1 Dec 16, 2025 2 SEAN F. MCAVOY, CLERK 3 4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 8 9 EVALYN LEWIS, No. 2:25-CV-00087-SAB 10 Plaintiff, 11 v. 12 PAUL LAURENCE LAW PLLC, and ORDER GRANTING 13 PAUL CALABRO, DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR 14 Defendants. SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN 15 PART 16 17 Before the Court is Defendants’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, ECF 18 No. 15. Plaintiff is represented by Gregory W. Albert. Defendants are represented 19 by Jeffrey T. Kestle. The motion was considered without oral argument. 20 Background 21 Defendant Paul Calabro (Defendant) is the owner of Paul Lawrence Law, 22 PLLC. Plaintiff hired Defendant in connection with the potential recovery of assets 23 from Plaintiff’s late brother’s estate and/or trust. Fourteen months after the 24 representation ended, Plaintiff filed an action against Defendant in the Spokane 25 County Superior Court to resolve an alleged attorney’s lien and Defendant filed 26 compulsory counterclaims for specific performance and breach of contract. The 27 court rejected Plaintiff’s petition as Defendant never asserted or filed a lien, and it 28 later dismissed Defendant’s counterclaims on summary judgment. Plaintiff then 1 filed this lawsuit. 2 Defendant has moved for summary judgment on certain claims, asserting 3 that Plaintiff fails to allege sufficient facts for those claims. The claims at issue are 4 legal malpractice and breach of fiduciary duties claims related to Defendant’s 5 conduct after August 12, 2022, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, elder 6 abuse, and outrage. Plaintiff has agreed to dismiss her claim of malicious 7 prosecution. 8 Motion Standard 9 Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no 10 genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a 11 matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). There is no genuine issue for trial unless 12 there is sufficient evidence favoring the non-moving party for a jury to return a 13 verdict in that party’s favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 14 (1986). The moving party has the initial burden of showing the absence of a 15 genuine issue of fact for trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). 16 If the moving party meets its initial burden, the non-moving party must go beyond 17 the pleadings and “set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for 18 trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. 19 In addition to showing there are no questions of material fact, the moving 20 party must also show it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Smith v. Univ. of 21 Wash. Law Sch., 233 F.3d 1188, 1193 (9th Cir. 2000). The moving party is entitled 22 to judgment as a matter of law when the non-moving party fails to make a 23 sufficient showing on an essential element of a claim on which the non-moving 24 party has the burden of proof. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. The non-moving party 25 cannot rely on conclusory allegations alone to create an issue of material fact. 26 Hansen v. United States, 7 F.3d 137, 138 (9th Cir. 1993). 27 When considering a motion for summary judgment, a court may neither 28 weigh the evidence nor assess credibility; instead, “the evidence of the non-movant 1 is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” 2 Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. 3 Factual Allegations 4 In 2011, Plaintiff’s mother passed away, leaving a trust which left a large 5 house in California to Plaintiff’s brother. Shortly after her mother’s passing, 6 Plaintiff hired Defendant to review her mother’s trust document. Defendant 7 charged a flat fee of $500 for those services and told Plaintiff to call him when her 8 brother passed away so they could discuss her inheritance of the house. In 2022, 9 Plaintiff’s brother passed away, leaving a trust which assigned the residue of the 10 trust in equal shares to Plaintiff and her sister. Plaintiff contacted Defendant about 11 her brother’s passing, and the following day, Defendant arrived at Plaintiff’s home, 12 unannounced, with a contingency fee agreement. 