abandoned.
Plaintiffs filed suit before this court, asserting that the Board violated the Administrative
Procedure Act (“APA”) by (1) improperly narrowing the Board’s jurisdiction, as determined by
Congress in the Medicare Act; and (2) arbitrarily and capriciously applying the agency’s
regulations and the Board’s rules to Plaintiffs’ claims. Plaintiffs also seek a writ of mandamus for
the same alleged violations. Defendant in this matter is Secretary of Health and Human Services
Xavier Becerra, in his official capacity.
1 In six of the eight appeals, Plaintiffs withdrew, transferred, or dismissed all other issues, aside from Issue 4, from the appeals. See Def.’s Cross-Mot. for Summ. J., ECF No. 18 [hereinafter Def.’s Cross-Mot.], at 8. In the other two appeals, Plaintiff Memorial transferred two issues from the appeals, leaving Issue 4 and one other issue active. Id.; see also Compl. for Jud. Review, ECF No. 1 [hereinafter Compl.], Ex. 1, ECF No. 1-1 [hereinafter Ex. 1], at 2 n.2. Plaintiff Memorial did not seek EJR on the other issue, and it is not before the court. Def.’s Cross-Mot. at 8–9; Ex. 1 at 2–5.
2 Before the court is Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment and Defendant’s Cross-
Motion for Summary Judgment. See Pls.’ Mot. for Summ. J., ECF No. 16 [hereinafter Pls.’ Mot.];
Def.’s Cross-Mot. for Summ. J., ECF No. 18 [hereinafter Def.’s Cross-Mot.]. As discussed below,
Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that the Board acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner in
denying Plaintiffs’ EJR request. Accordingly, Defendant’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment
is granted, and Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment is denied.
II.
Under the Medicare Prospective Payment System, hospitals that provide inpatient services
to covered patients receive payment at a predetermined amount per discharged patient, irrespective
of the actual costs the hospital incurs. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d). However, the statute also provides
for certain payment adjustments beyond the standard per patient payment.
The subject of Plaintiffs’ RFH is an adjustment known as the Disproportionate Share
Hospital adjustment. This additional reimbursement is available to hospitals that serve a
disproportionate number of low-income patients. See id. § 1395ww(d)(5)(F). A provider’s
Disproportionate Share Hospital adjustment is determined by calculating the hospital’s
Disproportionate Patient Percentage—the sum of two fractions commonly known as the Medicaid
Fraction and the Medicare-SSI Fraction. See id. § 1395ww(d)(5)(F)(vi). The Medicaid Fraction
reflects the number of inpatient hospital days attributable to patients eligible for medical assistance
under a state Medicaid plan but who are not entitled to Medicare Part A benefits. Id.
§ 1395ww(d)(5)(F)(vi)(II). The Medicare-SSI Fraction captures the number of inpatient hospital
days attributable to patients who are entitled to both Medicare Part A and Supplemental Social
Security Income (“SSI”) benefits. Id. § 1395ww(d)(5)(F)(vi)(I).
3 At the close of each fiscal year, a hospital submits to a Medicare contractor a cost report
that accounts for its costs during a particular reporting period. See 42 C.F.R. § 405.1801(b) (2022).
The Medicare contractor is responsible for issuing a Notice of Program Reimbursement, which
informs the provider of their final reimbursement payment for the fiscal year. See id. § 405.1803.
If a provider is dissatisfied with the payment amount, then the provider may ultimately appeal to
the Board via the administrative process set forth in the Medicare statute and attendant regulations.
See 42 U.S.C. § 1395oo(a); 42 C.F.R. § 405.1835 (2022).
The Medicare statute lays out three jurisdictional prerequisites that must be met for the
Board to have authority to hear an appeal:
(1) [the] provider . . . is dissatisfied with a final determination of the Secretary as to the amount of the payment [they received];
...
(2) the amount in controversy is $10,000 or more; and
(3) [the] provider files a request for a hearing within 180 days after notice of the intermediary’s final determination.
42 U.S.C. § 1395oo(a).
Final decisions of the Board are subject to judicial review pursuant to the Medicare statute.
See 42 U.S.C. § 1395oo(f)(1); 42 C.F.R. § 405.1875 (2022); id. § 405.1877 (2014). As relevant
here, the statute also provides for EJR of a legal question if the Board has jurisdiction over the
appeal but determines that it lacks the authority to decide the question of law. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1395oo(f)(1); 42 C.F.R. § 405.1842 (2022). Importantly, the Secretary and the Board establish
the procedural rules governing appeals to the Board, which, as pertinent to this case, are discussed
in greater detail below. See generally 42 C.F.R. §§ 405.1801–405.1873 (2022).
