Evangelia Bilalis v. Wallace Drennan and Zurich American Insurance Company

• Court: Supreme Court of Louisiana
• Decided: December 18, 2025
• Docket: 2025-C-00453
• Status: Published

Opinion

FOR IMMEDIATE NEWS RELEASE NEWS RELEASE #056

FROM: CLERK OF SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA

The Opinions handed down on the 18th day of December, 2025 are as follows:

BY Weimer, C.J.:

2025-C-00453 EVANGELIA BILALIS VS. WALLACE DRENNAN AND ZURICH AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY (Parish of Orleans Civil)

Retired Judge Eric R. Harrington appointed Justice ad hoc, sitting for Hughes, J., recused.

THE RULINGS OF THE DISTRICT COURT AND COURT OF APPEAL ARE AFFIRMED. SEE OPINION.

Guidry, J., dissents and assigns reasons. SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA

No. 2025-C-00453

EVANGELIA BILALIS

VS.

WALLACE DRENNAN AND ZURICH AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY

On Writ of Certiorari to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, Parish of Orleans

WEIMER, Chief Justice.1

This court granted writs to determine whether legal interest in a tort case

accrues from the date of judicial demand when a date, other than the date of judicial

demand, appears in the signed judgment. The judgment awarded judicial interest

“from November 17, 2023, the date of judicial demand, until paid[.]” November 17,

2023, was the date of the jury verdict, not the date of judicial demand. This court

finds that inserting the jury verdict date in the judgment in this matter does not

deprive the plaintiff of legal interest from the date of judicial demand. See La. R.S.

13:4203. Consequently, the judgment at issue requires that interest be paid from the

date of judicial demand forward, and we affirm the rulings of the lower courts

enforcing that judgment are affirmed.

1 Retired Judge Eric R. Harrington, justice ad hoc, sitting for Justice Jefferson Hughes, who is recused in this matter. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On December 22, 2020, plaintiff, Evangelia Bilalis, filed a petition for

damages, alleging that she sustained injuries in an accident wherein her vehicle was

rear-ended by a vehicle owned and operated by Wallace Drennan, and insured by

Zurich American Insurance Company. Mr. Drennan and Zurich were named as

defendants. The case proceeded to trial by jury, and on November 17, 2023, the jury

rendered a verdict in favor of Ms. Bilalis, finding Mr. Drennan 100% at fault. As the

prevailing party, counsel for Ms. Bilalis prepared the judgment memorializing the

jury verdict. On December 11, 2023, the trial court signed the judgment, which

contained the following pertinent language:

The jury found that the Plaintiff was injured in the accident and awarded the Plaintiff special damages of $376,871.62 and general damages of $360,000.00, for a combined total of $736,871.62 plus judicial interest thereon from November 17, 2023, the date of judicial demand, until paid; and for all recoverable costs, which will be taxed by a Rule to Show Cause in accordance with La. C.C.P. Article 1920. [Emphasis added.]

The judgment was not appealed.

On January 8, 2024, Defendants issued Ms. Bilalis a check in the amount of

$744,366.51, which included the underlying award of $736,871.62 and $7,494.89 in

judicial interest, as calculated by Defendants for the period of November 17, 2023

through January 9, 2024. The check was cashed. On March 19, 2024, Ms. Bilalis

filed a motion to enforce the judgment and to set a judgment debtor rule. Ms. Bilalis

asserted that the payment of judicial interest had not been fully satisfied, as she was

only paid judicial interest from November 17, 2023, which was the date of the jury

verdict. Rather, she argued that, by operation of law, judicial interest accrued from

date of judicial demand, which was December 22, 2020. She argued she was

2 underpaid $102,578.44 in judicial interest, plus additional interest accruing on that

amount.

In opposition to Ms. Bilalis’s motion, Defendants argued that Ms. Bilalis

drafted the judgment and did not file a motion for new trial to challenge the date

included in the judgment. As all appellate delays have run, the judgment is final and

can no longer be appealed or substantively amended. See La. C.C.P. art. 1951

(governing the procedure allowing a court to “alter the phraseology of the judgment

or to correct deficiencies in the decretal language or errors of calculation” and

providing that “[a] final judgment may not be amended under this Article to change

its substance.”).

On May 21, 2024, the trial court granted the motion to enforce the judgment

and set a judgment debtor rule, finding that the judgment was not satisfied because

the full amount of judicial interest was not paid.

On March 15, 2025, a divided panel of the appellate court rendered an opinion

affirming the trial court judgment. Bilalis v. Drennan, 24-0527 (La.App. 4 Cir.