13 The fee agreement stated Defendant typically charges an hourly rate of 14 $350.00. However, it also included language referring to a contingency fee 15 arrangement where Plaintiff would pay Defendant one-third of the gross amount 16 recovered from the trust/estate. The agreement indicated whichever amount was 17 greater between the hourly or contingent fees would be what was owed. 18 Plaintiff asserts she did not understand that the agreement would allow for 19 Defendant to receive a percentage of her inheritance and she trusted Defendant as 20 he had worked for her previously and she assumed he would be fair and honest 21 with her. Plaintiff signed the fee agreement. Soon after, Defendant allegedly began 22 harassing Plaintiff’s family with phone calls and letters, leaving long voicemail 23 messages, asserting the trustee of her brother’s trust was not actually the trustee, 24 demanding production of trust documents, and telling Plaintiff that her family was 25 taking advantage of her. On August 1, 2022, Defendant received the trust 26 document, which entitled Plaintiff to nearly half the estate, including a house worth 27 approximately $2 million. 28 On August 12, 2022, Defendant arrived at Plaintiff’s house unannounced 1 and asked her to sign a document without explaining its contents. The document 2 authorized Defendant to receive all of Plaintiff’s trust distributions to his trust 3 account before distribution to her. 4 On August 15, 2022, Defendant sent a letter to the firm responsible for 5 administration of the trust, requesting Plaintiff’s money be deposited directly into 6 his trust account. On April 17, 2023, Defendant emailed Plaintiff indicating that 7 the house in the trust had been sold, and he would like to talk with her about the 8 distribution. On May 25, 2023, Plaintiff sent a letter to Defendant explicitly 9 requesting documentation of his billable hours. On June 6, 2023, Defendant 10 responded, telling Plaintiff that her family members who were advising her not to 11 pay him a contingency fee were committing “crimes against the elderly” and 12 repeatedly invoked his role as a trusted advisor. He further highlighted the stress 13 she would endure by having to litigate against him. 14 Plaintiff later contacted Defendant and informed him she had not received a 15 disbursement from the trust yet. Defendant responded on June 14, 2023, telling her 16 to trust him and to not worry about the fees. On July 27, 2023, Plaintiff again 17 contacted Defendant to get documentation of his billable hours. Defendant wrote 18 back, telling Plaintiff to “stop worrying about how much you owe me and just send 19 me the documents for my file… Trust me Evy, I am in no rush to force you to 20 Court on this matter right now.” Defendant allegedly threatened to spend “many 21 months and years” burdening her with his claims. 22 Without an independent understanding of the law, Plaintiff asserts she 23 thought Defendant still represented her as an attorney and she did not know how to 24 terminate an attorney-client relationship nor that she had the power to do so. 25 Defendant now asserts the attorney-client relationship was severed verbally by 26 Plaintiff on August 12, 2022, as she decided she no longer needed his services as 27 the trust was not contestable.
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1 Dec 16, 2025 2 SEAN F. MCAVOY, CLERK 3 4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 8 9 EVALYN LEWIS, No. 2:25-CV-00087-SAB 10 Plaintiff, 11 v. 12 PAUL LAURENCE LAW PLLC, and ORDER GRANTING 13 PAUL CALABRO, DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR 14 Defendants. SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN 15 PART 16 17 Before the Court is Defendants’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, ECF 18 No. 15. Plaintiff is represented by Gregory W. Albert. Defendants are represented 19 by Jeffrey T. Kestle. The motion was considered without oral argument. 20 Background 21 Defendant Paul Calabro (Defendant) is the owner of Paul Lawrence Law, 22 PLLC. Plaintiff hired Defendant in connection with the potential recovery of assets 23 from Plaintiff’s late brother’s estate and/or trust. Fourteen months after the 24 representation ended, Plaintiff filed an action against Defendant in the Spokane 25 County Superior Court to resolve an alleged attorney’s lien and Defendant filed 26 compulsory counterclaims for specific performance and breach of contract. The 27 court rejected Plaintiff’s petition as Defendant never asserted or filed a lien, and it 28 later dismissed Defendant’s counterclaims on summary judgment. Plaintiff then 1 filed this lawsuit. 2 Defendant has moved for summary judgment on certain claims, asserting 3 that Plaintiff fails to allege sufficient facts for those claims. The claims at issue are 4 legal malpractice and breach of fiduciary duties claims related to Defendant’s 5 conduct after August 12, 2022, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, elder 6 abuse, and outrage. Plaintiff has agreed to dismiss her claim of malicious 7 prosecution. 