4 III.
Under the APA, final agency action can be set aside only if it is “arbitrary, capricious, an
abuse of discretion,” “otherwise not in accordance with law,” or “unsupported by substantial
evidence.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), (E); Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc., v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402,
413–14 (1971), abrogated on other grounds by Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977). The
Secretary’s compliance with the Medicare statute and regulations is reviewable under the arbitrary
and capricious standard, and the adequacy of record support for the Board’s decision is reviewable
under the substantial evidence standard, both of which “involve the same level of scrutiny.” Mem’l
Hosp./Adair Cty. Health Ctr., Inc. v. Bowen, 829 F.2d 111, 117 (D.C. Cir. 1987); see 42 U.S.C.
§ 1395oo(f)(1). Under the arbitrary and capricious standard, final agency action may be
invalidated only if it is based on an unlawful interpretation of the statute or regulations or is “not
rational and based on consideration of the relevant factors.” FCC v. Nat’l Citizens Comm. for
Broad., 436 U.S. 775, 803 (1978); see HCA Health Servs. of Okla., Inc. v. Shalala, 27 F.3d 614,
616–17 (D.C. Cir. 1994). Substantial evidence is “something less than the weight of the evidence,
and the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent an
administrative agency’s finding from being supported by substantial evidence.” Consolo v. Fed.
Mar. Comm’n, 383 U.S. 607, 619–20 (1966).
IV.
Plaintiffs advance two claims under the APA and also petition the court for a writ of
mandamus. First, Plaintiffs assert that the Board’s dismissal of Plaintiffs’ Issue 4 claims was
jurisdictional and improperly narrowed the Board’s mandatory jurisdiction as set forth in the
Medicare statute. In the alternative, Plaintiffs assert that the Board’s application of its rules to the
facts of their claims was arbitrary and capricious. Finally, Plaintiffs have petitioned the court for
5 a writ of mandamus stemming from the same facts upon which their APA claims are premised.
The court will address each claim in turn.
A.
The court begins with Plaintiffs’ APA challenge asserting that the Board’s decision
improperly narrowed the Board’s jurisdiction. Plaintiffs argue that the Board “characterized the
dismissals as jurisdictional,” and as such, “[t]he Board’s dismissals impermissibly constrict[ed]
Congress’s jurisdictional mandate.” Pls.’ Reply in Supp. of Pls.’ Mot., ECF No. 20 [hereinafter
Pls.’ Reply], at 1–2. Defendant counters that the Board’s decision was not jurisdictional, but
instead clearly rested on procedural grounds short of the merits. Def.’s Cross-Mot., Mem. of
P. & A. in Supp. of Def.’s Cross-Mot., ECF No. 18, [hereinafter Def.’s Mem.], at 15–19.
Defendant further argues that the Board’s procedural rules are proper under the Medicare statute’s
“broad [grant of] authority to establish procedural rules for purposes of managing its substantial
docket of appeals.” Def.’s Mem. at 13. The court agrees with Defendant that the Board’s dismissal
of Plaintiffs’ claims was on procedural, not jurisdictional, grounds and was appropriate under the
Secretary’s and Board’s authority to establish procedural rules governing the appeals process.
The Board may set procedural rules governing its appeals docket that are “not inconsistent
with the provisions” of the Medicare statute. 42 U.S.C. § 1395oo(e); see Bethesda Hosp. Ass’n v.
Bowen, 485 U.S. 399, 404 (1988). The Medicare statute vests the Board with “full power and
authority to make rules and establish procedures, not inconsistent with the [statute] or regulations
of the Secretary, which are necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of [the statute].”
42 U.S.C. § 1395oo(e). The Secretary’s regulations also reflect the Board’s authority to manage
its docket. They provide that “[i]f a provider fails to meet a . . . requirement established by the
6 Board in a rule or order,” the Board is empowered to “[d]ismiss the appeal with prejudice.”
42 C.F.R. § 405.1868(b) (2022).
At issue in this case are the Board’s rules regarding the form and substance of a provider’s
initial request to initiate the hearing process. The regulations require that this initial request for
hearing, or RFH, must provide an explanation of a provider’s dissatisfaction “[f]or each specific
item under appeal.” Id. § 405.1835(b)(2). Furthermore, the explanation for each specific item
must address “[w]hy the provider believes [the] Medicare payment is incorrect” or why it “is
unable to determine whether [the] Medicare payment is correct,” as well as “[h]ow and why the
provider believes [the] Medicare payment must be determined differently.” Id.