3/14/25), 414 So.3d 824. The majority, following the appellate court’s past

jurisprudence, held that accrual of interest is not contingent on the plaintiff formally

demanding it in her petition or using specific language in the judgment; rather,

interest operates as a matter of law and attaches automatically in tort cases from the

date of judicial demand. Id., 24-0527 at 4, 414 So.3d at 827. The majority reasoned

that December 22, 2020, is the date of judicial demand, and November 17, 2023, is

the date of the jury verdict, not the date of judicial demand. Id. The majority also

found that the reference to the November date was a drafting error. Id., 24-0527 at

8, 414 So.3d at 829. Nevertheless, the majority held that enforcing judicial interest

from the date of judicial demand did not amount to a substantive amendment, as the

3 ruling did not alter any substantive rights and merely ensured the judgment aligned

with the relief automatically provided by law. Id.

Judge Atkins separately concurred, emphasizing the mandatory nature of

judicial interest and finding Ms. Bilalis entitled to interest retroactive to the date she

filed her petition for damages, by operation of law, regardless of the judgment’s

language. Bilalis, 24-0527 at 1, 414 So.3d at 830-31 (Atkins, J., concurring). The

concurrence criticized Defendants’ argument, seeking to “phrase the issue as whether

the trial court erred by making a substantive change to a final judgment[,]” as “an

attempt to take advantage of a mistake” in the trial judgment. Id., 24-0527 at 7, 414

So.3d at 834.

Judge Ledet, joined by Judge Herman, dissented, agreeing with Defendants that

the lower court’s ruling amounted to a substantive amendment of a final judgment.

Bilalis, 24-0527 at 1, 414 So.3d at 830 (Ledet, J., dissenting). The dissent recognized

other appellate jurisprudence holding that amending a final judgment to add interest

is an impermissible substantive change. Id., 24-0527 at 2, 414 So.3d at 830.

Upon Defendants’ application, certiorari was granted to review the correctness

of the rulings below. Bilalis v. Drennan, 25-00453 (La. 7/3/25), 414 So.3d 485.

DISCUSSION

Pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 1921, “[t]he court shall award interest in the

judgment as prayed for or as provided by law.” Interest “as provided by law”

encompasses judicial interest in tort cases. La. C.C.P. art. 1921, cmt. (a); see Smith

v. Quarles Drilling Co., 04-0179, p. 5 (La. 10/29/04), 885 So.2d 562, 566.

Prejudgment judicial interest in tort claims is provided under La. R.S. 13:4203:

Legal interest shall attach from date of judicial demand, on all judgments, sounding in damages, “ex delicto”, which may be rendered by any of the courts.

4 The word “shall” in La. R.S. 13:4203 and La. C.C.P. art. 1921 is mandatory.

See La. R.S. 1:3 (“[t]he word ‘shall’ is mandatory and the word ‘may’ is permissive”).

Under well-established rules of interpretation, the word “shall” excludes the

possibility of being “optional” or even subject to “discretion,” but instead “shall”

means “imperative, of similar effect and import with the word ‘must.’” Louisiana

Fed’n of Tchrs. v. State, 13-0120, p. 26 (La. 5/7/13), 118 So.3d 1033, 1051. As this

court has stated, “an award of judicial interest is not discretionary, insofar as it

attaches automatically until the judgment is paid, whether prayed for in the petition

or mentioned in the judgment.” Oliver v. Magnolia Clinic, 11-2132, p. 14 (La.

3/13/12), 85 So.3d 39, 49; see also Smith, 04-0179 at 5, 885 So.2d at 566, n.6.

In tort actions, the operative date when legal interest attaches is the date of

judicial demand. La. R.S. 13:4203. A judicial demand “is commenced by the filing

of a pleading presenting the demand to a court of competent jurisdiction.” La. C.C.P.

art. 421. The date of judicial demand is “the day on which a party files a demand or

claim for relief,” or put another way, “the date of plaintiff’s first judicial claim against

all parties responsible for a single tortious occurrence.” Burton v. Foret, 498 So.2d

706, 711-12 (La. 1986).

The judgment awarded judicial interest “from November 17, 2023, the date of

judicial demand, until paid[.]” The judgment contains one specified date: November

17, 2023, and references the date of judicial demand. The record lacks any indication

that the inclusion of the November date in the judgment was anything more than a

mere scribe error. The date of judicial demand is December 22, 2020, when Ms.

Bilalis filed the petition for damages.

5 Nevertheless, Defendants contend that imposing legal interest from December

22, 2020, amends the substance of a final judgment, in violation of La. C.C.P. art.

1951, which states:

On motion of the court or any party, a final judgment may be amended at any time to alter the phraseology of the judgment or to correct deficiencies in the decretal language or errors of calculation. The judgment may be amended only after a hearing with notice to all parties, except that a hearing is not required if all parties consent or if the court or the party submitting the amended judgment certifies that it was provided to all parties at least five days before the amendment and that no opposition has been received. A final judgment may not be amended under this Article to change its substance.