8 Motion Standard 9 Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no 10 genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a 11 matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). There is no genuine issue for trial unless 12 there is sufficient evidence favoring the non-moving party for a jury to return a 13 verdict in that party’s favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 14 (1986). The moving party has the initial burden of showing the absence of a 15 genuine issue of fact for trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). 16 If the moving party meets its initial burden, the non-moving party must go beyond 17 the pleadings and “set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for 18 trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. 19 In addition to showing there are no questions of material fact, the moving 20 party must also show it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Smith v. Univ. of 21 Wash. Law Sch., 233 F.3d 1188, 1193 (9th Cir. 2000). The moving party is entitled 22 to judgment as a matter of law when the non-moving party fails to make a 23 sufficient showing on an essential element of a claim on which the non-moving 24 party has the burden of proof. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. The non-moving party 25 cannot rely on conclusory allegations alone to create an issue of material fact. 26 Hansen v. United States, 7 F.3d 137, 138 (9th Cir. 1993). 27 When considering a motion for summary judgment, a court may neither 28 weigh the evidence nor assess credibility; instead, “the evidence of the non-movant 1 is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” 2 Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. 3 Factual Allegations 4 In 2011, Plaintiff’s mother passed away, leaving a trust which left a large 5 house in California to Plaintiff’s brother. Shortly after her mother’s passing, 6 Plaintiff hired Defendant to review her mother’s trust document. Defendant 7 charged a flat fee of $500 for those services and told Plaintiff to call him when her 8 brother passed away so they could discuss her inheritance of the house. In 2022, 9 Plaintiff’s brother passed away, leaving a trust which assigned the residue of the 10 trust in equal shares to Plaintiff and her sister. Plaintiff contacted Defendant about 11 her brother’s passing, and the following day, Defendant arrived at Plaintiff’s home, 12 unannounced, with a contingency fee agreement. 13 The fee agreement stated Defendant typically charges an hourly rate of 14 $350.00. However, it also included language referring to a contingency fee 15 arrangement where Plaintiff would pay Defendant one-third of the gross amount 16 recovered from the trust/estate. The agreement indicated whichever amount was 17 greater between the hourly or contingent fees would be what was owed. 18 Plaintiff asserts she did not understand that the agreement would allow for 19 Defendant to receive a percentage of her inheritance and she trusted Defendant as 20 he had worked for her previously and she assumed he would be fair and honest 21 with her. Plaintiff signed the fee agreement. Soon after, Defendant allegedly began 22 harassing Plaintiff’s family with phone calls and letters, leaving long voicemail 23 messages, asserting the trustee of her brother’s trust was not actually the trustee, 24 demanding production of trust documents, and telling Plaintiff that her family was 25 taking advantage of her. On August 1, 2022, Defendant received the trust 26 document, which entitled Plaintiff to nearly half the estate, including a house worth 27 approximately $2 million. 28 On August 12, 2022, Defendant arrived at Plaintiff’s house unannounced 1 and asked her to sign a document without explaining its contents. The document 2 authorized Defendant to receive all of Plaintiff’s trust distributions to his trust 3 account before distribution to her. 4 On August 15, 2022, Defendant sent a letter to the firm responsible for 5 administration of the trust, requesting Plaintiff’s money be deposited directly into 6 his trust account. On April 17, 2023, Defendant emailed Plaintiff indicating that 7 the house in the trust had been sold, and he would like to talk with her about the 8 distribution. On May 25, 2023, Plaintiff sent a letter to Defendant explicitly 9 requesting documentation of his billable hours. On June 