§ 405.1835(b)(2)(i)–(ii).
In addition, the Board’s rules contain special content requirements for an RFH raising
issues that contain multiple subcomponents. In such cases, Board rules direct the provider to
appeal “each contested component . . . as a separate issue and describe[] [it] as narrowly as
possible.” Def.’s Mot., Ex. A, ECF No. 18-1 [hereinafter Board Rules], § 8.1. As an example, the
Board rules specifically list an appeal challenging a Disproportionate Share Hospital payment
adjustment—which was the subject of Plaintiffs’ RFH—as a “common example[]” of an appeal
involving issues with “multiple components.” Board Rules § 8.2.
Nothing in the rules or regulations at issue modifies or supplements the jurisdictional
requirements for Board appeals that Congress established in the Medicare statute. The court notes
its agreement with Plaintiffs that if the Board’s decisions in these appeals were in fact
jurisdictional, then they would plainly violate the APA. And, to be fair, Plaintiffs are not without
reason for thinking that the Board dismissed Issue 4 on jurisdictional grounds. The Board did
identify as one of the reasons for dismissal that it “lack[ed] the requisite jurisdiction under
7 42 C.F.R. § 405.1842(f)(2).” Compl., Ex. 1, ECF No. 1-1 [hereinafter Ex. 1], at 11. But the court
finds that, when its decision is read as a whole, the Board’s references to the term “jurisdiction”
are merely the “result of sloppy drafting” rather than an actual narrowing of the Board’s
jurisdiction. Akron Gen. Med. Ctr. v. Azar, 414 F. Supp. 3d 73, 80 (D.D.C. 2019), aff’d, 836
F. App’x 13 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (citation omitted) (finding that the Board’s jurisdictional references
were best understood as a “loose[] and imprecise[] . . . kind of shorthand meaning ‘disposing of
an issue short of deciding its merits’”).
The Board’s decision states, in pertinent part, that the Board “dismisses the Issue 4—SSI
Percentage issue . . . as the issue statement in the RFHs for these cases does not comply with the
specificity requirements under 42 C.F.R. § 405.1835(b) and Board Rule 8.” Ex. 1 at 11. Elsewhere
in the decision, the Board explains that § 405.1835(a)—the provision which lays out the Medicare
statute’s jurisdictional requirements—“describes the right to a Board hearing.” Id. at 6. The Board
explained that, by contrast, § 405.1835(b) describes “the content requirements of a hearing
request.” Id. In determining that Plaintiffs failed to satisfy one of the procedural requirements set
out in § 405.1835(b), rather than a jurisdictional requirement set out in § 405.1835(a), the Board
recognized its authority to dismiss the matters as a proper exercise of its discretion to dismiss an
action on a procedural ground short of deciding its merits. See, e.g., Akron, 414 F. Supp. 3d at 80.
Courts in this District and several Circuits have affirmed various procedural rules by the
Board as a proper exercise of the Board’s authority under the Medicare statute, even when such
rules result in the Board’s dismissal of a provider’s appeal. See, e.g., id. at 83–84 (upholding the
Board’s authority to dismiss issues that were not presented in accordance with the Board’s
procedural rules); Inova Alexandria Hosp. v. Shalala, 244 F.3d 342 (4th Cir. 2001); Kaiser Found.
8 Hosps. v. Sebelius, 649 F.3d 1153 (9th Cir. 2011); High Country Home Health Inc., v. Thompson,
359 F.3d 1307 (10th Cir. 2004).
Plaintiffs’ comparison of the rules at bar to those found by the Supreme Court to be ultra
vires in Bethesda Hospital Association v. Bowen is unavailing. 485 U.S. 399 (1988); see also
Banner Heart Hosp. v. Burwell, 201 F. Supp. 3d 131 (D.D.C. 2016). In Bethesda, the plaintiff
hospitals challenged a regulation that disallowed coverage for certain malpractice insurance costs.
485 U.S. at 401. Based on the regulation, only certain malpractice insurance costs were
reimbursable; as a result, the plaintiff hospitals purposely omitted from their cost reports the costs
that were not covered under the regulation. Id. The plaintiffs later made a timely request for a
hearing before the Board in order to challenge the malpractice regulation and seek reimbursement
for the costs that were not covered under it. Id. at 401–02. The Board in Bethesda, however,
determined that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the plaintiffs’ claims because the plaintiff hospitals
had not included the contested figures on their annual cost reports. Id. at 402. The Board therefore
found that the hospitals could not be “dissatisfied” with the contractor’s determination, as required
for jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 1395oo(a). Id. The Supreme Court held that this reading of an
exhaustion requirement into Congress’s jurisdictional grant was unlawful, as it narrowed the
Board’s jurisdiction, in conflict with the statute. Id. at 408.