Defendants argue that changing the amount of interest due is an impermissible

substantive amendment to the judgment and does not merely alter the judgment’s

phraseology. They argue that Article 1951 allows amendment only “where the

amendment takes nothing from or adds nothing to the original judgment.” See

Villaume v. Villaume, 363 So.2d 448, 450 (La. 1978).

Defendants urge the court to follow certain appellate decisions overturning

amendments to a judgment that reflected the imposition of legal interest. In Suprun

v. Louisiana Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 09-1555, p. 4 (La.App. 1 Cir. 4/30/10),

40 So.3d 261, 264, the judgment rendered after trial awarded judicial interest “from

the date of judicial demand until October 30, 2006,” with the October date

corresponding to an insurer’s offer of judgment. Ruling on the plaintiff’s motion for

costs and to assess additional interest, the lower court rendered an amended judgment

“to correctly show that judicial interest on the Judgment is due from the date of

judicial demand until … paid, instead of limiting judicial interest until October 30,

2006[.]” The appellate court vacated this portion of the amended judgment,

reasoning that a change to the end date of legal interest was a substantive amendment

violating La. C.C.P. art. 1951.

6 Defendants also cite to Richman v. Travelers Indem. Co., 24-258, p. 8

(La.App. 3 Cir. 12/30/24), 412 So.3d 992, 998, which relied on Suprun in reversing

rulings that granted leave to file a fifth supplemental and amending petition seeking

an award of interest on costs previously awarded, and subsequently, granted an award

of interest on those costs from the date of judicial demand.

This court finds both cases distinguishable from the matter before it. In

Suprun, the judgment specified an end date to interest and did not examine the date

on which interest began to run under the mandatory language of La. R.S. 13:4203.

The judgment in this matter differs considerably as its language includes both a date

from which interest accrues and “from the date of judicial demand.” In Richman,

premised on Suprun, the nature of the interest sought was not automatic and imposed

by operation of law.

This court is also unpersuaded by Defendants’ suggestion that the magnitude

of legal interest in dispute, over $100,000, is a substantive change. The amount of

interest owed does not change the fact that this matter involves a scribe error. A

substantive amendment changes the judgment’s outcome irrespective of the amount

at issue.

The record reveals that no motion to amend the judgment was before the trial

court. The trial court did not delete any phrase from the judgment and did not add

judicial interest to the judgment. Ms. Bilalis asserts that she did not seek an

amendment to the judgment. Instead, she seeks to collect what is legally owed under

La. R.S. 13:4203, which is judicial interest by operation of law. Ms. Bilalis argues

that the only way to interpret the judgment in the manner Defendants do is to add or

subtract language to specify that interest is “only” due from November 17, 2023. As

the appellate court majority indicates, interpreting the judgment’s reference to

7 November 17, 2023 to override the date of judicial demand would render the

judgment internally inconsistent and contradictory with La. R.S. 13:4203.

This court agrees with the assessment of Judge Atkins, as expressed in her

concurring opinion, criticizing Defendants’ position–in framing the issue as a

substantive change to a final judgment–as taking advantage of a mistake in the trial

judgment. As the concurrence posited, had the judgment mistakenly found interest

to accrue at an earlier date than the date of judicial demand, Defendants likely would

have argued as Ms. Bilalis did, that judicial interest accrued from the date of judicial

demand by operation of law.

Accordingly, this court finds no merit in the argument that any substantive

amendment of the trial judgment occurred and rejects the argument that enforcing the

payment of interest mandated by La. R.S. 13:4203 requires a substantive amendment

of the trial judgment. The judgment’s reference to November 17, 2023–which is

undeniably not the date of judicial demand–has no substantive effect on the amount

of interest owed because Ms. Bilalis is entitled, by operation of law, to legal interest

from the date of her petition.

The statutory award of legal interest under Section 4203 “is designed to

compensate a plaintiff for his loss of the use of money to which he is entitled, the use

of which defendant had during the pendency of the litigation.” Hall v. Brookshire

Bros., 02-2404, p. 24 (La. 6/27/03), 848 So.2d 559, 574, n.7. As Judge Atkins

pointed out in her concurring opinion, La. R.S. 13:4203 represents an exception to

the general rule under La. C.C. art. 1938 that legal interest runs from due date of the

obligation. See Am. Cyanamid Co. v. Elec. Indus., Inc., 630 F.2d 1123, 1129 (5th

Cir. 1980). As this court has long stated, “[t]he recovery of legal interest on the

8 judgment from the date of judicial demand is therefore a matter of absolute right.”