6, 2023, Defendant 10 responded, telling Plaintiff that her family members who were advising her not to 11 pay him a contingency fee were committing “crimes against the elderly” and 12 repeatedly invoked his role as a trusted advisor. He further highlighted the stress 13 she would endure by having to litigate against him. 14 Plaintiff later contacted Defendant and informed him she had not received a 15 disbursement from the trust yet. Defendant responded on June 14, 2023, telling her 16 to trust him and to not worry about the fees. On July 27, 2023, Plaintiff again 17 contacted Defendant to get documentation of his billable hours. Defendant wrote 18 back, telling Plaintiff to “stop worrying about how much you owe me and just send 19 me the documents for my file… Trust me Evy, I am in no rush to force you to 20 Court on this matter right now.” Defendant allegedly threatened to spend “many 21 months and years” burdening her with his claims. 22 Without an independent understanding of the law, Plaintiff asserts she 23 thought Defendant still represented her as an attorney and she did not know how to 24 terminate an attorney-client relationship nor that she had the power to do so. 25 Defendant now asserts the attorney-client relationship was severed verbally by 26 Plaintiff on August 12, 2022, as she decided she no longer needed his services as 27 the trust was not contestable. 28 Under the impression that Defendant would seek to put a lien on her 1 inheritance, Plaintiff sequestered her distribution. On October 31, 2023, she filed a 2 petition in Washington State Superior Court for Spokane County to resolve 3 Defendant’s fees through an RCW 60.40.030 summary proceeding. Defendant 4 responded with counterclaims. Plaintiff claims Defendant complicated proceedings 5 further by violating procedural rules, filing frivolous motions, scheduling and 6 cancelling hearings without informing Plaintiff’s counsel, and falsely claiming he 7 was unavailable for hearings for months at a time. The court ultimately determined 8 Defendant was not entitled to a contingency fee related to Plaintiff’s trust 9 distribution and reduced his fee to quantum meruit. The claim for quantum meruit 10 was eventually dismissed as Defendant failed to provide any documentation from 11 which billable hours could be discerned. 12 At that point, Plaintiff and her counsel moved for sanctions with the court 13 and disciplinary action with the Washington State Bar Association. Neither the 14 court in the underlying case nor the Office of Disciplinary Counsel and 15 Disciplinary Board Review Committee found Defendant’s behavior to warrant 16 imposition of sanctions or other penalties. 17 Plaintiff brought this action in the Eastern District of Washington, asserting 18 six causes of action: (1) Legal Malpractice (Negligence); (2) Breach of Fiduciary 19 Duty; (3) Malicious Prosecution; (4) Abuse of Process; (5) Elder Abuse; and (6) 20 Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress. She asserts the Court has jurisdiction 21 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2). 22 Plaintiff asserts she has suffered emotional distress over these events and has 23 suffered monetary damages due to paying for underlying adjudication which was 24 dragged on by Defendant’s actions. 25 Legal Framework 26 1. Legal Malpractice and Breach of Fiduciary Duty 27 To establish a claim for legal malpractice, a plaintiff must prove: (1) the 28 existence of an attorney-client relationship which gives rise to a duty of care on the 1 part of the attorney to the client; (2) an act or omission by the attorney in breach of 2 the duty of care; (3) damages to the client; and (4) proximate causation between 3 the attorney’s breach of the duty and the damage incurred. Hizey v. Carpenter, 119 4 Wash.2d 251, 260-61 (1992). 5 Summary judgment on the existence of an attorney-client relationship is 6 only proper “if reasonable minds could reach but one conclusion on it.” Bohn v. 7 Cody, 119 Wash.2d 357, 363 (1992). The “essence” is “whether the attorney’s 8 advice or assistance is sought and received on legal matters.” Id. An attorney-client 9 relationship, “need not be formalized in a written contract” but rather “may be 10 implied from the parties’ conduct.” Id. While the existence of the relationship can 11 turn on the client’s subjective belief, the subjective belief does not control the issue 12 unless it “is reasonably formed based on the attending circumstances, including the 13 attorney’s words or actions.” Dietz v. Doe, 131 Wash.2d 835, 843 (1997). 