Unlike Bethesda, however, the rules that the Board relied on to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Issue 4
claims here do not seek to condition or narrow the three jurisdictional requirements set forth in
42 U.S.C. § 1395oo(a). The relevant regulations and rules at issue are instead best understood as
“claims processing” rules rather than rules that modify the scope of the Board’s jurisdiction. The
Board’s delegated authority includes the power to manage its “substantial backlog of cases” by
“crafting . . . procedural rules” like those at issue here. Rapid City Reg’l Hosp. v. Sebelius, 681
9 F. Supp. 2d 56, 60 (D.D.C. 2010). Because dismissal of a claim or appeal for failure to meet the
procedural rules at issue is not inconsistent with the text or purpose of the Medicare Act, the Board
did not violate the APA by narrowing the scope of its jurisdiction.
B.
Plaintiffs also assert that, “[e]ven under the regulations and rules the agency seeks to
invoke, the Board’s dismissals were improper.” Pls.’ Reply at 5. Plaintiffs argue that their RFH
was sufficient under the regulations because they identified the issue as “Medicare Fraction—SSI
Percentage,” and stated their belief that they were unable to determine the correct reimbursement
calculation. Id. at 5–6. Defendant asserts that Plaintiffs’ broad description of an issue topic that
contains multiple subcomponents clearly fails the specificity requirement. Def.’s Reply in Supp.
of Def.’s Cross-Mot., ECF No. 21 [hereinafter Def.’s Reply], at 8. Defendant posits that Plaintiffs
themselves “effectively concede that their initial description of [Issue 4] did not . . . comply with
Board Rule 8” by failing to address it. Id.
The Board acts reasonably, and not arbitrarily and capriciously, when it applies its “claims-
processing rules faithfully to [a provider’s] appeal.” Akron, 414 F. Supp. 3d at 81. The regulations
require that a RFH provide “[a]n explanation []for each specific item under appeal.” 42 C.F.R.
§ 405.1835(b)(2). The Board rules further explain that “[s]ome issues may have multiple
components,” and that “[t]o comply with the regulatory requirement to specifically identify the
items in dispute, each contested component must be appealed as a separate issue and described as
narrowly as possible.” Board Rules § 8.1. The Board rules also specifically delineate how a
provider should address, as here, a challenge to a Disproportionate Share Hospital reimbursement.
Board Rule 8.2 explains that an appeal challenging a Disproportionate Share Hospital payment
adjustment is a “common example” of an appeal involving issues with “multiple components” that
10 must be appealed as “separate issue[s] and described as narrowly as possible.” Board Rules §§ 8.1,
8.2.
Plaintiffs did not follow these rules. In their RFH, Plaintiffs described Issue 4 simply as
follows: “The intermediary erred by incorrectly calculating the SSI percentage for inclusion in the
‘Medicare Fraction’ for purposes of the calculation of the provider’s [disproportionate share]
payment.” Ex. 1 at 3. This description does not specify which portion of the calculation was
incorrect nor how the fraction should have been calculated differently. Recall, a Disproportionate
Share Hospital reimbursement is determined by calculating a provider’s Medicare-SSI and
Medicaid fractions, which make up the provider’s Disproportionate Patient Percentage. The
Medicare-SSI Fraction alone has multiple component parts that a provider could challenge.
Plaintiffs did not specify which specific portion of the fraction they sought to challenge or what
would have constituted correct data for the Disproportionate Share Hospital calculation. This
provides sufficient basis to support the Board’s dismissal. The Board’s procedural rules empower
the body to dismiss a provider’s appeal when the provider’s RFH or Preliminary Position Paper is
deficient. See 42 C.F.R. § 405.1868(b); Board Rules § 41.2. Because Plaintiffs did not comply
with the specificity requirement, the Board acted reasonably in dismissing their Issue 4 claims.
Finding sufficient record support for the Board’s action, the court could end its inquiry
here. But, for completeness, the court also holds that the Board’s alternate ground for dismissal is
adequately supported by the record.
In addition to finding that Plaintiffs’ RFH lacked the requisite specificity, the Board also
found that “even if [Issue 4] had [met the specificity requirement], [Plaintiff Memorial] effectively
abandoned that issue in its entirety by filing perfunctory preliminary position papers that failed to
11 comply with” the rules governing Preliminary Position Papers. Ex. 1 at 11; Board Rules §§ 25,
25.1, 25.2.