Caldwell v. City of Shreveport, 150 La. 465, 470, 90 So. 763, 764 (1922).

Moreover, of the dates referenced in the judgment–the date of judicial demand

and November 17, 2023–the lesser includes the greater. Stated another way,

November 17, 2023, is contained within the period between the date of judicial

demand until paid. It follows that judicial interest accrues from the date of judicial

demand and continues to run from November 17, 2023, and from all dates that follow

until paid. Ms. Bilalis has not sought to, and is not entitled to, collect two separate

amounts of interest, only interest from the date of judicial demand until paid, which

includes the date of the jury verdict and the judgment.

The bracketed phrase “from November 17, 2023, the date of judicial demand,”

does not require the court to choose between two dates, and there is no justification

for choosing the date that is not supported by the law. Defendants’ reading of the

judgment would have us pretend that November 17, 2023, is the date of judicial

demand, even though the parties acknowledge this is not so. Construing the judgment

as requiring interest only from November 17, 2023, thus truncating the interest award

where the statute mandates otherwise, would produce an absurd result. Conversely,

the construction favored by the lower courts produces no absurd result; it merely

implements what the law requires.

Considering the automatic attachment of judicial interest by operation of

statute, the inartful drafting of the judgment cannot overcome the mandatory nature

of La. R.S. 13:4203. The inclusion of an extraneous date, even through a scribe error,

does not create an exception to the mandatory imposition of interest from the date of

judicial demand.

9 CONCLUSION

For the above discussed reasons, this court holds that granting the motion to

enforce the judgment and set a judgment debtor rule did not add to, subtract from, or

in any way affect the substance of the trial judgment. The trial court correctly applied

the mandatory provisions of La. R.S. 13:4203, which requires that judicial interest on

a judgment awarding tort damages attaches from the date of judicial demand until

paid. The presence of the November date in the trial judgment did not override the

statutory date of judicial demand by limiting judicial interest to an abbreviated period.

The trial judgment, enforced as written, requires that judicial interest runs from the

filing of the petition for damages on December 22, 2020 until paid.

THE RULINGS OF THE DISTRICT COURT AND COURT OF APPEAL

ARE AFFIRMED.

10 SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA

On Writ of Certiorari to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, Parish of Orleans Civil

GUIDRY, J., dissents and assigns reasons.

I respectfully disagree with the majority’s decision, which gives no effect to

the specific language of the final judgment at issue. The December 11, 2023

judgment that plaintiff seeks to enforce states:

The jury found that the Plaintiff was injured in the accident and awarded the Plaintiff special damages of $376,871.62 and general damages of $360,000.00, for a combined total of $736,871.62 plus judicial interest thereon from November 17, 2023, the date of judicial demand, until paid;” [Emphasis added.]

It is undisputed that the December 11, 2023 judgment is a final judgment, as

all appeal delays have expired. See La. C.C.P. arts. 2088 and 2123. A plain reading

of the judgment refers to the date of judicial demand as November 17, 2023. The

majority, however, reads out reference to the November 17, 2023 date, finding that

the date of judicial demand is set by statute as the date on which a party files a claim

for relief, which in this case was December 22, 2020. See La. C.C.P. art. 421.

The judgment in the instant case clearly decreed, albeit erroneously, the date

of judicial demand as November 17, 2023. Plaintiff’s counsel drafted the judgment,

and plaintiff failed to file a motion for new trial or motion for appeal to correct the

error. It was not until after the judgment became final and defendants paid judicial

interest from the November 17, 2023 date that plaintiff filed the instant motion to

enforce judgment and set judgment debtor rule. By granting plaintiff’s motion, the trial court did more than simply enforce the judgment; rather, it amended the

December 11, 2023 judgment by reading out the specific reference to November 17,

2023, as the date of judicial demand and increasing the amount of legal interest that

plaintiff was entitled to recover from defendants pursuant to the express language of

the judgment. The majority likewise ignores the November 17, 2023 date, finding it

to be a scribe error, and in so doing, essentially reasons that the language of the

judgment is immaterial, as the date upon which judicial interest attaches is

established by law. However, the language of a valid, final judgment must be given

effect. In the instant case, the judgment awarding interest was drafted by plaintiff,

was not appealed, and became a final judgment. The language specifically references

November 17, 2023, as the date of judicial demand, and plaintiff is bound by the

language of the judgment. As such, I disagree with the majority’s decision affirming

the lower court’s finding that the December 11, 2023 judgment, as written, requires

that judicial interest run from the filing of the petition for damages on December 22,

2020, until paid and affirming the lower court’s granting of plaintiff’s motion to

enforce judgment and set judgment debtor rule.