14 An attorney’s duty of care to their client requires them to exercise a “degree 15 of care, skill, diligence and knowledge commonly possessed and exercised by a 16 reasonable, careful and prudent lawyer in the practice of law” in the relevant 17 jurisdiction. Cook, Flanagan and Berst v. Clausing, 73 Wash.2d 393, 395 (1968). 18 In legal malpractice actions, courts are hesitant to award damages based 19 purely on emotional distress. Schmidt v. Coogan, 181 Wash.2d 661, 671 (2014). 20 However, when the attorney’s conduct is particularly egregious or significant 21 emotional distress is foreseeable from the sensitive nature of the representation, 22 plaintiffs can recover for pure emotional distress. Id. It is necessary for a plaintiff’s 23 damages to be reasonably within the scope of foreseeable harm given the 24 circumstances. Id. 25 2. Abuse of Process 26 Abuse of process occurs when an individual uses the judicial system’s 27 process to achieve inappropriate ends rather than what the process is intended to 28 achieve. Gem Trading Co. v. Cudahy Corp., 92 Wash.2d 956, 963 n.2 (1979). The 1 essential elements of abuse of process are (1) the existence of an ulterior purpose 2 to accomplish an object not within the proper scope of the process, and (2) an act 3 in the use of legal process not proper in the regular prosecution of the proceedings. 4 Batten v. Abrams, 28 Wash.App. 737, 745 (1981). The use of a process that is not 5 proper “usually takes the form of coercion to obtain a collateral advantage, not 6 properly involved in the proceeding itself.” Id. Additionally, the ulterior motive 7 “may be inferred from what is said or done about the process.” Id. 8 3. Elder Abuse 9 Under Wash. Rev. Code § 74.34.200, a vulnerable adult has a “cause of 10 action for damages” when the vulnerable adult has been subject to “abuse” and 11 “financial exploitation,” while residing in a facility or residing at home who 12 receives care from “a home health” agency, a “home care agency,” or an 13 “individual provider.” Wash. Rev. Code § 74.34.200 (1). The language of the 14 statute specifically states “[t]his action shall be available where the defendant is or 15 was a corporation, trust, unincorporated association, partnership, administrator, 16 employee, agent, officer, partner, or director of a facility, or of a home health, 17 hospice, or home care agency licensed or required to be licensed under chapter 18 70.127 RCW… or an individual provider.” Id. (emphasis added). This cause of 19 action is limited to a specific category of defendants and is intended to be available 20 for plaintiffs who experience abuse while being cared for by the individual or 21 entity licensed to provide said care. Turner v. Washington State Dep't of Soc. & 22 Health Servs., 198 Wash.2d 273, 301 (2021). 23 4. Tort of Outrage/Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress 24 To prevail on a claim for the tort of outrage, a plaintiff must prove the 25 following: (1) that the defendant engaged in extreme and outrageous conduct, (2) 26 the defendant intentionally or recklessly inflicted emotional distress on the 27 plaintiff, and (3) the conduct actually resulted in severe emotional distress to the 28 plaintiff. Kleopfel v. Bokor, 149 Wash.2d 192, 195-96 (2003). 1 Defendant’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 2 Defendant argues the Court should dismiss Plaintiff’s legal malpractice and 3 breach of fiduciary duty claims for behavior after August 12, 2022, as Plaintiff 4 allegedly terminated the attorney-client relationship on that date. 5 He asserts there is no evidence to show that he had an ulterior purpose 6 regarding his choices and actions nor that he engaged in improper acts 7 during the underlying litigation to support Plaintiff’s claim for abuse of process. 8 Defendant argues Plaintiff lacks standing to bring a claim for elder abuse, as 9 the underlying statute requires a claimant to either reside in an adult care facility or 10 receive at-home care. Further, Defendant is not a party against which a claim under 11 this provision can be maintained, as Defendant is not an “individual provider” nor 12 is he licensed or required to be licensed within the meaning of the provision. Wash. 13 Rev. Code § 74.34.020(10), 70.127. 14 Finally, Defendant argues Plaintiff’s claims for outrage/intentional infliction 15 of emotional distress should be dismissed as neither the court in the underlying 16 case nor the Office of Disciplinary Counsel and Disciplinary Board Review 17 Committee concluded that Defendants’ conduct warranted sanctions or other 18 penalties. Further, Defendant asserts there is no evidence that Plaintiff suffered 19 severe emotional distress because of Defendants’ conduct. 