In their Preliminary Position Papers, for Issue 4, Plaintiffs argued that “the intermediary
and/or CMS erred in its calculation of the SSI percentage and its application to this Provider,” and
asserted that the Board had “ruled on this specific issue” in another (subsequently appealed) case,
Baystate Medical Center v. Leavitt, 545 F. Supp. 2d 20 (D.D.C. 2008). Ex. 1 at 3–4. In their Final
Position Papers, however, Plaintiffs delved into a detailed argument about (1) CMS’s
interpretation of the statutory term “entitled to benefits,” and (2) Plaintiffs’ entitlement to data
regarding which patients should count as entitled to both Medicare and SSI benefits for purposes
of the Medicare-SSI fraction. Ex. 1 at 4–5. Plaintiffs then sought EJR on these two issues. The
record supports the Board’s conclusion that—assuming the RFH for Issue 4 was written to
encompass these two arguments about “entitlement” and who should be counted—Plaintiffs
waived the issues in their Preliminary Position Papers for two simple reasons.
First, it is clear that Plaintiffs’ Preliminary Position Papers did not explicitly address the
arguments about the term “entitled to benefits” and about entitlement to data concerning which
individuals should be counted. See Ex. 1 at 4–10. Board Rule 25.1 requires that a provider’s
Preliminary Position Paper “state the material facts that support” each issue raised, “[i]dentify the
controlling authority (e.g., statutes, regulations, policy, or case law) supporting your position,” and
“[p]rovide a conclusion applying the material facts to the controlling authorities.” See Ex. 1 at 8;
Board Rules § 25.1. It is undisputed that nowhere within the Preliminary Position Papers did
Plaintiffs expressly discuss either of these two arguments—nor the material facts which underpin
them, the controlling statutory authority, or a conclusion applying those facts to the statutory
12 authority—despite the Preliminary Position Papers presenting a longer format in which Plaintiffs
are tasked with fleshing out their arguments from the RFH. See Board Rules §§ 25, 25.1.
Second, the only “authority” that Plaintiffs did identify in their Preliminary Position
Papers, Baystate, did not deal with either contested issue. Baystate instead dealt with whether
CMS used the best available data in calculating the Medicare-SSI fractions and did not address the
statutory interpretation or SSI entitlement data issues as to which Plaintiffs sought EJR. 545
F. Supp. 2d 20, 26 (D.D.C. 2008). The Board therefore reasonably found in the alternative that
Plaintiffs had waived the contested issues by failing to address them in their Preliminary Position
Papers.
C.
Plaintiffs also seek mandamus relief, alleging that the Board owed them a “non-
discretionary, ministerial duty to hear [their] properly filed and pending appeals” but “improperly
avoided its duty when it acted contrary to facts and law and unilaterally dismissed [their] properly
filed and pending appeals.” Compl. ¶¶ 67–68.
To obtain mandamus relief, Plaintiffs must show: “(1) a clear and indisputable right to
relief, (2) that the government agency or official is violating a clear duty to act, and (3) that no
adequate alternative remedy exists.” Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, 812 F.3d 183, 189 (D.C. Cir.
2016). Plaintiffs did not move for summary judgment on this claim, see generally Pls.’ Mot., but
Defendant’s cross-motion seeks resolution of the issue in its favor, Def.’s Mem. at 30–31.
Plaintiffs’ request for a writ of mandamus clearly fails on the merits. An adequate
alternative remedy plainly exists: Under the APA, the court is entitled to “compel agency action
unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed” or to “hold unlawful and set aside agency action,
findings, and conclusions found to be . . . arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise
13 not in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(1), (2)(a); see Vietnam Veterans of Am. v. Shinseki,
599 F.3d 654, 659 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“[T]he standards for obtaining relief” under § 706(1) of
the APA and the Mandamus Act are “essentially the same.”); Navajo Nation v. Azar, 302 F. Supp.
3d 429, 436 n.4 (D.D.C. 2018) (“An adequate alternative remedy is available to the [plaintiff]
because the Administrative Procedure Act empowers district courts to ‘compel agency action
unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed.’ 5 U.S.C. § 706(1).”). Because Plaintiffs can
seek—and, indeed, have in this very lawsuit sought—relief under the APA, Plaintiffs’ request for
mandamus relief clearly falls away.
For the foregoing reasons, the court grants Defendant’s Cross-Motion for Summary
Judgment, ECF No. 18, and denies Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 16.
A final, appealable order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
Dated: September 30, 2022 Amit P. Mehta United States District Court Judge