20 Analysis 21 1. Plaintiff’s Legal Malpractice and Breach of Fiduciary Duty Claims 22 a. Existence of an attorney-client relationship 23 Defendant continued to contact Plaintiff and other relevant parties after 24 August 12, 2022, regarding disbursements from the trust account and other matters 25 related to the representation. Plaintiff asserts she believed the relationship 26 continued to exist past this date, as she did not know how to sever the relationship, 27 nor that she had the power to do so. Plaintiff’s subjective belief cannot be the only 28 assertion relied upon. However, Defendant continued to contact Plaintiff, 1 providing advice and instruction regarding the trust disbursements after August 12, 2 2022. As such, a reasonable jury could find that an attorney-client relationship 3 could have existed past that date. 4 b. Breach of duty of care 5 Defendant threatened to drag Plaintiff through litigation on several occasions 6 after August 12, 2022, and repeatedly told Plaintiff to trust him rather than 7 addressing her concerns. As such, a reasonable jury could find that these actions 8 amount to a breach of the typical standard of care for attorneys in this jurisdiction. 9 c. Damages 10 Given Defendant’s conduct within the relevant timeframe, Plaintiff’s age 11 and physical condition, and the position of trust and authority that Defendant held, 12 it is possible that a factfinder could determine that Plaintiff is entitled to damages 13 for emotional distress. 14 d. Proximate causation between breach of duty and damages 15 Defendant harassed Plaintiff’s family members, repeatedly threatened to 16 take Plaintiff to court, failed to address Plaintiff’s concerns. As a result, Plaintiff 17 alleges that she has experienced extreme distress. As such, a reasonable jury could 18 find that a causal connection can be drawn between Plaintiff’s emotional distress 19 and Defendant’s conduct. 20 e. Conclusion 21 Based on the record before the court, a reasonable jury could find for 22 Plaintiff on her claims of legal malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty after 23 August 12, 2022. As such, Defendant’s request for summary judgment as to this 24 claim is denied. 25 2. Plaintiff’s Abuse of Process Claim 26 Defendant told Plaintiff he would drag her through “many months and 27 years” of litigation, repeatedly stating she had no chance of prevailing against him 28 and engaged in behavior during litigation that Plaintiff asserts had no purpose other 1 than to delay and frustrate. 2 Although Plaintiff initiated the underlying summary adjudication and 3 Defendant’s filing of his counterclaims was compulsory, a reasonable jury could 4 find that Defendant’s actions throughout that process were undertaken to disrupt 5 the legal process, drag out litigation, and cause undue delay and frustration. As 6 such, Defendant’s request for summary judgment as to this claim is denied. 7 3. Plaintiff’s Elder Abuse Claim 8 Defendant is not a care provider within the context of the statute. As such, 9 Plaintiff cannot recover against Defendant under this specific cause of action, and 10 Defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to this claim is granted. 11 4. Plaintiff’s Outrage Claim 12 Defendant cites no authority which limits this Court’s discretion to 13 determine whether conduct is sufficiently outrageous to justify relief under this 14 claim. Neither the decision of the court in the underlying adjudication nor the 15 determination of the Washington State Bar Association are determinative here. 16 Instead, a reasonable jury could determine that Defendant’s conduct was 17 outrageous enough to justify recovery. As such, Defendant’s request for summary 18 judgment as to this claim is denied. 19 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 20 1. Defendant’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, ECF No. 15, is 21 GRANTED in part. 22 a. Plaintiff’s Elder Abuse claim is DISMISSED. 23 b. Pursuant to Plaintiff’s stipulation, Plaintiff’s Claim of 24 Malicious Prosecution is DISMISSED. 25 // 26 // 27 // 28 // 1 C. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment as to all other claims is DENIED. 3 IT IS SO ORDERED. The District Court Clerk is hereby directed to file this Order and provide copies to counsel. 5 DATED this 16th day of December 2025.
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